A SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE POSITIVE TRANSFER OF L1 STRUCTURE IN
SECOND LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

Rachael P. Caunce

MALING Thesis
For
Ling 698 MALING Thesis I, II, III

Presented to Dr. William Acton at the Canada Institute of Linguistics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Masters in Linguistics
August 30th, 2013

Abstract
Until recently, the field of second language pedagogy has focused disproportionately on the
impact of negative transfer in language learning. This, in part, has led to methodologies that
attempt to limit students’ use of their first language (L1), positioning many to feel ineffective and
unsatisfied by their learning experience. Currently, language educators are re-examining positive
transfer. It is suggested that the benefits of positive transfer were not emphasized to some degree
because the term “language interference” is misleading. This has over-simplified a complicated
process that when considered from a semiotic perspective with reference to language acquisition,
embodied cognition, neurolinguistic and applied linguistic theories could be better understood as
a symptom of “equivocal signs”. Language interference is also redefined as a symptom of
‘semiotic confusion’, which is a specific state of disorientation caused by a misinterpretation of
signs. A hypothetical model of two competing states of consciousness that correspond with
synthetic and analytic brain functioning and aspects of Peircian semiotics provides insights as to
the importance of activating their students’ internal and external semiotic cultural consciousness.
The thesis concludes with a brief analysis of language learning approaches that utilize colour to
help students transfer their L1 knowledge from their first language into the second language (L2)
in a manner that should limit some of the effects of ‘semiotic confusion’.

i
Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to my grandmother; Marjory Gilbert, for her generosity and love of
culture; my parents, Ian and Nancy Caunce, for their ongoing support; Dr. William Acton, for his
inspiration; and in living memory of my grandfather, Jack Gilbert. As well as my dear cousin,
Ryan Miglierina, who said if one could not go through something then one had to find a means
to go over it, essentially a bypass.

ii
Acknowledgments
It is with an immense depth of gratitude that I would like to acknowledge all of my advisors,
students and colleagues, who helped to make the dream of completing this thesis a reality. I owe
much of my current fascination with semiotics to my undergraduate degree in Fine Arts, and in
particular the brilliant art historian, and Professor Leslie Dawn and my cultural anthropology
professor Andrea Cullar. Jamin Pelkey, since then, has helped me refine my knowledge and has
guided my thinking with his expertise in Peircian semiotics, linguistics and embodied cognition
to an extent that my interest in semiotics has developed into a lifelong passion. His knowledge
and contemporary perspective has been invaluable right from the beginning of this research.
Piers Messum and Roslyn Young provided an extraordinarily detailed review of the
original thesis, which has ultimately resulted in a far stronger paper, one that I hope grounds the
complicated theory of semiotics within the language classroom and the process of learning in
general. Without their detailed knowledge of Gattegno’s Silent Way methodology, it would have
been difficult to clarify the link between semiotics and language learning. William Acton’s
previous experience of Lamb’s networks and Gattegno’s Silent Way Methodology was also
instrumental in making this connection apparent and relevant to a professional audience. William
Acton’s forty years of experience in the field of second language teaching, and keen interest in
each of the subject areas discussed in this thesis have been most instructive and inspiring. I feel
tremendously privileged to have had all of these professors’ input, particularly my thesis advisor,
William Acton, who has always been accommodating and supportive during the thesis process.
Michael Walrod must also be thanked for his lively conversations and research on the nature of
the cognitive grid, which were instrumental in shaping the initial argument of the thesis. I would

iii
also like to thank all of the Korean staff at my institution, who generously gave of their time to
produce the Korean examples that are presented in colour.
In consideration of the variety of books read in preparation for this thesis, I must acknowledge
the help and flexibility of both Trinity Western’s and CANIL’s library staff, who so kindly
assisted me in obtaining many interlibrary loans. Likewise, the guidance with formatting that I
received from CANIL’s technicians, most notably Norbert Rennert, was timely and immensely
appreciated. I would also like to thank my family, most especially my parents for all of their
patience and support during this process. Finally, immeasurable gratitude is expressed to my
stylistic editors: Cassandra Caunce and Rebecca Ouwehand, defence coach: Adelle Caunce and
technical assistant: Antony Hughes. In regards to any mistakes or possible misrepresentations of
concepts and authors’ work, these are my own, and I take full responsibility for them.

iv

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Semiotics Defined ........................................................................................ 19
2.1 The Evolution and Development of Signs ............................................................ 45
2.2 A Semiotic Interpretation of Key Sign Systems: Language and Culture ............... 68
2.3 A Semiotic Perspective on Positive Transfer........................................................ 85
2.4 A Semiotic Orientation in Language Teaching ..................................................... 94
2.5 Colour in Learning: A Potential Bypass ............................................................... 97
2.6 Dyslexia: Orienting the Self: Disorientation and Dissonance ............................. 112
Chapter 3: Semiotic Confusion: A Synthetic Construct Model .................................... 121
3.1 The Brain and Neural Networks......................................................................... 122
3.2 The Personal Semiotic Cultural Consciousness .................................................. 132
3.3 Sign Levels and Modes in the PSCC and the SCC ............................................. 139
3.4 The Semiotic Cultural Consciousness ................................................................ 142
3.5 Semiotic Confusion ........................................................................................... 158
Chapter 4: A Potential Semiotics-Inspired Resolution: Colourful Approaches ............. 169
4.1 The Montessori Approach ................................................................................. 169
4.2 The Silent Way Approach (SW) ........................................................................ 171
4.3 The Pronunciation Science Approach (PronSci)................................................. 176
4.4 Essential Haptically-Integrated English Pronunciation (EHIEP) ........................ 183
Chapter 5: Colour-form Methodology ......................................................................... 187
5.1 Colour-form Academic Teaching Context - Personal Note................................. 204
5.2 Making Bridges Between Korean and English Apparent .................................... 207

v
Chapter 6: Conclusions ............................................................................................... 214
Appendix A: Colour-form Description ........................................................................ 223
Appendix B: Bridges Between Korean and English Colour Patterns ............................ 235
Appendix C: Preliminary Coloured Figures of the PSCC/SCC Construct Model ......... 242
References .................................................................................................................. 257
Background Sources.................................................................................................... 269

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List of Figures
Figure 1. Saussure, Ferdinand de. 2000. “The Nature of the Linguistic Sign.” Translated by L.
Matejka and I. R. Titunik. In The Routledge Language and Cultural Theory Reader,
edited by Lucy Burke, Tony Crowley, and Alan Girvin, 21-32. London and New York:
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. (Original work published 1916 161-174): 26. ...... 22
Figure 2. Peirce, Charles S. 1994. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by
Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. 1866-1913[1931-1958].
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1885: 1.371............................................. 29
Figure 3. Eco, Umberto. 1997. Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition.
United States: Harcourt Brace. 1997: 177. .................................................................. 35
Figure 4. Deacon, Terrence. 1997. The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the
Brain. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd. 1997: 356. ................. 46
Figure 5. Lamb, Sydney M. 1999. Pathways of the Brain: The Neurocognitive Basis of
Language. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1999: 79. ............................. 57
Figure 6. Stokoe, William. 2001. Language in Hand: Why Sign Came Before Speech.
Washington, DC. United States: Gallaudet University Press. 2001:13. ......................... 81
Figure 7. Edwards, Betty.1989. Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain: A Course in Enhancing
Creativity and Artistic Confidence. Los Angeles: Tarcher St. Martin’s Press. 19879: 38.
.................................................................................................................................... 96
Figure 8. Davis, Ronald D.1994. The Gift of Dyslexia: Why Some of the Smartest People Can’t
Read and How They Can Learn. Ability Workshop Press. 1994: 49. .......................... 115
Figure 9. Chang, Suk-Jin. 1994. Korean. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Company. 1994: 70. .................................................................................................. 212
Figure 10. Chang, Suk-Jin. 1994. Korean. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Company. 1994: 74. .................................................................................................. 213
Figure 11. The PSCC with activated sign slots ........................................................................ 251
Figure 12. The PSCC and SCC’s connection to L-mode and R-mode ...................................... 252
Figure 13. Sign slots with signs beginning to form networks ................................................... 253
Figure 14. Sign slots with strong sign networks forming road ways ......................................... 254
Figure 15. L2 introduced through the SCC .............................................................................. 255
Figure 16. The full PSCC/SCC Construct Model ..................................................................... 256

1
Chapter 1: Introduction
In a manner of speaking, the disciplines of linguistics and second language learning have been
greatly influenced by the linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, who became so concerned with the
presumed structure and pieces of language, such as its grammar and forms, that he perhaps
unintentionally drew a circle around language (Agar 2002). Within linguistics, this hypothetical
circle thus situated the internal forms and frames of language that Saussure referred to as Langue
within the circle. Every other aspect of language, such as the use of those frames by actual
speakers for communication known as Parole (Saussure 2000), was kept outside the circle.
Saussure’s work also led to a potential solution to this problem through the study of linguistic
signs (semiology) but due to the dyadic nature of his conception of the sign, it focused on form
rather than function. While Saussure noted the importance of the collective for determining what
forms were to be used and in what circumstance, he was less concerned with the functional
purposes for using signs. In this way, language was considered to be a secondary modeling
system composed of non-verbal and verbal sign systems.
Given the place of Saussure in linguistics, the effect that original divide may have caused
between form and function is perhaps still apparent as the generative and functional strains
present in modern linguistics. Functional theories are more concerned with how actual speakers
use language to communicate, whereas generative theories tend to be more interested in the
mechanisms, rules, forms and constraints that make it possible for language to be used as a tool
for communication. Consequently, this difference in perspectives has provided insights into the
notion of an inner-self based function of the bodymind which is inexpressible through language
and a social-self (developed through the use of forms) that is maintained and communicated
through one’s membership in a collective sociolinguistic system. It seems the organization of the

2
aspects of language into one or the other of these categories has been to avoid making language
learning and description too confusing, but as a result, language studies may not reflect the
language used by real speakers. 1
The relevance of semiotics for applied linguistics and language teaching may not be
immediately apparent until one considers the phenomenon of transfer. In language teaching,
transfer refers to the process whereby elements of language A, a first language, may affect the
same forms in language B, a second or other language, when trying to learn language B. While
this has been referred to as language interference, this definition fails to address why there is
interference. Yet, when language interference is viewed from a semiotic perspective, the cause of
it may become evident. However, Saussurian semiology that goes no further than the signified is
not going to provide the necessary bridging material to move from one level of a sign to another.
One difficulty with semiology is that although it acknowledges that there is a relationship
between the sign and signifier, it does not explain how one form of sign becomes another type
through the transfer of the role of the sign to another.
In contrast, the semiotic work of Charles Sanders Peirce, who developed his conception
of the sign as a triad, does just this. By situating his triadic sign consisting of a representamen
(sign), an object and an interpretant (determined by the sign/representamen in relation to the
object) within the states of Firstness (signs relating to vague qualities), Secondness (signs
relating to facts) and Thirdness (signs relating to laws), Peirce’s work explains how the
relationships between signs are never static and in fact, constantly evolve. This is because signs
rely on habit forming experience. The implication is that meaning can be generated through sign

1

The inclusion of forms within the circle and the usage of those forms situated outside it might also
resemble a broader historical division between the body and the mind. When Chomsky (2006) proposes that the
mind contains predetermined forms he is following this Cartesian dualist notion. In section 2.2 an alternative theory

3
relations as a form of transfer from one type of sign to another. However, one may want to
consider that transfer is not a simple process because as Peirce argues the type of signs and route
by which they connect varies considerably.
One of Peirce’s many types of signs is called a rhematic indexical sinsign. This sign is
formed from the combination of a rheme, a sign of possibility; a sinsign, which is a sign that
relates to an actual event or something that exists; an icon, a sign that is related to an object
because of some similar quality; and an index, a sign that shows the influence of the object it is
related to (Tejera 1995, 137). This rhematic indexical sinsign points to the presence of another
sign, the one that motivated it. Peirce’s example of this is an unplanned scream (Peirce 1903, CP
2.256). Such a cry is a rhematic indexical sinsign because it is a sign of raw experience generated
as a reaction to some other sign. 2 Iconic sinsigns “… requires that the sign occupy (minimally) a
spatiotemporal position similar to that of its object and that it is through this property that the
sign can indicate its object” (Lee 1997, 123). A cry of surprise identifies its producer by its tone
and theme. In this way it becomes both an index and an icon. The cry functions as an index of
the person who cried out because he/she caused the sound to occur and it functions as an icon
because the sound quality of that unique voice serves to identify the individual (Lee 1997, 124).

2

In LeDoux’s (1996) book “The Emotional Brain,” he describes many of his studies with split brain
patients. In one such study with a patient referred to as PS he found that when the left brain had to make a judgment
about the level of goodness of each word that was only shown to the right hemisphere, the man’s judgments
matched those to be expected. His left hemisphere allowed him to class the word “devil” as bad without any
conscious knowledge that his right hemisphere had been shown the word “devil”. LeDoux implies the importance of
this may be that the right hemisphere can respond emotionally to signs and transfer that response to the left
hemisphere even without the aid of the corpus callosum (LeDoux 1996, 14-15). He considers emotions as particular
functions of the brain controlled by neural systems that coordinate interactions with the environment to ensure the
mammals survival (LeDoux 1996, 12, 125).

4
Peirce gave a cry of surprise as one possible example yet, arguably, signs of surprise are
not limited to screams, but likely include other automatic bodily responses. 3 Rhematic indexical
sinsigns could hypothetically be conscious or unconscious expressions of one’s emotional state.
Rhematic indexical sinsigns become particularly relevant to the task of learning when one
considers the relationship between surprise and confusion. The presence of such emotional signs
seems to demonstrate that a person has become confused because an expectation has not been
met.4 The individual is then uncertain as to the status of a known sign because of the influence of
an unknown sign. By default, there will be an element of surprise in confusion because of the
conflict between the expected and the unexpected sign. In response to a mismatch of
expectations, multiple signs may come to mind in an effort to find an equivalent or relevant sign
in order to gain some understanding of the new one. This processing of signs is to ensure one
may attain an accurate perception of one’s environment and circumstances. When an expectation
is not met, perhaps momentarily contradictory signs are present: one, the previous expectation,
and the other, the new situation. An individual will need to choose between these, often using
other signs to guide them. For example, if a man is eating his lunch before work, believing it is 1
PM and his boss calls to tell him that he is late as it is 2 PM, he may immediately check his
watch in response to the call, which is the unknown and unexpected sign. This is because the
man’s expectation was that he had an hour before work left. If he checks his watch and then sees
3

The full list of what these could be is beyond the scope of this current work. At the present time it is only
necessary to understand that a number of physiological reactions could be considered rhematic indexical sinsigns in
respect of its definition.
4

While surprise can incorporate a broader range of phenomena than confusion, as confusion is the focus of
this thesis, the use of rhematic indexical sinsigns is only for the purpose of explaining how the presence of a known
sign in tandem with an unknown sign can result in semiotic confusion. Surprise can be viewed as an integral part of
confusion because it involves an unexpected sign occurring where a known sign was supposed to have occurred. In
contrast, confusion is not necessarily a part of surprise as surprise is a complicated emotional reaction that as
LeDoux (1996) would argue, has been motivated by automatic mechanisms in the body that have evolved to ensure
the survival of the species.

5
it is 2pm, this will reinforce the strength of the call (unknown sign). However, if the watch says
it is 1pm this may motivate a sense of confusion resulting in any manner of emotional reactions
from anger to panic. It should be noted though, as everyone’s level of tolerance for ambiguity is
different, the strength of the rhematic indexical sinsign displayed will likely vary markedly
across cultures and between individuals. 5
Generally, it seems that when the meaning of a new sign is incomplete, some form of
rhematic indexical sinsign may be generated and this emotional response to the lack of
equivalence between signs may trigger a type of temporary disorientation whereupon a person’s
perception of their environment may be impaired. 6 This is referred to as ‘semiotic confusion’ in
this paper. This confusion is largely unconscious, but students can become conscious of it if they
can be made aware of sign systems and how they can be utilized to transfer meaning. When
Peirce’s rhematic indexical sinsign and its relationship to confusion is viewed within the
confines of the process of transfer, it appears that language interference between an L1 and an L2
could be caused by a mismatch of signs, thus language interference may only be a symptom of
this broader phenomenon of semiotic confusion. Semiotic confusion may occur when a person is
unsure which sign is right or true depending on the circumstances.
In this thesis, it is proposed that the underlying motivation of L1 transfer can fruitfully be
conceptualized as ‘semiotic confusion’. This concept could be somewhat analogous to the
semiotic mediation referred to by Anton and DiCamilla (1998) cited in Cook (2001). Based on
5

It is likely that age is also a contributing factor in regards to the strength of rhematic indexical sinsigns
because each hemisphere undergoes certain growth spurts which can affect a person’s emotional states. For
example, pre-linguistic children might express themselves through their volume or body movement, whereas adults
could use their words in combination with their facial expressions to indicate what they wanted to express. This
topic will be explored further in sections 3.1 and 3.2 when the PSCC is considered.
6

While Davis (1994) gives a detailed explanation of how Dyslexics can experience disorientation, he also
notes that almost everyone experiences altered perceptions due to disorientation at some point in their lives. This
suggests that anyone could have the potential to experience semiotic confusion.

6
Vygotskian research Anton and DiCamilla suggest that the tendency for students to use their L1
in group work is valuable because the “. . . L1 is used as a powerful tool of semiotic mediation
between learners. . . and within individuals” (Anton and DiCamilla 1998 cited in Cook 2001,
408). That position implies that the L1 contains signs that should enable the creation of meaning
and language acquisition in the L2. When no equivalent L1 sign can be found to match an L2
sign this can cause a form of disorientation where the individual feels confused. 7 As this
confusion is between signs, it is semiotic in nature. Thus, the self-created term ‘semiotic
confusion’ is appropriate.
Semiotic confusion (SC) results from the fundamental need to create meaning through
the L1 and L2 by incorporating L1 resources. 8 The abbreviated term SC refers to all manner of
confusion that can be generated by the self when there is a mismatch between signs. In this
sense, semiotic refers to sign systems, whereas signs may include anything that can be
experienced through the senses. Thus, semiotic confusion involves sign systems that have at least
some unequivocal signs. This means that SC can occur not only between L1 and L2 but also
within sub-networks of signs within the L1.9 For example, one may be looking for a street based
7

Davis’ description of average to extreme cases of disorientation in both dyslexic and non-dyslexic
individuals has a key role in describing the phenomenon of semiotic confusion and is discussed briefly in Section
2.6. Davis’ orientation training, which is designed to limit disorientations, focuses on the importance of perception
for an individual’s orientation (Davis 1994, 131-132). His analogy of the “mind’s eye” seems to support embodied
cognition.
8

The phenomenon of cognitive dissonance proposed by the social psychologist Leon Festinger in 1957 is
similar to the concept of semiotic confusion because it refers to the tendency of human beings to experience an
uncomfortable feeling if there is a disharmony between their beliefs and actions (Festinger 1957). According to
Festinger when faced with such dissonance a person is expected to either change their beliefs, their actions or their
perception of the relationship between their beliefs and actions in order to achieve harmony. For more information
about Festinger and Carlsmith’s landmark study read “Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance” (Festinger
and Carlsmith 1959).
9

When a scent sign such as the scent of bitterness from an orange conflicts with the healthy looking orange
seen on the counter this too is an example of semiotic confusion because two different sensory systems of signs are
involved. The appearance of the orange signifies a tasty ripe orange, but the bitter smell conflicts with this, so what
the orange may now signify is unclear.

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on its number, but the street may only have a name. Thus through the process of looking for the
number of the street one will experience a conflict between L1 signs. The map with the number
of the street, and perhaps numbers on the surrounding houses and streets, will indicate what
should be the correct street but the presence of a name is in conflict with the expected number
and may cause anxiety.
In order to represent the underlying elements involved in the phenomenon of semiotic
confusion, a construct model that is related to the notion of semiotic consciousness is described
here briefly. Deely states that “‘Semiotic consciousness’ is nothing more nor less than the
explicit awareness of the role of the sign as that role is played in a given respect” (Deely 1990,
107). In this thesis the self–created terms personal semiotic cultural consciousness (PSCC) and
semiotic cultural consciousness (SCC) are used to not only imply that an individual has some
sense of the role a sign can have but to situate this knowledge within the internal environment of
the self as the full actualization of embodied meaning and the external environment of the social
world.
The PSCC is perhaps similar to Uexküll’s concept of umwelt in that it connects bodymind
systems through sensory and motor codes as established through an organism’s experiences with
its environment; however, Uexküll’s concept extends to all manner of life, whereas the
PSCC/SCC is restricted to human beings. The degree of complexity of an organism’s umwelt
will vary depending on the needs of the species. Uexküll categorized types of umwelt based on
the species functional cycles; the combination of sensory and motor processes that help to create
an organism’s umwelt. Based on this sensory-motor code, Uexküll determined whether species
had a vegetative (non-temporal soley iconic umwelten), animal (spatial and non-temporal
exclusively iconic and indexical umwelten) or cultural (simultaneously spatial and temporal

8
iconic-indexical-symbolic umwelten). A vegetative umwelt allows the organism to recognize
when it is missing a cell or some quality in the cell. Actions that can result from vegetative
relations are searching, selecting, swarming and spreading among others (Cobley 2010, 52).
Animal umwelten involves the associating of objects with actions in memory and the creation of
relations between new objects. This then allows for the connections between objects, angles and
distances, allowing mental maps of terrain to be created, orienting animal species in space
(Cobley 2010, 53). As alluded to earlier in this paragraph, cultural umwelten involves the
combination of spatial and temporal relations such as those experienced by human beings. The
creation of human languages is a quintessential example of how these temporal relations become
represented by syntactic signs such as markings on verbs for present and past.
In consideration of Uexküll’s work, semioticians such as Sebeok (1999) and Deely
(2001) divide umwelts into three different systems based on the complexity of language possible
in each one. A first order system consists of the signs that are necessary for survival. Perhaps this
would be roughly equivalent to a vegetative umwelten, whereas a secondary system is more
complicated, geared towards communication. A third order modeling system is achieved when
an awareness of one’s umwelt allows one to actively combine the former modeling systems to
create a sense of reality. An awareness of one’s umwelt “life world” as an objective world
composed of objects and relations is also referred to as Lebenswelt (Kull 2010, 53). This
involves the recognition of signs as representing relations between objects that are separate from
the objects that evoke them.
Umwelt is a broader term than the PSCC because it represents the life world of any
species; whereas the PSCC, in similar fashion to the term Lebenswelt, only represents the
modeling systems of human beings. If one is to accept the three divisions within Lebenswelt then

9
it is fair to say that the PSCC would be considered as a first modeling system and that the SCC
would be a secondary modeling system, as it would rely heavily on verbal and textualized signs.
The SCC’s aforementioned proposed association with left hemispheric functioning supports this.
However, the PSCC does not stop developing and so it is never wholly fixed and constantly
utilizes the signs of the first and second modeling systems, therefore being itself both a first and
third order modeling system. Thus the concept of third order modeling is quite similar to the
PSCC because it consists of the combination of a first order modeling system, which is one that
life forms possess in some form, with a secondary modeling system, which is believed to consist
mainly of verbal signs and speech, such as is found in language and text.
In contradistinction to Lebenswelt, the PSCC could be associated with right hemispheric
functioning, whereas the term Lebenswelt remains connected to human awareness rather than
aligned with particular mental functioning. In this way the PSCC is distinct and lacks the grand
generality of Lebenswelt. In general, Uexküll seems to categorize umwelts as species specific
constructs with less focus on the umwelts of individuals. He implies individuals will vary within
the confines of their umwelten (Deely 2001, 162; Kull 2010, 44-45). The PSCC/SCC focuses on
the individual and his/her perspective of his/her social group’s worldview.
It seems that the PSCC also reflects Peirce’s states of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness because the PSCC overlaps a first order modeling system, the one created during
early-life, with an SCC, secondary modeling system of verbal texts and language. The layering
of the two modeling systems seems to create a synthesized third order system that unites the first
and second and subsequently balances their functioning through a greater awareness of each. For
example, a third order modeling system would allow individuals to move from a verbal sign (the
word “rose”) in their SCC, to a memory of the action associated with it in their PSCC. The

10
sensation of touching a rose’s petals as a child could be utilized as a means of teaching someone
else what a rose was; in other words, to create an awareness of the meaning of the term “rose”.
While the act of teaching may seem to be more strongly associated with the SCC because of its
communicative function, it is also a part of the PSCC as teaching is a responsibility and duty of
the teacher and is therefore personal as well as public. A third order system cannot be achieved
without an awareness of the other two systems as an umwelt.
The PSCC/SCC model that is proposed in this thesis also represents something of a
synthesis of Peirce’s states of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness; Piaget’s stages of child
development, Gattegno’s conception of the soma and learning, Chevalier and Lamb’s
perspectives on neural semiotic networks and Chomsky’s notion that there is an innate capacity
for human language that is generated from their common biological endowment that is referred
to as universal grammar. The model attempts to synthesize these and other relevant theories from
language acquisition, neurolinguistics and applied linguistics in order to demonstrate how
language interference can be conceptualized as a symptom of an initial mismatch of signs. The
model further contextualizes semiotic confusion within states of consciousness that correspond
to synthetic and analytic brain functions. 10 These are referred to as Left (L) and Right (R) modes.
The thesis includes some brief semiotic analyses of language learning approaches that utilize
colour to help students transfer their L1 grammar or phonological knowledge into the L2. It is
hoped that this research will provide more insights into the importance of engaging learners’
personal semiotic and semiotic cultural consciousnesses in promoting such positive L1 and L2
transfer. Semiotics may offer a perspective on transfer that reveals the need for a semiotic bridge
between established sign networks and unknown signs.
10

Going forwards, I will be using left and right hemispheric functions as a means of a conceptual short
hand which is consistent with Danesi (2003).

11
Lamb’s (1999) work on semiotic networks seems to support the idea of a semiotic bridge.
He proposes that there may be several perceptual pathways that allow for the integration of
sensory input within language. He intimates that a person’s linguistic system is a relational
network, which is composed of nodes and their interconnections within the brain. He asserts that
as there are multiple sense modalities such as sight, smell, touch and taste that form networks,
there could be numerous connective lines at different categorical levels that aid the process of
transfer by allowing the conceptual system to integrate perceptual systems with language through
sensory input (Lamb 1999). Any number of these pathways could be activated to stimulate a
node to move downward to production or upward to recognition. Lamb (1999) and Chevalier
(2002a; 2002b) imply that the information that signs represent, like neurotransmitters, travel
along pre-formed connection lines in a network of signs. Without sign relations organized into
networks perhaps it would be difficult to make sense of one’s perceptions.
If a sign remains alienated from relevant mental networks it may be more difficult to
retain it. For example, many learners find it challenging to pronounce English sounds that are not
in their language sound system. When there is no known sign to introduce a new one, instructors
might attempt to find an alternative established sensory network to create a connection between
the new L2 sign and the L1 sensory sign. Two learning approaches that appear to be utilizing
such semiotics-inspired strategies currently are Acton’s Haptic-integrated Clinical Pronunciation
(Acton 2012) and Messum and Young’s PronSci (Messum and Young 2012b).11 Acton intimates
that he uses haptic anchoring for the purpose of having his students connect new signs through
established kinesthetic networks. Likewise, Messum and Young’s PronSci Approach, which is

11

In section 4 these two approaches as well as Gattegno’s Silent Way and the Montessori approach are
considered from a semiotic perspective and related to embodied cognition.

12
largely based on the work of Gattegno, is designed to connect new pronunciation sounds with the
sensations of the articulators used to make those sounds.
Perhaps the presence of semiotic confusion is most prevalent when it occurs between an
L1 and an L2. The following example should elucidate the phenomenon of semiotic confusion
within the context of using an L1 to understand an L2. When individuals are faced with an L2
concept that they do not understand or a symbol they do not recognize, they may attempt to
consider whether they have anything like it in their L1 in order to help them interpret it. In a
situation where one needs to navigate through a foreign airport, communicating L1 words in an
L2 structure may result in receiving correct directions from a native L2 speaker. However, when
blank stares are returned instead of directions, one may use images or gestures to communicate
one’s need. Hand signals to indicate the gate number may be recognized at this point and one
may then be successful in finding the gate. Potentially relying on numerical data that was first
learned in the L1 can act as a bridge between the L1 and the L2, if the gate numbers are
represented in dots as well as the symbols of the foreign language.
In another example, it is a common practice to indicate essential service areas with a
symbol of a silhouetted woman in a dress to designate the ladies’ washroom. The effectiveness
of such symbols suggests that people are able to use stylized images as bridges between the L1
meaning and the L2 symbol. If one were to imagine this individual had no L1 understanding of
such images, he or she would be forced to use a system of trial and error in the same manner a
child would. Depending on the culture, a mistake between a ladies’ and a men’s washroom could
have unpleasant to severe consequences. The point of the bathroom example is not to suggest
that these symbols are universal, but to hint that human beings have a capacity through their
common biology to establish a symbolic code to refer to phenomena.

13
Once one code has been learned, the process of learning a second code will be impacted
in some aspect (Hammerly 1982). Hammerly (1982) argues that the process of first language
acquisition is fundamentally different from learning a second because the latter involves the
learning of a new code. Hammerly argues that:
The study of the native language calls for the expansion and creative use of a
known code; the study of mathematics involves learning a new code via a non-conflicting
known code; it is only in second language study that a new code must be learned despite
the conflicting demands of a known code. As a consequence of this difference, second
language teaching and testing procedures are unique. Secondly, this is the only field of
study for which adequate professional preparation means . . . taking several courses in
each of a considerable number of disciplines outside education…. (Hammerly 1982, 19)
Hammerly’s argument suggests that Second Language teaching does not always produce
positive results because of the phenomenon of language transfer: the idea that when learning a
language, elements of a first language can have a negative or positive consequence for the
learning of a second. Second Language pedagogy has been influenced by the concept of transfer.
Avoidance of negative transfer has been central to methodologies, such as Audiolingualism, that
tried to limit students’ use of their first language (L1), whereas an interest in positive transfer is
evident in mentalist models such as Selinker’s interlanguage perspective (Selinker 1972).
Currently, language educators such as Cook (2005), Collins (2001), Butzkamm (2003) and
Deller and Rinvolucri (2002) among others are re-examining positive transfer. Gass and Selinker
(2008) assert that over the years the term “transfer” has been reinterpreted as composed of two
processes: negative and positive transfer. They further assert that this tendency to use the terms
positive and negative transfer is theoretically untenable and that negative and positive transfer
must be seen as products rather than separate processes. The implication is that the term
“negative transfer” tends to emphasize the errors in student output (Gass and Selinker 2008;
Odlin 1989; Wang 2007; Arranz 2005). This tends to ignore the process, focusing only on the

14
product, making it difficult to assist students in gaining an awareness of their transfer process.
Student awareness is a pivotal factor in learning (Gattegno 1987; Young and Messum 2011).
Gattegno had a unique perspective on the importance of awareness in education and
assumed that the ability to be aware of the human skill to have an awareness of the self and
others came from the skill to distance oneself while still being present and aware of one’s own
body. He stated that:
Awareness of awareness can be illustrated by the example of awareness of ways
of knowing used by each of us every day with greater or lesser penetration. Exercises of
awareness of the perceiving self while perceiving can well represent the most universal
exercise to acquaint everybody with awareness as such. Because we focus while we look
and see, we know at once and immediately that the self is present that the will is present,
that we are mobilized in our sight, that we receive impacts and process them, make sense
of them by integrating to ourselves what we receive and to it what we already had.
(Gattegno 1987, 55-56)
It has also been argued persuasively that disallowing the use of a student’s L1 has the
potential to lead to identity denial and a lack of satisfaction with their learning experience (Belz
2003). From a different perspective, Gattegno contends that in developing his Silent Way
approach, which selectively utilizes the target language, he found that students were highly
motivated to participate and experienced a sense of freedom, in part decreasing the need to
produce language until they desired to. His approach took the same grapheme and sound
correspondences that are used in English teaching, but in one innovation, he colour-coded the
grapheme to symbolize the sound it represented to help students read the pronunciation of words
by aiding their’ recognition of graphemes and the retention of sounds via colour. Gattegno’s
claim was that this allowed students to give more attention to what the colour of the grapheme
designated as the sound rather than the grapheme itself to assist students with pronunciation and
spelling. Potentially the use of a relational network of the colour, sound articulator position and

15
grapheme made it easier for Gattegno’s students to retain information as they transferred from
one sign mode to another.12
The apparent success of Gattegno’s approach suggests previous understandings of
transfer may have been missing some vital element. In his work this may have been a colourbased pathway. From a semiotic perspective, Gattegno’s colour schema essentially appears to
have acted as a semiotic bridge that enabled children to learn more quickly because they did not
appear to have become as confused when faced with a grapheme that could signify more than
one sound.
As a symbol system has already been established in the L1, the learning of L2 forms may
require the connection to L1 meanings at some point. From this semiotic perspective, Cook’s
view that L1 sign usage is rudimentary for effective L2 learning (Cook 2001) becomes apparent.
It is argued that mediating the impact of semiotic confusion could be a key to enabling more
effective L1 transfer use in teaching. Since L1 transfer can occur between different types of
signs, the use of colour and articulatory awareness in Gattegno’s (1987) work, haptic anchoring
and colour in Acton’s (2012) and articulatory awareness in Messum and Young’s (2012a; 2012b)
approaches, can be seen to function as a semiotic bridge between L1 and L2 through their
connection to the L1’s perceptual sign networks.
The literature review in Chapter 2 is divided into six sub-sections that present research
and frameworks from various theories such as: semiotics, language interference, learning
disability theory, and colour in learning that have contributed to the formation of the semiotic
confusion model. The potential implications of these theories in relation to language teaching are
12

Leach describes a mode as a type of channel made of one sensory pathway such as a visual mode, tactile,
kinesthetic, auditory etc…. A sign mode then connects the information taken in by sense with the sense itself.
Peirce’s distinctions were far more complicated than this but the term “sign mode” is being used in an effort to make
connections between learning approaches and semiotic theory apparent (Leach 1986).

16
discussed in order to explain how semiotic confusion can affect learners and how it may be
avoided. Semiotic confusion is defined in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, this construct is then applied
to four language-teaching approaches in order to analyze them. The Colour-form approach,
which has been evolving through this work, is presented in Chapter 5. Conclusions and caveats
are presented in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Language learning is one of the most amazing achievements of human beings. Countless
researchers have contemplated how it is that an infant who can barely babble and receives
imperfect language gains a basic intuitive sense of their language’s grammar within a few years.
Although second language learning researchers have posited several hypotheses to account for
this, such as the critical period hypothesis 13 (Brown 1994, 52), neurocognitive linguistics is one
theory within applied linguistics to consider the impact of brain functioning on learning (Lamb
1999). Unlike traditional linguistics that analyzed language into units, neurocognitive linguists
consider the mental mechanisms that make it possible for language to be created (Lamb 1999).
Neurocognitive evidence from split-brain studies has recorded that children use both
hemispheres of their brains to make discoveries about language (Lenneberg 1967). The right side
of the brain is primarily responsible for analyzing the complex milieu of referential and imagined
images that come into the visual cortex, while the left side of the brain is mostly responsible for
categorizing them (Sperry 1973; Lenneberg 1967) and gradually creating a useful framework by
which to learn languages (Brown 1994, 109; Edwards 1989).14 “… Split-brain experiments
13

The critical period hypothesis suggests that after the age of puberty language learners rarely gain a
native-like accent when learning to speak a second language (Brown 1994, 53).
14

Neurology has been influencing education for decades and not just in linguistics and language learning.
In the silent language of art, Betty Edwards devised a drawing system to help her students produce more life-like
images based on the research of Sperry (1968;1973), Levy (1969) and many other neurologists’ work. Edwards
(1989) devised a strategy to bypass the critical and impatient left hemispheric (LH) functions (what she termed L-

17
established, in a phrase, that the two hemispheres complement each other in normal cognitive
processes. The main L-Mode and R-Mode functions they established are well-known today”
(Danesi 2003, 35). Danesi intimates that Second Language Acquisition (SLA) methodologies
can be placed on a continuum based on the degree to which they utilize L-mode processes or Rmode processes with an extreme R-mode endpoint on one side and a similar endpoint for the Lmode. In regards to this, he says that:
The midpoint of this continuum is, in effect, the "breakpoint" at which an SLT [Second
Language Teaching] practice takes on more and more of the modal characteristics of that
half of the continuum as it approaches an endpoint. Thus, for instance, the GrammarTranslation Method, in its extreme form, would be located at the L-Mode endpoint; Silent
Way teaching, on the other hand, would be placed at the R-Mode endpoint; communicative
approaches that integrate formal skills into their instructional plan would be located near
the breakpoint but slightly to its right; and so on. (Danesi 2003, 49-50)
The significant difference between first language learning and second language learning is
that, arguably, during the process of early first language learning, before the age of two, the
process of lateralization has not caused key language functions to have been specialized to the
left hemisphere (Brown 1994). It is likely that this is the reason why children with damaged left
hemispheres can often relearn their first language through their right hemisphere (Brown 2000,
54; Edwards 1989). In fact, as early as 1994, Chiron et al. argued that, “. . . the right hemisphere
develops its functions earlier than the left” (Chiron et al. 1997, 1057). Their studies showed that
there was a greater flow of blood through the right hemisphere than the left, resulting in showing

mode) while drawing. This allowed for the smooth shift into their creative and patient right hemispheric (RH)
functions (what she termed R-mode). In conceptualizing the R-mode, Edwards, based on this neurological research,
described the RH as mostly spatial, holistic, nonverbal and intuitive. During R-mode activities a person will have
little awareness of the passage of time, sounds are not made into meaningful words, thinking is in pictures and one
feels alert and focused yet relaxed. In contrast, the LH was considered logical, critical, punctual and impatient and
was inclined to aid in the production of symbols rather than what a person actually sees before them. Since Edwards
used these terms other authors have generalized them to refer to only the set of characteristics that each hemisphere
possess as is consistent with neurological research. L-mode and R-mode have become a convenient short hand for
describing the general functionality of the brain and how that may impact learning. They are hereafter used in this
paper with that purpose in mind.

18
a “right hemispheric predominance” (Chiron et al. 1997, 1057). Although there is continuing
debate as to the impact of lateralization, neural plasticity is greater during early childhood
(Damasio 2010; Edwards 1989, 59). In part because of this, it is argued that there is a greater
level of awareness of the subconscious cultural symbol systems in the first language (L1) than in
the second (L2). When activated at a conscious level, these linguistic systems may allow students
to view language as part of a broader system, one of signs. For the purposes of this thesis, the
initial state of these sign systems is referred to as sign slots. This is something of an extension or
an abstraction from Chomsky’s Universal Grammar (UG) theory where he implies that there are
certain universal slots for grammar. To accept the notion of UG would suggest that the brain in
some sense has an internal capacity for language, due to human beings’ biological endowment,
to generate signs out of experience. Sign slots represent the broad semantic categories that can be
generated out of experiences, which may be present in Chomsky’s UG. 15 In essence, if one
concedes the general validity of Chomsky’s notion of UG, then perhaps programs could be
designed to better utilize the embodied features of human neurophysiology such as the
somatosensory system in order to promote the positive transfer of information from an L1 to an
L2.
The Colour-form methodology that is based on the PSCC/SCC16 learning model is featured
in Chapter 5. It is just one of the many potential ways that semiotic confusion, a type of

15

Sign slots could be considered somewhat similar to Wierzbicka’s semantic primes. She hypothesizes that semantic
primes are universal meanings that occur cross-culturally, suggesting that human cultures though distinct in many
ways also have marked similarities. For more information on Wierzbicka’s theory please refer to her 1996 book:
Semantics: Primes and universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Another excellent read is “Semantic Primes
and Linguistic Typology.” In Meaning and Universal Grammar – Theory and Empirical Findings, Vol. II, edited by
Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka, Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 257-300.
16

PSCC is an abbreviation for personal semiotic cultural consciousness. This is a self-created term that
refers to the notion that individuals develop a personal understanding of themselves and the world based on the
experiences they have within and outside their body. This is used to refer to signs that one comes into contact with,
whether directly or indirectly, before the sign level of schema creation and object recognition is reached within the

19
disorientation, can be bypassed or moderated in learning. The PSCC and SCC are vital
components of a learning model that may provide a unique perspective on the cultural and
neurological forces that allow for the recognition, interpretation, creation and re-interpretation of
language signs.17 These model components are defined and explored in Chapter 4. The learning
model is based on the combination of various theories such as language interference, universal
grammar and neurocognitive studies. However, the overarching theory behind the model is
semiotics, the study of signs. While we have not been able to determine exactly how the mind
processes and stores information, semiotics does give one a useful meta-linguistic framework for
doing so. In order to understand the potential value of a semiotics-inspired model for second
language learning, we must begin with the study of signs, semiotics.
Chapter 2: Semiotics Defined
Semiotics can be loosely viewed as a theoretical framework that can be applied to any
phenomenon in order to understand its forms in relation to other signs. However, semiotics is not
merely a heuristic as Peirce refers to semiotics as the necessary laws of thought (Peirce 1896, CP
1.444). The origin of the word semiotic is the Greek term semiotikos, which means an interpreter
of signs (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 4). This term implies that there is a relationship between a
phenomenon, the background habits of the interpreter who is thinking about it and the resulting
interpretation of that phenomenon. Despite differing perspectives within the semiotic canon,
PSCC/SCC construct model. In contrast SCC is the abbreviation for semiotic cultural consciousness. In like fashion
to Eco’s Cognitive Types model, which is introduced on page 34, this is the idea that people have an understanding
of how the particular cultural group of which they are members, view the group and its position in the world through
the experiences it has with reference to itself and its members. The SCC refers to signs that one is exposed to in the
sign level of schema creation and object recognition.
17

The term “language signs” is used and not the term “linguistic signs” to make it clear that language signs
are being referred to as anything that can exist and be referred to using language, including people and solid objects.
In contrast, linguistic signs imply in Saussure’s words “sound-images” (Saussure 2000, 24); that is, only the
symbols that are used to express what is referred to.

20
these three components define the basic elements of the theory and their presence is expected in
any semiotic inspired investigation of texts.
Arguably, the most important term to emerge from semiotics is the term sign. Peirce
explains that:
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some
respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an
equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the
interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that
object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea…. (Peirce 1897, CP 2.228)
Peirce refers to this idea as a ground, which suggests it is perhaps the main or conventional
meaning that is associated with the sign. A sign in its broadest sense then seems to stand for
some phenomenon that can be used to indicate something through its relationship to other
phenomena (Peirce 1897, CP 2.228). This is a central idea in semiotics. Sub-fields of semiotics
consider signs within their relation to each other within a sign system (Cobley and Jansz 1999).
In this manner, signs are not isolated from the collective mind of the people because they reside
within conventional sign networks. Thus signs combine and interact with each other to impact
human thinking and language within systems.
The linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce
are credited with the formulation of semiotics even though they did not refer to their work as
semiotics per se, which was the original term for the analysis of signs that was re-used later in
order to cover all sub-fields and labels referring to the discipline of the study of signs (Cobley
2010; Cobley and Jansz 1999 13; Deely 1990, 1-2). It is claimed that Peirce is the father of
American semiotics (“semiotic”) and Saussure, the father of European semiotics (“semiology”)
(Cobley and Jansz 1999 13, 18). Peirce proposed the term ‘Semiotic’ for his work based on his
conception of how signs are thought, whereas Saussure used the term ‘semiology’ as his

21
investigation of the sign focused on linguistic thought (Deely 1990, 7). When contemplating the
term semiology, the logic of signs, it is important to note that Saussure thought of his semiology
as forming part of a social and general psychology because of the lack of autonomy he found in
semiology (Thibault 1997, 3, 21).
The notion that signs relate to one another through their status as an index, icon, analogy
or habit in vast associative webs of signification was first proposed by Peirce. This is referred to
as unlimited semiosis (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 26). Peirce’s collection of semiotic thought has
inspired the idea that the world is entirely composed of signs, as anything one experiences in life
is transformed via receptors in the brain (Lamb 1999) and made meaningful through the process
of signification (Deely 1990). Consequently, there is still some lack of consensus as to what
constitutes a sign and how a sign is formed. Deely suggests that semiosis, which can be roughly
equated with signification, the act of constructing relations, is a process of sign interaction as
mediated through socio-cultural frameworks (Deely 1990, 23). In this way, a sign can be created
from sensory experience because there will be a relation between a sign, an object and the
sensory mode that makes it perceivable. That means that anything that is seen, felt, touched,
tasted, heard or smelled is eligible to become a sign when it is received and used in the
experiential landscape of a person. Deely explains that:
… a sign is a representative, but not every representative is a sign. Things can represent
themselves within experience. To the extent that they do so, they are objects and nothing
more, even though in their becoming objects signs and semiosis are already invisibly at
work. To be a sign, it is necessary to represent something other than the self. Being a sign
is a form of bondage to another, to the signified, the object that the sign is not but that the
sign nevertheless stands for and represents. (Deely 1990, 35)
Deely’s explanation above can also serve to introduce Saussure’s dyadic
conceptualization of the sign, as it demonstrates that a sign can only represent an object and
never be an actual object, but only the mental image of it. The notion of the dyadic sign is a

22
defining contribution of Saussure to European semiotics. Figure 1 below illustrates his
conception of the sign.18

Figure 1. Saussure, Ferdinand de. 2000. “The Nature of the Linguistic Sign.” Translated by L. Matejka and
I. R. Titunik. In The Routledge Language and Cultural Theory Reader, edited by Lucy Burke, Tony Crowley, and
Alan Girvin, 21-32. London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. (Original work published 1916
161-174): 26.

Saussure proposed that the linguistic sign was composed of two parts: a sign and a
relational unit that exists between the signifier (the material aspect of the sign) and the signified
(a mental concept) (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 10-11). In semiology, a sign begins with an
“acoustical impression” (Saussure 2000, 21). This impression is a psychological unit that
connects a concept and a sound image. This conglomerate unit is both a sign and the
psychological imprint of a physical sound. It functions as the “instrument of thought” (Saussure
2000, 22). It seems that for Saussure, thought involves a physiological process whereby the brain
transmits sensory information and translates this into a sound image.
Saussure asserted that language was not just a nomenclature as a language is not simply a
set of arbitrary names relegated to pre-existing concepts (Thibault 1997, 23). Names instead refer
to the arbitrary relationship between the signifier and signified. These relationships are
considered arbitrary based on their distinctiveness in each language and their assumed lack of
motivation. It is clear that Saussure assumed that the relationship between the sign and signifier
18

Please note that although the diagrams above are originally from Saussure’s A General Course in
Linguistics, they were combined from two different diagrams in The Routledge Language and Cultural Theory
Reader and juxtaposed in order for the reader to follow the logical connections from mental concept to the word
“tree” and then to the image.

23
must be arbitrary because every language has a different set of signifieds. Saussure implied that
if a unit of language was expressed differently, it would still be the same fundamental sign so
long as it was still distinguishable from other signs currently in use by the collective speech
community (Thibault 1997, 21, 127). In this way, he contends that the overarching relationship
between a signifier and a signified contains no natural meaning despite the strength of the
association of the word to its meaning (Thibault 1997, 22).
Saussure’s assertion that languages are built on arbitrary connections suggests that there
is no natural human language, as it is entirely composed of layers of arbitrary connections that
are only validated and given meaning through a continual use of them via the collective mind of
a population. Saussure’s work implies then, that as the collective mind of a people changes, their
language can also reflect these changes. That change is not brought about by one person, but
must be used collectively.
Within Saussure’s vision of semiology, he reveals two oppositional processes regarding
language. Saussure suggests the signifier is fixed in terms of the linguistic community that uses it
and neither individual nor the collective could will it to be different because it is bound to the
language (Saussure 2000, 28). He calls this phenomenon the “immutability” of language
(Saussure 2000, 30). Relating to this immutability, he says that as language is such a complex
system, daily users of it are unaware of its mechanisms and do not perceive the logic that
governs its forms. He further suggests that even specialists have difficulty explaining the
linguistic devices that reveal the underlying logic of language. He contrasts immutability with its
antithesis, “mutability,” which is the rapid change of linguistic signs through a shift in the
relationship between the signifier and the signified due to its arbitrary nature (Saussure 2000,
30). As language is rooted in no natural law, it is uncontrollable when used by a collective.

24
Saussure acknowledges that these positional forces operate to ensure language evolves (Saussure
2000, 31).
These positional forces suggest that one must differentiate between relational units and
their physical representations. By this, Saussure means that the linguistic unit is a form rather
than a substance; a distinction he refers to as Langue and Parole (Thibault 1997, 22). Langue is
essentially language as a system of forms, whereas Parole is the actual speech made possible
through the system of language operating within a collective (Thibault 1997, 20, 22). Parole then
is realized when a person selects elements from the linguistic system and gives them a physical
representation. Saussure seems to suggest that linguists will be more productive if they isolate
their study of languages to Langue (Thibault 1997, 22).
Saussure defines speech as Parole (Saussure 2000, 23). As an individual conforms to the
language laws of the collective to express their own thoughts through speech, they create Parole.
When combined with other signs from either Parole or public sources, the sign can gain
relationships with the other signs close to it, as in a paragraph. In some cases, signs may even be
interchangeable depending on the context of their use. Some signs can also be signifiers, and a
sign is not only a signified but a representation of the relationship between signified and signifier
(Noble, Biddle, and Tempero 2006). Thus a written or visual text may embed various signs that
serve a unified function within the sign system. Saussure believed if he could understand the
linguistic sign, he would be able to interpret all semiological systems (Rauch 1980, 2). He
predicted the study of semiology would be considered a part of general psychology and would be
used to study the active use of glotto-centric linguistic signs in contemporary life (Barthes 1968,
22-23).

25
Within Saussure’s conceptualization of Langue, an ordered collection of signs such as a
sentence is called a syntagm (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 16). He proposed this term to show how
elements of a phrase have a relationship to each element contained within it (Cobley and Jansz
1999, 16-17). He recognized that as each language had a different way of ordering elements, the
language “storehouse” (Saussure 2000, 23) of possible options available must be socially derived
through a collective mediation of signs (Saussure 2000, 22). This system of signs is essentially
what is assimilated by the collective in an effort to communicate not merely through speech, as
this is only part of language (Saussure 2000, 22), but through written symbols and overarching
linguistic conventions (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 14-15).19
Saussure seems to suggest then that people can recognize a sign only in its relation to
other signs within a collective (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 14). The collective is able to use signs
within a signifying system to refer to mental concepts that they wish to communicate. What
helps to define the sign is its position in the system and its relation to other signs (Barthes 1994,
203; Cobley and Jansz 1999, 20). Languages do not have the exact same set of signifiers and
signifieds.
Though Peirce's work developed around the same time as Saussure’s semiological work,
there is no evidence in the literature that they ever influenced each other and instead remarkably
seem to have developed similar ideas contemporaneously (Deely 1990, 114; Chandler 2007, 29).
One of the quintessential differences between Saussure and Peirce’s work is that Peirce contrived
a three-part relation for the sign, not a dyad like Saussure. This triadic model consisted of a
19

Saussure implies that languages must be studied synchronically as systems that are complete in so much
as they fulfill the communicative needs of the collective body that use them. What he seems to mean is that at any
point in a language’s history the underlying system that is used to generate it is complete (Culler 1986, 35). This
shared language is viewed as self-contained even though it is perpetually changing with time, warranting diachronic
analysis as new words are added to the lexicon that it is generated from (Saussure 2000, 22). Thus, it is the
embodiment of Saussure’s Langue (Culler 1977).

26
representamen, which is the form that the sign takes (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 21); the
interpretant, which is essentially individuals’ experience of the relationship between sign and
object as mediated through collateral experience; and the referent, the written symbols, oral
sound, visual text, image, gesture or movement that relates to something outside of itself. The
representamen is usually considered the material aspect of Peirce’s model, but Peirce does not
attest this (Chandler 2007). It seems Peirce’s interpretant necessarily represents the habitual use
of signs because the very fact that there is a relation between an interpretant and an object
suggests that a convention had to exist for people to recognize the connection was a relationship.
If it can be perceived as a relationship this implies, if not a conventional system, then at least the
formation of habit. One point that cannot be emphasized enough is that Peirce views his three
components of the sign as perpetually in relation with each other because possibility, through its
relation with an object, becomes habit and habit ultimately relates to convention and laws. As
Peirce says, “A man may become aware of any habit, and may describe to himself the general
way in which it will act. For every habit has, or is, a general law, (Peirce 1902, CP 2.148).
According to Peirce (1895, CP 2.302) people only think in signs. A sign is manifested
through different forms, one moment a word or sound, the next an image, scent or flavor. For
example, the presence of the word “rabbit” may cause the image of a rabbit or the sound of it to
come to the person’s mind in an infinite spectrum of possibilities, forming a chain of signs. Signs
become the medium and vehicle for all thought when people give meaning to phenomena
through signification (Chandler 2007). Perhaps what Chandler is referring to here is that people
experience meaning through the process of signification.
In Peirce’s model all signs are interpreted through the observation of objects, whether
actual or imaginary (Ransdell 1980, 161). Each object in a given sequence is a sign and an

27
interpretant for the following sign. These parts are considered as part of a larger object, similar to
the way in which an animated movie is made up of hundreds of cells each predetermining the
layout of the other, in some way, to form a united motion picture. Signs can differ from each
other in terms of the form they take; the painting of an apple is remarkably different from a
photograph or an actual apple, but they can still represent each other. This fact led Peirce to
distinguish between sign types and the states that motivated them (Ransdell 1980, 138).
Peirce’s writings suggest that the order of signs are not fixed in terms of their referential
order, but are contained within a cycle of relations. Perhaps an example of cutting carrots will
make this clear. Sign A (a chopping knife) is connected with sign B (the carrot) and sign C (the
sensation of pushing down) relates to both A and B likewise D (the scent of freshly cut carrots)
relates to all of these (the physical sensation of chopping). When a person attends to A and this
focuses the person’s thought back on sign C (the sensation of pushing down on the knife), a
memory can be triggered creating sign E (cutting one’s finger while cutting carrots as a child)
producing sign F (an emotional response of anxiety). A whole other host of sign cycles could
then occur through the sign ‘childhood’ or could build on the existing sign cycle perhaps creating
sign G (the children’s song “Three Blind Mice”). In other words, sign A (a knife) that originally
referred to sign C (the physical sensation of cutting) could also refer to F (an emotional response
of anxiety). Thus while the elements exist in a cycle, the order in which they refer to each other
does not remain static. The point here is that a person may be vaguely aware of many layers of
subconscious signs simultaneously and that any sequence of these may bring to mind other signs.
For example, a person may hear the dull sound of the refrigerator fan behind them; feel the
sensation of their elbows resting on the counter and the cool temperature of the knife’s handle,
among many possibilities.

28
Peirce’s vision of “Firstness,” “Secondness” and “Thirdness” form a multifaceted
continuum based on his mathematical demonstration. Pierce reasons any triad must break into
three parts, any dyad into two parts and a monad into one because “…no element can have a
higher valency than three” (Peirce 1905, CP 1.292). A monad would contain Firstness, but a
dyad would constitute Secondness and a triad would possess Thirdness. In this way, there will
always be an element of Firstness in Secondness and an element of Secondness in Thirdness
(Peirce 1905, CP 1.297-1.298). Though this is seemingly simple, it is pivotal for an
understanding of Peirce’s perception of the sign and how it functions within signifying systems.
Firstness is linked to origin for it refers to the moment before the becoming of some
phenomenon. Thirdness is the mediation that modifies the First and Secondness. Within
Secondness, the origin aspect of Firstness functions as a quality. Secondness holds the notion of
relations with objects; for example, an object A might be shinier than object B. In Thirdness,
mediation is held to be a characteristic of the sign (Peirce 1902 CP, 2.92). A sign can typically be
anything related to its object in respect to a quality. This relation will produce an interpretant.
The diagram below which is taken from Peirce’s collected works could serve to illustrate these
concepts.

29
Figure 2. Peirce, Charles S. 1994. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Charles
Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. 1866-1913[1931-1958]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. 1885: 1.371.

In reference to this image, Peirce says, “. . . no combination of roads without forks can
have more than two termini; but any number of termini can be connected by roads which
nowhere have a knot of more than three ways” (Peirce 1885, CP 1.371). When considering this
quote, it seems like he is referring to his states of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. In the
“self-returning roads” that he depicts, arguably, the nothingness that exists before the roads can
represent Peirce’s Firstness. Following this, the two paths created by the fork can represent the
state of Secondness and of the connection of the object to its null set state, whereas the actual
divisions into paths that branch out from that point represent the state of Thirdness.
Firstness seems to imply a feeling or sense that has no recognizable component, a form of
non-binary immediate consciousness, and would refer to only a moment before the becoming of
some phenomenon and not even itself (Peirce 1902, CP 2.85). Though Peirce does not explain it
like this, one might consider a state of Firstness as an embryonic period where the self has only a
vague awareness of its existence, which is subconscious. The self cannot consciously recognize
anything yet still experiences a flow of energy. Firstness is used to describe events that just
happen as a kind of background existing within the ephemeral world of thought beyond active
human experience.
Secondness is seen as the object that bears a connection to its origin. In this way,
Firstness compels it to exist. Peirce gives an example of the terms “husband and wife” in order to
explain the state of Secondness in which he suggests the words “husband” and “wife” can be
seen as separate entities, but cannot exist without the other, thus they have a mutually exclusive
relationship with each other (Peirce 1902, CP 2.84). If there is no wife, then the man cannot call
himself a husband because there is no one to have a relationship with him. Another example of

30
this would be an infant in a pregnant mother. The mother does not exist without the baby and the
baby is in a state of becoming so the baby is in a state of Firstness and the mother is in a state of
Secondness. In a sense, the infant necessitates the existence of the mother.
The sentence “he threw a stone and it hit her,” is also an example of Secondness because
two simultaneous actions are taking place but the reader has no evidence that there is a relation
between them. However, if the sentence were to be changed to say, “he threw a stone at her” this
would imply intention and mediation and Peirce would now consider it as embodying a state of
Thirdness (Peirce 1902, CP 2.86).
Peirce contextualizes his Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness within three categories of
logic: “obsistant logic”, which refers to relationships between elements; critical logic, which is
the tendency for symbols and signs to possess some quality; and transitional logic, which is
concerned with methodology (Peirce 1902, CP 2.93). Because of this overlap of signs, signs that
are involved in Firstness may become the initiating sign in either Secondness or Thirdness. As
Peirce states:
In consequence of every sign determining an Interpretant, which is itself a sign,
we have sign overlying sign. The consequence of this, in its turn, is that a sign may, in its
immediate exterior, be of one of the three classes, but may at once determine a sign of
another class.
Symbols, and in some sort other Signs, are either Terms, Propositions, or
Arguments. A Term is a sign which leaves its Object, and a fortiori its Interpretant, to be
what it may. A Proposition is a sign, which distinctly indicates the Object, which it
denotes, called its Subject, but leaves its Interpretant to be what it may. An Argument is a
sign, which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its Conclusion, which it is
intended to determine. That which remains of a Proposition after removal of its Subject is
a Term (a rhema) called its Predicate. That which remains of an Argument when its
Conclusion is removed is a Proposition called its Premiss, or (since it is ordinarily
copulative) more usually its Premisses. . . . (Peirce 1902, CP 2.94-95)
As signs of one class can be the representamen, object or interpretant, for another, each state has
the potential to contain a sign associated with another state. Perhaps it would be useful to

31
consider each of the three parts of the sign as having a progression from something that more
closely resembles its state environment to gradually representing more complicated relationships
that involve signs from other states. This would mean that there should be a representamen for
the state of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. There would also need to be an Object and
Interpretant for each of the three states. In fact, this seems to be what Peirce is proposing in his
table of the states. Peirce’s table illustrates how Firstness can contain a sign that is associated
with Firstness called a qualisign, which represents a quality such as a colour, yet it can also have
a sinsign, which is a sign of Secondness. Thus, a qualisign is in a state of Firstness of Firstness,
whereas a sinsign is in a state of a Firstness of Secondness. In this manner, an iconic sign such as
a photograph, which relates to an object by merit of its resemblance, is one of Secondness yet
also Firstness through the qualisigns that the photograph may have. Likewise, a symbol, which is
a sign of Secondness, can also be contained in Thirdness through its relation to a conventional
law. To summarize, icons, indexes and symbols are associated with the object and are modes of
Secondness. Icons gain meaning from their resemblance to the object, whereas symbols involve
future-oriented habits based on previous experiences with iconic and indexical relations.
Peirce said that signification is a process, as symbols are not static icons but ever
changing. Semiosis involved three elements: dynamical interaction, meaning the physical or
psychological action of a sign; the interpretant, referring to the sign; and the significate outcome,
which exists explicitly in the sign (Deely 1990). Semiosis involves these elements because each
of the signs is associated with certain actions and these actions take place within the different
levels. Peirce is able to link language, man, signs and thought together and, through his
investigation, identified 66 types of signs (Misak 2004, 362). Later by devising a complicated

32
web of sign relations he identifies over 50,000 variations of signs (Misak 2004). However, he
only explains ten of these signs in detail (Misak 2004, 247).
Peirce made distinctions between the types of signs that operate within each state.
Firstness imbues the qualisign, sinsign and legisign sign types (Cobley and Jansz 1999). The
qualisign is made up of qualities such as the colour blue. The sinsign refers to a real object
existing in space. The legisign is a sign based on a law and the classifying function of it (Sebeok
1999, 124). Each of these functions as a representamen: qualisign in Firstness, sinsign in
Secondness and legisign in Thirdness (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 31). One reason Peirce sought to
discover the embedded states of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in multiple modalities may
have been to explain the process of unlimited semiosis. This means that the states allow one to
conceive of how a sign of a certain type can be interconnected with another. Inspiration for this
example came from Cobley and Jansz (1999, 25-29).
Peirce’s Secondness of Firstness focuses on the nature of the relationship between the
object and the representamen. Thus, although Secondness involves an indexical sign, icon and
symbol, an icon functions as the relationship between the representamen and the object in
Firstness, the index is the relationship between the object and the representamen in Secondness
and a Symbol is the relationship between the object and represeantamen in Thirdness. For Peirce,
an index is one possible event of a sign. Not all signs are indexes, but all indexes are signs
(Silverman 1998).20 As the index is a sign of Secondness it cannot be a sign of Firstness;
however, it can combine with a sign in Secondness or Thirdness. For instance in Chapter 1, one
can recall its role in the rhematic indexical sinsign.
20

Heidegger (cited in Silverman 1998, 49) critiques semiotics for this ambiguity. He is preoccupied with
the notion of essence and is frustrated with semiotics’ refusal to clearly define its essence.

33
In the realm of Thirdness, Peirce identifies three other types of signs. Namely, these are
the previously mentioned rheme, where the sign is depicted for the interpretant as an option; a
dicent, where the sign is depicted for the interpretant as a factual statement; and an argument,
where the sign is demonstrated for the interpretant as a rational (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 34-35).
Each of these signs functions as an interpretant. The rhematic interpretant is a mode of Firstness.
The dicent interpretant is a mode of Secondness and an argument interpretant is a mode in
Thirdness (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 31, 34-35). As discussed above, Peirce used the term ad
infinitum, which means unlimited semiosis to describe the combination of signs within a
contextual framework where each referred to another sign in the cycle (Cobley and Jansz 1999,
25).
Peirce says, “Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign” (Peirce 1902 CP, 2.308).
A sign then can represent an object as long as it is referable. To be phenomenal, the referent must
be describable. Thus, Peirce’s Secondness is demonstrated because if a sign can be related to
some object, there must be some kind of pre-existing relationship based on habitual usage
between the elements of a sign for it to be interpreted as a sign (Ransdell 1980, 154, 177). For
example, when looking at a picture of a castle, a child might imagine what it would be like to
live there, thus moving from the initial object, to the mental image, to the word sign “castle”
which triggered several other signs created in the mind. This supports Peirce's Thirdness
phenomena, where the sign representamen and object form a relationship that, while
simultaneously being conditioned by an interpretant, results in an interpretant (Wells 1980). This
cycle continues as more signs are observed or imagined by the child demonstrating Peirce’s ad
infinitum (unlimited semiosis) (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 25).

34
Peirce and Saussure’s followers have in some cases extended the founders’ underlying
assumptions to explore the implications of the theory. Following Peirce’s original intentions,
today’s semioticians use semiotics as a theoretical framework that can be applied to any
discipline. Since semiotics’ beginnings as a vital part of linguistics through Saussure, it has been
expanded through further research to apply to several areas of study such as zoology,
(zoosemiotics) and botany (phytosemiosis) among many others (Deely 1990, 29-30). Given these
diverse fields of study and the flexible nature of semiotics, it is not surprising Eco says that
“Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is everything which
can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. This something else does not
necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands in for
it” (Eco 1976, 7).
Eco re-considers Peirce’s conception of the sign with reference to Kant’s schema theory
(Eco 1997, 65). He argues that Peirce was likely influenced by Kant’s notions of perceptual and
experiential judgments and re-conceptualizes the schema as a three dimensional model in the
mind. This design would contain information gained from sensory input (Eco 1997, 121). Eco
emphasizes the connection between the task of recognition and this model. The model of a
subject could possess any number of features providing they were all consistent with the
parameters that were created in order to confirm or disconfirm the subject’s identity. While
cognitive theorists would be content to call this a prototype, because a three dimensional model
becomes assigned to it and it is then used to judge any other object, Eco feels this response is too
simplistic.
Eco’s model has a number of significant divisions. These are Cognitive Types (CT),
Nuclear Content (NC), and Molar Content (MC). If cognitive theorists were correct than his CT

35
would be reduced to a simple rule (Eco 1997, 130-132). As cognitive types are created through
collective knowledge and usage of signs one can recognize a subject without having to name it or
be aware of its name. For example, people can recognize that roller blades function in a similar
way to roller skates. The passage of a new term into a generic term comes from the social need to
be able to separate it from its current situation. The term roller blade did not become part of
one’s common vocabulary until marketers wanted to emphasize its differences from roller skates
in order to sell it to people as something unique and different. He suggests that experience
confirms everyone shares the same CT. The expansibility of the form a CT takes in the mind is
left understandably vague. He implies that the collective opinion of what the subject encapsulates
and means is the NC. Eco asserts that this is distinct from meaning because one associates
meaning with mental experience. He takes meaning as synonymous with content in the
Hjelmslevian tradition (Eco 1997, 137-138). A diagram of Eco’s CT/NC model is provided
below.

Figure 3. Eco, Umberto. 1997. Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition. United States:
Harcourt Brace. 1997: 177.

The NC also supplies the criteria to identify the referent that leads to the CT (Eco 1997,
139). He asserts that identification is not to be confused with recognition because recognition

36
implies that any cognitive processing of a previously experienced phenomenon relies on that
perceptual experience, whereas identification implies we have not actually had experience with it
(Eco 1997, 139). Thus, one can be given instructions in order to identify a referent and must
wholly rely on this because the individual has had no experience of it. By this, he contends that
the NC leads one to the creation of a “tentative” CT.
He argues that the CT supplies instructions for identifying the referent. However, when
referring to some phenomena, it is considered a form of performance. His foundation for this
argument is that a word for a thing is also a referent in and of itself, but referring to the referent
requires an act of referring. He also considers the labeling patterns of pre-categorical phenomena
saying that there are semiosis primitives that are sensed by human cultures before labeling has
occurred. Animality, life and rationality are considered pre-categorical to Eco.
As an artist and semiotician, Roland Barthes was intrigued by Saussure’s signifying dyad
and by semiology in general. He believed that he could use it to unpack culturally accepted
myths of everyday reality (Cobley and Jansz 1999, 43). Barthes wrote a short series of articles
titled “a mythology a month” in the French magazine, Les Lettres Nouvelles, decoding the
seemingly simplistic signs of everyday life revealing their complexity and hidden naturalisms
(Cobley and Jansz 1999, 43).
While Barthes was heavily influenced by Saussure, he recognized some of the
inadequacies of Saussure’s original model (Barthes 1968, 25). He notes that Saussure had
perceived that semiology would form part of a general study of linguistics, but Barthes implies
that no signification process can exist outside of language because a real object in space must
always have some referent acting as a duplicate of its meaning. He says all manner of objects
only assume a place in the system through this duplication in what he calls a second-order

37
language (Barthes 1968, 11). Therefore, he asserts that semiology is a part of linguistics as
opposed to linguistics being a part of semiology (Barthes 1968, 9-10). Thus, Barthes’ exploration
of the sign considers the sign with reference to how it functions in a linguistic system. Even
when Barthes was decoding images, underlyingly he still has a linguistic viewpoint and when he
refers to signs, it is within a linguistic context.
Barthes was fascinated with the idea that language was not referential but conceptual, as
Saussure implied. Language then was not simply the medium in which reality was represented,
but rather that, which allows reality to be constructed. It is this very function of the sign dyad,
which allows Barthes to modify Saussure’s model, and apply it to images and objects as well as
words. He reveals how objects relate to signification not only as signs, but also through their
layering (Barthes 1994).
For Barthes, the signifier was a level of expression and a signified was a level of content.
Barthes suggests that the world has an abundance of signs because signification is the mode of
thought rather than fact as held by the objectivists and positivists (Barthes 1994, 159). However,
signs have varying degrees of complexity (Barthes 1994, 158). Barthes chooses to focus on the
difference between signs (Barthes 1994, 159). Through this, he hypothesizes that signs can have
secondary levels of signification called ‘connoted meaning’ (Barthes 1994, 159). He notes that
the phonic and graphic substance of words has a denoted meaning that is very different from its
connoted meaning, although each of these are obtained through the interpretation of the
signifieds. The second level of interpretation (connotation) always refers to both messages. Here
the first message has become a simplified signifier of the second message because the first
message is already contained in the second (Barthes 1994, 175).

38
Barthes asserts there is no object that escapes meaning through some manner of naming,
for even if it attests to have no meaning, this signifies it as “nothing” (Barthes 1994, 182,188).
He viewed this naming system as a type of contract between individuals and the collective.
People had to follow the rules or they would not be permitted to function within the system. In
this way, he felt language was also an institution and it is this idea that leads him into thinking
about the myths of everyday objects because of the various institutions they represent; not the
least of these language itself (Barthes 1968 14, 166). Like Saussure, he viewed Parole as an
individual’s speech act complete only in a speech community and forming one-half of a
continuous dialectic with Langue (Barthes 1968 27, 169).
Barthes says that a sign must be repeated in order for it to exist, for without recognition it
cannot become a sign (Barthes 1985, 237). Semiosis is constantly being established and laid
open for interpretation and critique (Silverman 1998).21 Here visual texts are read in reference to
the person’s own cultural semiotic understanding as embodied in their “gaze” (Barthes 1985,
238), a discursive conversation occurring between the art object and the reading viewer. While at
first art appears to have no code, the code must be present, for anything that can be depicted must
exist first in the realm of language (Barthes 1985, 228). He suggests that when words become
illustrated, the image encodes the history of those words into the very fibers of the canvas
(Barthes 1985, 228-229).
The sign of the word attempts to impose itself on the signifier (the painting) and force it to
signify what the word connotes (Barthes 1985, 171-174). While the word sign seems to have
tamed the signifier in a realistic painting, this is not so present in an abstract art piece where
21

Technically, what Silverman refers to as semiosis is Conceptual Linguistic Semiosis, However, it seems
that, given the main direction of the thesis to suggest a semiotics-inspired learning program that attempts to
capitalize on the effects of positive transfer through the bringing about of student awareness of the similarities and
differences between an L1 and L2 via colour, the basis in Conceptual Linguistic Semiosis is implicit.

39
tension between the word sign and signifier (abstract image) are apparent on a subconscious
level. Arguably, this tension holds the viewer’s gaze and allows them to have an aesthetic
experience. In order to do this, Barthes implies, the modern artist must attempt to strip the
signified (Barthes 1985, 233). The act of signifying implies that there is something that functions
as a sign, which can be understood, because there is also a sign system present to regulate the use
of such information based on convention (Barthes 1994, 180-181).
The challenge of interpretation was how to dissect the art image as text yet not tamper
with its aesthetic beauty. Through the substitution of words through synonyms the writer is able
to substitute one signifier for another of the same meaning but this frequently will create a
connotation (Barthes 1994, 84). Barthes implies that art objects, be they musical scores or
theatrical performances or paintings, only gain meaning when integrated in the material life
(how a material is utilized) of its users (Barthes 1985). The implication of Barthes’ work is that
signs will gain meaning based on the cultural context they are used in. A sign’s environment will
affect how sign users interpret the meaning that is presented through the sign.
In a like fashion to Barthes, Halliday contends that there is a semiotic code in language,
but he also contends that language is a “product” of a “social process” (Halliday 1978, 1).
Halliday says that “… the semantic system, which is the meaning potential embodied in
language, is itself the realization of a higher-level semiotic which we may define as a behavioral
system or more generally as a social semiotic” (Halliday 1978, 39). This social process occurs
within a semiotic framework composed of tenor, register and mode. Tenor refers to the role
relationships of the participants; the mode is the function the language has in the action (Halliday
1978, 110). “A register is a set of meanings that is appropriate to a particular function of
language, together with the words and structures which express these meanings” (Halliday 1978,

40
195). In this way, a person’s reality becomes continually informed by their semantic system
because it has been used to encode reality. The development of language in a semiotic
framework is the creation of “meaning potential” (Halliday 1978, 1).
Halliday views language as a “shared meaning potential,” and a text, in light of this, is
the actualized potential for meaning. Thus, the semantic system is a network of meaning
potential. While Halliday agrees with Saussure that there is an arbitrary connection between
content and expression, he argues that the connection between semantics and grammar cannot be
arbitrary because grammar represents roles or functions of which language is but one realization
of a social semiotic (Halliday 1978, 55). Halliday asserts that in its basic nature, a text is
essentially a sociological event: “… a semiotic encounter through which the meanings that
constitute the social system are exchanged” (Halliday 1978, 139). Halliday says “… it is only
through the encoding of semiotic interaction as text that the ideational and interpersonal
components of meaning can become operational in an environment” (Halliday 1978, 145).
Semantic trends of the environment are the register. The combination of the field, which refers to
what is happening, the tenor, which represents the social “… status and roll relationships” and
purpose for speaking and mode which is essentially the genre, determine the register (Halliday
1978, 62). He contends that there is no strict boundary between vocabulary and grammar. The
relationship varies across cultures. He uses the example of colour to demonstrate this (Halliday
1978, 197, 198). The human eye has the potential ability to view the whole spectrum, but this
does not mean each language will have a word for each of the visible colours. This helps set the
standard for what users pay attention to as they converse (Halliday 1978, 198). As a discourse
has a generic structure, and lexicogrammatical systems take from all components to form a text,

41
a text may contain a variety of meanings which all conform to fit the structure (Halliday 1978,
188).
Halliday views language as just one of the semiotic systems that produce culture.
Language is used to express social processes and metaphors, allowing people to use language to
act and to reflect on their thoughts. He says that language as a system is divided into three levels:
semantics, phonology and lexicogrammar. Meaning is expressed through a variety of modes, and
language is only one of these (Halliday 1978, 189). Variation is built into the language.
Language represents reality referentially and metaphorically. Context creates needs for certain
language, and certain language allows for the development of content. Halliday realizes that
language as knowledge is connected to other broad fields of information: language as
knowledge, language as art, language as behavior.
Halliday says language is the medium through which a human being becomes a
personality in consequence of his membership of society and his occupancy of social roles
(Halliday 1978, 15). He asserts that even an infant has a linguistic system in as far as he/she can
use vocal sounds for a consistent reason (Halliday 1978, 19). In other words there is a
relationship between infants’ content and expression (Halliday 1978, 30). Halliday argues that
initial utterances gradually result in instrumental, regulatory, personal, heuristic, imaginative and
informative language functions (Halliday 1978, 19-20). Halliday believes that these are the six
basic functions that result from utterances (Halliday 1978, 19-20; Halliday 1975, 19).
He contends that infants internalize the fact that language gives them the potential for
these functions. Language becomes a means of learning, and children learn how to use it to
encode their daily experiences (Halliday 1978, 21). He states that at 18 months of age, infants
subconsciously encode utterances as either mathetic or pragmatic, and at 21 months, most

42
utterances are classed as one or the other. At 24 months, “every utterance” an infant hears “is
both ideational and interpersonal” (Halliday 1978, 72).
Halliday says that “… language is first used to identify the self, in contradistinction to
the environment; it is then used to explore the environment” (Halliday 1978, 55). He contends
that language has to interpret the various phenomena that one encounters in the external world
outside the self as well as the internal processes occurring in one’s consciousness, thus a
linguistic system must have a certain number of categories and processes to make it manageable.
Halliday’s model is triadic, composed of ideational, textual and interpersonal parts. He states that
the child’s system is two dimensional with content and expression, whereas an adult system
includes grammar as a third dimension in order to separate various language functions (Halliday
1978, 56) to make it more clear which function is being utilized. 22 In the adult system the
speaker/hearer looks to the social system in order to decode a text. It seems that the tenor creates
the mood which makes up part of the interpersonal part and the textual aspect (Halliday 1978).
When children become aware of their own semiotic, there can be a conflict with the
semiotic of their ideas and those of the dominant culture. As linguistic codes have different
statuses, the knowledge of one code may be viewed as a deficit in comparison to another and this
has no relation to the actual language structure or vocabulary (Halliday 1978, 103). It is a social
disadvantage (Halliday 1978, 104). Halliday implies that a child’s ability to develop his/her
meaning potential is not an innate property of the child or any indication of his/her intelligence,
“… it is merely the result of a mismatch between his own symbolic orders of meaning and those

22

Halliday’s (1978) argument that grammar is not a part of children’s semiotic system could support the
idea that children begin thinking in signs that are more likely to be present in R-mode thinking such as qualisigns,
sinsigns and icons before being able to process arbitrarily related symbols such as letters. Children may be exposed
to such signs through viewing images, manipulating objects and expressing their feelings.

43
of outside influences such as school” (Halliday 1978, 26). He feels this mismatch results from
different social patterns (Halliday 1978, 26).
Halliday contends that, because of external influences on the internal symbolic system of
people, the act of creating meaning is limited to the way people are allowed to interact in the
social structure (Halliday 1978, 66). There is a sense then, that the linguistic system is “value
charged” (Halliday 1978, 66). He suggests that if a person’s speech or their semantic habits are
imbedded in one’s consciousness, criticisms of pronunciation have less to do with forms and
more to do with the value placed on linguistic tendencies. A person’s language can be viewed as
somehow aesthetically or pragmatically sub-standard based on the specifications of their
language, thus language can function as symbols and represent indices of social structure
(Halliday 1978). Children learn then that there is a natural dialectic relationship between
language and the social system (Halliday 1978). Through the union of internal and external
influences children create meaning based on a certain set of social functions, gradually
developing the ability to use combinations of these as they present advantages for their
developing minds.
Halliday views social contexts as semiotic structures. These, he asserts, are three
dimensional, composed of the role relationships involved, the ongoing social activity and the
symbolic of rhetorical channel. He formalizes these into tenor, field and mode (Halliday 1978,
110). In this way, Halliday says that one’s culture is transferred to one by making the semiotic
principles of one’s culture accessible. The code comes pre-defined thus language is the main
medium through which culture is transmitted (Halliday 1978, 106).

44
Codes are “above the linguistic system” as “they are a type ‘of social semiotic’ meaning”
as generated by the social system (Halliday 1978, 111). These codes are manifested in language
through social actions. Thus they control the patterns of register underlying culture.
Hence the codes transmit, or control the transmission of, the underlying patterns of a
culture or subculture, acting through the socializing agencies of family, peer group and
school. As a child comes to attend to and interpret meanings, in the context of situation and
in the context of culture, at the same time he takes over the code. The culture is transmitted
to him with the code acting as a filter, defining and making accessible the semiotic
principles of his own subculture, so that as he learns the culture he also learns the grid or
sub-cultural angle on the social system. (Halliday 1978, 111)
Barthes’ impression of Langue as a language made of societal conventions based on values
and devoid of speech sounds very similar to Halliday’s. Barthes did not consider this an act, but
a social reality made of rules that individuals could not penetrate unless willing to conform to the
rules of the collective in order to communicate within the confines of the system. Of central
importance to this system was the act of classification (Barthes 1994, 47). This included the
naming of phenomena into rules, materials, styles, genres and parts (Barthes 1994, 47). He adds
that the signified has two coordinates. The first is the symbolic coordinate, whereby each object
has some metaphorical basis, and the second, a classification coordinate, whereby objects are
given a name within a particular field that associates them into a category (Barthes 1994, 183184). While these categories are by no means universal, it is likely that there is some “reservoir”
of a “finite” set of “symbolic objects” (Barthes 1994, 185).
From the arguments in this section, some conclusions can be drawn before moving to
section 2.2. The Saussurian sign does not seem to go beyond the confines of language, whereas
Peirce’s sign, due to its triadic representation, necessarily interacts with wider semiotic subsystems through his states of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Although Barthes seems to
extend Saussure’s semiology by noting that a sign’s context can influence the meaning it
conveys, his focus still seems to be linguistic because he is decoding the written and visual texts

45
of items from popular culture such as advertisements. In other words, he is treating a sign
whether it is on a canvas or a billboard as something that can be read and interpreted based on
the broader linguistic context that it occupies within society. Halliday then takes cultural context
even further, trying to determine how social context aids in language learning. He discovers that
children actively create meanings from the sign relations they recognize through the performance
of functions within the confines of their social environment. In order to understand how learning
became dependant on the use of internal and external signs as a mode of human functioning, it
can be useful to consider how the use of signs evolved.
2.1 The Evolution and Development of Signs
Deacon asserts that human beings are the only mammalian species to possess the rare ability to
use “symbolic reference” (Deacon 1997 22, 41). This associative power separates human beings
from chimpanzees that can be trained to use tools and make certain routine associations between
images on computer screens. During such computer-based tests, human beings are able to
randomly choose from a variety of images and combine them in any manner. However, while
chimpanzees can be trained to remember a certain combination of images, when given the
opportunity to combine any set of pictures together, they are unable to choose freely without
duplicating the original learned sequence.
According to Deacon the ability to “communicate” symbolically came from years of
evolution where symbolic reference became a kind of organizing strategy in which to catalogue
and classify referents (Deacon 1997, 22, 100). At some point in humankind’s evolution it
became advantageous to communicate through symbols instead of non-symbolic grunts. As early
hominid cultures diversified, the need to communicate more complicated messages, such as

46
teaching skills to offspring, became necessary. 23He hypothesizes that as symbolic reasoning
became more and more useful, it actually helped form the brain by gradually developing more
specialized brain sectors for language and communication. Deacon attempts to make the
distinctions between ape and human vocal apparatuses clear, using the diagram in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Deacon, Terrence. 1997. The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain.
New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd. 1997: 356.

Deacon says there are concrete and abstract concepts represented in the brain, but these
are culturally recognized and constructed as people create hierarchies of indexical interpretations
through their daily experiences. He states “… it is not the thing that is ultimately brought into
reference, nor even the common images that are elicited, that determines the difference in the
ways that words and odors can derive their reference; it is rather how these responses are

23

These developments came into effect in part due to the need for a more stable society where men hunted
and returned to the camp with meat in order to ensure pregnant mothers could be guaranteed there would be enough
meat for them to sustain their offspring who would be raised to support the group (Deacon 1997).

47
produced” (Deacon 1997, 64). Human beings are able to interpret signs in different ways and
organize them into hierarchies of associative relationships.
People have to be able to create indexical associations between words and objects in
order to achieve symbolic reference, but they must go beyond them in order to achieve a
functioning symbolic reference. He hypothesizes that as there are words that can transfer to a
word that rhymes with it, stimulus features and semantic features reveal how the brain can house
both symbolic and non-symbolic connections under the same classification. This is because
symbols do not only relate to objects in the world, but to each other, thus hinting at the system
that lies behind them. He implies that the blueprint for this system pre-exists in order to give a
symbol its referential power. This is the basis of non-symbolic referential processes where
indexical relationships exist in a hierarchy that in turn dictates the symbol’s relationship to other
symbols and continues to influence the evolving symbolic reference system (Deacon 1997, 71,
72, 98).
Deacon further argues that symbolic reference is complicated because the signs’ linkage
has nothing to do with their proximity to each other but represents the function of the
relationship that the symbol has to other ones. For example, words that have similar functions do
not occur together. Once formed, previous sign relations allow one to anticipate future
correlations. Thus, people learn to connect symbols to corresponding objects, which provides
guidance to understanding the relationship represented by the association.
Piaget became interested in testing children to determine how they learned to associate
objects with symbols. He also wanted to understand the effect that established sign relations
would have on future ones as the child’s synthetic and logical thinking skills developed. Piaget’s
research has provided numerous contributions to child psychology (Vygotsky 1962). In his book,

48
The Grasp of Consciousness, he summarizes children’s intellectual development by tracking how
conscious they are of their actions while they perform certain tasks. He summarizes these
findings based on operational levels of skill and cognition. How conscious children are of the
effects of their actions is determined by their level of cognitive growth. His work shows that this
correlates with children’s ages. Knowing this helps him to establish his sensorimotor,
preoperational, concrete operational and formal operational stages of conscious development
based on children’s ages. Although his followers such as Case, Pascual-Leone and others have
since modified precisely when these stages occur, the essential idea that children go through
certain developmental stages as they grow from infancy remains intact (Santrock et al. 2004).
Piaget’s theories are discussed here only to establish a plausible timeframe for the activation of
the sign slots and networks that is compatible with Peirce’s states of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness. This synthesis, in the form of a construct model, is referred to in Appendix C.
Piaget’s work suggests that the child’s mind has two mental modes of thinking. One is
concerned with all his/her immediate wants. This is the plane of subjectivity. It contains
egocentric thought. He says this functions as a sub-conscious thought where causal relations are
represented by images not words and, as such, is “incommunicable” (Piaget 1966, 63).24 The
second sphere consists of the upper plane. This is called the plane of objectivity and it houses
socialized thought (Claparede 1966, 14). It is built up by the social environment and gradually
shapes the child’s speech and logic and vise versa. This socialized thought constitutes the child’s
reality outside her/himself. The socialized plane of the brain then is viewed as “. . . enabled
through the bond established by language between thoughts and words to make an increasing use

24

This incommunicable state seems to resemble Peirce’s state of Firstness: images are fluid, continually
taken in by the sensorimotor system in the brain. Piaget’s socialized thought is more like Peirce’s state of
Secondness because this brings the child’s situational environment into a relation with the self.

49
of concepts; whereas autism, just because it remains individual, is still tied to imagery, to organic
activity, and even to organic movements” (Piaget 1966, 64).
Piaget argues that egocentric reasoning is more intuitive, “syncratic” rather than
deductive, while “abstract collaboration” does not seem to appear until age seven. Piaget argues
that egocentric thought is different from socialized thought in that it is non-discursive, intuitive
without deduction, whether the thoughts are expressed verbally or not, and uses schemas. He
conglomerates the three aspects of egocentric thought into the phenomenon of syncretism of
thought (Piaget 1966, 140). Until a child is seven or eight years of age, egocentric thought will
dominate, and the child’s need for syncretism will be evident. After the age of seven to eight
years, egocentric thought is still present, but only in abstract verbal modes of thought. The result
of this is that children may not reveal any syncretism in their thoughts motivated by what they
observe whether these include language or not, but it becomes apparent in their thoughts that do
not involve immediate observations. This type of syncretism is called verbal syncretism and only
appears after age seven to eight (Piaget 1966, 141). He says that children think in terms of
general schemas and that these schemas “supplant” the ability to perceive detail (Piaget 1966,
144). From this, Piaget suggests that language must develop from the whole to the part and from
a syncretism of thought to more analytic thought (Piaget 1966, 146).
Piaget intimates that egocentric and socialized forms of thinking are active during certain
operational stages in the child’s life (Piaget 1966). Egocentric thought dominates during the
sensorimotor stage from birth to two years of age. The preoperational stage occurs from age two
to age seven and is characterized by the increased use of socialized thought, while still within an
egocentric framework. The period of age eight to eleven is characterized by more socialized
thought and less egocentric thought, whereas the formal operational stage is dominated by

50
socialized thought (Santrock et al. 2004). He feels there is little social life for children younger
than seven due to the dominance of their egocentric thought (Piaget 1966, 61). He found that
during the ages of five to seven and a half, children speak to themselves even when in a group of
children because children do not pay attention to the hearer as their speech is for their own
benefit only (Piaget 1966, 32). Piaget called this a collective monologue (Piaget 1966, 33). This
form of self-communication still occurs between the ages of six and seven (Piaget 1966, 37).
Children have great difficulty understanding another person’s point of view because their
thought is egocentric. He suggests that children can still understand each other only that their
comprehension may not be along verbal lines depending on which stage they are in (Piaget 1966,
62).
Piaget lists several examples where children justify the feature of an item by the presence
of other features as integral and un-removable from the whole. One such example was a five year
old trying to justify that the moon does not fall down because it is high up and the sun is not
there. This answer demonstrates that the child always perceives the moon’s features together as a
unified whole (Piaget 1966, 147). When he tested children’s understanding of proverbs, he found
that they were able to sense that the story had some symbolic meaning. During his observations,
he was able to deduce that unknown words in the text were formed from the same schema of the
phrase, and then any details to be discovered after these were interpreted within the framework
of general schemas (Piaget 1966, 162). All children of the same age groups answered the
questions in the same manner. There was continuity between the children’s answers. Piaget
states that “. . . the ego-centric mentality, occupies, as will be shown later on, a position halfway between autistic and logical thought” (Piaget 1966, 170). He demonstrates this by noting

51
that when children draw, it is not as they see things, but as they interpret their world based on the
aforementioned general schemas (Piaget 1966, 189).
Piaget wanted to test to what degree the child attributed the item’s reactions to his action
or to the causal relationship between objects (Piaget 1976, 238). These studies ranged in their
complexity from describing the act of crawling on the ground and reproducing the crawling
motions taken with a toy model, to more complicated acts such as estimating in which direction a
tethered ball would travel after being released from a specified location. The accumulative
results of all of these tests showed that children of a particular age group tend to have the same
level of awareness of the causality of their actions and the actions of objects. While the infant is
in this sensorimotor stage, which occurs from birth to about two years, the infant is focused on
his own understanding and can only use trial and error procedures to lead him/her to a correct
understanding (Piaget 1976).25 He argues that the act of becoming conscious of an action
associates a concept with an action (Piaget 1976, 332). For example, if a goal is assigned to a
particular object such as throw the ball at a right angle, Piaget suggests that when learners are
aware of the result of their actions these are recognizable while still generalizable, allowing the
schema to become a concept (Piaget 1976, 336). Thus, the implication of this is that learner’s
awareness of the ball moving from their throw allows for the development of cause and effect
relations.
Piaget argues that an infant of a few months old first discovers “causal connections” only
through his own actions (Piaget 1976, vi). Later he/she gains the ability to perceive these in
terms of how objects can act on other objects, for example, a ball bouncing off a toy. This is
25

Piaget’s account of the infant’s trial and error procedures in order to learn would likely support the theory
of embodied cognition because the implication is that the infant only gains an understanding of himself by
continually exploring his environment through his/her body. The repeated movements would also strengthen
pathways between receptors in the body and the corresponding connections in the brain in the bodymind.

52
called the “representation level” (Piaget 1976, vi). Piaget concluded that “the mechanism of
cognisance appears in all these aspects as a process of conceptualization—reconstructing, then
going beyond, on the semiotic and representational planes what was acquired on that of the
action schemes” (Piaget 1976, 342).
Piaget suggests that “pre-causality” results from confusion between the
physical/intellectual world, known as the world of ethical or logical necessity, and the world of
mechanical necessity (Piaget 1966, 188, 194). This is because children understand an object by
its name. In this respect, the name is bound to the thing (Piaget 1966, 199). The assumptions of
children reveal confusion between “. . . the real order of things, just as pre-causality confuses
logical implication and causal explanation” (Piaget 1966, 215). When children ask what an
object is, they mean they want to know the name of the object. When they receive this name, it
functions as a symbol, a definition, and an explanation of the object itself. From his research
with children, Piaget was able to deduce that the mind has two main categories of thought: an
explicatory function and an “implicatory function,” that exist simultaneously in the process of
thinking. The “explicatory function” refers to when the mind turns outwards, whereas the
“implicatory function” operates at a moment when one’s mind turns inwards (Piaget 1966, 236).
Vygotsky contends that Piaget “revolutionized” the study of child language and thought,
allowing for many positive developments (Vygotsky 1962, 9). He summarizes Piaget’s argument
as the view that egocentric thought associated with the earliest form of thought lies in the middle
of autistic thought and socialized thought. Vygotsky critiques Piaget’s work saying that Piaget
has ignored the phenomenon of inner speech, but if he were to connect these to Piaget’s
egocentric and socialized thought, he would have to consider that a child’s inner speech
development occurs before their socialized speech. However, Vygotsky’s research suggests this

53
is contrary to his findings (Vygotsky 1962, 19). His perspective is that both communicative and
egocentric language have distinct social functions. Egocentric speech is produced when a child
transfers social behaviour into inner-functions. He hypothesizes that socialized behaviour comes
before inner speech thus he believes that an individual is shaped from the social to the individual
(Vygotsky 1962, 20). He asserts this because the very fact that children can learn concepts
suggests that there must be a pre-existing system in which to designate them as such.
Vygotsky hypothesizes that there is a link between the overt and inner-speech of children.
In the child, this intermediary stage occurs when a child starts using grammatical forms and
structures before they know what they mean (Vygotsky 1962, 46). Being able to say words does
not guarantee a child understands them. For example, a child can speak with correct grammar
long before he or she knows the causal relations between the words he/she speaks (Vygotsky
1962, 46). For example, a child can use words like “because” and “if” before he/she understands
temporal, conditional, or causal relations. Words and syntax are mastered in speech before
thought (Vygotsky 1962, 46). He suggests one can consider speech and thought as divergent
lines. Where they intersect verbal thought involves speech (Vygotsky 1962, 5, 49).
Vygotsky argues that during the child’s first months of life, sound formations such as
babbling have definite social functions (Vygotsky 1962, 42). He envisions the mind as
overlapping spheres where thought and speech come together to form verbal thought. From such
evidence, Vygtosky implies thought and speech develop from different types of thought. He
contends that a child will understand the external structure of word-object before the inner
symbolic structure (Vygotsky 1962, 50). This means that if children are given guidance by a
more informed learner, the introductory learning will help them learn the concept and convert it
into their inner speech. Careful guidance from adults and older children can help prepare

54
children for concept formation. Thus, Vygotsky stipulates that learners have a zone of proximal
development, which allows them to learn concepts that would normally be too difficult for them
to grasp, providing they are given help in the form of social instruction from elders such as
teachers, older family members, etc. Vygotsky says,
All the higher psychic functions are mediated processes, and signs are the basic means
used to master and direct them. The mediating sign is incorporated in their structure as an
indispensible, indeed the central, part of the total process. In concept formation, that sign
is the word, which at first plays the role of means informing a concept and later becomes
its symbol. (Vygotsky 1962, 56)
The ability to control one’s mental actions by using words and other signs is central to
concept formation. In general, this skill develops in adolescence and progresses through
adulthood (Vygotsky 1962, 59). Vygotsky argues that concept formation can be divided into
three stages. The first stage involves the creation of syncretic heaps of objects. The children in
his study guessed what the meanings of the words were in order to place the words into piles. In
the second stage, the pile is organized based on the children’s original self-created criteria, based
on their current perceptual needs. During the second phase, individual objects become bound to
each other. When children enter this stage they will no longer confuse their perceptions of
connections and the conventional ties that exist between objects. Vygotsky referred to this as a
complex. A complex contains concrete connections that are based on factual evidence rather than
logical and abstract conceptions (Vygotsky 1962, 61).
Narziss Ach (cited in Vygotsky 1962) argued that concept formation is a creative
purposive process, whereby a concept is formed through searching for a solution to a problem
(Vygotsky 1962, 54). Thus for a concept to form at all, a problem has to occur that needs the
concept to be learned in order to solve the problem. Ach’s study showed that children under
twelve years of age might understand there is a problem but take a different mental route in

55
determining how to solve it (Vygotsky 1962, 55). Children, under the age of seven, form
complexes to establish relationships between objects, experiences and words. To attain this
complex thinking, one must learn how to abstract elements away from the experience they were
connected to. The process of abstraction continues while children gradually put objects in groups
based on greater similarity of features (Vygotsky 1962, 76).
The bonds forming the basis of complexes are based on experiences, thus there may be
no unity between the objects in the complex. Vygotsky mentions a few types of complexes, such
as the associative type, whereby an object is given a name and the name is used to mediate which
objects will be selected based on their degree of similarity to the collective by merit of its
features (Vygotsky 1962, 62). All objects in the group will then take on this name in the same
way that people have family names. A common feature is not necessary to require the family
name because even the degree of spatial closeness may motivate the child’s decision to include
the object in the family group of objects (Vygotsky 1962, 62). Children may also group objects
based on their level of contrast to the nuclear object (Vygotsky 1962, 63). The nuclear object has
no special significance once the objects are selected for the group because there is no hierarchy
in the group. As each part is equal at this point, it has become a chain complex and no longer an
associative complex (Vygotsky 1962, 64).
The last type of complex is called the “pseudo-concept,” as it is still a complex, although
it seems like a concept (Vygotsky 1962, 66). Complexes are connected to word meanings that
already exist in adult language. In Vygotsky’s last experiment, a word was written on the block
that had a contrary meaning to test what children would do to classify it. In this situation, the
children have conflicting information because they have classed the object based on their own
criteria but now the word gives them a contrary meaning. Subjects that followed what the

56
classificatory word said restarted their sorting, but other subjects, after finding out they were
incorrect, kept objects together based on the colour or shape of the block under the category
name. Other children removed the one block containing the contradiction, but kept the rest in the
pile under their original label (Vygotsky 1962, 67). From his experiments, he contended both
adults and children have a sense of what words mean, but the child uses different mental
processes to reach that conclusion (Vygotsky 1962, 68). In terms of labels, Vygotsky says that
the transfer of names to objects is carried out through concrete similarities such as through its
image or function. Various associations will influence transfer, but the longer the time passes
before the transfer occurs the more difficult it will be to locate the source of the original
connection (Vygotsky 1962, 74).
When a child is able to abstract features or qualities of objects away from the complex
and re-analyze them as a synthesis of which complex thinking is a necessary part, then this
synthesis becomes the main instrument of thought (Vygotsky 1962, 79-80). For adolescents to be
able to take that and apply it to concrete situations, which are unlike their original experience
that helped them to form the complex, an abstraction of what they have learned must occur
(Vygotsky 1962, 80). Vygotsky says that research shows that adolescent concept formation
involves the use of words to focus a category, which will lead to the abstraction of qualities and
the synthesis of these qualities until they can be “symbolized” with a sign (Vygotsky 1962, 81).
Vygotsky criticizes Piaget for his failure to connect the socialized thinking that begins to
develop in children to their inner-developmental processes because he feels that the inner
egocentric thought of the child is assimilated by the socializing thought they receive from their
external environments (Vygotsky 1962, 85). Vygotsky says that Piaget’s research would suggest
that during a child’s development these two types of thought would be in conflict, each

57
compromising its use until adult language subsumes it (Vygotsky 1962, 87-88). Vygotsky
contends that egocentric language does not just fade away as this does not take into account the
integrative process of concept formation (Vygotsky 1962, 135).
In contrast to Vygotsky, Lamb (1999) is interested in what happens to concepts once they
have been formed and need to be related to established concepts within the brain. He argues that
a person’s linguistic system consists of relational networks, which are composed of nodes and
their interconnections within the brain. Figure 5 is one of his diagrams that illustrate this.

Figure 5. Lamb, Sydney M. 1999. Pathways of the Brain: The Neurocognitive Basis of Language.
Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1999: 79.

He asserts that multiple sense modalities, such as sight, smell, touch and taste, form
networks. He contends each of these seem to connect to higher levels within its sense network
until the newly activated nodes reach a level where they interact with the other senses (Lamb
1999, 124). For instance, one’s perception of a bird song could also be connected to its image or

58
the sensation of touching its feathers. The combinations of these networks create the concept of
bird. In other words, in a similar manner to semiotics, Lamb (1999) believes that the brain
processes brain signals as signs. These signs are represented by a label, which is connected to a
network. He intimates these signs and symbols can form part of the structure of a system and be
the sign itself (Lamb 1999, 112). This system allows people to view words and sentences
metaphorically as linguistic objects (Lamb 1999, 112, 118). Evidently, text has a form on paper
that one can perceive.
Lamb (1999) uses the term ‘concepts’ to refer to a group of connections that reside in a
network. The label for the network is a lexeme, such as the word ‘bird,’ which is used to
represent the category of bird. Lamb’s work suggests that the lexeme level of categorization is at
the same level of the conceptual fields at the tops of the sense networks, thus the conceptual
system integrates perceptual systems with language.
Halliday, cited in Lamb (1999), contends with Lakoff (1987), Dooley and Levinson (2000)
that child language evolves as a two part system whereby meaning is linked to sounds and
gestures at first, but gradually evolves and shifts to take meaning from words first and secondly
to apply them to expressions (Lamb 1999, 34). The cognitive mechanism that functions to allow
for the creation of concepts through the activation and deactivation of nodes has two different
responsibilities: production and comprehension. To stimulate production, both perception and
recognition are required. He postulates that there is likely considerable redundancy of high
frequency phonological forms and commonly used words in the production and reception
systems, while low frequency forms may only be represented in the recognition system. As low
frequency items have to travel from the lower levels of the recognition system to the production

59
system, it takes longer to produce low frequency forms (Lamb 1999). He illustrates this by
drawing out networks and describing each of the types of junctions that are possible.
The recognition and production functions of the cognitive mechanism must be considered
in the process of learning (Lamb 1999). Children learn to recognize sounds before they can
produce them (Lamb 1999, 131). The area of the brain responsible for sending messages to the
organs involved in speech is activated through its recognition of signs. This tendency is
demonstrated when people can understand more vocabulary than they can produce because
articulatory production is in effect maintained by auditory perception. When one is listening to
speech, the nerves in the auditory receptors send messages to the brain to the conceptual and
motor areas of the brain. Thus, new words are learned at the recognition level first, before they
move downwards to production. Reception not only occurs before production but it also
influences that production, such as when a person monitors their own speech as they say it
(Lamb 1999, 131).
Lamb gives an example of a concept network at work in a child’s mind after limited
exposure to a shirt. He says that even this small network is made of 10,000 nodes because the
concept is formed through the joining of many sub-networks. There is a visual sub-network that
contains the object’s viewable features (Lamb 1999) and there are also the somatosensory
connections through sight and touch of a shirt (Lamb 1999). All of these sub-networks come
under the lexical category of ‘shirt,’ which in turn represents the concept of shirt. A child
learning language must learn to connect this vast system of sub-networks to the category and
word ‘shirt,’ which she/he has heard previously in order to communicate effectively. Thus, a

60
connection between the phonological form and the mental label of ‘shirt’ is able to form out of
necessity. 26 Lamb says that categories:
. . . will be defined for each child according to that child’s semiological system,
according to that child’s knowledge (already present) of what eating is, as it exists at the
time of learning of the word eat. Later, as the child learns more, it may change its
understanding of the categories. (Lamb 1999, 268)
Children will know that humans share qualities such as the ability to eat and that
something needs to perform the action. Gradually they will become aware that most often
the first participant in the utterance performs the action. (Lamb 1999, 269-270)
Lamb implies that the elements of a system that allow for the development of networks is
pre-determined by biology. He proposes that children are born with a universal set of preconnections. Thus, the human brain may already have thousands of connections to other
networks simply waiting to be activated with the appropriate stimuli (Lamb 1999, 190).27
According to Lamb, these connection lines do not become activated through a logical point A to
point B manner, because the activations are constantly moving, strengthening one pathway, and
weakening another as the nodes move from the “semological” level to the “lexemic nection”
level of activation (Lamb 1999, 125). How strong the activation of a connection becomes is
dependent on the connection itself and the amount of activity it receives (Lamb 1999, 178).
Lamb suggests that human beings are “model builders” (Lamb 1999, 103). Each person
has a personal information system that is embedded in a world that one uses to navigate his/her
environment. This world encapsulates all that is within and outside the body. Lamb criticizes the
26

Lamb hypothesizes that children only process the content words in the sentence because they do not yet
have the cognitive ability to process the grammar. In his example, he says that participants and verbs are grouped
together as a unit because words such as “eat” cannot be separated from the action (Lamb 1999, 268).

27

Lamb’s (1999) idea that despite the proposed pre-programmed nature of the brain activation of such
networks requires the appropriate stimuli such as muscular action seem to support the notion of embodied cognition.
Here he suggests that there is evidence that shows merely having networks is not enough. Mental networks need
stimulus to be activated and they need more activity to sustain those networks.

61
idea that there are three worlds: the real world, the mental system that reflects it, and the
projected world. He believes the projected world is always super-imposed on the real one. He
also feels one’s mental system is not a world in and of itself because it is merely an internal
representation of the actual world, in essence the creator of the projected world (Lamb 1999).
The internal world receives direct experience of the real world as experienced through the
senses and perceptual systems (Gattegno 1973; Lamb 1999). This includes linguistic information
(Lamb 1999, 105). Because the cognitive mechanism has worked so hard to render itself
invisible, it is not surprising that people can have difficulty distinguishing between the projected
world and the actual world. Model building is a lifelong process. The cognitive mechanism
works so well that people equate what it is able to do with what it actually does to produce
products.
People are limited in their perceptions of the world (Lamb 1999, 105) because they can
never grasp what is truly real and must be content with approximations of it (Lamb 1999, 106).
Lamb’s response, according to his network model, is that the process of putting information in
memory is a matter of strengthening connections within the network. The activation, reactivation
and deactivation of nodes allow memory to work as directly as it seems to (Lamb 1999).
Lamb implies that the connection of forms to the actual world they represent is not as
direct as it seems because there are several levels of “activations” that occur between the lexicogrammatical level and the world. He proposes that there is an “inner semantics” and an “outer
semantics” level in the “sememic system” (Lamb 1999, 145). The inner involves the lexis but the
outer includes its interactions with the outside world (Lamb 1999, 146). For instance, as a
person’s concept of a bird expands to include a bird song, auditory connections are established.

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Lamb attests that lower level nodes, which represent perceivable characteristics, allow for
one’s conscious experience of the world, whereas high-level nodes internalize that perception,
slotting it into categories. Lower level nodes allow the spread of information from one subsystem to other ones (Lamb 1999, 152). Lamb asserts that there is sufficient research in
neurophysiology to postulate that for children, language development is mostly a bottom up
process (Lamb 1999, 162). For example, in the fetus the neurons of its cerebral cortices have
very little myelination on their axons. When there is myelination, this enhances the abilities of
the neurons to activate the primary cortical layers gradually spreading to the secondary layers
(Lamb 1999, 162-163).
Lamb is, of course, not the only theorist to consider the brain’s relationship to signs in the
mind. Chevalier endeavours to determine how the brain and language intersect using
neuropsychology, semiotics and philosophy (Chevalier 2002a, 3). He attempts to answer whether
signs could relate to each other in a similar way to how neurons function (Chevalier 2002a, 91).
Communication between neurons involve “…a special type of branched cell that binds together
and supports the nervous tissue of the central nervous system” (Chevalier 2002a, 6). He
metaphorically links this net of neural activity, to the process of signification (Chevalier 2002a,
9). In this manner, Chevalier does not quite equate the process of signification with “nervous
sign activity” in the brain, but rather says the ways by which signs connect will likely resemble
neural processes (Chevalier 2002a, 91). In his vision, the physical mental fibers that neurons pass
through become the foundation of the webbing to allow for the transference of signs from one
strand to another. Davis (1994) also uses a similar analogy of a net to describe the relationship of
neurons to synapses. As it serves to clarify Chevalier, it is included below:
Picture the brain as a large fishing net. There are vertical cords and horizontal
cords, and every place the cords cross there is a knot. In this model, the cords would be

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neurons and the knots would be synapses. By tracing along the cords, you can move from
any knot to any other knot in the net. So theoretically, every synapse of the brain is
connected to every other synapse. (Davis 1994, 46)
As a perceptual stimulus comes into the net, the first knot is stimulated. From
there the signal is processed by sending other stimuli along other cords to other knots,
and so on, until the original stimulus has reached all the knots it must reach. There are an
untold number of different paths this stimulus could follow, but once a particular path is
used, it becomes stronger. The stronger it is, the more it is used. Also, there are certain
paths that never get stimulated, so they remain weak and unused. (Davis 1994, 47)
Chevalier calls this phenomenon “semiotic weaving.” He intimates that neurons can only be
discussed in reference to things that are bound to affect brain and sign activity.
Chevalier contends that brain functions can be syncretic or diacritic in nature (Chevalier
2002a, 81-82). As some tasks are more syncretically oriented, whereas others require more
diacritic processing, the lateralization of the brain reflects this. The middle of a neuron is
composed of a soma cell body, which is covered by a protective membrane. Outside the
membrane, the intra and extracellular ions mix with negatively charged ions. As these neurons
move around they travel through single-ion channels signaling back and forth between neurons
(Chevalier 2002a, 86). He argues that the brain functions through both diacritic and syncretic
processing. He concludes that more research is needed to confirm whether sign processes are
synonymous with neurons’ sign activity but adds signs likely resemble neural communications
(Chevalier 2002a, 92) because sign actions are made by the brain. He says that when words only
denote and do not connote meaning, such words may represent nerve cells without connections
to other types of cells (Chevalier 2002a, 100).
Sign neurons exist within broader networks that group similarities and differences
(Chevalier 2002a, 100) through their negative and positive charges. Signs, through their preexisting interconnections, become associated with other signs. In light of this, Chevalier states
“… the sign process is a nervous brain and body activity involving massive quantities of

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electrical and chemical events” (Chevalier 2002a, 138). Thus, nervous signs that both act and
react to other nervous signs produce a form of neural conversation. He suggests that a sign is the
go-between that links an object to a subject’s concept (Chevalier 2002a, 143). Sign processes
have the ability to make an infinite amount of connections (Chevalier 2002a, 143). He argues
that cells organize themselves into groups based on actions and the situational context of other
cells that are around them. This is precisely how words interact with other words and utterances
link to body signs, etc. (Chevalier 2002a, 143-144). In this way, signs are similar to sensory
transducers that change energy into different forms (Chevalier 2002a, 144).
Chevalier states that, sometimes, neural conversations trigger the web. He calls this a
reticle, which means to activate synapses, allowing the brain to be aware of depolarizations as
they occur. However, many of the “communications” between neurons do not trigger an
awareness of them because during a neural process, there can be both attentive and inattentive
synaptic intersections. He compares the nervous system with sign networking, finding that there
are striking parallels between somatic, autonomic, hypolarized and polarized functions of the
neuron and semiosis. He implies that they process information in the same manner. Chevalier
further argues that semiosis produces “somatic sign communications” (Chevalier 2002b, 58).28
He contends that, just as in the brain, people are not aware of every interaction between
signs because many of these neural conversations only support the thinking process, preparing it
to accept incoming signs. He also suggests that there are inhibitive devices that do not allow for
certain connections to form between nervous signs. These involve “hypolarized” interspaces;

28

Gattegno (1973) refers to a person’s soma as their “bag,” intimating that individuals in the womb possess
the genetic material in which to create the proteins that allow for the growth of the entire body. Chevalier’s use of
the term here when viewed in the broader scope of his argument suggests that the process of semiosis is not only the
mode of thought as Peirce intimated, but it is entirely integrated through one’s biological systems. This supports the
embodied cognition theory.

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sign pathways that cause tension because the pathways have not made appropriate connections
(Chevalier 2002b, 58-59).
The potential of the sign to be activated and used is referred to as its sign potential. He
says it is fruitless to try to place this in any distinct area of the brain because “synaptic events”
are read through the combination of many functions and levels of semiotic activity (Chevalier
2002b, 167). As changes in the brain’s voltage travelling past the membrane allows ions to pass
through channels creating a path for one neuron to signal to another, Chevalier views this as
semiotic nervous activity (Chevalier 2002a, 87).
Chevalier discusses the different functions of cerebral hemispheres, suggesting that it is
better to consider them as having different cognitive styles rather than entirely separate
hemispheres. He reviews the research generated from split-brain studies to contend that the right
hemisphere (RH) tends to be primed for interpreting information in nonverbal, holistic, spatial
and emotive ways. The connection between right and left is so integrative that it is difficult to
divide their functioning entirely in practice. For example, he claims that even in a drawing task,
which has traditionally been considered a right brain dominated technique (Edwards 1989), the
task also needs to utilize the left hemisphere to consider details (Chevalier 2002a, 29). Synthesis
occurs because of the interaction of these different hemispheres.
Gattegno’s approach to concept formation is different from Piaget, Vygotsky and Lamb’s
in some respects. His opinion is that the soma is conscious of itself in as much as it can sense
energy move through itself. Infants do this so that they can know their own energy in order to
maximize their potential (Gattegno 1973, vii-viii). Thus, consciousness was already forming in
utero and possibly at the point where a single cell started to divide and designate particular tasks
for each cell. Consciousness then did not start in the brain, but began in the egg that the brain

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would ultimately grow out of (Gattegno 1973, 13-14). He implies the soma is aware that it is
constructing itself with a full chemical knowledge of how that is to be done (Gattegno 1973, 15).
He intimates that when the mother’s raw elements of blood and the chemicals it carries have
been “objectified” into tissues, the soma can then repeat this process with every other element in
the body, and thus tissue can be developed into all aspects of the body that the soma needs
(Gattegno 1973, 15-16).
After each necessary item is made for the body, the conscious energy of the self can
provide it an additional amount of energy to allow it to sustain itself, and then move from there
to focus on the objectification of something else until it needs to utilize that area (Gattegno 1973,
16). He says that the internal world of the soma receives direct experience of the real world as
interpreted through the senses, but only in relation to itself. His research implies that conscious
knowledge also creates a residual mental image of all of its parts from the way they feel in the
soma (Gattegno 1973, 19). In this manner every person is a self-motivated learning system that is
continually shaped by experience through a conscious awareness of itself (Gattegno 1973, viii). 29
It can be inferred from Gattegno’s research that consciousness is formed through layers of
residual sense-images and is therefore initially pre-linguistic. It is not established within a
collective through Saussure’s Langue or through Barthe’s connotative conventions.
Consciousness in this sense is created out of the embodiment of meaning in the self. As Peirce’s
description of Firstness implies, the somatic state is one that is ever present in more complicated

29

Gattegno says, “Another non-verbal awareness permitted to each not-yet-born baby is the formation of the
so-called body-image. Under this name, for a long time, has been understood the image each of us has of
every part of his soma, the intimate knowledge of his limbs, say, which remains in the mind even after an
amputation” (Gattegno 1973, 19). “Dysfunctions call for the intervention of consciousness and the
knowledgeable self that has learned what its soma is all about knows what to do to put things back into
balance (Gattegno 1973, 20)”.

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relationships because, regardless of the actions human beings engage in, the self is always
present.
One’s somatic state could involve Qualisigns, Iconic Sinsigns and Rhematic Indexical
Sinsigns especially. Given the manner and speed by which infants develop their awareness of
these signs through experience with various objects most especially their own bodies, it seems
that human beings’ universal capacity for language involves the creation and recognition of
relationships between signs long before speech develops. At this point it seems they take in
information that then comes to occupy their sign slots.
Saussure and Lacan might argue that these relationships are already present because the
child has been born into a pre-existing linguistic system (Cobley and Jansz 1999) until the infant
becomes aware of the conventional uses of objects. Before this recognition, in a sense they create
relationships between objects through means of their experience because they know of no other
interpretation. Lacan, a follower of Saussure, explained this in an algorithm S/s. The large “S”
represents the world of signification and culture, whereas the little “s” represents the human
subject that enters into the realm of signification (Cobley and Jansz 1999). Perhaps the little “s”
can be associated with the self and the large “S” with social. Lacan cited in Cobley and Jansz
(1999) argues that the two realms never meet yet there are key signifiers that lock in some
manner of meaning for participants who use the sign. The implication of this is that the sign may
appear to have inherent meaning even though it does not. This suggests during a child’s prelinguistic stage, they are engaged in the creation of rudimentary relationships somewhat within,
but also external to the confines of Langue. Lacan’s use of an internal world of the self and an
external social world becomes valuable for the discussion of the PSCC/SCC construct model to
be defined in Chapter 3, Section 2.

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2.2 A Semiotic Interpretation of Key Sign Systems: Language and Culture
Arguably there are many sub-systems of signs within larger sign systems. If we consider
the work of Gattegno (1973) in regards to the evolving soma, there is the potential to view the
human body as one immense sign-creating machine with various faculties. For example, the
pulmonary system is designed to respond to certain signs; the sign of the unaerated blood
signifies to the heart that it needs to react by aerating it. Because of how neurons interact in the
brain and allow information to travel from one to another, every body part, through its
neurological connection to the brain, has the capacity to function as a sign and an interpretant of
other signs. Given that the body is organized into a vast sign network, it should not be surprising
that people can perceive the external world as an immense and intricate tapestry of signs.
Language and culture are perhaps the most intricate sign systems there are. Each is
complex, being composed of multiple and often overlapping sub-systems because signs have
relationships with each other. Since the introduction of semiotics, researchers and philosophers
alike have sought to characterize the types of sub-systems that allow for the use of language and
culture. Language and culture are such immensely complicated systems that they have led to
centuries of research and contemplation. As they are constantly evolving, there is no way to
describe them comprehensively; therefore, one must be satisfied with exploring certain areas of
language in a sufficient amount of detail for the time available. With this in mind, the rest of this
section will highlight some significant sub-systems in language and culture, beginning with a
fundamental one called categorization.
Categorization, the labeling of a certain phenomenological slot, is practiced by all human
societies in one form or another (Lakoff 1987). Human beings have a basic need to classify and
categorize phenomena they perceive in their physical and mental environments in order to

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survive and be successful through organizing their life. Lakoff implies human societies use
categories to group information for easy retrieval and understanding. People create categories in
order to link concepts and objects that have certain properties or qualities in common (Lakoff
1987, 5).
Wittgenstein, cited in Lakoff (1987), asserts that categories can have extendible
boundaries in that they can be extended to include additional objects or be limited to include less,
but this is an active choice by the user and not a natural flexibility of the category (Lakoff 1987,
16). Wittgenstein suggests that categories are based on items that have family resemblances
(Lakoff 1987, 16). In other words, items can belong to a family if they have some feature in
common, but each member does not need to have the same property in common. For instance,
Sibling A and Sibling B may have one quality that is the same, but Sibling D and Sibling A have
a different commonality (Lakoff 1987, 16). Thus, categories are made to be flexible. Historical
semanticists and lexicographers have considered such relationships.
Lakoff’s (1987) proposal is distinct from the classic view, which holds that categories are
created based on the properties of the items within the categories. For example, in the classic
sense, marbles, billiard balls, pachinko balls and peppermints may all occupy a single category
because of the properties of hardness and roundness that each possesses. Lakoff argues that this
classical view came from objectivism and has been central to western culture for so many
decades that people seldom question its logic. He implies that the only logic to come from this
socially imposed and self-internalized system is that symbols are given meaning through their
relation to actual objects in space (Lakoff 1987, 7).
Lakoff (1987) argues that categorization involves not only the embodiment of knowledge
from a people group’s daily experiences, but also imagination, perception, motor activity and

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culture. Categorizing can happen consciously or subconsciously as people use a combination of
the above to organize their understanding of the environment. There can be good and poor
examples of categories since many abstract concepts do not share properties, but will be related
in specific ways through the relationships that they have, such as through, analogy or metaphor
in sentences (Lakoff 1987, 7).
In order for language to serve its communicative purpose, speakers must have an
understanding of categories. They need to have some sense that an utterance refers to some other
elements other than simply sounds. Thus, language is made possible through categorization and
it becomes such a natural process that one is scarcely aware of it (Lakoff 1987). A toddler’s
broad groups of objects are initially organized under one word. The term “dada,” for example,
may be a child’s first word, but it can represent many different objects in the child’s
environment, not just their own father (Gattegno 1972, 10).
As this mental organizing process develops so early, the practice of categorizing becomes
so natural for people that they tend to believe that the world is actually composed of natural
kinds and that one’s mental categories describe things, as they are (Lakoff 1987, 6). People have
countless categories to represent abstract ideas such as emotions and relationships. Lakoff also
argues the process of categorization is so fundamental to human beings that to alter one’s
perception of what constitutes a category is to change one’s understanding of the world. This
means that one’s understanding of knowledge, meaning, grammar, truth, and rationality may
change based on their category construction processes (Lakoff 1987).
Brown (1965, cited in Lakoff 1987) states that basic level categories develop before
taxonomic categories. Basic-level categorization involves experiential aspects of human
psychology, gestalt perception, motor activities, social function, memory and mental imagery

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(Lakoff 1987, 37). Therefore, basic level interactions connect to cognitive structures and
knowledge about the actual world. A basic level category is a level where shape is used to
determine membership into the category. In a basic level category, the role of perception is to
perceive shape and to produce a single mental image in order to promote immediate
identification through symbol recognition and fast recall. The level of subject is the level learned
most quickly, as it is also the first category level to be named and understood by children across
languages (Brown 1965).
Basic-level categories govern how a person organizes most of the knowledge he/she
gains. This means that basic level categories involve perception, function and communication to
help organize information in specific ways (Lakoff 1987, 47). Function is connected to the
general motor skills that are needed to do the action associated with the category.
Communication functions to promote ease of use and sharing through its contextually neutral
words. Qualities and characteristics of all the words are usually accompanied with the words at
this level. These are usually divided into parts and wholes (Lakoff 1987, 47).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Uexküll categorized types of umwelt into different levels
based on an organism’s sensory-motor code in relation to its environment. The vegetative umwelt
included organisms that could perform simple actions such as searching, selecting, swarming,
and spreading among others (Cobley 2010, 52). Animal umwelten involves the associating of
objects with actions in memory and creation of relationships between new objects. This then
allows for the connections between objects, angles, and distance allowing mental maps of terrain
to be created, orienting animal species in space (Cobley 2010, 53). The last type is referred to as
lebenswelt and this category is strictly used in reference to human beings. This involves the
recognition that signs represent relations as separate from the objects that evoke them. Thus,

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lebenswelt involves the ability to perceive one’s umwelt as an “objective world.” According to
Deely (1982), Uexküll intimated that given the unique forms of organisms, the manner by which
they interpret signs would be dependent on their sensory systems (Deely 1982, 99).
Leach implies that sensory information can be converted into sign “modes” (Leach 1986,
11). 30 This makes it possible to move smoothly from a written text into speech and from
listening to music to singing or visualizing the song being played. He implies that this means all
sensory data must be coded in the same manner. This seems to support Peirce’s notion of
unlimited semiosis where one sign of the triadic relation functions as a representamen for
another. Leach proposes to modify Saussure’s original term of sound image to sense-image
(Leach 1986, 18). Likely this would extend Saussure’s semiology to more of a semiosis where
the emphasis is on the process of forming signs rather than linguistic analysis. Leach endeavors
to explain the connection between these sense-images, objects and events in real life. Signs occur
within events that flow from culture, thus signs are inextricably linked to each other through that
event. Without its relationship to other signs a sign cannot convey information. He asserts that
outside of this, context signs must have come from the same contextual set if they are to have
meaning (Leach 1986, 13). This is because “human communication is achieved by means of
expressive actions which operate as signals, signs and symbols” (Leach 1986, 9).
Although, like Leach, Chomsky is interested in human communication, he is less
interested in analyzing what it is and how it is achieved through signs than discovering what the
mental mechanism is that allows it to take place. To account for the fact that children learn how
to communicate in relatively similar ways despite being exposed to imperfect linguistic forms,

30

Leach uses the term “modes” to refer to the means or pathway that the sign information uses to travel.
For example, he says “The basic argument is that the messages which we receive in different modes (through our
various senses of touch, sight, hearing, smell, taste etc.) are readily transformed into other modes” (Leach 1986, 11).

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Chomsky argues that human beings are genetically endowed with a universal grammar
(Chomsky 2006, viii). The language faculty believed to house this UG is part of the brain. Thus,
UG is a study “… of the nature of human intellectual capacities” (Chomsky 2006, 24). He speaks
of the means of generating grammar from a singular UG source through deep and surface
structures (Chomsky 2006, 24). The surface structure will be the same as the actual language
used; however, the deep structure will consist of the abstract structures that influence which
surface structures appear. This UG would serve to explain why the rules in each language
operate to produce certain sentences while disallowing others. He considers UG as “… a system
of conditions on grammars” (Chomsky 2006, 55). This determines how they are to be interpreted
and distinguishes between deep and surface structures that limit what manner of transformations
can take place in order to fulfill the UG constraints (Chomsky 2006, 62). Chomsky seeks to
know what the first mental structure is that can be attributed to the mind that allows it to
construct a generative grammar from sensory data (Chomsky 2006, 69). Anttila (2003) seems to
suggest that it is an individual’s ability to use analogy to create relations between signs. He says
that “… the faculty to analogize is innate …” (Anttila 2003, 428) and argues that “Language
structure and language use are also predominantly analogical, and this is why analogy is a central
component of UG” (Anttila 2003, 439). For without this ability it is uncertain how human beings
could generate a language grammar. Analogy through its function to utilize certain qualisigns of
objects is arguably semiotic in nature.31 Analogy allows one to find a commonality between
seemingly dissimilar signs that at first appear completely different such as those between distinct
semiotic sub-systems such as an L1 and an L2. Perhaps Chomsky would not object to Anttila’s

31

Anttila (2003) also discusses gestalts, relating them to UG and suggesting that they are structures of
empty slots awaiting components. In section 3.2 and 3.4 the notion of an empty slot is viewed through a semiotic
perspective and takes on a role within the embodiment of meaning, as a sign slot.

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argument in part because he intimated that UG may simply interact with other mental faculties to
create this grammar. This could mean there may not be a distinction between linguistic
properties and “common sense understanding,” because UG is not a system that can generate an
infinite amount of sentences with their semantic properties (Chomsky 2006, 42).32 If this was the
case, Chomsky says that:
… grammar is not a structure of higher-order concepts and principles constructed from
simpler elements by “abstraction” or “generalization” or “induction.” Rather, it is a rich
structure of predetermined form, compatible with triggering experience and more highly
valued, by a measure that is itself part of UG, than other cognitive structures meeting the
dual conditions of compatibility with the structural principles of UG and with relevant
experience. (Chomsky 1977, 43)
In the above quote from Chomsky, his mention of predetermined form leading to structural
principles through experience seems to imply that at some level, he recognizes that if UG’s
structures are truly predetermined then they need individuals to engage in certain experiences to
gain the compatibility conditions necessary to use language. In other words, there must be some
stimulus that unlocks these structures, making them accessible to users. His conception of the
language acquisition device as a switch box where the language of an individual is determined
by the input that goes into the box also implies this. Perhaps at some level, cross culturally,
infants receive the same general input. With reference to semiotic theory this input could be
called somatosensory signs. Once infants reach the stage where they specialize on a language in
their environment, one could hypothesize that constraints develop which inform the switches as
to what structures are appropriate for the language based on the input that is received.
32

Chomsky considers Saussure’s impression of Langue and Parole, noting that Saussure restricted Langue
to linguistic units, whereas Parole meant the active and creative process of sentence formation. Chomsky
hypothesizes that the phonetic form of a sentence is derived from the surface structure. He says that “Deep structure
provides the grammatical relations of prediction, modification and so on, that enter into the determination of
meaning” (Chomsky 2006, 97). In addition, it appears that matters of focus and presupposition, topic and comment,
the scope of logical elements and pronominal reference are determined, in part at least by surface structure
(Chomsky 2006, 97). Language users thereby need both linguistic competence and the skills in order to perform
them with extralinguistic competence.

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Considering the amount of conflicting input that may be present in the infant’s environment, the
fact that cross-culturally children develop their linguistic competence suggests not only that
Chomsky’s UG theory is at the very least partially correct, but also that there is some mental
function that allows an infant to concentrate on one set of sounds rather than others. One might
wonder how that distinction is made without the use of analogy: the process of making
connections between dissimilar entities.
Anttila argues that analogy is “… the warp and woof of cognition” (Anttila 2003,
425). This suggests that when one considers the task of language specialization in infants,
babies may be associating their L1 somatosensory signs with the L1 sounds they hear
rather than with other languages perceived in the environment. Anttila’s suggestion that
analogy has a central role in UG seems highly plausible in light of this. Anttila’s argument
suggests that analogy’s status as an innate capacity of human cognition grounds it in UG.
His work demonstrates that other paralinguistic devices, such as metaphor, may also be
present in a universal grammar. Considering once again Saussure’s dyadic
conceptualization of the sign and Agar’s circle from Chapter 1, it seems apparent why such
aspects of language have been kept out of linguistic enquiry. However, a theory that has
grown in popularity over the last decade in light of neurological studies and Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1980) pivotal work on metaphor is motivating some to reconsider whether the
circle was ever necessary. This is the theory of embodied cognition and it rejects the
Cartesian dualism that has dominated many disciplines within Western culture.
The central idea of embodied cognition is that aspects of the body, and not merely
the brain, have an important role in cognitive processing. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980)
work could support this because they argue that metaphorical concepts are based in one’s

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physical orientation in space. They present many examples where orientational and
ontological metaphors, that once established, have been extended to other concepts to
describe one’s human experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14, 26). So widely used are
such metaphors in one’s daily life that their metaphorical basis is not considered. Like
Anttila’s analogy, metaphor has been regarded as outside Saussure’s permissible circle.
Orientational and ontological metaphors are based on relationships that go beyond form
and instead correspond with how individuals experience the world through their physical
bodies. They stress that metaphor is not simply in language but in one’s thoughts and
actions as well (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 6). Their assertion that “A metaphor can serve
as a vehicle for understanding a concept only by virtue of its experiential basis” (Lakoff
and Johnson 1980, 18), implies that the development of concepts is only possible through
the extension of orientational metaphors gained through one’s body’s interactions in space.
By this account, learning and communication become extensions of these “experiential
gestalts” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 81). Thus, concepts are understood in relation to other
concepts (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 56) and the function of metaphor is to aid individuals’
understanding of one kind of experience with another. Such capacity to understand is “…
rooted in the structures of our biological embodiment but are lived and experienced within
a domain of consensual action and cultural history” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991
149).
Within the theory of Embodied cognition, there are three main strains: “body as
constraint,” “body as distributer” and “body as regulator” (Wilson and Foglia, 2011). Body
as constraint refers to the tendency of an agent’s body functions to limit the nature and
“…content of the representations processed by…” (Wilson and Foglia, 2011) his/her

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cognitive system. For example, a human cannot experience flight as a bird because a
human has no wings. Body as distributer implies that a body will spread its
representational load over the whole “bodymind” including neural and non-neural
structures. Thus, people can have a physiological response to an image based on their
perception of it. An example of this could be young children crying in response to a
frightening image. Body as distributer is similar to body as regulator whereby cognitive
activity is monitored by body functions. This would show that cognition and action are
well integrated (Wilson and Foglia, 2011, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodiedcognition/). Embodiment theorists have reinterpreted the works of nativists and cognitive
theorists while conducting their own research to determine that, in part, perception and
motor processing are related and assist in cognitive functioning.
Upon reflection on the connection between perception and motor processing and
Peirce’s semiotics, it seems if Peirce is correct, then signs are involved in cognitive
processes and as signs are created out of one’s perception of signs’ relationships to other
signs, the process of sign creation, semiosis, likely has a role in embodied cognition. Leach
seems to support this argument when he suggests that signs can develop from different
sensory modes. The fact that visual consciousness in part relies on how individuals move
their eyes, head and body in order to “bring something into visual consciousness” also
implies that semiosis is a part of embodied cognition (Madary and Spicer 2010, cited in
Wilson and Foglia 2011). Likewise, the discovery of mirror neurons and how individuals
watching other people doing a task will experience the same neural activity in their sensory
areas as if they were doing the task themselves seems to suggest that somatosensory signs

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are created through embodied cognition. Embodiment theorists attest that this may be
evidence that perceptual and sensory motor systems contribute to cognitive processing.
An infant’s learning process as described by Gattegno (1973) seems intrinsically
semiotic. If one applies Peirce’s triadic model of the sign to the event of an infant learning
through the manipulation of objects, an infant is only able to gain some sense of the
objects through qualisigns such as colours, texture and weight. This learning is made
possible through the use of his tongue and fingers as extensions of his bodymind.
Gradually the memory of these experiences may allow the infant to realize certain
qualisigns are connected to the objects he manipulates with his body. This realization
would constitute a state of Secondness. All of a sudden, the infant’s beloved toy has
qualities that as Piaget’s moon example implies, the boy knows in its totality though he is
as yet unable to abstract these qualities away from the object. At this stage, he does not
separate the parts away from the whole. Until he can recognize this, he will not have
attained a state of Thirdness, where he becomes aware that objects including his own body
can function as symbols. Peirce’s account of how signs are formed through relationships
between the representamen, object and sign seems consistent with Piaget’s developmental
stages as well as the embodiment thesis.
In a somewhat similar vein as Leach, Gardner is also interested in mental experience and
how that can be aided through sensory modes. However, Gardner extends the ideas of sensory
modes, looking at how sensory input leads to the development of specific intelligences. By
intelligence Gardner means “… the ability to solve problems, or to create products, that are
valued within one or more cultural settings” (Gardner 1985, x). The implication of this work is
that human beings gain intelligences through sensory experiences. Pathways can be strengthened

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through repeated use of the sensory apparatus used to develop a particular intelligence. For
example, if one’s visual intelligence is weak then one can engage in activities that involve using
the eyes in specific ways in order to strengthen that intelligence. Gardner says that typically the
intelligences are intertwined so it can be difficult to tease them apart, though as he defines each
of these, he notes that people will have some blend of intelligences. Gardner wanted to follow
Piaget’s idea that assessing students’ correct answers was not as important as understanding how
and why the students thought in a particular way (Gardner 1985, 18). Gardner questioned the
validity and efficacy of “traditional IQ tests” because he felt that they did not give sufficient
focus to each of the intelligences (Gardner 1985, ix) and criticizes Piaget for not including other
skills such as artistic ability among others in his research on scientific thought.33 Gardner
proposes to take the methods and schemas developed by Piaget and apply them to a broader
range of symbol systems that include each of the senses. He considers the whole notion of
intellect as more complicated because it is influenced by both genetic and cultural factors
(Gardner 1985, 35). It is best then to think that there are a variety of intelligences that act as sets
of knowledge that are organized in the brain (Gardner 1985, 69).
In a distinct but similar manner to Gardner, Stokoe becomes interested in the genetic and
cultural factors that influence the creation and use of language. His argument that sign language
likely evolved before spoken language may reveal that culture and language are more directly
connected than once thought. He wanted people to conceive of sign language as a full language
in its own right. He said that “the idea that language does not exist without speech persists, and
yet the nature of signs and their importance to all life forms shows the universality of semiosis33

Other scientists have found Piaget’s stages were not entirely accurate as the tasks that the children
performed in his studies were not considered real world tasks. However, as previously mentioned, his stages of child
development are only being used in this thesis to provide a general context for the development of a personal
semiotic cultural consciousness with reference to Peirce’s triadic conception of the sign.

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something gets interpreted by some creature or person as a sign meaning something else”
(Stokoe 2001, 74). Semiosis is possible through the presence of a collective that creates the sign
through their acknowledgement of the thing that is being referred to as a sign.
Stokoe (2001) reasons that humans’ need to hunt in packs while strategizing, as well as
the need to teach skills to offspring would have necessitated the use of visual signs. Those who
argued that a language must have speech stipulated that gestures would not be able to make all
the necessary contrasts in language. He refutes this by stating that the human torso can make as
many movements as the vocal apparatus can, if not more, and the human eye can detect all of
these distinctions. He further contends that as public speakers often use gestures to support their
meaning, only visible signs would have direct links to what they represented. In contrast to
written or spoken language, Stokoe argues that visible movements can represent actions or
persons directly through their natural resemblance to the event as it took place and therefore
visible actions are signs (Stokoe 2001, 11). He provides the example of a person pointing in the
direction someone just walked in. The image of the act of the person pointing now refers to the
person who is absent. Thus, the visible action of him pointing functions as a sign to refer to the
absent person.
Stokoe says that human beings use movements in the same way other animals do. Vocal
sounds and gestural signs are elements of primate behavior, however due to greater manual
dexterity; human beings could make their movements represent beings and actions more
accurately (Stokoe 2001, 137). These could be fine tuned later to shows subtle distinctions
between subjects and actions. The diagram of the signer below in Figure 6 illustrates this.

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Figure 6. Stokoe, William. 2001. Language in Hand: Why Sign Came Before Speech. Washington, DC.
United States: Gallaudet University Press. 2001:13.

Early human beings who realized their movements could represent relationships between
things instead of just things would have used this to their advantage. Human beings could point
to their subject of interest. For example, motioning with a finger as someone left could represent
both the action and the subject moving in the direction he/she went (Stokoe 2001, xiii). The hand
and its movement would represent a whole mental conception (Stokoe 2001, 112).
Using the hand to point to items to refer to them would have been the first step towards
the development of a sign language. He also intimates that arm movements could re-make the
features of many types of activity. He contends that visible movement was essential for making
the first connection between sign and movement (Stokoe 2001, 21). Early hominids would have
used a simplistic syntax; however, this kind of usage would have served to create more
connections in the brain gradually giving them a greater capacity for expression, allowing
individuals to pass on what they had learned to their offspring, creating a more sustainable
culture (Stokoe 2001, 121). He predicts this would also have increased the capacity of the brain
to sense information from the hand.

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Early gestural languages would have developed increasingly more complicated visible
representations such as movements that had adverbial and adjectival functions. These could have
been added through the accompaniment of facial expressions or posturing. As society became
more complex, busy hands would have lead to verbal communication as a surrogate for hand
motions (Stokoe 2001, 116). Once gestural language was established, oral representations could
have been made to match these signs (Stokoe 2001, 103). Thus early hominids would have had
two sign modes for the same set of signs. Changes to the bones, skull and neck, as the need to
walk bipedal increased, would have allowed for the larynx to become lower, thus lengthening the
vocal apparatus, creating a double resonance-chamber making speech, not merely sounds,
possible. From that point, it would have been a natural progression to the discovery that when
only sound could be used to convey meaning because hands were busy doing something else,
gesture may have become decreasingly necessary.
When considering the origin of language Stokoe argues that the visual system would
have been a more complex and “neurologically richer” system then the auditory system (Stokoe
2001, 20). He asserts that the senses of seeing and hearing do not have the same level of strength.
In the visual system there are strong connections between the eyes and the brain, whereas there
are far fewer connective lines joining the auditory center of the brain to the ear. Also, the task of
waiting for each sound to hit the ear and then be processed by the auditory system would have
been cumbersome in comparison to gestural communication. He asserts that words and sentences
would have come simultaneously as part of a single gesture that resembled the original action.
Later, some early hominids were able to recognize that the sentence contained a noun-like
element and an action and the sentence was interpreted as one sign. In reference to this, the
coordination of eye and hand would have been essential for everyday life. Once established,

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younger generations would have been born into a linguistic environment that would support the
continued growth and development of their gesturing and speech capabilities. This implies that
there would be a pre-existing culture and a collective that actively created and maintained it.
Like Stokoe, Agar is also interested in culture, but he takes a broader perspective,
focusing not on one specific area like sign language as Stokoe does, but trying to summarize the
key issues that bind language to culture. Agar emphasizes that, in contrast to the traditional view,
culture is not something that people possess, but something they are exposed to as they
experience life. It occurs with them and through them. Agar says that “Culture is an awareness, a
consciousness, one that reveals the hidden self and opens paths to other ways of being” (Agar
2002, 20). It “… starts when you realize that you've got a problem with language, and the
problem has to do with who you are” (Agar 2002, 20). “Culture happens in language, but the
consciousness it inspires goes well beyond it” (Agar 2002, 20-21). Essentially Agar refers to the
conscious knowledge of the language and its usage in context as a “languaculture” (Agar 2002,
71). This is because “Culture is in language, and language is loaded with culture” (Agar 2002,
28).
Agar seeks to remove language from the circle that has inadvertently been drawn around
it by such structural linguists as Saussure. This circle objectified language, making it easier to
conceive of language as a set of forms such as grammar and the dictionary that could be studied
diachronically and avoid sociolinguistic considerations. However, Saussure almost
simultaneously insisted that languages are not fixed and therefore must be studied
synchronically. In other words, language had to be studied beyond the circle as well as within it.
Agar considers grammar and the dictionary components of the circle, whereas he refers to the
schematic material that exists outside the circle as frames. These “frames contain default values”

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(Agar 2002, 134) that motivate cultural expectations and influence behavior though they are not
static. Agar states that “Culture happens when one realizes that something “natural” is actually
just a frame, that the way one always assumed things were isn’t always the case” (Agar 2002,
162).
While Agar concedes language is not a system of frames, it can be useful to think
of areas of difference between cultures, what he refers to as “rich points,” as the gradual
collection of information in order to build frames. These frames help one navigate through
problems with language as it refers to culture. However, given that many frames are
unconscious, they can also lead to problems, especially when one is suddenly faced with
the situation where one’s frames turn out to be wrong and individuals are forced into an
awareness of them. By questioning these frames, it brings to light the possibility that the
frame one has may only be one of many possible frames. This can lead to an awareness of
one’s own “languaculture” which is essentially how individual’s languages operate beyond
the circle and within it (Agar 2002, 205). Agar says learning a “languaculture from the
inside” or the outside “are the same thing,” though when “learning from the inside”
differences are more subtle because the inner circle maintains the guise of sameness”
(Agar 2002, 205).
Agar argues that while syntactic considerations of language are important and
indeed languages are still classed as similar or not based on their grammar and words,
these should not comprise the entirety of language study nor should they outweigh the
cultural context that surrounds the circle. He also implies that semiotics is the key Saussure
provided for connecting the inner circle of grammar and words to the outer circle of
experience and usage. If one wants to communicate effectively it is vital that one learn

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these frames (Agar 2002, 47). As a teacher, becoming aware of one’s own languaculture
will help one understand the ideological nature of one’s own frames. This awareness can
aid in the presentation of a second language as just another semiotic sub-system that is
made up of frames and the sharing of languacultures to discover “rich points” and extract
frames. As frames connect the inner circle and the outer circle, the sharing and discovery
of frames can lead to broader discussion of culture because frames have connections to
institutions and values (Agar 2002, 218). This exchange and transfer of knowledge can
help students to become more aware of the similarities and differences between their L1
and L2.
2.3 A Semiotic Perspective on Positive Transfer
Simply put, according to Gass and Selinker (2008), the classification of transfer is that aspects of
language A (L1) may affect the same forms in language B (L2) when trying to learn language B
(L2). Structures that are the same may aid the learner, resulting in a positive product. Aspects
that are distinct may or may not make it difficult for learners to understand the new form being
presented. In terms of a semiotic perspective this means that where signs have a high degree of
similarity, positive transfer should be easier to attain, whereas dissimilar signs may result in an
incomplete or weak transfer of an L2 sign to an L1 sign. Supporters of the contrastive analysis
hypothesis came to view L1 as interference to the learning of the L2 and the methodology
developed at that time limited the learner’s use of their L1 (Bou Franch 1998). Gass and Selinker
contend that learners have a tendency to transfer the meanings, forms and the order of their L1 to
their L2 in situations where they are producing L1 or receiving L1 input (Gass and Selinker
2008).

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Early studies of transfer were based on the behaviorist model, whereas a more cognitive
approach to transfer is common at present (Gass and Selinker 2008, 90). Although transfer was
first associated with behaviorist habit formation, this could not account for L1 influence and
learner strategies such as avoidance (Bou Franch 1998). The 1960s and 70s witnessed a number
of learning movements such as The Silent Way (Gattegno 1972)34, the Berlitz Method, that was
developed in 1978 (Brown 1994)35, the communicative language teaching method (CLT)36
(Brown 1994, 244; Harmer 2004, 84)37, the audio-lingual method (ALM), that was based on
behaviourist principles (Harmer 2004, 79).38 Suggestopedia created by Lozanov in 1979 (Brown
1994, 97) and the Total Physical Response (TPR) method created by James Asher in 1977
(Brown 1994, 98). The lack of L1 use in each of these methods suggests that they may have had
concerns about using L1 in the classroom. As these approaches are not known for their use of the
L1, this could suggest that perhaps practitioners attributed L1 use with learner errors due to the
potential negative transfer of the grammatical, phonological and morphological patterns of their
students’ first language.

34

The Silent Way used colour coded charts called Fidels and Cuisenaire rods of various lengths and colours
to prime students on how to create specific situations students could learn from (Gattegno 1972).
35

The Berlitz method was developed in 1978 by Charles Berlitz from the Direct Method and only uses the
target language to teach, mimicking an emersion setting (Brown 1994, 44).
36

In the CLT model students develop various competences as they use language for communicative
purposes and pick up grammar intuitively like native speakers would (Harmer 2004, 85).
37

The ALM moved beyond the Direct Method to include recorded dialogs and role-plays that included
communicative drills as well as grammar learning (Brown 1994, 70-71; Harmer 2004, 79).
38

Suggestopedia even transformed the learning environment to be one of relaxing music and images where
students sat on comfortable chairs and did yoga in order to evoke the sense of ease and simplicity that Western
culture associates with childhood (Harmer 2004, 89). This was meant to simulate the first learning environment in
order to allow the student to learn the second language as they did their first (Brown 1994, 97).

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A few methods such as Krashen’s Natural approach suggested that second language
learning should reflect the learning process of the first. As a nativist, Krashen says that despite
the differences between languages, first language learners tend to go through remarkably similar
stages of language development (Krashen 1987, 15). He called this “language acquisition”
(Krashen 1987, 10). This was meant to maximize the student’s ability to learn the second
language by limiting interference from the L1. He intimated that there could be benefits as well
as serious consequences if students used syntactic rules from their L1 to communicate in their L2
(Krashen 1987, 27). In contrast, Kellerman (1979) attempted to put transfer in the cognitive
domain by suggesting that a learner’s perceived distance could influence their learning. He said
that learners actively use their perception of the L2 in comparison to the L1 to make decisions
about what is similar and different between the two languages and its degree of transferability
(Gass and Selinker 2008, 146).
Odlin (2005) pushes transfer further into the cognitive domain, investigating the transfer of
concepts from the L1 to L2. He says, “Speech communities vary in how they code the affective
meanings that permeate languages, and the linguistic differences can induce conceptual as well
as meaning transfer” (Odlin 2005, 15). He intimates that even if meaning transfer occurs,
conceptual transfer may not because it is merely a subset of meaning transfer (Odlin 2005, 6).
For example, he would consider that temporal meanings such as space, time and effect might not
be conceptually transferable elements (Odlin 2005, 10). He refers to the work of Stutterheim on
conceptual transfer, noting that the examples presented in her work imply that the structure of
one’s language may shape the way one conceptualizes reality (Stutterheim cited in Odlin 2005,
13). For instance, she discovered that English speakers tend to use a path to finish their
sentences, whereas German speakers use a concrete location for an endpoint. Thus, German

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speakers are apt to describe things more holistically than English speakers who phrase things
more analytically (Stutterheim cited in Odlin 2005, 14-15).
There is also evidence that suggests advanced learners are more likely to use an L2
processing strategy than new learners (Gass and Selinker 2008, 151). Singleton (cited in Gass
and Selinker 2008) concluded that the L1 and L2 are likely stored in separate locations with a
communicative channel between them (Gass and Selinker 2008, 462). Gass and Selinker contend
that negative transfer and positive transfers are not two separate processes, but these are in fact
merely products of the process of transfer (Gass and Selinker 2008, 90). They state that learners
will bring previously learned skills and apply them to a new situation such as a transfer from
tennis to playing racket ball (Gass and Selinker 2008, 93). They note that there are two types of
language errors: interlingual which involves the L1 and intralingual which involves the L2
(Gass and Selinker 2008, 103).
Kellerman suggests that if languages appear too similar this may seem unbelievable to the
learners (Kellerman and Smith 1986). However, Gass and Selinker argue that learners must be
able to recognize some similarities between their L1 and the L2 before they will concede that
their L1 may assist them in learning the L2. Also learners may be influenced by how they view
content. For example, if an aspect of language is viewed as language-neutral that would imply
the content is common across languages, at least in the L1 and L2. These might include certain
grammatical structures and writing conventions among other rules (Gass and Selinker 2008,
147). How they perceive the distance between their language and another is the learner’s
psychology (Gass and Selinker 2008, 148-149). Kellerman (1979) found that the concept of
“coreness” which related to forms’ frequency of usage, their degree of abstractness and how

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literal the forms were, strongly influenced how quickly L2 users were able to learn the L2 (Gass
and Selinker 2008,149).
Gass and Selinker suggest that such items would be likely to occur across languages,
whereas the non-core meanings would likely be language specific items (Gass and Selinker
2008, 149). Their hypothesis is consistent with such linguistic theories as optimality theory
which holds that non-default language features will likely be associated with only a few
languages and will be marked because of it, whereas there will be default features that are shared
by many languages (Hale and Reiss 2000, 159-160). Gass and Selinker (2008) state that, “… we
can predict where transfer will and will not occur” (Gass and Selinker 2008, 149). The
implication of this is that the greatest likelihood of transfer is in core elements regardless of the
perceived distance.
In reference to first language acquisition, Gass and Selinker examine the impact UG
theory has had on SLA (Gass and Selinker 2008, 159). They seem to propose that UG principles
make up a part of one’s mental representation of language allowing for the connection of sound
to meaning. They describe UG as a set of principles that show there is a need for a certain
language form within human languages and there are parameters that designate how much a
particular language needs a form (Gass and Selinker 2008, 161). These universals are believed to
be caused by properties of the brain that are present in the human mind regardless of the
language spoken (Gass and Selinker 2008, 160). Each language puts a different level of
importance on each of the various forms. 39

39

Optimality theorists accept Chomsky’s notion of a universal grammar. However, they argue that the
variations between languages may be accounted for by the different ranking of universal constraints (McCarthy
2002; McCarthy 2008, 15-16).

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Lado (cited in Gass and Selinker 2008) insisted that teachers should do a contrastive
analysis of the mother tongue and the language the student wanted to learn, to determine the
similarities and differences between them (Selinker and Gass 2008, 89). However, there have
also been researchers who suggest that the L1 has little influence on L2 learning, such as Dulay,
Burt and Krashen’s Creative Construction Hypothesis theory, which investigates how human
beings are able to learn a first language if exposed to language input (Dulay, Burt and Krashen
1982, 8). They argue that this is mostly unconscious learning because people acquire languages
without an awareness of what all the forms are called. They refer to the linguistic rules for the
forms’ positioning as constraints. It would not be unreasonable to suggest these constraints as
expressed in optimality theory, when ranked, account for the similitude and variation found in
the world’s languages (Kager 2004, xi).
In a second language learning situation, when children are given language input they will
not have access to UG principles because the only language universals they have are created via
their L1. These second language learners may subconsciously use their L1 to access UG by using
their ability to solve problems to extract overarching tendencies of language. For example,
students learn a second language keeping certain basic rules in mind, such as the understanding
that speakers must be able to use language to create an infinite amount of sentences through a
finite means, and that a language will have rules for what forms can be combined (Selinker and
Gass 2008, 165). People have some sense that there is a difference between lexical and
functional categories. Lexical contains content words such as nouns and verbs, whereas
functional categories are made of functional elements that allow for the connection of the actor
to its action.

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Gass and Selinker say it’s important to determine whether a class of words is connected
with lexical properties (Gass and Selinker 2008, 166). As UG is an abstract concept, it is difficult
to determine to what extent learners have access to UG (Gass and Selinker 2008, 170). If
language users had full access to UG, they predict that learners should be able to reset the
parameters to match the forms appearing in the L2 (Gass and Selinker 2008, 170). The
implication of their proposal is that an awareness of UG principles could aid in teaching a second
language and as UG is not visible, it cannot be proven entirely wrong (Gass and Selinker 2008,
174). References to UG are speculative and rely on “arguments of learnability” (Gass and
Selinker 2008, 177). In this manner, an understanding of how students learn a certain form has to
consider differences between the L1 and L2 as well as universal tendencies (Gass and Selinker
2008, 179). Learners will try to maintain their L1 syllable structure even when there are sounds
in the L2 that are not present in their L1(Gass and Selinker 2008, 180). This L2 syllable structure
is affected by L1 structure but also influenced by UG tendencies (Gass and Selinker 2008, 182).
They imply that discrepancies between the results are due to the use of distinct analytic
frameworks (Gass and Selinker 2008, 131).
A collection of the various UG parameters would give one an impression of the types of
languages there can be. From Greenberg’s landmark study on language’s universal tendencies on
word order, one can notice that languages that have certain features are likely to have certain
companion features. For example, in languages that have prepositions as opposed to postpositions, the genitive is likely to follow the main noun. However, in languages with postpositions the genitive will come before the noun (Gass and Selinker 2008, 191). There is some
evidence that lexical errors will cause more disruption for the learners than incorrect
grammatical structure; however, they conclude that difficulties in producing sentences may make

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it difficult to use words correctly (Gass and Selinker 2008, 450-469). They state a combination
of considerations that affect language transfer: perceived distance between L1 and L2, learner’s
knowledge of their mother tongue and a learners’-psycho-typology (Gass and Selinker 2008,
150).
While Gass and Selinker’s book focuses on adult second language learning, they refer to
children’s first and second language acquisition where appropriate (Gass and Selinker 2008, xv).
As SLA has been influenced by child language studies, these studies are often referred to. In
some studies, children are found to use L1 structure when presented with a complicated L2
structure (Gass and Selinker 2008, 124). This possibility seems reasonable given the tendency of
human beings to use previously learned signs to learn an unknown sign. Studies of L1 and L2
language acquisition research were, in part, behind the development of the concept of
interlanguage. An interlanguage is composed of a combination of L1 structures with L2 forms.
Interlanguage theory utilizes a few principles; the learner’s language is flexible, thus it develops
as the learner’s knowledge and usage of forms grow. Interlanguage is a transient representation
of the learner’s language and it is systematic in that it uses predictable formulas (Bou Franch
1998).
Ellis’ (1982) work explores the concept and origin of interlanguage. He attempts to
conflate second language learning with first language learning in order to problematize
interlanguage. He investigates research regarding L1 and L2 acquisition in order to determine if
interlanguage is both a learning and an acquisition process. When Ellis studied his two year old
daughter’s utterances, he found that she used language in terms of its somatosensory motor
meanings. This included semantic roles such as agent/actor and undergoer which are readily
available regardless of which language individuals speak. He also noted that she made no

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attempt to express tense, mood or aspect in her utterances. Ellis suggests that the former might be
universal elements of grammar, whereas the latter will need to be acquired linguistically (Ellis
1992, 82, 214).
Ellis implies that both L1 and L2 learners use “semantic” language. This is language that
describes their immediate experiences. Thus, it seems that one’s interlanguage is unconsciously
based on previous experience. L1 and L2 learners code their experience into expressible
language such as “me cookie eat.” As evident from the example above, even the word order may
not impede the meaning until undergoers are involved. As languages involve some form of
action, the implication is that some kind of actor must be present to perform the action and
therefore L1 and L2 learners can communicate a wide variety of expressions without having to
utilize grammar. When the actor is obvious to the speaker then sometimes learners omit the actor
entirely. One of Ellis’ examples was when his daughter said, “daddy down,” which indicated she
wanted to be put down (Ellis 1982, 213).
Ellis concurs that semantic simplification is the learner’s primary strategy for processing
L1 and L2 data. However, the L2 learner uses this strategy in tandem with his/her awareness of
word order and looks for “modality elements” that will help communicate how he /she feels
(Ellis 1982, 16). He says that both L1 and L2 users learn language for social purposes. The
implication is that as the more complicated expressions arise, the learner will need to gain a
knowledge of language structures. Ellis states that as a learner begins to process language “… it
is syntactic only in the sense that the learner operates word order rules borrowed from his L1 in
order to sequence the symbolic function he elects to encode” (Ellis 1982, 219). His evidence for
this is that both baby language and teacher talk have a reduced length of utterance, few function
words and the use of feedback questions (Ellis 1982, 209). Past studies regarding L2 learning

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and interlanguage have focused on the use of grammatical functors and syntax rather than the
semantic ordering of utterances. He urges that semantic simplification should be considered an
important developmental strategy, but this simplified action seems to be limited to events
occurring in the here and now. Establishing an event in time and space tends to require formulas.
The desire to communicate when an event is finished rather than occurring drives the need for
such formulas (Ellis 1982, 217).
2.4 A Semiotic Orientation in Language Teaching
Doughty (cited in Halliday) says that:
“… language is both a product of, and the means by which we have access to, the
systems of meaning relationship that constitute culture, the specifically human
environment.” That the child makes a language system for himself out of his cumulative
experience of the “specifically human environment” to which he has access is a fact that
no one working in education can now afford to ignore or evade. (Doughty cited in
Halliday 1975, v)
Recent research suggests that students who have difficulty learning a second language
have weaknesses in their oral native language. Thus affecting their performance within an
English language environment, these weaknesses affect the comprehension of phonetics,
syntax, and semantics. Dyslexic and other learning-disabled students may be affected by
the same weaknesses. If a child cannot decode letters, they will inevitably have difficulty
reading, whether they are learning disabled, learning English as a second language, or in
early grade school and presently learning reading skills. (Nosal 2012)
As noted by Marcel Danesi, while several authors have written about the overlap between
education and semiotics, few volumes have been published on whether a semiotic perspective on
education is relevant to second language teaching (Danesi 2000, vi). His investigation includes a
view of Piaget’s work on child development. He intimates that as infants grow, they rely on more
semiotic behaviors and finer motor skills to explore objects and try out new sounds. Thus
children gradually become more reliant on the system of signs they have been predisposed to
create based on their cultural environment (Danesi 2000, 15). If children begin to construct their
symbolic system from objects and events that become linked to words in their mother-tongue(s),

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then it stands to reason that some kind of transfer process needs to occur for the child to
recognize the same sign in an L2. For this reason, a semiotic perspective on second language
teaching may provide some valuable insights.
According to Goodman (cited in Chomsky 2006), the reason why the problem of
language learning is different from that of first-language learning is that “once one language is
available, it can be used for giving explanations and instructions” (Chomsky 2006, 72). He then
goes on to argue that “… acquisition of an initial language is acquisition of a secondary symbolic
system” (Chomsky 2006, 72) and is quite on a par with normal second-language acquisition. The
“primary symbolic systems” to which he refers are “pre-linguistic symbolic systems in which
gestures, sensory and perceptual occurrences of all sorts function as signs” (Goodman cited in
Chomsky 2006, 72).
At around one year of age, children begin using words such as “mama” and “dada.” This
occurs after they have made a progression of babbling to mono-syllabic abbreviations from their
sound inventory. While it is tempting to consider these indications as signs, they can connote a
whole phrase in reference to a milieu of different sign types such as images, stories, or a mental
diagram, not just a symbol. Then this holophrastic stage of one word utterances becomes a
condensed phrase more reminiscent of an adult’s grammatical structure, but only containing the
basic elements which operate around grammatical pivots (Braine 1971) such as “me want
cookie.” Vygotsky noted that human beings remember through the assistance of signs (Vygotsky
1978) and Danesi calls a person’s ability to use a variety of sign devices, such as music and
pictures, as their “semiotic competence” (Danesi 2000, 15).
Danesi uses the terms of L- and R-mode that were first used by Edwards to refer to left
and right brain functioning, illustrated in Figure 7.

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Figure 7. Edwards, Betty.1989. Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain: A Course in Enhancing Creativity
and Artistic Confidence. Los Angeles: Tarcher St. Martin’s Press. 19879: 38.40

Danesi makes a distinction between acquisition and learning in a similar manner to
Krashen (1987) where he contends that a second language is learned, rather than acquired, as a
first language is. Danesi conceptualizes acquisition as a function of the R-mode, inadvertently
linking it to a learner’s mother-tongue (Danesi 2003, 17, 42), whereas the L-mode is associated
with the left brain functioning and by default with learning. He suggests this while
acknowledging that different language tasks can activate several areas of the brain. When
presented with some unfamiliar information, the R-mode is needed to experience a sufficient
amount of freedom for the mind to be prepared for learning the new information.
40

Edwards’ table in Figure 7 provides a convenient visual for distinguishing between the characteristics of
the left and right hemispheres. Her simple design of the “L” and the “R” makes the differences between the modes
apparent.

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Danesi intimates that neurological research can help teachers make informed decisions
about classroom conditions and expectations, particularly research that concerns how to utilize
the strengths of each hemisphere (Danesi 2003, 37).41 There is some evidence that if R-mode
techniques are used to introduce a new lesson, Danesi argues it will cause an association between
memory and the new information. Classroom activities then can be organized into a series of
three stages: an R-mode stage, where information is introduced in a manner that utilizes more
synthetic functioning such as discussion and creating diagrams; to an L-mode stage, where
learning is reinforced through a more analytic means such as analysis; and an intermodal stage,
where a synthesis is achieved through the discoveries made in the L and R-mode stages (Danesi
2003, 51). When considering this once again within a semiotic framework, one might suggest
that, given the evidence from Sperry (1973) and Lenneberg (1967), the two hemispheres of the
brain have evolved to process certain types of signs more efficiently than the other. If this is the
case then it seems the use of signs, such as qualisigns, sinsigns, icons and indexes, would be
engaging during an R-mode stage of a task. As mentioned in chapter 1, pre-linguistic life can
include qualisigns; therefore the use of colour in particular may be effective during R-mode
stages.
2.5 Colour in Learning: A Potential Bypass
The nature of colour is arguably semiotic in the way that it connects hue with object in the
perceptual apparatus. Colour seems to function to join disparate sensory experiences into unified
actualizations of self. Conway et al. (2010) contend that “Color has become a premier model
system for understanding how information is processed by neural circuits and for investigating
the relationships among genes, neural circuits, and perception” (Conway et al. 2010, 14955).
41

Asher cited in Danesi attests that the brain will house and analyze linguistic information autonomically
when introduced through an R-mode first (Danesi 2003, 40).

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Assuming this is correct, an investigation into the visual system and an understanding of how the
mechanisms operate to allow for perception is essential because it will mediate and impact the
sensory experiences human beings are able to have. Furthermore, “…color has immediate
perceptual and cognitive significance in human experience” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991,
157).42 Varela, Thomspson and Rosch (1991) argue that individuals’ experience of colour is
shaped by the structure of colour, its role as a perceivable attribute of objects and as an
“experiential category” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, 157). With their work in mind, a
discussion of colour would not be complete without a brief description of its properties, how it is
produced and how it is perceived.
Libby defines what colour is and reviews Munsell’s (1905) system of colour relations in
light of this. He considers Munsell’s system of colour notation as necessary to gain an
understanding of colour relationships. However, he recognizes that due to the flexible nature of
colour, it cannot be perfect. Libby implies that colour is complex because it originates as
electromagnetic energy and then goes through a process of change. This energy travels through
waves to the inner eye where it is transformed into electrochemical energy. Later it is changed
into encoded impulses through the optic nerve and then is finally processed by the visual centers
in the brain to be recognized as colour (Libby 1974, 25).

42

Although the current discussion is about colour the following quote from Varela, Thompson and Rosch
in regards to the category of form seems to suggest that colour is merely one component of the perceptual apparatus
and is therefore influenced by other senses.
This category refers to the body and the physical environment. It does so, however, strictly in
terms of the senses—the six sense organs and the corresponding objects of those organs. They are the eye
and visible objects, the ear and sounds, the nose and smells, the tongue and tastes, the body and touchables,
and the mind and thoughts. The sense organs do not refer to the gross external organ but to the actual
physical mechanism of perception. (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, 64)
The argument that not only colour but any somatosensory sign could potentially serve as a semiotic bridge between
an L1 and an L2 is highlighted in the analysis of language learning approaches presented in Chapter 4.

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Munsell wanted to create a notation form for colour that functioned in the same manner
as notes did for music. However, Libby says this is unattainable because there is no static
relationship between a surface and its colours. Colours of objects are perpetually changing based
on the reflective surface of the object and the colours of the surfaces around it. All objects
deflect, divide and absorb the light that touches them (Libby 1974, 25). Perceiving colour then
involves both external and internal processes. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) seem to
imply this when they say “We have seen that colors are not "out there" independent of our
perceptual and cognitive capacities. We have also seen that colors are not "in here" independent
of our surrounding biological and cultural world” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, 172).
Walsh (1999) argues that the colours people perceive are not merely the wavelengths
reflected from the surface being looked at, but of the surrounding surfaces as well. In essence,
this supports Libby’s critique of Munsell’s colour system. Walsh says that the body’s visual
system can respond to changes in “incident illumination” giving a relative perception of light,
but not actual proportions of reflected light (Walsh 1999, 13594). He refers to this tendency as
colour-constancy.
Zeki et al. cited in Walsh (1999) conducted a study of a patient with severe atrophy of the
occipital parietal cortex to determine whether the patient, who was virtually blind, could see
colours (Walsh 1999, 13594). He found that the man reported seeing different colours than
subjects without that condition. He saw the colours as its wavelength dictated irrespective of any
surface illuminants, whereas those without his condition saw colour as the surrounding objects
influenced it.
The results of Zeki’s study support Varela, Thomson and Rosch’s assertion that colors
are not contained in the “pregiven world” but in the perception of the world only made possible

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through the connections between colour, shape and other qualities processed through the sensory
motor system (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, 164). Varela et al. refers to this combining as
“structural coupling” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, 164). The implication of this is that
perception is yet another aspect of individuals’ embodied experience. In further support of this
interpretation he states that:
The visual system is never simply presented with pregiven objects. On the contrary, the
determination of what and where an object is, as well as its surface boundaries, texture,
and relative orientation (and hence the overall context of color as a perceived attribute), is
a complex process that the visual system must continually achieve …. Indeed, color
vision is actually involved in the cooperative processes by which the visual scene comes
to be segmented into a collection of surfaces. In the words of P. Gouras and E. Zrenner,
"It is impossible to separate the object sensed from its color because it is the color
contrast itself that forms the object."29 Thus colors and surfaces go together: both depend
on our embodied perceptual capacities. (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, 167)
According to Munsell (1905) cited in Libby (1974), colours have three attributes:
chroma, the amount of strength of a colour; value, the degree of light in the colour; and hue, the
specific wavelength that makes a colour unique from others (Libby 1974, 12, 18, 19, 20). The
light sensors in the human eye, called rods and cones, are sensitive to wavelengths of light. It is
assumed that these sensors transfer colour messages to the optic nerve, which is then interpreted
by the brain as colour.
In the back center of the retinal area of the eye, the rods and cones are very sensitive to
yellow, whereas rods and cones at the outer edges of the retinal area are more sensitive to the
degree of lightness or darkness. When stimulated, these sensors allow a person to see white, and
when there is no stimulus, they see black (Libby 1974, 74). The Young-Helmholtz theory of
colour vision (cited in Seidelinger 1947) proposed that the eye is able to perceive colours
through a red, green and blue set of sensors where upon each set is designated to pick up the

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lightwaves of a different colour either blue, red or green depending on which set they belong to
(Seidelinger 1947, 24).
Zeki et al. refers to the parts of the visual cortex and discusses how wavelengths relay
information between them. An area of the visual system, composed of portions of the posterior
fusiform gyrus, was found to influence colour constancy without relation to memory, learning or
judgement and it is instrumental in the act of connecting colour to form (Walsh 1999).
It is believed that when a dominant colour wavelength is present in the field of vision for
an extended period, such as one to two minutes, the sensors designed to receive that wavelength
become too tired to send the wavelength message to the occipital lobe. At this time, if the eye is
exposed to a neutral ground such as a white piece of paper, other receptors send the message and
the eyes perceive an “afterimage” of the dominant colour (Wilkins 2003, 36). This is why when
one sees a pink light after a camera flash, the pink image will then turn green.
Every hue has its own “afterimage” and these tend to complement each other. For
example, green has an afterimage of magenta (Wilkins 2003, 25). When two colours are present,
their afterimages will overlap, blending with the other. If complimentary colours are used in an
image, the degree of influence and visual interest between the colours is heightened. The colour
mixing that occurs when complementary colours are adjacent to each other is called
“simultaneous contrast” (Sidelinger 1947, 28). This effect is most powerful with primary hues
and decreases with additional light and dark values (Sidelinger 1947, 28). In reference to
afterimages, the new colour is based on the average of the chromas and values in reference to the
original hues. This mixing occurs via the eye physiologically and is relayed to the occipital lobe
and back to the brain and it is perceived as an “afterimage” (Sidelinger 1947, 28).

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Although Libby acknowledges that it may never be proven, he predicts that one of the
reasons for the human eye to attend to warm colours first is because sources of heat would have
been extremely important for early human beings. Likewise, such colours as red and yellow
would have been found not only in the sun, but also in animals they killed. Thus, warm colours
could have become associated with living beings, different from the cool green of the ground and
trees. Despite current cultural differences, if one were to trace the origins of man back to his
beginning, perhaps one would find that warm colours were extremely important to pay attention
to. Gengenfurtner et al. (1998) postulate that colour vision evolved into two separate systems:
“… a primordial (yellow-blue opponent) subsystem and a phylogeneticlly more recent, second
(red-green opponent) subsystem” (Gengenfurtner et al. 1998, 1041). The first sub-system
compares short (S) wave cones with long (L) wave cones and middle (M) wave cones. They
predict that this function served to allow for the division of the colour spectrum into cool (S
wave), warm (L wave) and neutral colours (M wave) as this would help in the classification of
objects (Gengenfurtner et al. 1998, 1041).
In contrast, the second visual sub-system compares the L and M cones (the red-green
opponent). In both sub-systems however, wavelengths divide into cool and warm colours. 43
Mollon (1991) suggests that this division would have made it easier for early man to find fruit
43

Gegenfurtner et al. (1998) presented subjects with 48 images of randomly chosen natural scenes from a
data base of 96 images. These included such elements as green fields with flowers, rocks, trees and even a few manmade objects. Half of the images were black and white and half were in colour. These images were presented to
participants 50-100-msec within an interval of 7seconds in between each image. After this, a second set of images
with the same 48 images and 48 new images were reordered and presented. Participants were asked to identify the
original 48 images from the new ones at their own pace. The evidence from their tests showed that both colour
deficient observers and those with normal colour vision were able to remember 5-10% more of the colour images
than the black and white images. Gegenfurtner et al. thus concluded that there was little difference between those
with normal vision and those with deficiencies. However, the authors concluded that an image of a scene is different
than being in a tropical forest foraging for food or knowing when to ascertain when to cross the road in the urban
jungle. For present, they suggest that their results show that the visual system’s ability to discern forms from the
primordial visual subsystem of yellow –blue is sufficient to recognize landscapes. They also suggest that as a person
with normal colour vision can perceive more details than those that are colour deficient, un-visually impaired people
would likely gain advantage in certain contexts (Gegenfurtner et al.1998).

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among an African tropical rainforest. “Because all objects in the visible external world possess
attributes of colour, colour difference is always an available means of classification. But, an
indefinitely large variety of things will fall into any one colour class, so the social metaphors of
colour are always potentially polysemic” (Leach 1986, 59).
Berlin and Kay’s (1969) study of colour terms has also generated some evidence that
could support Mollon and Libby’s hypothesis. The (1969) work of Berlin and Kay argued that
the evolution of basic colour term systems has developed independent of language. In their
research they discovered that languages tend to gain colour terms in a predictable order. Cultures
separate the spectrum into warm and cool colours that will be represented by the terms for white
and black. Berlin and Kay (1969) called a language with two colour terms a “stage II” system.
Warm colours tend to be divided up first before cool colours. For example, according to Berlin
and Kay it is more likely for a language to have colour terms for red and yellow than green and
blue. Typically, after a basic colour term has been established for a colour category, it is rarely
removed from the language (Kay et al. 2009, 8).
Since reviewing and re-testing some of Kay and Berlin’s work, Kay et al. find that Stage
II systems develop into either a type III system comprising of green and blue, or a type III
system that includes black, green/blue44. Stage III systems could develop into Stage IV systems
that include green and blue or stage IV systems that contain black and blue. The general idea is
that the spectrum is partitioned into two categories, warm and cool colours. This is followed by
additional partitioning of the categories, dividing them in half each time. Thus, they claim that
there are five evolutionary trajectories of basic colour term systems.
44

Where green and blue are represented with a slash between them this signifies that they do not have
separate terms in the language. The / is used to represent a conglomerate term whenever it is used with any colours
throughout this section.

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Kay and McDaniel (1978) have come up with a seven stage system and replaced Kay and
Berlin’s model of eleven universal colour categories with three distinct types of colour
categories: primaries, composites and derived categories (Kay and McDaniel 1978; Kay et al.
2009; Regier, Kay and Cook 2005). Primaries are roughly equivalent to focal categories, whereas
composites are fuzzy categories that are made from the combination of primaries. In contrast,
derived categories are made from the mixture of these combined primaries (Kay et al. 2009, 4).
World Color Study has also found that Kay and Berlin were correct in their conclusion that
colour adjacency is predictable based on its position in the colour spectrum. For example, focal
colours have dominant wavelengths. Warm colours have more dominant wavelengths than cool
colours (Kay et al. 2009, 6). From this, they were able to determine rules for composite
categories. When a blend of primaries occurs, which they call “fuzzy unions,” a chain that does
not cross the delinquent line forms (Kay et al. 2009, 6).
The Kay and McDaniel model assumes that every language will begin as a Stage 1-“fully
partitioned” system and will divide into certain groups of colours as it develops (Kay et al. 2009,
38). They hypothesize that as the yellow and green belong to distinct composites at Stage 1,
yellow and green should not become associated, and yet there are languages that do this (Kay et
al. 2009, 38). However, in a Stage III system where black, white and red have established terms
but yellow, green and blue do not, it could divide into two ways. It could divide the yellow from
the green/blue or the blue from the yellow/green. Cree was the only language in the data set to
demonstrate the yellow/green composite pattern (Kay et al. 2009, 38).
Ultimately, Kay et al. view the yellow/green/blue situation as temporary before it divides
into the expected yellow/green/blue. It is rare for languages to parse the spectrum into
yellow/green and blue. They predict that in such rare cases, the cause of this parsing will be

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either a natural extension of black, white, and red colour terms to composites, the existence of a
special term that means yellow/green/blue or not black/white/red, or well defined terms for
yellow/green/blue or green/blue. In general, there is a fair bit of variability of these terms
between the language’s speakers as derived categories may occur before all the expected
composite categories do (Kay et al. 2009, 39).
They remove Stage IV and V from their stages and restrict their research to “basic
stages” (Kay et al. 2009). They conclude that there are five basic stages moving from two to six
term systems, as it was more accurate to classify languages in between two types rather than
assigning them to one (Kay et al. 2009, 8). Presumably, this allows them to have one system that
accounted for some of the data that did not fit the original studies, such as why a culture could
have brown, a derived category, instead of purple which was only a composite of red and blue.
Individual’s internal representation of colour seems to influence how colour term systems
evolve in languages (Kay et al. 2009, 32). Each partition is believed to add one colour term until
each of the six primaries has its own basic colour term. A Stage I system dictates that either
white/red/yellow will have separate terms or black, green/blue will have separate terms (Kay et
al. 2009, 33). If the division is between white/red/yellow it will result in a stage II system. When
portioned again, black will be extracted from green/blue as white is already separate. This will
result in a stage III system (Kay et al. 2009, 33).
A Stage III system will have terms for black, white, red/yellow and green/blue.
Red/yellow are typically the next two colours to be distinguished with separate terms creating
one more term, resulting in a Stage V system that has separate terms for black, white, red, and
yellow, but green and blue are still connected. The next colour to be divided up is green/blue,
resulting in another separate colour and a Stage IV system. There is variation within Stage II and

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III because in the transition between Stage II to Stage III red and yellow may be divided instead
of dividing black from the single green/blue term (Kay et al. 2009, 34).
Similarly, a Stage III system becoming a Stage V system can group black with blue or separate
black from both green and blue (Kay et al. 2009, 34).
In a survey conducted by Kay et al., 110 languages were assessed for colour systems.
The survey showed that 92% of languages are consistent with the partitioning, but 10% order red
over black and white at some point in their development (Kay et al. 2009, 35).One such language
is Yeli Dnye which has basic colour terms for black, white and red and another red term that
describes the red of kula shells. However, Kay et al. assert that this still meets the criteria for
“basicness” and therefore does not contradict the principles based on Levinson’s (2000) work
(Kay et al. 2009, 35). This is because the black, white and red extended, but instead there was
separate “phrasal expressions” for the colours of green, yellow and blue thus Yeli Dnye is not a
stage II partitioning language (Kay et al. 2009, 37). If a language has not gone beyond
distinguishing the colours of red, black, and white with terms, they expect to see that the colour
terms for black, white, and red are used consistently with language speakers. There would also
be a significant amount of variation in the descriptions used to describe other areas of the
spectrum and they would not have simple terms (Kay et al. 2009, 37).
With the potential to confuse one colour with another because of the tendency of the eye
to perceive afterimages, and for cultures to code them differently, one might think the use of
colour in learning would cause more problems than it solves. However, evidence from Wilkins
(2003) suggests that this may not be the case. Wilkins proposes that the use of coloured overlays
can help prevent visual stress, allowing people to increase their reading speed significantly.
Wilkins has done studies that suggest people can have difficulty reading due to print size, clarity

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of print, spacing, brightness of paper and glare from surrounding light sources. He argues that the
text in children’s books is not optimal as it is sometimes too small with not enough white space
in between words (Wilkins 2003).
Poorly printed texts can lead to symptoms of “visual stress,” even leading to headaches
(Wilkins 2003, 20). He describes this as a type of distortion experienced when reading. He says
that any one of these criteria can cause the image of the text to become distorted. These
distortions may manifest as the words looking fuzzy, jumping words, letters moving, letter
reversals and even whole pages turning into bright white blurs. Frequently these distortions lead
to headaches, stomach aches and other forms of physical stress (Wilkins 2003, 85, 20). The
application of coloured overlays on top of a text may prevent these distortions from occurring
(Wilkins 2003, 15). In clinical trials he found that even students who had no prior learning
challenge found their visibility of text improved and they were able to score higher on tests then
when they did not use the overlays.
Through several trials he has been able to determine that the use of coloured overlays are
far more effective for helping children read than clear ones and grey ones. While other colours
can help a student read, the best results tend to come when the child selects which colour overlay
works best for him/her by trying each one in turn and choosing one (Wilkins 2003, 47). Seventyeight children reported 2.8 symptoms of visual distortion and chose to use a colored overlay.
Eleven other children did not choose an overlay because they only mentioned 1.0 symptom. “Of
children who showed an increase in reading rate of more than 30% or more, 83% reported four
or more symptoms on the group test. Conversely, 63% of those who reported less than four
symptoms showed an increase in reading rate of less than 30%” (Wilkins 2003, 49).

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Grounds and Wilkins cited in Wilkins (2003, 50) arranged three different groups of
children: those diagnosed dyslexic, non-learning disabled students of the same age, and a group
deemed intellectually impaired and the same age The results of the study showed that there did
not seem to be a significant difference as to who could benefit from overlays. In light of this, he
concludes that approximately “… 5% of a school population reads considerably faster with the
use of an overlay….” and an additional 20% of the school populous had some benefits (Wilkins
2003, 55). For additional information regarding the details of this study please see Wilkins
(2003). The children that benefit from overlays may already be “good readers” but more
frequently overlays help those who have difficulty reading (Wilkins 2003, 118). He states that
“the proportion of individuals with dyslexia who benefit is not significantly greater than the
proportion of non-dyslexic individuals who benefit” (Wilkins 2003, 109).
Wilkins is not the first person to believe that colour may assist in the process of reading
and learning. Montessori and Gattegno’s methodologies both utilized colour. Perhaps it can be
assumed that the tendencies of colour to grab people’s attention, evoke emotional responses and
stimulate the senses through its connection with memory are just some of the reasons why these
educators made it an important part of their approaches. Montessori suggested that when children
could experience colour through their senses, such as by seeing it and touching it, they would
achieve what she called “colour memory” (Montessori 1965, 86). This meant that through prior
interaction with coloured materials, the child would be able to call back the colour image that
had been created through that interaction even when the object was no longer present
(Montessori 1965, 86). Leach suggests, “It is possible that early childhood experiences may
'imprint' particular emotional attitudes towards particular colours” (Leach 1986, 57).

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Gattegno’s (1962) Words in Color approach used colour effectively to help students
associate sounds with colour in order to learn how to read and, perhaps, to prevent the flow of
students’ thoughts from being disturbed by the contrary relationship of vowel combinations with
their corresponding grapheme. Gattegno says that colour can help to teach reading and writing,
explaining that:
If we use colors to write each sign, we can at first refer to the sign by its color
instead of giving its sound or name. That will reduce our interference with the
learning process. In addition to this, we can make use of color in a systematic way
to bring out the similarities and differences in sounds that we want the learner to
perceive. (Gattegno 1962, 8)
Gattegno says “. . . it seems that colors add an extra dimension to the sign and strikingly
help most learners to distinguish between similar shapes” (Gattegno 1962, 28).45
45

In Words in Color: Background and Principles, Gattegno devotes several pages to the explanation of his
use of colour and alludes to the benefits colour can have in aiding language learners. It seems years later when he
writes the Silent Way, the same principles are used, but he no longer needs to justify his use of colour as explicitly
because he has already done so in the previous book. While the relationship between the two books may not be
apparent because the former was used to teach English speaking children reading skills and the later was designed
for teaching English as a second language, Gattegno includes a section of how his methodology has been successful
with “foreign” languages (Gattegno 1962, 21-24). The following quotes from Words in Colour: Background and
Principles seems to confirm that Gattegno used colour for essentially the same reasons in his work regardless of the
language being learned.
“As a result of our work in a number of languages, we have evolved a number of learning principles that may be
valid for all languages” (Gattegno 1962, 25). “The most distinctive characteristic of our approach is not so much the
use of color to make a language quasi-phonetic, but in the fact that this method uses the dynamic properties of the
mind” (Gattegno 1962, 10). In section 4.1, evidence from Montessori also implies that colour can be used to
stimulate these dynamic mental properties.
Since there is no logical reason why one should write from left to right in some languages, from right to left
in others, and from top to bottom in still others, we must expect that the new apprentice will want some
time to decide on that, and some pupils show us that they do need some time for this decision. Similarly,
since there is no logical reason for any sign corresponding to a given sound, we must pay special attention
to the way in which we introduce signs and their corresponding sounds. The English alphabet is patently
the wrong way to introduce them. Based on the work we have done to date, it seems that colors add an
extra dimension to the sign and strikingly help most learners to distinguish between similar shapes.
(Gattegno 1962, 28)
The successful transfer of the ideas that worked in one phonetic language to other phonetic languages
enabled us to arrive at a tentative conclusion: the principles underlying the learning of reading and writing
were largely independent of the structures concerned, i.e., the shape of the signs and the sounds of these
particular languages. Naturally, each language to which we applied our method had its own problems and
required adaptation of the principles which resulted in apparently different treatments for the first three
phonetic (or quasiphonetic) languages… (Gattegno 1962, 67)

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Gattegno states that colour can be used effectively for helping students who are learning
how to read and write language (Gattegno 1963). He intimates that if educators use colors to
write each sign, they can refer to the sign initially by its color rather than giving its name or
sound (Gattegno 1962, 8). By coding such sounds as [ʌ] in the word “up” and [ʌ] in the word
“from” with the same colour he bypasses the non-phonetic nature of English spelling, making it
easier for children to read and spell in English. Gattegno uses colours in order to help students
instantly recognize how a word needs to be pronounced so that they can read confidently. “The
learning principle involved in the use of color is to contrast or show similarities between the
signs of spoken American English by using sharply contrasting or very similar colors; the choice
of colors is obviously to a great extent arbitrary” (Gattegno 1962, 31). He suggests that using
colour assists in the learner’s ability to build mental structures for letters, words and phrases in
their mind.
Shams and Seitz (2008) attest that studies of perceptual learning have been more
interested in the effects of single sensory modality, but their research suggests that people
experience the world through a constant integration of multisensory information. They argue
that visual and auditory information are inextricably linked during the performance of many
tasks such as bird watching, driving a car, etc. They hypothesize that these experiences have
caused the brain to be most efficient in multisensory environments. Therefore, they feel that “…
multisensory training protocols greater resemble natural learning conditions and would
ultimately be more beneficial than single modality ones” (Shams and Seitz 2008, 1, 5).

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Shams and Seitz (2008) attest that traditionally researchers and critics of multisensory
learning argue that using more than one sense while learning can be confusing. When students
engage in an activity that involves primarily one sense, such as answering the question of what a
cat looks like, knowing the sound of the cat may only interfere with the learning of the image of
the cat. These researchers imply that the sound of the cat should be absent while learning its
image. Shams and Seitz contend that their research suggests this is not the case. They state that
“multisensory interactions are ubiquitous in the nervous system and occur at early stages of
perceptual processing” (Shams and Seitz 2008, 1).
Within the brain itself, Shams and Seitz found that there are many brain areas and
pathways for the interaction of multisensory input. These areas extend from the brain stem to
early sensory cortical areas. This has led them to believe that learning during early development
can involve multisensory processes at any time. Researchers have noted that during early
development, a change in the effectiveness of one sense can directly influence other senses,
demonstrating there is a high degree of neural plasticity. Shams and Seitz also hypothesize that
congruent stimulus, the relationship between stimuli that matches the individual’s previous
experience in nature, will really respond to multisensory learning protocols.
Shams and Seitz claim that the main difference between uni-sensory and multisensory
training protocols occurs during the encoding process because a wide set of processing structures
becomes active during multisensory learning. Thus, there are multiple possibilities in regards to
which structures will change during the learning process (Shams and Seitz 2008, 4). Lehman and
Murray cited in Shams and Seitz found that when they presented an image with its correct sound,
observers were able to recognise the image again, and had a better chance at success than those
who only saw it. In addition, when an incorrect sound was paired with the image, the image did

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not facilitate the memory of the object. They conclude that multisensory interactions with stimuli
allow it to be encoded into multisensory representations and because of this, when presented
with the same stimuli again later, will stimulate a larger network of brain areas than after unisensory encoding.
Educators such as Slingerland and Montessori and psychologists have known about the
benefits of multisensory learning for decades (Shams and Seitz 2008, 5). Beyond its benefits to
individuals, the use of multisensory learning allows a class of students an opportunity to learn
through their own preferred style as well as strengthening their other intelligences. Shams and
Seitz attest that “Related research indicates that multimodal processing reduces cognitive load
because information from different modalities can be more easily chunked into short-term
memory and used to build long-term representations” (Shams and Seitz 2008, 5).
2.6 Dyslexia: Orienting the Self: Disorientation and Dissonance
Traditionally, the classification of mentally disabled was bestowed upon a person based
on the result of an intelligence test (Westling and Fox 1995, 4). The American Association on
Mental Retardation (AAMR) adapted this, ensuring those suspected of having a disability were
evaluated based on the evidence from multiple areas (Westling and Fox 1995, 4). The focus of
this scrutiny is to find the means for people to function tolerably well in society. Their strengths
and weaknesses are identified and supports put in place in order to assist individuals to be able to
do what they would need to (Westling and Fox 1995, 4). Individuals who scored between 20 to
25 and 35 to 40 were classed as severely mentally disabled on “traditional intelligence tests”
(Westling and Fox 1995, 4). As such, this class of individuals were seen as having few academic
skills. Individuals who received lower scores than this were viewed as profoundly disabled.
There is a great deal of variability in this category, but many are capable of participating in daily

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activities (Westling and Fox 1995, 4). In the current AAMR classification system, these labels
are no longer used and a multidimensional approach is utilized instead (Westling and Fox 1995,
4). This is meant to generate an accurate profile of the person’s adaptive skills, as well as their
internal influences, such as emotional and physical health considerations, and external
considerations, such as their environment (Westling and Fox 1995, 4).
One well known learning disability is dyslexia. This term is used to describe people who
have difficulties with reading due to irregular mental processing, although it can occur with
many other areas of difficulty such as dyscalculia (difficulty in math), dysgraphia (difficulty with
writing/spelling), etc. Since the discovery of learning disabilities and the classification of
individuals as learning disabled based on intelligence tests, the theories of researchers such as
Orton, Gillingham and Slingerland have been used to develop programs to help dyslexics learn.
Orton, a neuropsychologist, used multisensory techniques as far back as the 1920s to treat
patients with language-related difficulties (Nosal 2012). He believed that using kinesthetic and
tactile movements could help students with their visual and auditory understanding of letters and
specifically prevent learners from reversing the letters. Orton encouraged Gillingham to take his
research and theories and apply it to her work with alphabets (Nosal 2012). She developed
techniques for teaching phonemes, morphemes and spelling rules. This became known as the
Orton-Gillingham or Multisensory approach.
In the Multisensory approach, students connect what they hear with the letter by writing
it out on a large piece of paper. Students run their finger over the letter multiple times while
repeating its sound. The approach utilizes sight words, tracing and phonics (Nosal 2012). OrtonGillingham Multisensory Learning has been in operation since the 1920s and the classroom
adaption of that, The Slingerland Method, has helped decades of students learn to read, write,

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spell and do mathematical equations (Nosal 1012). The Slingerland Method is based on the
premise that the more mental pathways that can be activated during the learning process, the
greater the retention of that material there will be.
While the hypotheses of Davis (1994) are unique and researchers and practitioners may
question whether his results are scientifically verifiable, as Davis is a severe dyslexic himself, he
has a strong voice in the dyslexic community. His explanation of what causes dyslexic symptoms
has been influential because it has made tremendous sense to dyslexics across the globe. There
are licensed professionals for the Davis’ Dyslexia Correction program in many countries such as
America, Austria, Germany and Greece, just to name a few. In fact, the programs are available in
over 45 nations and in 30 languages (Davis 1994).
The thousands of dyslexics that have been helped through Davis’ program attest to its
remarkable effectiveness (Davis 1994). For example, L. Smith, a Davis facilitator from Rocky
Point Academy in Calgary, noted that students made an improvement in four full grade levels in
their reading and one third of the group showed an improvement of at least three grade levels by
the end of the five-day program. Smith’s results also confirmed that children, teenagers and
adults were able to improve their skills, proving that the Davis program is effective for multiple
ages. On average, adult participants improved their skills by six grade levels after the five day
sessions (Marshall, Smith and Borger-Smith 2009). The image in Figure 8 below is from the
book The Gift of Dyslexia that was written by Davis in 1994.46 It shows a typical example of how
fast students can improve their writing after receiving the Davis training.

46

Please note that this book was written to be read easily by Dyslexics. It features large print with minimal
punctuation marks. At times colloquial language has been used and images are used throughout the book.

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Figure 8. Davis, Ronald D.1994. The Gift of Dyslexia: Why Some of the Smartest People Can’t Read and
How They Can Learn. Ability Workshop Press. 1994: 49.

A central concept of Davis’ theory is the phenomenon of disorientation. He says:
Disorientation is a common occurrence. With very few exceptions, it happens to
everyone at times. Disorientation is the natural function of a normal brain. It occurs
when we are overwhelmed by stimuli or thought. It also occurs when the brain
receives conflicting information from the different senses and attempts to correlate
the information. (Davis 1994, 15)
During a disorientation, your brain sees things moving when you really aren’t, or
your body feels as if you are moving when you really aren’t. Your sense of time can
slow down or speed up. Your brain alters your actual perceptions, and you
experience the altered perceptions as reality. (Davis 1994, 17)
While disorientation is a normal occurrence, Davis asserts that dyslexics unknowingly cause
disorientations to happen as a means of perceiving objects multi-dimensionally. In this way, “…
they are able to experience multiple views of the world” (Davis 1994, 18). “They can perceive
things from more than one perspective and gain more information from these perceptions than
other people” (Davis 1994, 18).

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Davis has created his program based on certain assumptions about the dyslexic mind and
how it operates using his own experience and perceptions as a means to understand others. He
realizes that it may be a long time before science can provide the evidence to support his
hypothesis. However, the success rate of his program and its longevity of several decades
suggests he may have discovered certain truths about the dyslexic mind. He contends that the
source of dyslexics’ difficulties, and their often profound ingenuity and creativity, is the same
and comes from the dyslexic’s ability to think in three dimensional pictures rather than words or
two-dimensional images (McConvile 1998). This may not cause difficulty for words that
dyslexics can generate a picture for, but for functional words such as the word “the” which has
no immediate meaningful image, it can cause problems (McConvile 1998).
Davis contends dyslexics can become confused when they initially encounter such
abstract words as “the” because they are unaware that their mind will unconsciously view that
word from every possible perspective resulting in the page suddenly appearing blank or letters
moving (McConvile 1998). Letters may move, the word may shift or the page may appear blank
several times during the reading of a passage. If this happens frequently during the task, then the
movement or blanks can trigger a special type of confusion he calls “disorientation” where a
person no longer perceives what they see and only what their mind perceives is there (Davis
1994, 17). It does not take much imagination to determine from this that if dyslexics think in
three-dimensional images, then when they encounter a functional word like “the” they will see
nothing. As such words are common, after coming to the end of a sentence or paragraph,
dyslexics may not understand what they have read.
Davis implies that when dyslexics become confused they will apply different strategies to
deal with their confusion, perhaps the most common of these being concentration, an intense

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stare into the page in an effort to make those printed letters produce an image (Davis 1994). In
Davis’ program students are instructed to form letters out of clay thereby making them threedimensional and “picturable” 47 so that they do not cause these blanks. After punctuation signs
have been introduced, students set out to replicate this process for all of the two hundred and
seventeen “trigger words” that he assists the learner to identify (McConvile 1998). Students also
create a clay model of the image they want to associate with the word (McConvile 1998).
Davis attests that “the primary thought process” of a dyslexic is a non-verbal threedimensional picture thinking mode which occurs at thirty-two pictures per second. “In a second,
a verbal thinker could have between two and five thoughts (individual words conceptualized)
while a picture thinker would have thirty-two (individual pictures conceptualized)” (Davis 1994,
98). This results in anywhere from 6 to 10 times more thoughts per second (Davis 1994, 98).
Thus, picture thinking in general is believed to be 400 to 2,000 times faster than verbal thinking
(Davis 1994, 98). It is believed that visual and auditory information is retained in a sensory
register for only 3 to 5 seconds (Swanson and Cooney 1991, 107). Thus, in dyslexic students the
thoughts could speed by so fast, many of the thoughts would be too fast for the individual be
consciously aware of them.
Davis’ approach emphasizes the importance of awareness in the orientation training
phase of his program. Orientation involves a combination of mental picturing and visualization
techniques where students are helped to create devices in their mind such as an image for their
mind’s eye. Davis says that “The mind’s eye does have a location. In fact, it has a multitude of
possible locations. It is wherever its owner intends it, wishes it, or perceives it to be. If this

47

Please note that “picturable” is not Davis’ term, but one of my own that is used to describe a sign that
one is able to make a mental image for. The word cat for example is picturable.

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sounds like a supernatural or metaphysical concept, please remember that dyslexics are able to
experience their mental images as actual perceptions” (Davis 1994, 129).
Without an awareness of where their mind’s eye is, dyslexic students cannot orient
themselves. Davis stresses that the mind’s eye is a location inside the students themselves.
Figuratively speaking, this might function as an internal window that they look out from. In
order to re-orient their mind’s eye they need to understand that:
When dyslexic people look at an alphabet letter and disorient, within a split second they
see dozens of different views-from the top, the sides, and the back of the letter. In other
words, the mind’s eye is mentally circling around the letter as though it were an object in
three-dimensional space. (Davis 1994, 129)
Whenever disorientation occurs, all the senses (except the sense of taste) are altered. The
brain no longer sees what the eyes are seeing, but an altered perception of the images.
The brain no longer hears what the ears are hearing, but an altered perception of the
sounds. And so on through the rest of the perceptions, including the senses of touch,
balance, motion and time. (Davis 1994, 17)
Davis is aware that this analysis will sound somewhat akin to the quantum physics
concept that an object is affected by one’s perception of it, and he is not entirely sure whether the
dyslexic mind is simply creating these multiple views. He cannot prevent the theory from
seeming somewhat surreal. For the present, all he can assert is that he knows that somehow this
mental movement disorientation process takes place in the dyslexic mind, as he is a severe
dyslexic (Davis 1994, 129).
Davis is not the only researcher to have realized that a conflict between relations during
cognition can result in a state of disorientation. Festinger uses the term “dissonance” instead of
disorientation in his cognitive dissonance theory. However despite the distinct terms, the
principles underlying both Davis’ and Festinger’s theories are quite similar due to the manner in
which they involve conflict and attempt to resolve it by sustaining a consistent orientation.
Festinger describes dissonance as “nonfitting relations among cognitions” (Festinger 1957, 3).

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According to him the theory of Cognitive Dissonance stems from the idea that “. . . the
individual strives toward consistency within himself” (Festinger 1957, 1). This can be likened to
the idea of the individual’s orientation point as described in Davis’ theory. Festinger later uses
the term consonance to refer to this consistency, making its oppositional relation to dissonance
more apparent. He states that although there are of course exceptions generally, a person’s
beliefs and attitudes tend to be internally consistent and where there are inconsistencies these are
usually obvious (Festinger 1957, 1). In Davis’s work he is able to recognize these inconsistencies
tracking their source to a disconnection between letters on a page and the mental image resolving
them by giving the necessary visual information to achieve, as Festinger would say, consonance.
In a like manner to Davis, the work of Festinger seeks to account for dissonance in the
hopes that he may discover a formulaic means of limiting the “psychological discomfort” that
results from it. Festinger contends that, “The existence of dissonance, being psychologically
uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance”
(Festinger 1957, 3). Davis would say that dyslexics will employ concentration in order to do this.
Festinger further argues that individuals will likely avoid situations and information that could
intensify the degree of dissonance they experience. Davis notes this possibility as well. In their
own ways both Festinger and Davis suggest that when new information is presented to someone
this may cause temporary dissonance with previously learned knowledge (Festinger 1957; Davis
1994). It should be noted, however, Davis implies for dyslexic individuals this is most likely to
happen with text and would not likely occur with visual media, whereas Festinger makes no such
distinction.
Festinger also implies that in situations where individuals cannot control environmental
variables during an event dissonance may result (Festinger 1957, 4). As both Davis and Festinger

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intimate the level of tolerance for dissonance will understandably vary between individuals
(Festinger 1957, 4). Although Festinger does not specifically mention that a person can become
overwhelmed by this discomfort, as Davis seems to suggest, Festinger does imply through his
use of Adams (1954) work that the dissonance can build up. Ultimately a build up will result in a
release of tension whether that is smooth or abrupt (Festinger 1957, 33). Thereby the degree of
dissonance experienced will depend on the value given to elements which exist in opposition to
the element being considered (Festinger 1957, 17). The level of dissonance increases as the
degree of importance of the elements increases. Davis would likely agree with Festinger in this
regard, knowing that some dyslexics avoid certain subjects to prevent feelings of disorientation
while others struggle to find bridges and alternative routes to learning such as utilizing analogies
and pictures. Festinger concurs that the expectation would be that when faced with dissonance
individuals would look for information “. . . that would produce new cognition consonant with
existing cognitions and the avoidance of information that would add to the dissonance”
(Festinger 1957, 144).
He further suggests that when a person experiences a sense of dissonance the person may
become defensive “. . . to protect himself from the new information” (Festinger 1957, 149).
Language teachers have certainly noted how their students can become agitated when they do not
comprehend a new concept because of some previous conception. A defensive strategy could
result in a misperception or avoidance of the information (Festinger 1957, 150). Student work
that reveals holes in their grammatical knowledge, demonstrates this tendency. In other words
individuals may simply forget information that causes dissonance. As previously mentioned Gass
and Selinker (2008) have certainly noticed this in their research. In particular if the individual’s
experience is not prolonged and no reminders are provided through their daily life, the

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information will likely be disregarded (Festinger 1957, 156).48 Festinger says that “The total
dissonance introduced into a person’s cognition by the knowledge that someone holds a contrary
opinion will, of course, depend upon how many existing cognitions are consonant with the
cognitive elements corresponding to the operation in question” (Festinger 1957, 178). Speaking
of Cognitive elements, it is time to consider the brain and its significant role in the process of
learning.
Chapter 3: Semiotic Confusion: A Synthetic Construct Model
Regardless of the topic, neurological research will ultimately become useful for
explaining certain events or behaviors in any number of fields of study. This is why neurological
research is applied to a large assortment of fields such as psychology, marketing, linguistics and
especially education. Indeed the scientific journal, Cerebrum, says there is even an emerging
field of study called “neuroeducation” (Hardiman and Denckla 2010, 4). Current research
focuses on the “Neuro-plasticity” of the brain that accounts for human beings’ extraordinary
ability to adapt to new situations and environments (Hardiman and Denckla 2010). LeDoux says
that as the basic framework of the brain is the same for all individuals, the unique soma that is
created is a result of how synapses form into neural systems (LeDoux 2002, 36, 65). It is evident
from this work that, assuming he is correct, the brain both constructs the self and the brain is
influenced by the self as it evolves (LeDoux 2002). 49

48

Although the work of Festinger is from a number of decades ago, today’s teachers are still faced with
such challenges and regardless of how old a theory may be when considered in the light of current practices and
research it cannot help but to produce a post modern perspective because those that utilize it are products of their
current culture. In chapter 4, two current methodologies, Pronunciation Science (Messum and Young 2012) and
AHIEP (Acton 2012) attempt to address the tendency of students to forget what they have learned.
49

LeDoux’s use of the term self here arguably can be thought of as the soma. The implication of this is that
he recognizes that the body influences the brain after the neural systems have worked to create it, thus at some level
he recognizes the underlying principle of embodied cognition; the body has an important role in cognition.

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3.1 The Brain and Neural Networks
LeDoux (2002) explores the biological mechanisms in the brain that ultimately allow for
the creation of the self. The information that people become consciously aware of gradually
forms the explicit aspects of the self. He says that the implicit and explicit aspects of self are in a
constant state of change because one’s genes can be affected by one’s external environment. To
appreciate these insights fully, it is necessary to consider what the brain is composed of and how
it creates. The brain is categorized into ever-smaller areas such as the fore/mid and hind brain
and these contain neurons and glia cells that help the neurons to function optimally (Danesi
2003). The broader structures of the cerebellum, cerebrum and brain stem make up the nervous
system.50 The brain is encased in three protective membranes. Together these seem to isolate the
brain from damage and to increase the efficacy of neural circuits (LeDoux 2002).
According to LeDoux (2002) and Gattegno (1973), the creation of the self initially
begins in utero as an embryonic form. While they have somewhat different views as to the level
of awareness the soma has at this stage, their account of human life in the embryonic phase is
similar. LeDoux says that the embryo lacks sensory systems and has no direct contact with its
external environment. However, even within this fragile state of existence where the embryo
depends fully on the mother’s body to sustain its life, genes can be affected by the chemical
environment outside the soma. Gattegno views this period of life as being a time when the
slowly evolving soma is consciously aware of the energy that moves in and out of itself

50

The cerebrum is discussed in more detail on page 127.

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(Gattegno 1973). 51 In contrast, LeDoux is more focused on the biological mechanisms, such as
the distribution of neurons and the polarizing of synapses that make such awareness possible.
An embryo is made up of three parts: the ectoderm, which will become the vertebral
column; the mesoderm, which will later turn into limbs; and the endoderm, which becomes the
protective tissues that line the pharynx and throat, etc. Each of these contains all that is needed to
develop its part of the body, including the brain. During the brain’s embryonic stage, the main
task of genes is to produce proteins, which will serve to create the soma or the “bag” as Gattegno
would say (Gattegno 1973, 4). There are different types of proteins in the soma. Some stimulate
other genes to make more proteins and others can cause chemical reactions or form blockades,
restricting the movement of cells to ensure that they do not go where they are not needed. Some
cells even form a glue-like substance that allows them to adhere to another cell while travelling
some distance (LeDoux 2002, 66). These cells form a neural tube. As the tube expands, cells
leave it and travel to their designated locations in the evolving brain (LeDoux 2002, 69). During
this transient cell movement, cells interact with a variety of neurons (LeDoux 2002).
While LeDoux concedes that neurological research has not yet determined how each cell
migrates to its designated area, he suggests, based on the research of transplant subjects, that
brain cells will function as their chemical environment dictates they should. In other words they
will assume the function of the environment they are in (LeDoux 2002, 70).
To understand the relationship between neurological interactions and thought, it is
helpful to consider how cells, particularly neurons, interact within the newly developing embryo.
A neuron is a brain cell with the ability to relay messages to other neurons and throughout the

51

Thinking back to Peirce’s state of Thirdness, Gattegno’s idea that consciousness begins before the fetus
is fully formed is relevant to the null state because even a terminus road, a nothing, is a something through one’s
conscious awareness of its nothingness. Thus consciousness is the something that comes out of nothing.

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brain. It has a membrane-covered cell body that houses genetic material that can make necessary
proteins. Nerves project out from the cell body in the form of fibers that resemble wires called
axons. Within the evolving embryo, all cells including neurons are covered by membranes and
LeDoux says this is like a “spandex suit” (LeDoux 2002, 54). The nerve fibers stretch way out to
gain contact with neurons. As the cell’s axons become connected, they form networks. The end
of the axon is called a terminal, and the sending and receiving of neurons occurs at this terminal
(LeDoux 2002, 40). The messages projected out by the axons can affect other neurons and axons
nearby. This phenomenon is called “divergence” (LeDoux 2002, 42).
A single neuron can hypothetically receive messages from any number of neighboring
neurons. This is called convergence.52 Thus, in a neuron, some part of it will be sending out
messages while the other part is receiving them (LeDoux 2002, 42). When these two functions
meet, a synapse, which is a little gap between neurons, is formed. Perhaps a synapse is similar to
a bubble between the sender and the receiver neurons. Messages from the sender neuron then
float across the synapse to communicate with the other neurons. The first neuron located before
the bubble is referred to as the presynaptic neuron, whereas the neuron after the bubble is the
postsynaptic neuron (LeDoux 2002, 43). The membrane covers the neurons’ axons, dendrites
and cell body as well. The transmitter then floats across the synaptic space and unites a dendrite
with some other neuron.
Inside the membrane are a variety of chemicals that produce electrical charges. Some of
these influence the way in which the cell functions. The chemicals on the inside of the cell are
more negatively charged then the chemicals on the outside of the cell, approximately sixty to one
thousandth-of-a-volt more negatively charged.
52

Neurons are aided in this task by growth cones that protrude like fans from each end of the axon
(LeDoux 2002, 71).

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Throughout every part of the brain, biologically propagated nerve impulses motivate
electrochemical actions. This impulse, called an action potential, will travel down an active
neuron’s nerve fiber causing the release of a chemical neurotransmitter from its final destination.
As the impulse travels down the axon, the axon carries energy of that impulse and the electricity
contained in it touches other parts of the axon, all the way down to its end. Typically, these
impulses are motivated by synaptic inputs (LeDoux 2002, 44). LeDoux refers to this whole
process as the “neurodomino effect” (LeDoux 2002, 44). There can be several axons on neurons;
however, more commonly, brain cells have only one axon with the ability to branch out creating
several terminals. The chemicals at the axon need to be released to allow axons the chance to
complete their work.
Action potentials are synchronized, but as soon as the action potential flows down the
cell it then becomes a receiver, otherwise known as a presynaptic neuron. When presynaptic cells
converge into a post-synaptic neuron this motivates an action potential. When various
presynaptic neurons come to the post-synaptic neuron they must arrive in the cell more or less
simultaneously. This role reversal between neurons seems similar to the game of catching a ball.
In order for the game to continue, the receiver of the ball must throw it. The brain also contains
inhibitory “interneurons” that release transmitters that decrease the chance of action potentials
forming in a post-synaptic cell (LeDoux 2002, 51).
Transmitters have two properties. They must be able to change rapidly and they must
prime the electrical state of the post-synaptic cell to increase the chances of an action potential to
form. The projection neuron must activate the next cell in the sequence. There are also inhibitory
neurons which function to prevent synapses from firing action potentials by rereleasing
inhibiting impulses all of the time. These serve to deactivate projection cells, making them

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inactive unless stimulated by neurotransmitters that are released by the projection cells (LeDoux
2002, 53).
LeDoux says there are different types of neurons such as sensory neurons, motor neurons
and interneurons and that each of these have specialized jobs. Sensory neurons deliver sensory
input to various areas in the brain. Motor neurons send messages to gross and fine motor
systems. Interneurons, such as GABA cells, monitor the flow of neurons. Similarly the amino
acid neurotransmitter, glutamate, has two tasks in the body: the first is as a neurotransmitter in
the brain and the second is to support metabolic processes that occur throughout the body to
sustain its life. The effects of glutamate and GABA are not specific to any one area, but are
genetically felt throughout the body (LeDoux 2002, 53). After being released from a presynaptic
terminal, glutamate attaches itself to the outside wall of a post-synaptic receiver, and a pathway
opens through it. When this happens positively charged ions pass through the channel, entering
the cell, causing the electrical charge to shift. If there are enough positive ions to change the
inside charge to a positive one an action potential will commence (LeDoux 2002).
LeDoux’s research supports Lamb’s theory that inputs are transmitted and stored in
hierarchal groupings. LeDoux would call these groupings circuits and he contends that local
circuits mediate the circuit’s connections at each level. The transfer of information from one
level of a hierarchal circuit to another typically involves excitatory connection that is regulated
by inhibitory local circuits and both hierarchical and local circuits to another. For both
hierarchical and local circuits, transmissions are modulated by “single source divergent
projections” (LeDoux 2002, 50).
The cerebrum divides into the left and right hemispheres. There are nerve fibers
connecting these two halves and each of the halves divide into four sections. The hemispheres

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share a half of the frontal lobe at the front of the brain, the temporal lobe at the lower side, the
parietal lobe in the middle and the occipital lobe in the back (Danesi 2003). Through the corpus
callosum that connects the left hemisphere (LH) and the right hemisphere (RH), the LH controls
the right side of the body and the RH controls the left side (Danesi 2003, 26).
The LH is commonly associated with language because Broca’s Area is involved in
organizing the movements of the mouth and throat necessary for speech production as well as
Wernicke’s area that controls comprehension (Danesi 2003, 28). Vygotsky later attested that
such linguistic components such as phonemes, grammatical categories and words resided in the
LH; however, he thought language use and creation was motivated by the interaction of synapses
occurring throughout the brain (Danesi 2003).
The popularization of the research of Broca (1861) and the work of Wernicke (1995) has
impacted the field of education. Their studies have lead scientists to associate the left hemisphere
with logic, language and analysis, whereas the right hemisphere has been connected to creativity,
complexity, intuition, emotion and synthesis. This has given rise to the dichotomy of analytic vs.
synthetic forms of thought. The notion that people have these two distinct forms of thought has
also influenced pedagogy. Arguably, the dichotomous union of thought may have contributed to
the motivation for the development of such learning methods as the Montessori Approach as well
as Suggestopedia and TPR (Danesi 2003). Danesi argues that TPR utilizes four central “R-mode”
principles (Danesi 2003, 40).53 These are that there should be an emphasis on developing
receptive skills, establishing teacher rapport with students, presenting new information through a
combination of verbal and kinesthetic modes and that information students have difficulty with
should be returned to at a future time (Danesi 2003, 40).
53

When Danesi uses the term R-mode he is referring to a mode of thought accessed through right
hemispheric functioning.

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Currently, the distinctions between analytic and synthetic functioning have been so well
established that people may not question them. However, as useful as these distinctions may be,
they have been generalized from the research collected about split-brain studies. Such studies
have prompted modern neuroscientists to reconsider what human beings know of the brain and
delve deeper to investigate how one’s genes and neural circuitry continue to evolve to serve to
create individuals.
Danesi’s (2003) work is a part of a growing trend in applied linguistics to apply the latest
neurological discoveries to classroom practice. With neurological studies, such as the Dana
Foundation’s projects occurring presently, teachers are hoping to improve their students’ chances
of success by learning what materials and techniques will help their students refine their mental
processing (Gordon 2010). Danesi seeks to find a more productive short hand for describing
functions that correspond with these traditional views of the LH and RH. He asserts that the
brain must have a way of processing different kinds of information simultaneously. He implies
that creating a less cryptic way of talking about left and right brain functioning, as it applies to
language education, could aid practitioners. While this research is not new, teachers are still
trying to find more effective ways of utilizing such information in their reading and learning
approaches.
Danesi reviews some of the methods that have attempted to utilize the R-mode in their
design. He says that:
Suggestopedia, TPR, and the NA were the first serious attempts in the history of SLT to
base classroom pedagogy on the view that the brain's acquisition mode--the R-Mode--is
the crucial one in SLA. In so doing, however, they downplayed the role of the L-Mode
perhaps too drastically. They continue to generate much interest and enthusiasm in
teacher and learner alike during the initial stages--the stages during which the R-Mode
probably dominates the intake of novel information. But their overemphasis on this mode
throughout the course of SLA also probably explains why, by the early 1990s, interest in
them declined considerably. (Danesi 2003, 42)

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Danesi uses the concepts of the L and R modes to describe the functional qualities of
each hemisphere. The RH is assumed to be mostly spatial, holistic, non-verbal and intuitive.
When one is in an R-mode there tends to be a lack of awareness of the passage of time, sounds
are not made into meaningful words, thinking is in pictures and one feels alert and focused yet
relaxed. Danesi says the R-mode is the brain’s mode of acquisition, whereas he considers the
time conscious and analytic-mode to be ideal for learning.
He intimates that when R-mode learning precedes L-mode learning students will shift
into L-mode for grammar production naturally. However, he also implies that while some
students may need the L-mode more than others, adding L-mode activities are a vital part of the
reinforcement process (Danesi 2003, 54-55). While current neurological research still concedes
that split brain studies reveal that certain functions and neural activity occur in the left or right
hemisphere, they describe this in terms of the specific part within the hemispheres of the brain
that is affected. In other words, even though there is ongoing evidence that supports these
divisions, current research is more focused on the general plasticity of the brain and how
stimulus can activate multiple areas.
Danesi states that the right hemisphere is designed to transmit messages from its neural
networks out to the rest of the brain. Therefore introducing new concepts through the R-mode
will facilitate the spread of information in the form of impulses to other awaiting neural networks
that are composed of signs. In contrast, he argues that the left hemisphere is organized to take in
the impulses, catching them and not sending them out (Danesi 2003, 55). He further argues that
“neuroscientific research on hemisphericity . . . strongly suggests that the R-Mode is a crucial
point-of-departure for activating the appropriate language acquisition areas of the brain” (Danesi
2003, 55).

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Danesi’s argument is supported by current neuroscientific research. “The emerging
picture from the current literature seems to suggest a special role of the right hemisphere in selfrelated cognition, own-body perception, self-awareness and autobiographical memories” (Uddin
et al. 2006, 65). A recent book by Narvaez et al. (2012), reviews a number of these studies, such
as Kasprian et al. (2011) neuroimaging studies54, utilizing them to argue that the infant’s early
maturing right hemisphere, which is dominant for visual and emotional processing, “… is
psychobiologically attuned to the output of the mother’s right hemisphere” (Narvaez et al. 2012,
35). In other words, the authors argue that the attachment bond between mothers and infants
greatly influences the growth of the infant’s right hemisphere. This bond helps the infant develop
survival mechanisms and therefore they conclude that the right hemisphere needs to mature more
quickly than the left. Infants experience rapid hemispheric growth during the last trimester
through the post natal period up to 18 to 24 months of age. “Evidence now clearly indicates
during this rapid period of brain development, the right hemisphere develops before the left”
(Narvaez et al. 2012, 33). Narvaez et al. argue that there is now a considerable body of research
that shows at the non-verbal level the attachment bond between mother and infant structures
post-natal right brain development (Narvaez et al. 2012, 33). They state that:
Over the course of the first year, increasingly complex right brain to right brain attachment
communications imprint first posterior cerebral areas involved in sensory processing (e.g.,
right occipital, right fusiform gyrus, right superior temporal sulcus, right temporoparietal
regions), and later right anterior cerebral areas. . . . prenatal and postnatal interpersonal
events also wire the connectivity of structures in the developing central nervous system
(CNS) with energy-expending sympathetic and energy-conserving parasympathetic
branches of the evolving auto-nomic nervous system (ANS). There is now consensus that
the right brain plays a greater role than the left in autonomic arousal and therefore the
somatic aspects of emotional states.” (Narvaez et al. 2012, 38)

54

Kasprian et al. (2011) found that at 26 gestational weeks neuroimaging studies showed that right
hemispheric functions matured faster than left hemispheric functions.

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These are not new ideas, for in 1975, Brown and Jafe said that, “The right hemisphere can be
considered dominant in infancy, for the type of visual and acoustic communication which is
relevant for the pre-linguistic child” (Brown and Jafe cited in Narvaez et al. 2012, 35). If one
was to accept Narvaez et al.’s (2012) conclusion that the right hemisphere develops first to
promote infant survival, then one would expect that the emotional reactions of fully bilateralized
adults and pre-linguistic children would vary considerably because of all the learning that has
taken place in the adults’ lifetime. Lamb notes that one’s perceptual structure is, to a certain
extent, inherited through one’s learning. Such education includes a complete and yet evolving
impression of the sign systems internalized by an individual’s culture. In consideration of this, it
seems that deviations from this known sign system would cause some kind of reaction because
the expectation would be that signs would have a meaningful relationship with other signs.
While it is difficult to determine the distinctions between the rhematic indexical sign as it is used
by children and adults, a child’s pre-linguistic signs of surprise and confusion may manifest in
different ways from an adults. In the following paragraph this issue is explored with reference to
rhematic indexical sinsigns.
As pre-linguistic children gradually become accustomed to the somatosensory signs
experienced in their environment, they may build up expectations for what they anticipate they
will experience. When deviations occur, this may motivate dramatic rhematic indexical sinsigns.
For example, consider a six-week-old infant that awakes in the arms of someone who is not
his/her mother and then immediately begins to cry. Neurological studies such as those presented
monthly in Merill Palmer-Quarterly (Palmer 2002), would suggest this infant is reacting to the
lack of the familiar smell (known sign) of their mother and the presence of the unknown scent of
the other person (unknown sign). The infant is responding to strong chemical signs and likely the

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lack of mother’s scent stimulated the emotion of fear, an emotion that LeDoux (1996) would say
has been hard-wired in the genes from early ancestors.
In contrast, while an adult would experience some degree of anxiety after waking up in an
unknown environment, they would perhaps try to control their emotional responses, using signs
from their environment to ascertain how they should feel in that new environment because they
might be in danger. The discovery of a new phenomenon might alternatively intrigue prelinguistic children rather than frighten them. Infants that may become fascinated by the rattling
sound of an object and would not necessarily discern that sound could be attached to danger.
One observing infants, can determine that, to some extent, they are accustomed to not
knowing signs and only remember certain signs, presumably those that are essential to their
survival and form part of their umwelt. Infants rely on their caregivers to protect them from all
dangers and fulfill their needs. Because of this, their response to unknown signs will likely be
that which can alert another person. Also, as infants have only a first level modeling system their
umwelt will be less complicated than adults, causing them to react instinctively. From an
evolutionary viewpoint, their response to confusion should follow a predictable course in order
for their kin to recognize what the infant needed. In light of this fact, Narvea’s conclusion that an
infant’s right hemisphere develops quickly in order to promote strong attachment bonds between
infants and their kin seems probable.
3.2 The Personal Semiotic Cultural Consciousness
In order to summarize the research previously mentioned in regards to brain
development, semiotics, language teaching and learning in a manner that may make it more
accessible to the practitioner, it is proposed that a two-sided synthesis model be considered. The
two-sided aspect of the model represents the different functions of the LH and the RH. The

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model utilizes some of the neurological research of LeDoux (2002) and Damasio (1999) and
some of the child development research of Piaget (1966), Vygotsky (1962) and Gattegno (1973).
As the model is described, other influences will be noted where appropriate. The reason for
presenting the construct that this model represents is, in part, meant to provide the viewer a
visual means of understanding the connections between right and left brain functions as they
apply to language learning. With this goal in mind, the R-mode could be associated with
individuals’ understanding of themselves and their beliefs about their situation in life, whereas
the L-mode could be associated with individuals’ understanding of the collective’s beliefs about
life.
From the standpoint of semiotics, one might term this R-mode perspective “personal
semiotic cultural consciousness” (PSCC). The L-mode by contrast would then be the “semiotic
cultural consciousness” (SCC). It needs to be made clear that the PSCC and SCC are only being
used as a short form to discuss processes that are associated with either left or right brain
functioning, economically. A personal semiotic cultural consciousness refers to the ability of
each person to have a sense of who they are as a sign within and external to language. 55
Information that can be brought into the brain can be interpreted as signs through one’s
conscious awareness of them. From the point at which an individual begins recognizing the
meaning of the sign, a consciousness of him/herself within a culture of pre-existing signs
gradually develops. All signs that are formed are directly related to the soma’s functioning in the

55

People can become aware of themselves as a subject, “I” or “me” within language (Lacan cited in Cobley
and Jansz 1998). Halliday called this the personal function of language. However, not all human experience is
communicable. For example, one can express that one is in pain, but no person can know exactly what another’s
pain is like. In this way Benveniste (1971) implies there will always be a part of the self that is inexpressible in
language (Benveniste (1971) when he says “… that man constitutes himself as a subject, because language (Langue)
alone establishes the concept of ego in reality in its reality which is that of being (Benveniste 1971, 224).

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discovery of itself. As the PSCC develops, signs fill up the sign slots and each has a connection
to the learning event that occurred for the child to learn it. These signs can be conceived of as
residing in different sign levels in the PSCC. Gradually, layers of signs make up one’s selfconcept. Therefore, according to this theory, the PSCC is the sum of an individual’s experiences
as mediated through signs.
Damasio (1999) hypothesizes that there is a separate form of the self called the proto-self
which is responsible for storing all the ancestral hard wiring that accounts for individuals
instinctive reactions to danger. This could be likened to an Animal umwelt. These basic functions
include: occurrences such as the regulation of hormones, blood sugar levels and reflexes, and
does not suggest conscious awareness. Damasio predicts that this proto-self would likely be
connected to the amygdale. Gradually the synapses take in information from the external
environment and send it to the part of the brain that controls the body’s responses to external
stimuli; the amygdale. When the amygdale encounters something potentially dangerous from this
input, it then signals to the body to react. These reactions may include any number of the
following: changes in blood pressure, changes in heart rate, a release of hormones or freezing up,
among many others (LeDoux 2002, 7).
The amygdale is designed, in a manner of speaking, to instinctively recognize certain
messages such as the sensation of pain (LeDoux 2002). LeDoux predicts that such a defense
system could have come about by having a two part system; one system being pre-programmed
based on the species, and the other for dealing with individual specific needs. In this way, the
amygdale can respond to instinctively known dangers and learned dangers. “All it has to do is
create a synaptic substitution whereby the new stimulus can enter the circuit that the prewired

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ones used” (LeDoux 2002, 7). LeDoux’s work gives the impression that strong emotions, such as
fear, are likely produced in the amygdale as a response to signs that are interpreted as dangerous.
The amygdale will respond based on the experiences the individual has had. The brain
can also extract from these experiences to decide how to react to a novel stimulus. When
information that is not evolutionary coded, but is associated with a strong emotion, this
secondary information can produce a similar response. However, the input coming into the
amygdale may stimulate the GABA cells as well as a projection neuron. Thus, as cells become
more active, inhibiter cells activated which then begin to deactivate the cells in the amygdale. If
this does not commence, other formerly not dangerous stimuli may be perceived as such
(LeDoux 2002, 63).
Similar to Lamb, LeDoux suggests that the brain organizes things into networks unconsciously (LeDoux 2002, 10). As such, reactions are instinctive and human beings have been
evolutionarily hard wired to respond to dangers in this way as a means of survival, therefore it
seems likely that the PSCC would develop out of this original simple system. In order for the
amygdale to quickly interpret stimuli as dangerous, it would need a strong connection to all
sensory networks that would be contained in the different sensory modes.
A quick diagnosis of a situation would necessitate well connected networks with axons
stretching to all of the other pertinent networks, ensuring that the synapses could fire their action
potentials all the way up the lines of connected neurons like neurological “dominoes” (LeDoux
2002, 307). This might be a significant amount of information for one hemisphere to process,
thus it makes sense that the left and right hemisphere may be pre-programmed to interpret certain
input or functions while leaving the opposite hemisphere to process the rest. In light of this
possibility, it is proposed that right brain functioning may lead to the development of a personal

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semiotic cultural consciousness, whereas left brain functioning may lead to the creation of a
semiotic cultural consciousness.
As the fear response is the one that is basic to mammalian species and the right
hemisphere has networks meant to respond rapidly to incoming dangers and problems (Schutz
2005), it is likely that this function would form part of the PSCC. This would be distinct from
Damasio’s proto-self stage because that stage occurs before the individual is able to process any
references other than themselves. In contrast, although the PSCC develops during the period for
Damasio’s proto-self, it allows for the interpretation of inputs that exist beyond the soma, but
only as far as it refers to the self. Thus, in the PSCC construct, children may be able to recognize
there are other people in the world, but only in as far as they relate to themselves. For instance, a
child might think: this is the man who lives by my school and gives me cookies.
An individual’s PSCC may interpret the presence of a bear as unknown stimuli, resulting
in the sensation of their heart racing or the desire to run. In order for individuals to deduce this
from the situation, they would need to use previous knowledge of some similar sign and access
the brain’s imaginative function. Imagining what might happen if they remained in the
environment with the bear, would be an important right brain function or as Lamb and LeDoux
contend their synapses would have to be pre-programmed through years of evolution to have
marked certain inputs as triggers. 56
LeuDoux’s work in regards to fear suggests that at a first level umwelten individuals are
likely to have similar reactions to stimuli, but as their umwelten evolves these will develop into
distinct sequences of behaivour. As pre-linguistic children are fully emerged in their PSCC, they

56

For an informative and interesting argument about what emotions are and how they arise please read
LeDoux’s (1996) book The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life. London: Simon &
Schuster paperbacks.

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would not experience the same kind of discomfort as adults might when confused because
infants would not have to traverse between signs in the PSCC and SCC. According to the model,
the signs in the infants PSCC would relate to him/her and expressing their ability to express their
relation with these signs would be limited to somatosensory expressions that adults could infer as
signs. These could include, but are not limited to, changes in pitch and volume of their voice,
facial expressions and hand gestures. The fact that infants tend to be more physical and dramatic
in their reactions, and perhaps react more quickly than adults, suggests they do not have access
to as many levels of signs as adults. Liégeoisa et al’s (2000) argument that inter-hemispheric
integration does not occur until around age two, would also support the notion that pre-linguistic
children may not utilize the same signs as adults.
It seems that as the infant’s first brain functions to develop are somatosensory, all sensory
inputs would be necessary to the development of the PSCC. It is also possible that once the first
sensory inputs are in place, the LH becomes involved in the interpretation process. This is
difficult to confirm because right brain functioning also includes interpreting relationships and it
is unclear whether a very young child would be able to break up the inputs about the bear coming
into their presence into abstract qualities. In fact, one of Piaget’s studies on child learning was
about a boy who could not separate the moon from the qualities it possesses suggests that young
children are not able to divide a concept into components (Piaget 1966, 147). Thus, according to
Piaget, it can be assumed that they think in wholes and not parts.
Piaget’s study demonstrates how the child automatically perceives the object of the moon
in its totality as a “general schema” (Piaget 1966, 147). Though the child is unaware that he is
conceiving the moon as a synthesis of its qualities, he is. This could mean that even young
children can gain meaning from a concept. They might simply lack the ability to abstract out

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other meanings that are associated with it through its parts, because this requires the mental
ability to extract smaller parts of meaning from a whole. The fact that children have difficulty
with this could support the idea that the PSCC develops out of right brain synthetic functioning
and not left brain analytic functioning. Also R-mode functioning is known for its
spontaneity/immediacy and intuitive nature and all of these skills would help develop a person’s
sense of self.
Halliday states that the utterances of children may be represented either as attempts at the
adult language, or as independent structures. He says that:
…the first approach, which is in a sense presupposed if one adopts a nativist view,
involves treating many of the child's utterances, perhaps all of them at a certain stage, as
ill-formed; they are interpreted as deviations from an eventual norm, resulting from
distortions of various kinds, particularly the deletion of elements. . . . This brings out their
relationship to the adult forms; but it blocks the way to the recognition and interpretation
of the child's own system. (Halliday 1975, 2)
Halliday criticizes the nativist interpretation because it does not address the question of
what motivates a child to move from his language to the adult language after he has invested so
much time and energy into learning his own. Of course, adults will interpret children’s language
based on their own semantic system. Through this early transfer of child language into an adult
system, the child’s language development, especially the knowledge of the language roles of
intruder and interpreter within language, is reinforced. Halliday states that when children’s use of
language is interpreted based on its functional merits, it becomes easy to understand and
accounts for the progression to the adult language because he implies that adult language still
reflects its functional origins (Halliday 1975, 26-27).
In the following, the PSCC is described in detail. Comparisons are briefly made between
the PSCC and several authors’ works, notably, Halliday’s language functions and Lamb’s
networks. (For an illustration of what the PSCC could be conceptualized as, see the diagram

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provided in appendix A.) Within the PSCC framework, apart from different semiotic levels, there
are two overarching spheres of influence in the PSCC. One of them would be considered the core
basic nature of a person, which begins to develop from birth; the second is a flexible layer that
would not begin to appear until about age three.
As Lamb intimates, the creation of the self is mediated through genes and then sensory
inputs that are taken in through the brain and processed by synapses (LeDoux 2002). It seems
likely that Lamb is correct in suggesting that people think in terms of signs that are housed in
neural semiotic networks (Lamb 1999). The PSCC would be composed of several levels of signs.
A level refers to a progression of functioning from simple to more complicated sign
organization. It is assumed that each of these levels would possess certain sign slots that have
been pre-created as part of the natural development of the brain according to the universal
blueprint. In light of Lamb’s networks, this would be from the trunk of a tree out to its branches.
Each piece is still needed and valid for the concept, but one had to exist before the others were
possible. Regrettably, what type of sign slots may reside in each level is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
3.3 Sign Levels and Modes in the PSCC and the SCC
In the PSCC model, the first level of signs to develop is the immediate somatosensory
level. The metabolic activity, that is the base of cerebral function, is “ontogenetically highest in
the posterior sensorimotor cortex” (Narvaez et al. 2012, 38) and it processes input that comes
into the brain from the senses. This information is consistent with Piaget’s sensorimotor stage.
The next level to develop would be bodily kinesthetic; essentially the feeling of what it means to
exert energy in the body and the recognition that this creates changes in the self. Although bodily
kinesthetic senses may have already begun to take shape in utero, as noted by Gattegno, the

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soma’s awareness of this movement and what it can do with it continues to expand rapidly once
the infant is outside of its mother. The next level of signs to develop is spatial orientation, which
includes the recognition that the self has an interior and an exterior; thereby, things go into the
soma and come out of the soma.
Once infants have an awareness of their bodies’ position in space, and through
experimentation by doing such activities as putting their fingers and feet in their mouths, they
have found the boundaries of themselves, applying that knowledge to objects is a logical next
step. Thus, object recognition and spatial orientation are part of the same level of signs. During
this stage, the instrumental function, that is referred to by Halliday, is likely present because a
child can communicate requests for objects, which is an instrumental function. As Halliday
intimates, this instrumental use of language is completely based on the child’s social context.
Children may also develop the regulatory function so that they can attempt to influence others in
order for them to get what they want faster. While this may seem like genuine interaction, the
language is used to achieve the children’s goals and therefore, it continues to have a direct
reference to the self, and as such is still part of the developing PSCC.
Actual memory creation is the next sign level to emerge from this. To clarify, when the
actual memory creation level of signs is mentioned, this label refers to the point when the child
can create memories that can be actively brought forward or pushed back in the mind. As
memories are created through the child’s interpretation of what they experience from their
senses, they form an important part of the PSCC. The infant’s experience of emotions is
processed in the right hemisphere during the first stages of brain “ontogeny” (Semrud-Clikeman
and Hynd 1990, 198). Arguably, one of the reasons why people can become emotionally scarred
for life is that memories that are created at this point are so connected to the pre-linguistic child’s

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interpretation of sensory input that their effects are felt deeply, but at a level which is
inexpressible in language. For example, if a traumatic event such as experiencing terrible illness
or pain, whether physical or emotional, occurs during the formation of the first memories, these
may have strong effects on the child later in life. The individual will not understand why they
feel the way they do because the event may be buried in their subconscious. Halliday’s
interactional language function begins to form at this level because children start using labels
such as “mommy” and “daddy” and remembering individuals to whom they are close. For
example, a baby may recognize the scent of its mother while the mother is present, but it is
unlikely that the baby could purposely bring back the scent of its mother when the infant is in
need of her.
It should be said that any assumption made in regards to which level of signs in the PSCC
develops first may vary from one individual to another, but in general these sign levels are fairly
consistent with the stages of child development that Piaget laid out. Even still, the capability of
the child to create memories is very limited at this point and would likely surround only a few
key objects for which the child has emotional attachments, for example, favorite people and toys
or actions that their own bodies have performed. Also within this level, Halliday’s personal
function may commence because a child starts expressing their opinions out loud because
possibly they become fascinated with the sound of their own voice and want to experiment with
it and through that play, develop their personality.
As an infant develops, right brain functions are needed for the toddler to learn emotional
and social functions. Predictable interactions with familiar caregivers provide the infant with a
safe environment where they can be curious and engage in self-exploration. These prepare
infants for the stage of human socialization in their second year of life when the baby must learn

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social information through the transfer of culture (Schore 2001). In Chiron et al.’s (1997) study,
results showed that functional brain activity was greater in the RH than the LH in infants but
then shifted as the child became older, around three and a half years of age (Chiron et al. 1997,
1062). They conclude that, “The right to left sequence of asymmetry seems to be related to the
consecutive emergence of functions dedicated first to the right (visuospatial abilities), and then to
the left posterior associative cortex (language abilities)” (Chiron et al. 1997, 1064).
In summation of this section regarding the PSCC, the evidence from split brain and infant
neurological studies suggests that the right hemisphere has a vital role in somatosensory
development. This includes self-related cognition (what Saussure would perhaps have called
Parole), own body perception (what Davis might refer to as orientation), self-awareness and
“autobiographical memories” (Uddin et al. 2006, 65; Narvaez et al. 2012) Given all the evidence
in reference to the significant role the right hemisphere has in self-related learning, somatic
integration, quick maturation, its connection to the limbic system and the emotional implications
of this, it seems that the PSCC would be associated with right hemispheric functioning. This is
not to suggest that the Personal Semiotic Cultural Consciousness has no relation to the Semiotic
Cultural Consciousness, only that it can be inferred from the research that the PSCC, like right
hemispheric functioning, necessarily develops first to provide the infant with the necessary
somatosensory signs that allow for the attachment bonds which will lead to future socio-cultural
learning and future rapid growth of left hemispheric functions.
3.4 The Semiotic Cultural Consciousness
There are two more levels of signs in the PSCC: schema creation and schema creation
with object recognition. These are considered the last levels of signs to form in the PSCC before
the SCC begins its rapid growth spurt that occurs around age two. During schema creation

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children may begin to categorize events. They can have some sense of when it is a special day
versus a normal day. For example, a child may begin to build up a schema for a birthday as
images of color, special food, other children and celebration. At this age, children may not be
able to abstract away from the scene to pick out the individual objects in the schema because
he/she thinks in wholes, just like the child in Piaget’s moon example that was discussed on pages
50 and 78. This is why in the last level schema creation requires object recognition. This means
that children can identify different objects outside of their context.
Object recognition within a social context has implications for the amount of meaning the
child can express. Once a child can recognize that different objects can be present during the
same events or kinds of events, he/she can build expectations of what they expect to see and
experience from event to event, and may evoke the necessity to build categories in order to keep
all of these signs readily available. An experience of a new event may prompt very young
children to ask questions about the objects they see in the environment, such as whether or not a
gift on the table is for them. These expectations will be heavily influenced by the socio-cultural
environment in which they reside, and the children will want labels for the things they see or
make their own.
There are significant parallels between the PSCC/SCC and Eco’s Cognitive Types (CT)
and his Nuclear Content (NC). Eco’s NC is similar to the PSCC because it refers to people using
their intuition about the subject based on their experience of the subject. This personal
experience of the subject may include events or topics that share qualities. The NC also supplies
the criteria to identify the referent that leads to the CT (Eco 1997, 139) which is similar to the
proposal that sign slots in the PSCC are duplicated in the SCC. He says one can be given
instructions in order to identify a referent and must wholly rely on this because the individual has

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had no experience of it. By this he resolves that the NC leads one to the creation of a “tentative”
CT (Eco 1997, 139). This is also the case in the PSCC model whereby signs as somatosensory
inputs come into the PSCC and are processed into sign slots and then transferred over to the
SCC. Eco suggests that the experiences people have, when expressed, confirm that individuals
shares the same CT. This is precisely how the SCC could operate as well. As standard names for
subjects are created through collective knowledge and usage of signs, one can recognize a
subject without having to name it or be aware of its name (Eco 1997, 67).
Though not a semiotician like Eco, Walrod proposes a similar model, such that there is a
cognitive grid in individuals’ minds that is responsible for collecting and interpreting information
(Walrod 1988, 7). This grid is greatly influenced by one’s culture and is enabled through one’s
exposure to culture to function as a type of culture consciousness that continuously interprets and
reinterprets signs.
Walrod’s model is also quite similar to Agar’s description of languaculture with a few
exceptions. In contrast to Agar, Walrod does not distinguish between an L1 cognitive grid and an
L2 cognitive grid, but only mentions one. He implies then, that people have mental maps of all
their experiences in a cognitive grid in their minds, which serve to allow for the recognition of
signs (Walrod 1988, 7-8). Agar might refer to this map as a frame because he says, “The
meanings that frames organize are expectations not certainties” (Agar 2002, 134). Agar speaks of
an L1 and an L2 languaculture.
Walrod’s model has marked similarities to the SCC in that it suggests people have some
kind of mental map that is constructed by their understanding of their culture and their place
within it. The cognitive grid may also include a person’s ethics and beliefs about how they ought
to act in a given situation, as does the SCC. He calls this the “native paradigm” (Walrod 1988,

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7). The contents of this native paradigm strongly influence what kinds of information people
tend to focus on in a conversation. He argues that because of the existence of this paradigm,
people are likely to see what they expect to see. Walrod’s research has a significant implication
here, which is that the SCC can influence the actions of the PSCC. This is a truly intriguing idea,
which is also present in the SCC model. The implication is that a person’s cultural lenses will
mediate their perceptions based on the framework of this paradigm (Walrod 1988, 8). An
effective example of this is L2 learners reading and writing the L2 in an L1 pattern without
perceiving they are doing it.
Walrod asserts that one’s cognitive grid is not a perfect reflection of the actual world,
because one’s own physical body and the conventions of one’s own culture limit one’s
perceptual abilities (Walrod 1988, 8). The conventions stored in this grid make up a person’s
behavioural expectations for any given event (Walrod 1988, 8). He further argues that when
people have to see in different ways, this requires direct models that can be observed or
experienced, in some way, in order for people to learn to see differently (Walrod 1988). This
idea has particular relevance to Chapter 4 where four different learning models that could be
viewed as attempting to create bridges from the L1 to the L2 by using different sign forms, are
discussed.
Agar’s languaculture seems similar to the SCC model, but reference to a PSCC-like
construct is only implied once, where he refers to the knowledge of the language one receives
while still crawling around in diapers. However, throughout his book, he is concerned with the
social aspect of language: how it is used to express oneself while addressing the collective and
not the inner speech, like Parole, that Saussure refers to or the soma-like self that Gattegno and
Damasio implicate. Agar’s languaculture likely manifests during the sign layer of schema

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creation and object recognition in the PSCC. This seems sensible because Agar briefly mentions
that another potential term for language frames could be schemas.
Although Agar only mentions first language learning briefly, one can imagine that
children just beginning to create schemas could be more exacting than adults when events did
not unfold the way they expected them too. Thus, children’s frames could be either more rigid or
more flexible depending on the personality of the child and how many different languacultures
they are exposed to. Children would likely see rich points everywhere because they would not
have as large an inventory of signs as adults do. A Chinese New Year dragon might be an
amazingly unique sign to a Caucasian child, whereas to the parents, it would be an accepted
seasonal norm and perhaps even an expectation, if the sign is associated with an event they
attend every year. In the adults’ PSCC and SCC, the Chinese dragon and the New Year event
may be permanently linked under the category Chinese culture. However, for the child, the
category may be limited to dragon/flying/sharp teeth with any number of labels after that from
other imaginary creatures or types of dragons to similar events.
Even though children may have labels, it does not mean their categories will resemble
those of an adult. For example, a boy who loves playing with cars may tell his mother there are
no toys if he goes to play somewhere where there are no cars. This is because, to the boy, cars
may be the only toys that matter. The boy’s categories are based on his PSCC. After his mother
has corrected him, he may adopt the word “car” for all toys, instead of the term “toys” for all
cars. As previously mentioned, sensory data in the PSCC is processed into pre-established sign
slots and as signs go into these slots, connective lines like the dendrite branches of axons, expand
out touching other slots and signs, forming networks. This will include any sensory experience
such as the image or feel of one’s own writing and the way the tongue feels in the mouth when

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alphabetic sounds are being formed, etc. Here again, it is apparent that the slots are embodied,
the pathways metaphorically and perhaps physically strengthened through the compilation of
sensory experiences.
In summation, neurons work to create synapses. These allow for the development of
synaptic networks where sensory input is later slotted, thus building up groups of signs, which
then become semiotic networks as labels are applied to them. These labels reflect the schematic
hierarchies that are created through sensory experiences within a social environment. Halliday
says that:
“... once the boundary between the child himself and his environment is beginning to be
recognized, then the child can turn towards the exploration of the environment; this is the
heuristic function of language, the 'tell me why' function that which later on develops into
the whole range of questioning forms that the young child uses. At this very early stage,
in its most elementary form the heuristic use of language is the demand for a name,
which is the child's way of categorizing the objects of the physical world; but it soon
expands into a variety of more specific meanings. (Halliday 1975, 20)
Halliday’s (1975) imaginative function is established during the creation of this last sign
level in the PSCC model, because schema formation is based on one’s own creative
interpretation of an event. When a parent teaches gender expectations to a boy who plays with
dolls, then forces him to give up his beloved dolls and only play with cars, is an example of a
gradual category assimilation process. These teachings from the parent can range from just
handing a child a particular toy from the toy box, to harsh words and shaming. These events can
have a strong impact on the child. Once the boy has accepted this expectation, he may want to
regulate others behaviour, particularly that of a younger sibling. The model suggests that from
ages 3 to 5 (Santrock et al. 2004), children’s PSCCs are very well established, though children
will continue to organize signs into these slots throughout their lifetimes.

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It is predicted that when children begin school, the necessary shift to more abstract modes
of thinking, such as math, reading and writing, and a greater reliance on others to attain accuracy,
causes a major shift from using signs in the PSCC to parallel sign slots in the SCC. Each year,
these slots fill up with signs until there is nearly a parallel sign in the SCC for every sign in the
PSCC. The combination of interacting with people constantly in structured ways, as well as the
greater focus on analytic functions may cause children to place less emphasis on tasks that utilize
the R-mode, the mode of the PSCC.
As aforementioned, it is proposed that the SCC would develop fully after the PSCC. As
children begin to notice cause and effect relations, they can understand that when they do a
certain action there may be some predictable response, such as when they make a loud noise they
may receive attention. When they did this as infants, it was a primal function; one that they had
little control over. They were only responding to biological urges, which were hard-wired for the
purposes of survival and, as the research suggests, controlled by the right hemisphere. As parents
encourage their children’s attempts towards language, this is typically an area children receive
both attention and encouragement. Thus, using language for communicative purposes is
reinforced, and with the collection of prosody signs and emotional cues that are contained in the
PSCC, the SCC can grow quickly in order to process ever more diversified forms of language.
As the PSCC’s response to too much stimuli can be to freeze or have an emotional outburst,
sending the information away temporarily for further processing becomes useful and the SCC’s
analytic ability becomes essential.
In a similar way to the PSCC, the SCC contains two overarching spheres of influence.
The first of these is somewhat fixed because as Saussure’s work suggests people have a sense
that the language they speak is, at any moment, more or less stable through the use of it by the

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collective mind of those who use the language. The second sphere is never stable because it
allows people to constantly review and analyze signs and synthesize them to create new
knowledge and new signs.
The SCC would have the same sign slots as the PSCC because for every sign that is
experienced, no two people will experience it in quite the same way and when a sign is shared
through any type of media over some period of time, gradually a standard of what the sign is
emerges through the discourse of the collective mind. This sign, as well as all the discussion that
went with it, develops in the SCC. The soma’s communication between its PSCC and SCC is
pivotal otherwise a person becomes abstracted from his/herself and this could leave an individual
open to the influence of others. An extreme example of this is how Hitler was able to motivate
regular people to commit some of the most terrible atrocities the world has seen. Arguably, in
Hitler’s attempt to create a unified Germany there was a shift from dealing with individuals to
one of dealing with the nation, one which in this model would be considered a shift from the
PSCC to the SCC. Although, thankfully, PSCC abstraction like Hitler’s brainwashing is rare, it
does serve to illustrate the potential dangers of individuals becoming disengaged from their
PSCCs.
An individual is most effective in life when there is a balance between their PSCC and
their SCC. There are real consequences if a teenager, for example, does not have a strong sense
of self. They could be caught up in something they would never consider doing away from the
group, such as participating in a riot or contemplating drug use. While this is commonly
attributed to peer pressure, this response seems simplistic; though true, it does not account for
why influences that are external to the soma should cause individuals to forget themselves. There
are levels involved in these feelings. When people become distanced from their PSCC they no

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longer ask themselves how they feel about what is occurring around them and as such, they do
not question what is happening. Alternatively if one’s PSCC is so much stronger than one’s
SCC, this could lead to social isolation, feelings of depression, selfishness and even aggression.
One’s PSCC would be very precious and children would fight to preserve their selfconcept if they felt it was being threatened. As Festinger states individuals can become defensive
toward information that causes dissonance (Festinger 1957, 149). By the time children become
teenagers, there are so many bio-chemical bodily changes and they become so reliant on their
peer groups that they may not be able to recognize when their self-concept is actually threatened.
Festinger’s research implies that one’s social group can be a major factor in both causing and
decreasing the amount of dissonance one experiences (Festinger 1957, 177). The expectation of
these pre-teens is to absorb information so quickly that, unless it is directly encouraged by
someone close to the student, whether it is a friend, a teacher or parent, adolescents may forget to
compare the newly absorbed sign in their SCC with the one in their PSCC. This connection is
vital if newly learned information is to have any personal relevance to them. Later in life, if
teenagers have become so reliant on their SCC without considering how they feel about
information, this can be a very dangerous situation potentially leading to feelings of isolation or
co-dependence on another to define them. It is predicted that, at about the grade 6-8 level, or
pre-adolescent level, the strength of the SCC would increase, in part, because of the focus on
analytic style learning.
As the PSCC is beginning to develop, emotions would be felt quite keenly and deeply but
as LeDoux suggests this may serve to influence the growth of certain synapses of which the child
may have no recollection when they are an adult. If an individual’s PSCC somatosensory level of
signs has formed with a traumatic event in it, this may begin to influence the teenager’s actions

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subconsciously. Adolescents and adults may experience reactions they cannot account for
completely, unaware of what has affected them. Repressed emotions from traumatic experiences
are prime examples of this.
LeDoux and Lamb’s research suggests neural networks are formed through the
connection of neural and semiotic networks. Given this, it seems that when the neurons have no
memory of a particular sign because it was not gained through the life experience of the
organism, a pathway between neurons cannot be formed. Also the information that the sign
would contain in that neuron could not travel across the synaptic space. Alternatively, the foreign
sign may evoke a flurry of activity in the brain as pre-established sign carrying neurons attempt
to integrate it into its pre-existing network.
Pre-existing networks can be thought of as imprints that leave impressions in the mind.
For the sake of argument, if for the moment one could consider the brain as a clay ball, the
imprints of the first signs from an L1 are placed into the ball and then every other freshly learned
sign is placed into those imprints. Here is a hypothetical example. The first sign a child develops
leaves imprints in the mental clay. These imprints reveal the patterns of the L1’s grammar at a
subconscious level. Years later, these original imprints may have hardened and if she is trying to
learn a second language, then the new input will be made to fit into those L1 imprints. When this
happens, she may be constantly making the same mistakes in the L2 because she is not aware
that her brain is trying to use these original imprints. If a person comes across an experience they
are unfamiliar with, for example a birthday party, then out of their pursuit to know more about
the event, they will attempt to classify the sign by their classificatory system. The sign will
become slotted along the imprints of their own language. If it has been slotted incorrectly, then

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even when that sign is relocated to a different area, there may be residual traces of it in the
grooves of the original imprint.
The construct of the PSCC and the SCC suggest that the bodymind is designed to seek for
meaning and to slot it in reference to the boundaries of its self; the organism’s immediate
functioning, including its identity, as well as in relation to others and the environment.
Throughout the literature review in Chapter 2, theorists consistently hypothesized that there were
two distinct types of behavior and knowledge roughly composed of internal and external
environments. This idea of two separate spheres that impact behaviour was present in Saussure
through his Longue and Parole, Piaget via his egotistical and social thought, Vygotsky through
his social learning, Halliday in his social semiotic, Damasio’s proto-self, autobiographical and
core self, and Eco’s nuclear content and cognitive types among others.
Pierce’s state of Firstness and Gattegno’s somatic awareness, if applied to Piaget’s
theories concerning child development, might offer insights that could aid in the explanation of
how the PSCC must be created before the further development of an SCC is possible. Gattegno’s
explanation of an infant’s active soma, consciously aware of itself and its energies, is similar to
Peirce’s state of Firstness, as the state of Firstness is one of a vague unconscious sense of
oneself. When one considers the gradual learning of infants through object manipulation, such as
learning about objects by trying to put them in their mouths, they are gaining knowledge about
the world through the embodiment of their experience. Therefore any meaning that they extract
from the object comes from the relation of the object to their bodies. Piaget’s description of the
sensorimotor stage confirms that infants learn in this manner. At first this appears to contrast
with Vygotsky’s work, which contended that conscious awareness of the external environment
had to develop first because children develop language through social learning and by being

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helped by those who had superior skills. However, Vygotsky did not suggest that children had no
sense of self before they started communicating, only that they learn language from their social
environment. Current research of the importance of the infants’ attachment bond to its mother
confirms that this early learning is the first step towards learning how to communicate (Schore
2001, 13). However, current neuroimaging studies also show that this initial learning occurs
chiefly in the right hemisphere (Chiron et al. 1997, 1057, 1064). Given the research of Damasio
(2010), who implies that a sense of self comes from the brain’s ability to convert all sensory
information into mental images, Vygotsky may simply have been referring to the fact that
children do not begin expressing themselves articulately until they begin interacting with social
groups.
The PSCC would function by converting all sensory data into layers that when
superimposed on each other serve to create a full mental image of an event or object. As
Damasio implies, it is one’s first encounter with sensory data as it is felt through the Proto-self
that allow for the creation of mental images and later signs. Complementing this, LeDoux asserts
that this sensory data will affect the way in which synapses are formed in the brain and will
result in unique individuals.
LeDoux’s assertion that neural communication and neural networks will occur at some
level in everyone suggests that, in principle, Chomsky’s UG may still have merit. If there is in
fact a UG, as Chomsky has stated on many occasions, it likely forms part of the “neural blue
print” that allows for the creation of cells into neurons and then into synapses and into the
globalized location of brain elements. It would appear that UG is not specifically about grammar
then, but about universal patterns. As alluded to earlier, these patterns can be represented
semiotically by sign slots.

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The implication of LeDoux’s work is that the cultural variation between human beings is
a result of both nature; genes that stimulate neurological growth and development, and nurture,
the social and environmental constraints that influence an evolving genetic system. Evidence
from the countless studies that document the negative effects of poor nutrition, neglect and the
use of adverse substances while pregnant on the unborn fetus, support LeDoux’s conclusion.
These are not new ideas, but there is an important distinction between the PSCC/SCC and
similar models. Perhaps its difference lies in its recognition that Peirce seems to have been
correct in stating that people think in signs. Knowing this is important because it gives
practitioners a broader perspective on learning and the issues faced by language learners. It
seems that generalizing the issues to this seemingly simple framework, as Lamb did with his
semiotic network diagrams, can aid practitioners in understanding the source of their students’
difficulties. They can perceive the source of their students’ confusion as a lack of an equivalent
sign in their PSCC.
The first information taken into the brain is somatosensory. This information is taken in
through certain brain cells, but then processed by other brain cells. The PSCC model proposes
that information that comes in through the senses forms a level of signs within the brain. Lamb
and LeDoux’s work on neurological hierarchies supports this notion, as does Chevalier’s (2002a;
2002b) perspective that sign creation and neural circuit distribution are related. Once sensory
information is processed and made into a sign, it is then sent along to become a participant in a
network of other signs. LeDoux’s work suggests that synapses become active and deactivate all
consistently, depending on how much information is coming in from the senses that stimulate
synaptic memory.

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Several authors, including Saussure, have noted that children do not grow up in a
linguistic vacuum, but are born into a pre-existing linguistic system. The recognition of the
system necessitated the drawing of Agar’s aforementioned circle around language. While it is
true that people cannot be raised in culturally neutral linguistic environments, perhaps
individuals’ admittance into that system is gradual as they must experience a number of different
activities before their sign slots activate and take in all the signs they need to establish their
unique languaculture. As Saussure was unaware of Peirce’s work on the triadic function of the
sign, perhaps he did not believe that semiotics could be applied to anything in one’s
environment. If he had, there may have been no reason to draw the circle.
When considering the biological necessity for memory, it makes sense to assume that
infants begin creating simple signs such as recognizing the scent of their mother through
repeated exposures to her. It seems that the sensory system begins to develop as layer upon layer
of the infant’s experience touching, hearing, tasting, listening and smelling create a complete
mental image of the baby’s world. Because sensory information cannot become signs until the
neural connections, on which they may attach, are well established and connected, it might take
the infant many tries with materials and its body to build up signs. This would cause the
activation of pre-determined sign slots which would then absorb new signs until there were so
many in the developing baby that they began to activate other signs around them in a like manner
to action potentials on neurotransmitters. Lamb and LeDoux would likely say this is the
beginning of the child’s development of networks. Current research suggests that this sign
development is meant to help the infant develop the skills it will need to survive, such as
expressing emotions and forming bonds with caregivers which cause rapid growth in the right
hemisphere (Schore 2001, 10). The PSCC model predicts that the infant will gradually build up

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this first inventory of simple signs until the infant progresses to the point where he/she can view
these signs in terms of their relationships with other signs.
From that perspective, until a baby can start recognizing there are relationships between
signs, their SCC is not likely to develop at the speed of their PSCC. One might argue with this
analysis, saying that the baby’s SCC should have started developing from the moment the infant
begins interacting with others. This is a valid concern, however, Piaget’s work on child studies
implies that very young children only view objects in relation to themselves, therefore a child’s
mother is viewed as merely an extension of the child’s own body before true sign creation is
possible. Baldwin noted this tendency of children in his paper “Imitation: A Chapter in the
Natural History of Consciousness” (1894). He intimates that infants are at first unable to
properly recognize objects such as a caregiver as separate and not a part of their own bodies
(Baldwin 1894, 42-43).57 There is a subtle difference between an infant and a child that thinks,
“mom may come back because I want her” and “If I want her to, maybe mom will come back.”
In the latter, the child perceives he/she has control over what mother will do, whereas in the
former the child recognizes mother’s will is separate from his/hers. The noticing of this
separation suggests that the child has reached a point in their development where they are
beginning to internalize some of the semiotic systems that operate outside of him/herself. From
this example it is perhaps apparent that the infant or child had to possess some understanding of
their own needs and desires even at a very instinctual level, such as the inborn skill of rooting,
before they were able to recognize the socio-cultural and linguistic systems that people outside
themselves operate in.
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Neuroimaging studies offer support of Baldwin’s research stating that when monitoring both infant’s and
mother’s brain while interacting with each other they found that both brains exhibited molecular activity in the right
hemisphere suggesting that infants’ bond with their mothers may be even more vital for right hemispheric
maturation than once thought.

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The area where sensory information is taken in has a very limited memory, but likely
working memory is not established until the infant can convert this immediate information into
signs. For example, until the infant can interpret the sensation of being hungry with the sign of
milk, episodic memory is unlikely to be possible. Once the child builds up a number of these
connections and has several networks, it becomes necessary for the child to label these so that
they can be easily recalled when the appropriate situation comes up.
While Damasio (2010) proposes that there are three separate stages of the self: proto,
autobiographical and core self; the progression of these suggests that the autobiographical self is
a time when the proto-self and autobiographical self overlap. The PSCC model proposes that
apart from the time period that Damasio would call proto-self, the PSCC and the SCC continue
to interact throughout an individual’s life time, just as the left and right hemispheres do. In this
way, documented life stages, beyond this proto-self environment, will have a greater or lesser
overlap of the PSCC and the SCC.
Split-brain studies demonstrate how individuals can still perform a number of functions
yet they also show that common functions have been limited because of the lack of a
hemisphere. In a like manner, if an individual were to lack either the PSCC or the SCC, it would
definitely cause them some significant limitations. For example, a person with no awareness of
where their body was in space would constantly be running into things and people.
The practitioners of multisensory learning know that when an activity stimulates only one
sense it will be far less effective than when a multisensory approach is utilized. The PSCC model
suggests this is because a learner will not have a complete mental image. Gardner’s (1999) work
in multiple intelligences would suggest that if individuals were to be given a task that allowed
them to use their preferred learning mode then the weakness of the evolving picture may be

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limited. However, even a strong sense can only be so useful. For example, a language learner
may have an acute sense of hearing, but this may not help them learn how to spell words.
Neurological research in regards to learning is rapidly becoming a robust field of study
called “Neuroeducation” (Hardiman and Denckla 2010, 4; Grafton 2010, 2). This includes not
only neuroscientists, but also psychologists, medical professionals, etc. Researchers such as
those that are involved in the Dana Foundation have various interests within this new field such
as second language learning, the effects of physical movement on the brain and the multiple
intelligences, just to name a few. The foundational split-brain studies that designate certain parts
of the brain as responsible for either analytic or synthetic functions continue to influence a
considerable amount of this work.58 Researchers in this field aim to make neurological
discoveries accessible for a larger audience. Danesi is one of the few authors who has applied
such neurological research to both semiotics and second language education.
3.5 Semiotic Confusion
Briefly, “semiotic confusion” describes a state of confusion where an enquiry in regards to a sign
is sought, yet cannot easily be selected from a presenting body of signs. This confusion can occur
in any of the sign levels that were previously discussed. For example, if a person comes across
an experience they are unfamiliar with, such as a bar mitzvah, then out of their pursuit to know
more, they will attempt to classify the components of that experience in meaningful ways based
on a classificatory system provided by their language. If no sign can be found to match the other,
a compromise will be made. If they attempt to classify the sign by their own classificatory

58

At this point, the pedagogical application of the R-mode and L-mode to the PSCC and SCC may not be
that evident. They are critical, however, to understanding the development to come of Semiotic Confusion and how
it may impact learners.

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system, it will become slotted along the imprints of their own language. Here it will remain until
the person gains more sign layers about the sign and then reorganizes its position.
Semiotic confusion (SC) is a state of being whereby a potentially uncomfortable
emotional response is triggered by the conflict between hemispheres in response to an
unresolved enquiry in regards to a sign that was previously introduced. The state of semiotic
confusion may manifest as anxiety, fear or even resentment, among other emotions. These strong
emotions could be associated with the state of semiotic confusion because such emotions are
associated with any number of signs as they are experienced in a person’s lifetime. When a sign
is sought out to resolve some question, if a sign cannot easily be selected from the vast plethora
of sign forms, the state of semiotic confusion may result. SC is likely a fairly frequent occurrence
because human beings are not omniscient and therefore they will come across signs that are
unfamiliar to them at some point in their lives.
The academic arena is not the only place where SC can occur. For example, if one is
driving to a place where they have never been, the presence of a street name instead of a number
when one has only been given a street number may quickly result in SC. Part of the confusion
comes about by the difference between the personal experiences that individuals have had with
the sign and the understanding of the use and meaning of the sign within the collective and the
fact that connective lines between L2 signs will be different from those between the L1 signs.
This means that the pre-programmed paths that a student has regularly followed intuitively with
success, will now lead them to incorrect forms in the L2. As these connective lines were formed
from birth to five years of age as referenced in the PSCC model, the student may be so adept at
using them that they are completely unaware that they use the signs in such a way.

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The fact that individuals may not be aware of the connections between sign slots and
their corresponding signs in the PSCC means that no matter how many times teachers repeat
language, students may not hear them or retain what they write, and may not recognize that they
are constantly making mistakes, apart from the teacher’s feedback. After which, students may
come out of class feeling like they have not learned anything and they are more confused than
before. If this were a symposium, there might have been some head nodding in the crowd after
that last comment. However, teachers can find ways to help struggling students. If students can
be helped to form a connection with new signs that do not rely on L2 symbols with their PSCC
sign slots, then new pathways may be able to form to existing connective lines through the
interactions of their PSCC and SCC. The term “sign slots” could be roughly equated with
embodied neural structures in a similar way to Lamb’s pre-programmed networks analogy.
As Kay and Berlin’s colour study noted, human beings are biologically pre-programmed
to see all the colours of the visible spectrum. Therefore as long as the student has not been
visually impaired in some way, they should have billions of signs that contain colour. Thus
hypothetically, when colour is used to represent different aspects of language, including
structural components such as word order and discourse level components such as pragmatics
and register, colour may activate the various signs and serve to create a bridge from the L1 into
the L2.59
Lakoff’s work suggests that all human societies use processes of classification and
categorization to organize their collective signs. Thus all human societies organize the signs that

59

In light of these considerations, for the last three years, I have been trialing a system based on perceptual
salience that attempts to do this. See the Colour-form section in chapter 5. Students who have been through the
system have ranged in age from 9-19. During these three years, it has grown from a short 20 minute component
during regular classes in 2007 to small classes of 1 to 2 students who were having difficulty in their regular classes
to having its own class with 5-8 students once a week in the summer and two classes per week this summer of 2012.

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are encountered in their lives in ways that are meaningful to them. The classificatory system that
they employ to help them with this task is expressed and formed through whatever level of
language they utilize. If no sign can be found in their sign inventory to match a new sign then
people may attempt to classify it under some of their established categories or a new
combination of two categories, even without knowing the actual meaning. For example, when a
person comes across a word in their L1 that they do not know, they can make an educated guess
as to what the word means by affix patterns or grammatical environment, allowing them to
clarify the meaning, slotting it into a more detailed category later. It seems then, that how one’s
signs are organized in one’s mind is largely dependent on the collective consciousness of the
people group in which one lives.
Chomsky proposed that individuals have some kind of language acquisition device
(LAD) that allows them to learn the unique specifications of their language out of an underlying
collective universal grammar. He likened this to a switch box where the parameters would be set
for the specific language based on the input the device received. Authors, such as Householder
(1965) and Halle (1962), have critiqued this idea because it cannot account for all language
phenomena. 60 However, if one was to reconfigure Chomsky’s LAD into a malleable, neural,
clay-like substance simply for referential purposes, the L1 structure would leave imprints in this
neural clay, this new LAD model might demonstrate, in physical terms, why language
interference is a common problem for language learners.
In the clay ball variation of Chomsky’s model, L1 imprints that are left behind in the
neural clay harden as a person becomes older because the basic structure of a language becomes

60

For additional authors’ opinions on Chomsky’s Universal Grammar theory read : Eubank, Lynn, ed.
1991. Point: Counterpoint: Universal Grammar in the Second Language. John Benjamins Publishing. This book
offers many interesting perspectives.

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internalized and is no longer actively tested as it was when they were learning as a child. The
language structures are so well known that a person hardly needs to think about the basic
structure of their L1 and because of this, the neural clay becomes rigid. This inflexibility makes
it more difficult to learn new language items unless there is a one to one correspondence between
the L1 and the L2 form. Also, as grammar teaching goes in and out of fashion, learners may not
be aware of the patterns their language actually follows and the functions of individual words.
The level of difficulty experienced by the learner will depend on the type of language
item being learned, the perceived distance of the L2 from their L1 and, as Krashen’s (1987) work
would suggest, their emotional state. For example, if a person is learning an L2, they may
subconsciously reconfigure the L2 into the grammatical pattern of their L1 as they attempt to
make sense of the L2. This would occur because the new signs would travel along the
established connective lines. When this happens, unless feedback is given, the learner may not
register that their use of the L2 sounded different from their teacher’s model of the L2.
Essentially, students may push the L2 into the imprints left by their L1, slotting them into their
L1’s linguistic order in attempt to generate meaning from a foreign semiotic system.
Alternatively, learners may have a vague perception that their speech does not match their
teacher’s model yet not understand why and therefore have no comprehension of how to fix it
and feel apprehensive when writing and speaking in their L2.
In light of this, learners would constantly and unconsciously make the same structural
errors because without being made aware of their own mental process, they would be left with
trial and error methods of learning. Ellis (1997) states that the symbols, that will transfer, are
directly affected by L2 learners’ perceptions of what is transferable and their stage of language
development. Ellis says that learners typically create their own temporary language rules and

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then gradually refine them as they receive and process more language input (Ellis 1997, 19).
Selinker (1972) called the tendency of learners to create a temporary language an interlanguage.
This acted as a bridging agent between their L1 and L2. Ellis argued that while there have been
many perspectives in regards to the value of analyzing student errors, interlanguage seems one of
the most fruitful because it allows errors to be considered “…useful evidence of how the learner
is setting about the task of learning, what 'sense' he is making of the target language data to
which he is exposed and being required to respond” (Ellis 1997, 66). He suggests that by
studying student errors, teachers can learn how best to correct their students (Ellis 1997, 66). “By
studying them the teacher may gain insight into the learner's state of knowledge at any particular
moment and also into the strategies of learning that the learner may be using. With this
understanding, he will be in a better position to devise appropriate corrective measures” (Ellis
1997, 66).
The tendency of an L1 to impede the learning of an L2 has been termed language
interference. This is a well documented term within the field of applied linguistics. However
unlike Ellis’ (1997) label of positive transfer, language interference has a negative connotation
because the L1 is presented as the miscreant that prevents the L2 from being learned. This
mindset may have contributed to the development of language learning methods such as the
Berlitz Method, Suggestopedia, Audiolingual Method and the Silent Way, that endeavor to use
the L1 as little as possible, and in the case of the Silent Way, not at all. Perhaps avoiding L1 use
to prevent such interference may ignore the actual problem and only treat the symptoms of SC,
not its cause. The term language interference also does not reveal what caused the interference as
it merely implies that some element has interrupted the underlying process involved. The use of
methodologies that discourage students from using their L1 may prevent students from being

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able to use the content in their L1 signs. While Gattegno intended for students to be able to use
what they know about language to help them make logical discoveries about the L2, arguably it
would be difficult for them to express concepts learned in their L1 in the L2 initially. The usage
of techniques that discourage students from using their L1 seem to perpetuate the perspective
that the L1 is somehow not useful in learning the L2.
The degree of difficulty that students would experience in learning an L2 would vary
depending on the level of similitude between the students L1 and L2 and hypothetically how
much it deviated from Chomsky’s UG pattern. Danesi considers the challenges with Chomsky’s
UG suggesting that it is not clear whether the theory applies to the development of verbal and
non-verbal skills. If one considered UG as pertaining to a broader construct and not simply
languages’ phonology, morphology, and syntax; then one might find that Chomsky’s UG is
consistent with LeDoux’s argument that everyone has, as Danesi would say, the same “neural
blueprint” (Danesi 2003, 46). Danesi says that languages are made to encode concepts differently
(Danesi 2003, 21, 66). The greater the distance between cultures and historical relations between
languages, the greater the perceived differences between them and the more difficult it will be to
learn them.
Braine (1963) cited in Danesi (2003) reveals that when very young children communicate
with one word utterances this in fact may be a “holophrastic phrase,” where one word can stand
for a complete phrase such as, “Daddy, I want it” (Danesi 2003, 18). The use of holophrastic
phrases may reveal that sign slots are available long before children can organize the signs into
them. The use of such phrases may also support Stokoe’s theory that the use of signs evolved
from actions and those actions became inextricably linked to the types of information such as

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subjects and actions.61 Also, one could interpret from Stokoe’s work that visual texts may have
more direct delivery of information between the L1 and L2 because they can relate to mental
pictures of events that have occurred.
Two semiotic systems do not simply influence each other randomly, as there are
processes involved. The definition of language interference fails to address why there is
interference. This is because language interference may only be a symptom of a broader
phenomenon of semiotic confusion. Without acknowledging this state as the cause of language
interference, one might believe that only linguistic structures can cause language interference
when, in fact, any unrecognized sign, whether it is from a written or visual text, can influence the
signs of the L2. Thus, any sign form, whether it is visual, kinesthetic, tactile, olfactory or
auditory, can cause SC. This means that designers of learning materials must consider the impact
of visuals as much as written texts.
Paulo Freire (1994) is famous for being adamant about the need for critical thinking in
language teaching. He was aware that the materials used by the learners could have a strong
impact on their learning progress. He was sensitive to the fact that there is no universal form of
representation, thus in order for a people group to accept learning materials, they had to conform
to the people’s ideological constraint for forms of representations for images. An image that is
considered offensive to a learner will impact how they feel about the language they are learning
which, in turn, may lead to anxiety through the state of semiotic confusion.
It is proposed in this thesis that language interference may be caused by the broader set of
processes involved in SC. In the SC model, when a sign is not recognized, a person will

61

Stokoe has an interesting argument, saying that he predicts sign language may have evolved first before
verbal language because it would be useful to be able to communicate to each other quietly via a more direct and
less arbitrary route than written language (Stokoe 2001).

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subconsciously try to activate certain established connections in their mind in order to grasp the
new concept represented by the sign to assist in the production of a full mental image of the
concept. This requires the activations of multiple connection lines and hypothetically causes a
flurry of activity in the brain. Consider for a moment LeDoux’s research about the way synapses
can activate and deactivate in the brain depending on the stimulus provided. One can then
imagine that L2 signs carried by dendrite branches could connect to the neurons carrying L1
signs, and the resulting action potentials may follow original L1 connective lines because their
paths are more established than L2 connective routes. This may result in L2 signs becoming
linked to L1 connective lines. These connective lines may be based on L1 morphology, syntax,
pragmatics or phonology, among many other possibilities.
When considering an L2 word, this process may chiefly be occurring in a left hemisphere
because it has become more frequently used for processing language. However, the word sign
will need to be connected with its meaning and this concept may be contained in the SCC and the
PSCC. When the L1 meaning represented in an L2 sign cannot be matched or is simply too
complicated for the left logical hemisphere to process, the right hemisphere may try to take the
task over using creative R-mode means to synthesize the many connections that the use of the Lmode has activated. It seems plausible then, that the clash experienced through the different
states of consciousness and functioning in the right and left hemispheres could be contributing to
semiotic confusion, as the cognitive shift from L to R-mode thinking occurs as a natural reaction
to needing to connect a word to a concept.
As this can happen between different sign modes within an L1, one can imagine that
adding an L2 into the equation is only going to complicate matters. Lamb’s work on the brain’s
neural networks and latent pathways could explain why SC can cause language interference in

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second language learners and disorientation in learning disabled students. As the L-mode is
typically the dominant mode of transmission of new information, a struggle for dominance of a
learning task may ensue, until neither mode can be used effectively to compose a full mental
image, causing SC to occur. At this time, the learner may experience a sense of uneasiness or
lethargy from the experience, depending on the degree of sensitivity of their affective filter. 62
L2 learning is a complicated process that is full of opportunities to become confused.
Sometimes there seems to be such a reliance on trial and error techniques, that students can
become disheartened by their lack of progress and conclude they are incapable of learning the L2
or unworthy of learning it. These emotions may come from chastising interactions between
learner and teacher or if learning on their own, a lack of confidence in their learning abilities.
Gattegno found that when he taught through his Silent Way method, few of his students
displayed the anxiety and lethargy that they had in other colleagues’ classes. On the contrary, he
found that his students were fully engaged in their learning and each enjoyed their own learning
process. He surmised that his students felt empowered by their newly given freedom to
participate in the class at the level they wanted to (Gattegno 1963; Gattegno 1962).
One of the elements that Gattegno used in both his Silent Way and Words in Color
programs, which are distinct from other methods, was colour. Colour, with the additional
stimulus of other senses, seems to have acted as an unparalleled bridge between the right and left
hemispheres. Perhaps, in part because it may have united the L and R-modes, it even provided a
level of sign with the potential to bypass SC. Colour has no intrinsic content, yet perhaps it could
be associated with any other sign level or form, thereby it could be made to represent a sound, a

62

The reference to affective filter here refers to Krashen’s (1987) work on how the degree to which the
learner is “open to the input” will affect their perception of the L2 and how well they are able to learn it (Krashen
1987, 9). This was based largely on the factors of motivation, self-confidence and anxiety.

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phoneme, a word class, etc. The stronger the connections can be made between the colour and
the sign, the more accessible the meaning of the sign could become.
Gattegno states that using colour can be effective for helping students who are learning
how to read and write language (Gattegno 1963, 8, 28, 40). By displaying the words in colour,
this seems to decrease the need for students to recognize the grapheme right away. Considering
the near remarkable success of Gattegno’s programs, it is worth briefly investigating what may
have made them so successful. One must consider what was it about colour that allowed it to
help students bypass a number of learning obstacles by enhancing the association between the
sound and the grapheme. In light of Chevalier’s (2002b and Lamb’s (1999) research on semioticnetworks, it seems likely that the use of colour was able to activate the RH, which thrives on
complexity and allows for creativity (Edwards 1989, 50, 90). The combination of using the Lmode for linguistic signs and the R-mode for colour would allow learners to utilize the strengths
of both hemispheres for the learning task.
While Gattegno attributes the difficulty of learning a language’s pronunciation to the
extent to which it is non-phonetic, future research may show that the degree of difficulty faced in
learning a language is directly related to how pictorial the written script is (Davis 1994, 22) and
to what extent people are able to use their R-mode to learn it. As Gattegno’s Words in Color
methodology demonstrates, the rate of learning can be miraculous when an R-mode is utilized.
Upon reflection, it seems that the temporary reliance on R-mode for colour allows a person to
learn the pronunciation of a second language without activating their L1 sound signs while still
stimulating the sign slots. In fact, colour may actually lead to the positive transfer of the sounds
from one language into another.

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Chapter 4: A Potential Semiotics-Inspired Resolution: Colourful Approaches
In one form or another, practitioners over the last fifty years have had an awareness that
stimulating the senses during teaching aids students’ language learning. This awareness has
come from decades of experience, being exposed to ongoing research, as well as the every-day
affirmations in classroom settings from teachers and students. Colour has been used effectively
to activate the visual sense, whereas movement has allowed students to learn through their
kinesthetic intelligence. Some educators, such as Montessori and Slingerland, use a multisensory
assortment of learning materials to capitalize on the malleability of the young child’s brain.
While each of these approaches has been successful, perhaps there is some question as to how
they have been so effective for learning. The following section further investigates the Silent
Way and Montessori approaches that were previously mentioned. This also includes a brief
summary and analysis of two current (TESOL)63 approaches: Essential, Haptically-Integrated
English Pronunciation (EHIEP) (Acton 2012), and Pronunciation Science (PronSci), (Young and
Messum 2011), which is a modified version of Gattegno’s Silent Way. Although each of these
approaches utilize colour in learning protocols, the utilization of other senses is also mentioned.
An analysis from a PSCC/SCC/SC model perspective is presented for each approach
immediately following a summary of the approach.
4.1 The Montessori Approach
Montessori, heavily influenced by her knowledge of the brain and experience watching
over young children, created an approach that focused on assisting children to develop their
sensory and motor skills by using what she called didactic materials. Students of her schools
called “child houses” were encouraged to explore a wide variety of materials that focused on the

63

TESOL is a well recognized abbreviation for Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages.

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development of a particular sense while utilizing the others in a secondary manner (Rambusch
1965, 9). For example, children learn about tone by interacting with wooden bells or fine-tune
their ability to recognize distinctions between colours by placing them one after the other in a
scaled line. Montessori asserted that each child would approach his/her learning materials in a
different way, with various degrees of interest, concentration and length of focus (Montessori
1965, 18).64 “Each will respond differently to color, shape and quantity according to his own
physical and temperamental make-up. Children reach the goal of self-fulfillment, and selfcontrol by different roads, indirectly prepared by the perceptive adult” (Montessori 1965, 18).
Through interactive but constructive self-focused play, children are able to learn about
subtle distinctions between objects such as variations in size, length, colour, shape, texture and
weight. After an initial demonstration of how the materials can be used, the teacher merely
observes as the child’s own curiosity leads him/her to observe the objects closely, make
judgments about their similarities and differences, and reason out problems fuelled by his/her
own momentum to discover the solution to a problem. When introducing colours “… exercises
of the chromatic sense lead, in the case of the older children, to the development of the ‘color
memory’ (Montessori 1965, 86). Montessori says that:
The children are very fond of this exercise in ‘color memory’; it makes a lively
digression for them, as they run with the image of a color in their minds and look for its
corresponding reality in their surroundings. It is a real triumph for them to identify the
idea with the corresponding reality and to hold in their hands the proof of the mental
power they have acquired. (Montessori 1965, 89)

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The fascinating history of Montessori’s determination to be recognized by the Italian medical
community, and her extensive work with children is a topic that deserves its own volume. However, there is
insufficient time and space to do that here. After reading a few books on her methodology and biographical details
the following works are highly recommended: Montessori, Maria. 1969. Spontaneous Activity in Education. United
States: Schocken Books Inc. Also, for her own critical reflection of her work read: Montessori, Maria. 2004. The
Montessori Method: The Origins of an Educational Innovation: Including an Abridged and Annotated Edition of
Maria Montessori's The Montessori Method. Edited by Gerald Lee Gutek Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.

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It is apparent that Montessori’s approach is designed to capitalize on the neural plasticity
of the child in order to help children learn effectively, to prepare them to contribute positively to
society. Montessori’s use of materials and activities that promote the use of the R-mode would
have helped the children refine their imaginative function, giving them the sense of freedom and
self-fulfillment that can be lost in older grades when L-mode learning tends to dominate
classroom activities. When one considers the Montessori approach with reference to the PSCC, it
may become apparent that the Montessori approach focuses on the development of the PSCC
through a focus on the PSCC’s somatosensory sign level. Activities that are meant to stimulate
children’s natural curiosity about objects in their environment assist individuals to learn
distinctions between objects. It seems this knowledge will inevitably transfer into the SCC’s
matching sign slots as children have to apply this knowledge to solve problems that are
meaningful to them.
All of Montessori’s demonstrations of materials and use of didactic materials allow the
child to work from an inward to an outward motion, moving smoothly from a strong PSCC focus
to the establishment of an SCC. Even the act of weighing the children one by one and allowing
them to track their physical growth helps support the construction of a strong self-concept, which
is the result of a healthful PSCC. Essentially, Montessori’s didactic materials appear to be
designed to help the child to become aware of the discerning powers of their own senses through
the interaction of their body with objects.
4.2 The Silent Way Approach (SW)
As a mathematician and teacher of students from kindergarten to university, Gattegno
viewed language in a unique way. He tried to make the invisible process of learning visible to
teachers so that they might endeavor to teach more effectively by subordinating teaching to

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learning and allowing their students to learn independently at their own pace. He worked on
several different approaches to teaching reading and published his “Words in Color” reading
program for children in 1963. Later he applied some of the tools utilized in that program to
language teaching and learning. Though Gattegno’s Silent Way is an approach to language
learning, it postulates such a unique set of ideas that it functions more like a theory, in that one
has to make certain assumptions about the various elements involved in order to attain the results
one expects to see. Without accepting that learners will gain more understanding from their own
thoughts about the sound images that they encounter than through direct teaching, the Silent Way
approach cannot succeed.
Gattegno’s radical ideas were first published in 1963. To propose silence on the part of
the teacher as a tool within second language learning was completely unheard of and yet
purportedly, Gattegno’s classes with his own students showed that students learned quickly and
efficiently by using their own powers of observation (Gattegno 1963; Gattegno 1972). Gattegno
attested that students were very excited about the program because there was no fear of failure.
This meant that students had a kind of learning freedom that they had never experienced before.
All types of tests were integrated right into the learning context, just by him observing the
progress of his students and allowing them to use their logic to test whether meanings were
plausible or not. Gattegno says that “If the learner has any understanding of the words he has
met, he will know, because of his general experience, that such strings of words are no more
acceptable in the foreign language than in his own” (Gattegno 1972, 49).
While it is hard to think of an actual situation that is contradictory, it is very easy to
produce any number of contradictory statements by pointing the words on the charts, or
with pen on paper. These can serve as tests of whether understanding of the meaning of
words used in various situations exists to a sufficient degree. A statement may be
grammatically correct but logically unacceptable: for example, "the largest of these rods
are the smallest among them." (Gattegno 1972, 49)

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He allowed them to work through language problems with their classmates, giving an
occasional nod to signal to students that their solutions were the correct ones whenever this was
necessary (Gattegno 1963; Gattegno 1972).
The basic materials of the initial lessons of the Silent Way classroom are a set of colourcoded sound charts (called Fidel charts), a pointer for the charts, word charts, and colour-coded
wooden rods. There is also the mention of word cards that are colour-coded based on
grammatical function, but this is only implied and not made explicit. According to Messum and
Young, although these existed, they were not seen as useful as other tools and were removed
from the system (Messum and Young 2012, personal communication). The following quote from
Gattegno’s (1972) book indicates the rest of the materials:
• A phonic code chart(s) (Fidel)
• Tapes or discs, as required
• Drawings and pictures, and a set of accompanying worksheets
• Transparencies and a second set of worksheets
• Three texts: sentences to be read separately; sentences to be read consecutively;
a Book of Stories
• Worksheets on the whole language, without any restrictions
• Three anthologies
• Films (Gattegno 1972, 15-16)
The first and second anthologies are divided into short texts each, about 500 words in length.
Gattegno says these are “… taken from authors who have passed hurdles and have become
literary figures of their time” (Gattegno 1972, 69). The third anthology is more focused on
critical discussion and academic style writing thus containing longer texts (1972, 71).
The colour coding used in the Silent Way is based on the phonetic sound represented by
the letter or symbol, or combination of letters depending on which language is being represented.
Gattegno does not explicitly explain the purpose of the colours of the rods; however he uses
them to present situations without ambiguity. The distinction in the size of rods seems to be used

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more effectively than the colour to make comparisons. Students learn the terms for each of the
colours, but based on the explanation provided by Gattengo, it does not seem that a colour is
associated with a certain type of word or concept (Gattegno 1963; Gattegno 1972).65
As students begin to make progress, reading materials are introduced into the lessons.
Students study these texts and compare them to their own sentences, attempting to add to them
and modify them by concentrating on making their meaning obvious. Gattegno focuses on
helping students achieve a degree of proficiency in the target language suitable for everyday
living, as well as for further academic study or employment opportunities, depending on the ages
of the students. Once this level has been reached effectively, Gattegno introduces three books of
anthologies that contain texts from famous writers. These are used to compare different author’s
styles and begin asking a number of questions that are designed to stimulate critical thinking. He
suggests teachers can make their own anthologies by purchasing the classics in the target
language and making them available to students who want them (Gattegno 1972, 75).
An analysis from the perspective of the PSCC model would reveal that, like Montessori,
Gattegno also supported the development of the PSCC through the use of somatosensory signs.
Though a variety of signs are activated during a Silent Way lesson through the manipulation of
rods, the approach utilizes the visual sense through its use of colour. It seems that Gattegno takes
advantage of the natural qualities of colour to attract and maintain attention, excite the emotional
centers of the brain and to act as a symbol for something else. 66 In a similar way to Montessori,

65

At present, after decades of language learning materials development, Gattegno is, perhaps, best known
for his use of silence in the classroom, colour coded phonetic and word charts and his use of colour coded
Cuisenaire rods (Acton 2011, personal communication).
66

Young notes that she has also been able to use this approach effectively with blind students (Young
2012, personal correspondence). This evidence speaks to the dexterity of Gattegno’s original design and
demonstrates that other sensory modes through their relation to the perceptual system can function as semiotic

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he also uses size to help students learn to express distinctions. Gattegno used the rods to
introduce spatial and temporal relationships, at times using them to represent objects (Gattegno
1972, 47).
A PSCC model perspective would argue that colour acts as a “unifier” between the two
separate signs of the grapheme and the sound in Gattegno’s SW. In this way, colour provides the
referent for the relationship between the sound and the grapheme. As previously mentioned,
colour is an element that would be present in each of the PSCC’s sign levels and, as such, may
be particularly powerful in its ability to carry the L2 pronunciation and connect it to a similar L1
sign. As colour is assumed to be present in each level of signs within the PSCC framework, the
use of colour would connect the L2 sound sign with the L1 colour sign. In a manner resembling
some neurotransmitters, the L1 information might team up with the colour sign as the colour sign
travels through various connective lines moving towards similar signs in the PSCC.
The use of coloured L1 and L2 charts could help learners approximate the L2 sound
through assisting them to become aware that they have some of the same sounds in their L1 as a
point of departure before working on the sounds in the L2 that are different from the L1.67
As a particular colour may have been viewed countless times before during the initial
development of the PSCC, its presence could theoretically stimulate multiple L1 networks, even
perhaps bringing back memories and sensations and allowing the student to become more
bridges between L1 and L2 signs. This does not necessarily mean that people without visual impairments would not
benefit from the element of colour as a reinforcement of the semiotic bridge between the L1 and the L2 signs.
67

Hypothetically, if Gattegno’s Silent Way utilized two charts one in the L1 and one in the L2 using the
same sounds for equivalent colours and different colours sounds that were different colours would stand out, but the
places where they were the same would help ease the learner into the process of gaining L2 pronunciations. Students
would be made visibly aware of the difference between sounds. This could help them to avoid approximations. For
example a Japanese student given a colour coded chart of their L1 sounds and a colour coded chart with their L2
sounds might question their inclination to turn the English [l] into a flap because the colour would visually reinforce
their differences.

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connected to the sound through the colour. Likewise, although the grapheme could trigger
semiotic confusion due to its foreignness, the presence of the colour and its ability to bring the
other two signs with it may bypass the need to establish a connection between the L1 and the L2
grapheme. 68 This means that students would only need to remember the colour in order to access
both the sound and the grapheme with it. Effectively, then it seems colour is a sign that can
connect the PSCC and the SCC
4.3 The Pronunciation Science Approach (PronSci)
Messum and Young have been heavily influenced by Gattegno’s methodology and have built
their Pronunciation Science (PronSci) approach around Gattegno’s SW approach. In general,
they take Gattegno’s system and modify it to utilize the mirroring technique that would have
been used in the learning of a student’s first language, based on discoveries made in phonetics
and child language development since Gattegno’s time. They hold that although the learning of a
first and second language is similar in some respects, the learning of an L1 and the learning of an
L2 are fundamentally different. They promote the silence aspect of the SW by not allowing the
teacher to be an articulate model of the L2.
This reduces modeling to the occasional visual presentation of simple mouth shapes and
articulator movements that the student can use as initial guidance towards the articulation of the
sounds that they themselves will produce. If the teacher has shown the mouth shape indicating
the articulators used through his/her gestures, students are invited to begin making sounds while
holding that mouth shape. Then experimentation and practice is meant to gradually help students

68

Recent research from the University of California, Berkeley suggests that colour and sound are
intimately connected through emotion. The research team found that they could predict with 95% accuracy, which
colours they would assign to particular musical pieces despite differences between cultures (Stephen E. Palmer,
Karen B. Schloss, Zoe Xu, Lilia R. Prado-León. “Music-Color Associations are Mediated by Emotion.” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 2013; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1212562110 ).

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reshape their sounds through consistent feedback without pressuring them to follow the teacher’s
pronunciation. They argue that this will free the student from needing to achieve correct
pronunciation at once, allowing him/her to concentrate on developing motor skills as well as a
knowledge of the location and sensation of his articulators when speaking L2 (Messum and
Young 2012a). “Learners can more easily detect what non-native speakers do to pronounce
sounds, words and sentences than what fluent, expert native speakers do. They will learn more
from watching and listening to other students than from trying to copy the teacher” (Messum and
Young 2012a, 15).
Although PronSci’s developers borrow many ideas from Gattegno, they have also chosen
to make certain aspects of his approach such as the sensing of articulatory positions, more
explicit. They do not use Gattegno’s original Fidel charts from his “Words in Colour” program
that was designed to help native speakers learn literacy in their first language (Messum and
Young 2012, personal correspondence) because a different Fidel is required for language
teaching. They contend that the original Fidel chart, having been designed for learning to read
and write English, became unnecessarily complicated when it formed the basis for a
sound/colour rectangle chart, because it then uses too many two-coloured rectangles to represent
blended sounds in English, when fewer would be sufficient. Gattegno originally put these on the
chart to illustrate spelling combinations. They intimate that the order of these elements in
columns are not all needed to reflect the sound pattern of the language adequately, thus their
adapted version of his chart removes these. Gattegno actually modified this original chart himself
when he began applying his SW approach to other languages. In the PronSci approach, the word
charts also use dots to demonstrate when a word can have a weak form, which is not a part of
Gattegno’s original design (Messum and Young 2012a, 32).

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Messum and Young are in agreement with Gattegno about the importance of silence.
Silence allows for students to become aware of their articulators. When the teacher is quiet,
students may feel more encouraged to talk, listen to each other and attend to the variety of
sounds they hear while the teacher observes, encouraging students’ attempts with the occasional
nod. They assert that:
… when one's teacher is silent, one is present to and aware of one's own
articulators as well as what one produces. So one is learning about what one has
to DO with oneself to make a new sound. When a student is copying a model he is
asked to attend to the model rather than what he is doing physically, and if he
does so he has little or nothing to take away from the experience. (Messum and
Young 2012a, 12)
Verbal teacher models are not helpful because students will not know what features of the
language are general to the collective and which ones are specific to that particular individual
and therefore, in an attempt to imitate their teacher, students may copy irrelevant features
(Messum and Young 2012a, 5). Regular speech involves the extraction of meaning from what
the speaker has said (Messum and Young 2012a, 12) and therefore it is best that students not be
burdened with trying to copy some verbal model. Likewise, given Messum and Young’s
research, in classes where teachers provide verbal models, one could imply that students may
come to judge other English speakers as possessing less standard forms of the language because
it does not match language of their teacher. They say that “… although the students know that
there are different accents in English, the work they actually do when copying their teacher
might well produce the mindset that there is only one correct way to pronounce English: hers.
Other perfectly acceptable ways to speak will seem wrong” (Messum and Young 2012a, 13).
They hypothesize that students will also learn about English pronunciation from watching their
classmates approximate sounds (Messum and Young 2012a; 2012b).

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The PronSci approach has been designed based on the assumption that “listen and repeat”
forms of teaching are not effective. Regardless of the program, Messum and Young believe the
majority of students will not learn how to pronounce sounds well with the “listen and repeat”
approach. They also assert that if a student does succeed with the “listen and repeat” approach, it
is because they have been practicing motor skills rather than invoking previously learned skills in
sound imitation, and it is this self-practice that has made them successful. They question the
long-held assumption that children learn to pronounce sounds by imitating the sounds of more
skilled speakers. Instead they imply that children likely learn by trying to produce different
sounds and use their mother’s mirroring of mouth movements to generate a breathing pace that is
suitable for the clear pronunciation of sounds. Gradually as their mothers repeat their attempts
reformulated in well-formed L1 utterances, they internalize the rhythm of the language to help
later production.
In the explanation of the ideas underlying PronSci, the terms pronunciation, imitation,
and mimicking are defined to make the distinctions between them and how they apply to
pronunciation learning obvious. According to Messum and Young pronouncing is a motor skill,
whereas mimicking involves the recreation of a sensory experience and imitating means to do
what one sees (Messum and Young 2012a, 4). Messum and Young assert that children cannot
really learn how to speak by imitating the sounds of their parents because this does not allow the
children to recognize how the sounds were made.
One of the realities of providing a teacher model is that the veridical sound of the
teacher’s example will not stay in the student’s mind for more than approximately 20 seconds. In
contrast, Messum and Young feel that students will come to remember what their vocal
apparatus has had to do to create a sound and they can further refine this muscle memory through

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practice. This will help students attune their listening and articulators to the English sound
system. PronSci teachers also use their fingers and other gestures to guide students toward
correct production of strings of words (Messum and Young 2012a).
A vital part of attaining a natural rhythm is stress training. As Young conducts stress
training with her students, she uses techniques to help them become aware of their articulators
and work on their speech breathing.
As they speak, she asks them to feel exactly what they are doing with their tongue in
relation to their teeth and to the alveolar ridge. She might draw a diagram of the mouth
and ask the students to show her where their tongue is. She might use one hand to
represent the tongue and the other to represent the roof of the mouth, with her nails
representing the teeth. Her other hand can then indicate what the tongue is doing. During
speech we can rarely see what happens inside the mouth, so it is the students' job to feel
what happens. She repeatedly asks that the students focus their attention on their mouth
and tongue, and become more aware of their movements. (Messum and Young 2012a,
36)
Students can learn about stress, in part, by looking at diagrams and engaging in a
discussion about where their tongue is; at which point teachers can gesture with their finger or a
pointer where their tongue should be for an English stress pattern. During an initial period of
time, there is no discussion of what the sentences mean and the teacher’s task is to guide the
students towards correct pacing and pronunciation of the sounds. Their approach does not use
metalanguage in regards to the process at all (Messum and Young 2012a).
The use of a sense-sign form that was utilized as an infant to aid in the discovery of
articulators and sounds strongly supports the PSCC construct. From this perspective, the
development research that went into designing the PronSci approach is valid. If students are not
given signs that will relate back to their first level of somatosensory signs in the PSCC, it will be
difficult for L2 signs introduced into the SCC to activate the connective lines between the L1 in
the SCC and the L2 signs. Given that Messum and Young acknowledge the difficulty that

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students have hearing and holding a model of the L2 signs in their mind long enough to practice
them, it seems that they are using the sensory mode of touch, having students concentrate on the
feeling of their articulators in their mouths, effectively bypassing semiotic confusion.
From a PSCC/SCC perspective, by choosing to avoid the use of the L1 sound system to
introduce L2 sounds, it would likely make them more difficult to learn and also cause them to
lack a connection with their deepest levels of signs contained in the PSCC. Without such a
connection it may take a considerable amount of time before a learner can gain an intuitive sense
of the sound. However, as PronSci uses the mirroring of mouth movements and breathing, both
of these processes would have been initiated during the learning of their L1 and as such may
allow for the connection of the L2 signs to L1 signs contained in the PSCC.
The difficulty is that the L1 and L2 articulator positions may not be equivalent, thus
students will bring in other sound features to approximate the sound. These will likely be
influenced by their L1 sounds. Languages that have similar mouth positions in this regard should
be easier to learn and there is evidence in the literature to suggest this is the case. For example,
Japanese speakers wanting to produce an English lateral approximant [l] will likely produce a
flap because this is the closest sound in their L1 to an [l] sound. However, if they were to watch
the mouth of an English speaking person as he/she created the sound in their mouths, they might
notice a slightly different positioning of the tongue and adjust their aperture trying to make it
more like their teacher’s visual model. The new sound that they make might be distinct from the
first, but perhaps it will still be flap-like. It may require considerable exploration and practice
before students achieve an L2 sound.
Without an acoustic model it is difficult to determine whether students would hear the
distinction between sounds. Perhaps Messum and Young have foreseen this eventuality and feel

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without the distraction of a model, students will pay more attention to the feeling of the sound,
and they assume students will associate this feeling with the change in the sound. The fact that
they assert silence is a necessary part of this suggests that they have sensed that silence could
remove the conflict between the L2 sound signs and the L1 sound signs, using instead the more
common signs to both of them, the articulators.
It is very likely that the PronSci approach will be far more effective with the modified
Fidel because these charts use colour. It has been argued that colour would be considered a
universal sign because the human eye has the ability to perceive all the colours of the spectrum.
One could argue that all sounds of language are audible. While this is true for the first six weeks
of life, after this time infants begin to specialize on the sets of sounds they hear. At this time
language sounds from other languages will be heard in relation to the L1 sound system. Listeners
will only hear the distinctions between sounds if they cause the meaning of a word to change.
For example, in the following set of minimal pairs [sɪp] and [ʃɪp] in English these are two
different conceptual sounds, but in Korean these belong to the same conceptual sound and they
never cause a difference in meaning to a word, thus Koreans do not hear the difference between
the [s] and [ʃ] when they first begin learning English.
Gattegno’s colours, arguably, signify to students that there is a difference between the
sounds. In the case of [s] and [ʃ] the graphemes “s” and “sh” help show that there is a difference;
however, as the graphemes are L2 signs they lack a connection to the L1 in the PSCC. This
means that the learner first has to decipher what the grapheme signifies from the L1 in their SCC
and then they have to try and remember the sound from the L1 in their SCC as well as how to
produce it. In contrast, if the grapheme is coloured, and that colour represents the sound, then
there is a more direct connection between the grapheme and the L1 sounds that need to be

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produced. Colours “… make it absolutely clear that there is something new to learn here. The
student can’t ignore what he sees for himself” (Messum and Young 2012, personal
correspondence).
4.4 Essential Haptically-Integrated English Pronunciation (EHIEP)
Acton’s “multi-modal” EHIEP approach utilizes movement and touch protocols to help
learners internalize the positions of vowel sounds in an imagined matrix that learners visualize
(Acton 2007). The matrix essentially symbolizes the standard International Phonetic Alphabet
(IPA) chart for vowels, excluding those that are not contained in English. Through the initial
orientation video, students gain a sense that there is an invisible matrix in front of them,
stretching from the learner’s waistline and slightly past their shoulder, as though they were
looking out a window into English. The approach has been designed to address several
challenges in second language pronunciation teaching, among them the integration of
pronunciation learning into their conversations beyond the classroom; a lack of English rhythm
in body movement; and the idea that only native speakers can teach this well. EHIEP’s goal is to
help learners improve the intelligibility of their speech rather than achieve accent reduction.
To assist students in anchoring the vowel sounds to these key locations in the matrix,
Acton uses not only movement and touch, but also colour. In a similar manner to Gattegno, the
colours represent sounds, specifically the vowels from the IPA chart. One of Acton’s graduate
students assisted him in the building of a colour-theory inspired visual component for his
matrix. 69 Colour theory was greatly influenced by Munsell who was discussed in section 2.6:
Colour in learning. The general idea underlying colour-theory in art is that colours can be
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As a graduate student of Acton’s, I had the privilege to be trained in one of the first versions of his
EHIEP approach in 2007. I found that I could not situate the vowels in the matrix without the addition of colour.
After this use of colour Acton found that my division of the matrix into colour values helped learners associate the
sound to the colour and situate their torso within the matrix.

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divided into tints which are colours mixed with white; tones, which are colours mixed with grey;
and shades, colours that have had black added to them. In the colour portion of Acton’s system,
high vowels, those made at the front of the mouth are represented by tints. This is in part because
when spoken these vowels tend to have a higher “brighter” sound. In contrast, low vowels, or
what linguists would refer to as back vowels, are represented with a colour that has been mixed
with black. The assumption is that sounds made further in the mouth will have a darker sound
and students will be able to associate a darker sound with a darker colour. Lastly, central or mid
vowels are represented with a tone. Field testing of Acton’s work has shown these sound and
colour associations to be quite effective in helping students situate vowel sounds within the
matrix.
During a class, students are led through various motions that are associated with sounds.
These begin as monosyllabic sequences and gradually move up to full sentences. The actual
movements are designed to activate certain areas of the body, for example large swooping TaiChi like arm movements are meant to activate the torso and most especially the diaphragm to
allow the learner to speak with the appropriate intonation and diction. Acton finds that insisting
that students focus on refining their movements can distract them from the anxiety students feel
when speaking in a foreign language. Likewise, the touch and tap sequences often performed in
tandem with arm movement also serve to take students attention away from their voices.
However, these also have the critical function of promoting what Danesi calls “bimodality:” the
activation of both the left and right hemisphere through activities that engage both analytic and
synthetic types of thinking (Danesi 2003, 28). The EHIEP approach ensures bimodality is
attained by having the right arm cross into the visual field of the LH and vice versa.

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Acton’s EHIEP has been influenced by the work of several authors such as Lessac
(1997), Guiora (1972) and Morley (2002). The materials of EHIEP are videos of an instructor
performing within the matrix. Acton calls these recorded lessons protocols. Each module consists
of six steps: a review of the previous video’s lesson, a modeling of the new techniques to be
learned in that class, intensive training of that protocol, “bilateral” rhythmic practice, classroom
practice of the protocol and a contextual practice of the technique in a prepared 12-line
conversation (Acton 2012, 5).
Acton’s system seems to work through association and internalization. Students learn to
associate the vowel sound with the arm movement and internalize the sensation of making the
sounds at different levels of their body. For example, students might internalize that the [ɔ]
sound was always lower than the [i] sound because of the distance between the arm movements.
One could argue that the arm movements represent the tongue position in the mouth and is
therefore, a kinesthetic/physiological referent for the actual tactile sign of the sensation of the
tongue touching the various locations in the mouth. In this case, the arm movement signifies the
sound.
Considering Peirce’s concept of unlimited semiosis, the combination of the sound sign
and physiological signifier in EHIEP can lead to other signs and referents. Words and even
pictures or colours could be associated with the sound signs and physiological signs created
through the practicing of the movements. For a basic example, if there was a chart that
represented the matrix, the front, central, and back vowels would be present as coloured squares
on the chart. A student’s arm movements could then be adapted to ensure the students hand
could tap the chart as they moved from one vowel to the next. The colour would become
associated with the sound through the tapping of the colour with the hand. One might also be

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able to have these colours laid out on a flat mat where the movements would involve legs and
feet in a type of sequenced dance-like movement resembling a pronunciation teaching Dance
Dance Revolution (DDR) video game routine.
Acton’s EHIEP tries to assist students in learning pronunciation by anchoring sounds in
a haptically-oriented matrix. From a PSCC/SCC perspective, EHIEP would allow students to
bypass semiotic confusion by avoiding the clash that will occur between the non-equivalency of
the L1 and the L2 sound signs. Through the use of haptic signs, arguably, Acton’s approach
connects at the somatosensory level of the sign network. This has the potential then to connect to
the PSCC through the somatosensory level of signs that contain the signs for movement.
However, similarly to Messum and Young’s PronSci this connection is only likely to happen if
the haptic signs that are being used match those that were used in the student’s L1. If they are not
equivalent, the assumption is there will be a clash and some degree of semiotic confusion may
ensue.
Acton realized the possibility mentioned above and that is why he has also integrated
colour into his approach. Acton would argue that due to the universality of colour, for those with
standard colour-vision, the placement of sound within the matrix would have the potential to
become intuitive and colour signs might transfer between the L2 in the SCC and the L1 in the
SCC, which would then connect to the L1 in the PSCC. The PSCC/SCC model predicts that if
this connection were to happen, then the learner would feel engaged in their learning (Acton
2012, personal communication). There would also be a sense of ease and freedom through the
use of the R-mode and perhaps an emotional response to the signs through the ability of the
colour to activate the neural networks involved in memory.

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In the case of EHEIP, the presence of afterimages might complicate results because while
colours can aid in the retention of sounds by fixing an image in the minds of students, the colour
image will be in contrast to the original one that they saw. Though this is a complication, with
careful planning of colours, this may not confuse students because the basic premise of using
tints, tones and shades to distinguish between front, central and back vowels will remain
relatively constant provided that the colours are displayed on a black background. That should
absorb the colour of the afterimage, limiting its effects.
Chapter 5: Colour-form Methodology
The design and methodology of the Colour-form approach has been influenced by several
theories such as van Valin’s (2010) Role and Reference Grammar (RRG), Chomsky’s (2006)
Universal Grammar (UG) theory and Gattegno’s (1972) Silent Way approach, among many
others.70 The Colour-form approach uses a synthesis of generative and functional linguistic
theories. This is to help students develop both their analytic skills, such as analysis, and their
synthetic skills, such as creation and synthesis, in order for them to grasp how languages can be
learned as well as learning them.

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Colour-form trials have been with Korean students.

The Colour-form approach takes Chomsky’s idea that language has a universal grammar, a
blueprint, whereupon the potential for a finite number of language characteristics may manifest
due to the parameters set for it (Chomsky 2008, 295) and converts that idea into colour

70

I developed the Colour-form approach first as a game to assist my Korean students to improve their grammatical
skills in English grammar in order to help them to learn how to write as well as they hoped because they were
frustrated that they could not. They also hated grammar and were afraid to write in English. My first students could
hardly write one simple sentence.
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Please note that the title Colour-form is the name of the approach where as colourform(s) written with a
lowercase “c” and no hyphen refers to the actual pieces that students and teachers pick up and move around that are
used throughout the methodology.

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patterns.72 In the Colour-form approach, the visible spectrum represents this blueprint and the
colours are selected from it, with reference to the colour terms used in a language. Ultimately, a
different genus of language could be represented by a different set of colours used or an
alternative colour pattern. The combination of parameters and the degree of importance of each
is unique between languages, just as the amount of colour terms a language utilizes is specific to
that language.
As languages do not necessarily have colour terms for all the colours in the visible
spectrum, the colours chosen for the felt manipulatives might vary markedly from language to
language. In the situation where a language has only two colour terms for the entire visible
spectrum, then it might be necessary to first teach students alternative terms for colours, perhaps
relying on the terms of objects that are always associated with that colour, such as the term blood
for red. The (1969) colour word, world study of Berlin and Kay suggests that all people have a
sense of base colours. In their study, when people were asked to pick out a good example of each
colour, participants consistently selected the same hue, even if they did not have those terms in
their language. Kay and Berlin concluded that the people of every culture they tested consistently
picked the same colours when asked to identify a pure version of a specific colour, and from this
research, they confirmed that there are eleven basic colours. They found that if languages have
particular colours, then the spectrum of colour that those colours represent would be consistent.
Also, as people are capable of perceiving all the colours of the spectrum, it would not be

72

The following quote from Hardin 2009, taken from the forward of Kay et al.’s 2009 colour world survey,
suggests that others have seen a parallel between colour as a perceptual universal and Chomsky’s UG. “And if there
are such cross-cultural patterns and developmental orders, do they at least in part reflect the structural features and
salience of color perception that human beings have in common? (Here we glimpse the possibility of a semantic
analogue to Noam Chomsky's deep grammar, a semantics that might be extended beyond color to terms for other
perceptual universals)” (Hardin in Kay et al. 2009, forward).

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necessary to refer to the colours by name. Pointing to each coloured shape may be just as
efficient.
The use of colour in Colour-form reflects Gattegno’s idea that colour can be used to
make the learning of certain language features easier. Gattegno utilized a set of colours in his
SW approach. He would use as many colours as there were sounds in the language (Young 2012,
personal correspondence). In the Colour-form approach, colours are introduced as the
grammatical function of the category that the colour represents. Young applied this to a
colour/symbol/sound correspondence, whereas Colour-form uses colour to represent language
features at the word, phrase, clause, sentence and paragraph level. 73 Gattegno says that:
If we use colors to write each sign, we can at first refer to the sign by its color instead of
giving its sound or name. That will reduce our interference with the learning process. In
addition to this, we can make use of color in a systematic way to bring out the similarities
and differences in sounds that we want the learner to perceive. (Gattegno 1962, 8)
On the other hand, color saves us the trouble of saying that ough is o, u, g, h, which
represents various sounds in various words. If we say that the olive sign sounds as in
though, the double-colored as in bough, the green as in through, this supposedly difficult
letter group becomes as easy to unlock as the word cat. In this work, all one-sound groups
of letters are considered to be one sign only in the English language. We merely increase
the number of signs to correspond with the different sounds. Thus, the ay in way, the
eight in weigh, the ai in wait, and the a in wane are all considered to belong to the same
sign group. They have one sound and, hence, one color only. Pupils learn from the start
that color represents something and they pay close attention to it until mastery is
achieved. (Gattegno 1962, 9)
Can the discovery method be used in teaching children to read and write? The most
distinctive characteristic of our approach is not so much the use of color to make a
language quasi-phonetic, but in the fact that this method uses the dynamic properties of
the mind. (Gattegno 1962, 10)
In this sense it seems Gattegno removes some of the burden of symbol recognition on the
brain by allowing the student to go straight from the recognition of the colour into the production

73

Please note this quote also appeared on page 108 and is repeated here to give an impression of the
sequencing and flow of Gattegno’s discussion of colour for purposes of clarity.

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of the sound the colour signifies. This seems to prevent the student from becoming confused by
the different spellings in words. Gattegno’s SW colour, in part, seems to function to prevent
students from becoming distracted by the spellings of words, thus enabling them to work quickly
through their ideas from recognition to production. The Colour-form approach uses this idea, but
more broadly.
The Colour-form approach uses colour as a possible means of stimulating L1 signs at
various sign levels in the mind to allow students to learn structural patterns without their thought
process being interrupted because of L2 symbols that may conflict with their L1 symbols. As the
coloured felt pieces, called colourforms, represent word classes and not words, the students can
choose from their vocabularies with the guidance of colour patterns to reassure them that they
are placing the words in appropriate locations. Colour-form may even decrease the cognitive
load language students must maintain in order to progress in their learning.
In a similar fashion to Messum and Young, Laurent has also been influenced by
Gattegno’s work. Like Colour-form, Laurent’s learning system for French also uses colour to
represent word classes (Laurent 2012). He does not account for why he uses certain colours and
implies in a like manner to Gattegno that his colour choices are arbitrary. In contrast, Color-form
uses the separation of warm colours for content words and cool colours for non-content words
based on the research of Gengenfurtner et al. (1998) and Kay et al. (2009).
In Laurent’s system, he gestures to words that are on a board on the wall with a pointer
while his students observe. Laurent’s students watch and listen during the initial lessons as he
says a simple sentence such as “cats meow” while pointing to each word as he says it. At this
level, Laurent is associating the words with the grammatical categories in the boxes that are
outlined in colour. He does not name the category while moving from the word to the coloured

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rectangle until every child knows what words belong in it. Perhaps, this allows students to grasp
the function of the word based on its placement and how it is used in their speech (Young 2012,
personal correspondence).
In Laurent’s system, the number of grammatical categories that are represented in the
initial sentences will depend on the ages of the students. For example, for students who are in
formal schooling at the grade one level, the initial sentences will only use up to four word
classes, but for classes of adolescents or adults, the initial sentences will contain at least one
word from each word class. After the first sentence has been demonstrated with the pointer,
students are gradually invited to come up and use a pointer to generate sentences by pointing to
the coloured rectangles in a manner that resembles what Laurent has previously shown them.
Laurent provides sentences for his students until they know what grammatical category each
coloured box represents. Due to the limitations of software to translate Laurent’s work from
French to English for this thesis research, it is unclear whether students make their own
sentences later by pointing towards the colours in different sequences. At present, it is assumed
that when the students understand the grammatical role of each coloured box, Laurent
encourages his students to make their own sentences out of the framework he has shown them
(Messum and Young 2013, personal correspondence).74
Laurent’s work with French bears an interesting parallel to Colour-form up to a certain
point. He has a similar system in establishing the colours in grammatical categories. He has been
influenced by Gattegno’s work and his initial lessons are rather Gattegnoesque by introducing

74

As I do not speak French, my research is based on the translation of his website. Consequently and most
unfortunately, subtle nuances of his methodology may be neglected in the description of his work. In addition, it
can be assumed that the educators of other languages and those of non-western cultures may also use colour and
other qualisigns in their language teaching methodology. However, the scope of this thesis has been limited to
English.

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the colour and word class by pointing to the word and the coloured rectangle. Colour-form’s
initial lessons also focus on helping students associate the colour with the word class, but also
the higher-level sentence components such as subject and predicate.
Later in Colour-form, students will become aware of the presence of green Colourforms
and question green pieces’ role in the sentence. As green represents sentence elements that serve
to bring the subject and verb into a relationship with each other by locating them in time and
space, this leads to a greater focus on the establishment of relationships between objects and their
actions. Such pieces situate objects and events in time and space. Within the first hour of the
class during the first week of Colour-form, students write sentences in their native language and
with coloured markers they colourize their L1 to identify where these word classes are in their
sentence. From here, the class presents their findings and generalizations made about the basic
grammar colour pattern. As the basic word order of Korean is subject, object, verb, the colour
pattern that Korean students are expected to discover is red, red, green, and orange using this
approach.
The engagement and functional load of colours seems to be much greater in Colour-form
than in Gattegno’s and Laurent’s approaches. Gattegno and Laurent’s approaches seem highly
audio-visual; students are watching and listening to a classmate, themselves or the teacher, while
whomever moves the pointer from one box to the other. In their work, colour seems to function
more as a mnemonic device to strengthen the student’s connection between the word and the
grammatical position associated with the word within the sentence. In contrast, in Colour-form,
colour serves as a unifying framework between L1 and L2. Apart from the green article, colours
represent their membership in a phrase and the size of the colourforms refers to whether it carries
a basic meaning such as a noun or expands this meaning by giving more information about the

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subject or predicate. As previously noted the Colour-form method also utilizes the shapes of
squares and rectangles. The squares represent word classes that carry the primary meaning, such
as nouns and verbs, whereas the rectangles represent word classes that are used to express
additional meaning. The colours introduced in Stage 1 signify the colourforms’ relationship to
the broader categories of subject, predicate or locative. For instance, the red rectangle is an
adjective because modifiers expand the amount of knowledge one can have about the noun.
These are introduced in the first stage or unit of the approach.
The use of colour in the approach has also been inspired by Davis’ theories about dyslexia
(Davis 1994). Davis has been instrumental in developing programs to aid learning disabled
learners. He uses the term dyslexia to cover the whole spectrum of learning disabilities such as
ADHD, while excluding physical impairments such as visual or auditory disorders (Davis
1994)75. While multiple labels have been assigned to types of dyslexia, when referring to
dyslexics he feels that, in general:
1. They can utilize the brain’s ability to alter and create perceptions (the primary
ability).
2. They are highly aware of the environment.
3. They are more curious than average.
4. They think mainly in pictures instead of words.
5. They are highly intuitive and insightful.
6. They think and perceive multi-dimensionally (using all the senses).
7. They can experience thought as reality.
8. They have vivid imaginations. (Davis 1994, 5)
These observations about dyslexic learners have led to the use of colour in Colour-form to evoke
an intuitive sense of language structure through multisensory techniques by helping students to
become aware of constituent environments.

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Going forwards, left and right hemispheric functions will be used as a means of a conceptual short hand
that is consistent with Davis framework (Davis 1994).

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Davis notes that there are differences between verbal and non-verbal thought. He estimates
that the speed of verbal thought is about the same speed as speech. Thus a skilled speaker could
say and think about 200 words per minute, whereas a non-verbal thinker’s thoughts could be
thousands of times faster (Davis 1994, 9). Non-verbal thought is intuitive and frequently beneath
conscious awareness. While human beings utilize both modes of thinking, people will use one
for most of their thinking, utilizing the second when needed (Davis 1994, 9). Davis contends that
as language can reflect one’s thought process, when faced with the arbitrary relationships
between sounds and symbols, dyslexics’ inability to think in terms of verbal conceptualizations
suggests that their primary thought process is non-verbal.
Davis asserts that dyslexics think with the meaning of the language by creating mental
images.76 These are multisensory images that evolve as more information is added to them.
Although this thinking can be 400 to 2,000 times faster than verbal, when any “unpicturable”
word is introduced,77 a non-verbal thinker will not grasp its meaning (Davis 1994, 98). Davis
even says, “It is impossible for a non-verbal thinker to think with words whose meanings can’t
be pictured” (Davis 1994, 11). A prime example of this is the word “the;” no matter how many
times a dyslexic reads and writes it, the three letters “t,” “h” and “e” do not have a corresponding
picture. Saussure would likely say this is because the relationship between letters is entirely
arbitrary. For verbal thinkers, these letters should not cause difficulties because a verbal thinking
child can work out how they should sound (Davis 1994, 11, 81). In contrast, a dyslexic person

76

Though this is a strong claim, from a semiotic perspective images can have many different signs in them
thus a picture can display multiple relations, culminating in the representation of some meaning that the individual
can interpret based on the relations between signs in the image, but also in light of the signs present in their
memories.
77

Please note “unpicturable” is not Davis’ term, but one of my own that is used to describe a sign that one
is not able to make a mental picture for. The word “the” for example is not very “picturable,” therefore it is
unpicturable.

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who processes information in the form of an evolving mental image has never heard their
thoughts (Davis 1994, 11) and may not be able to express them because they have passed by so
quickly. Any “unpicturable” word that appears in a sentence will prevent the image from
progressing (Davis 1994, 12). His work suggests that this will make it difficult for the dyslexic
learner to see the relationships between the elements in their mental image and linguistic
phenomena such as letters; they will become confused (Davis 1994, 13). For example, if dyslexic
students come across a verb that they do not know while reading a story, they can have a mental
image of two characters perhaps, but have no idea what happened to them.
As the amount of confused signs builds up it can trigger “disorientation.” Davis describes
this as the mind’s eye moving, causing a shift in perception (Davis 1994, 13). When this
happens, dyslexics will no longer perceive what their eyes see, only what they think their eyes
see. In other words, dyslexics will then experience a distorted reality. When this occurs,
dyslexics may see a word forward, backward, upside down or from various other perspectives.
This means that if the word is not recognized, dyslexics will mentally dissect it and reassemble it
in every possible configuration. They will then feel confused, because of the many incorrect
options they have to choose from. Gradually, they will eliminate all potential configurations in
their mind, finally arriving at the correct form of the word, but to do this they could have run
through more than 3,000 more computations than non-dyslexic children (Davis 1994).
Davis asserts that:
In normal childhood development, the skills for analytical reasoning and logic should
begin to develop at around the age of three. These are the skills for consciously
recognizing people by seeing elbows, and kittens by seeing white balls of fur. Children
who need these skills begin to develop them. But little P.D. already has a system that is
faster and more accurate than analytical reasoning and logic ever could be. He has no

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need for these skills at all, so they don’t develop. (Davis 1994, 79)78
In contrast, in a non-dyslexic child the development of logic and reasoning necessitates the
learning of speech. Davis states:
This explains why verbal conceptualization is many times slower than nonverbal
conceptualization: The speech and language center of the brain must, of necessity,
operate at the maximum intelligible speed of speech—at most, perhaps 250 words per
minute, or about 4 words per second. The result is that the normal child’s thinking
process is dramatically slowing down, while P.D.’s mind continues to race along at full
speed. (Davis 1994, 80)
Davis says P.D., a hypothetical dyslexic person, will have learned to speak, but when
communicating may try to talk at the speed of his thoughts which are visual.
Thus, a non-dyslexic child has to “… use the speech and language center on the left side
of the brain in his or her thought process” (Davis 1994, 80). He contends that as logic and
reasoning are based in language, these types of thought resemble the language patterns in
sentences (Davis 1994, 80). In contrast, according to Davis, a dyslexic child already has an
effective means of processing this information that is more efficient for recognition tasks than
verbal thinking, and as a result, the development of analytical skills is delayed. Consequently, the
use of verbal conceptualization associated with logical skills is also not utilized.
Recent research suggests that students who have difficulty learning a second language
have weaknesses in their oral native language. Thus affecting their performance within an
English language environment, these weaknesses affect the comprehension of phonetic,
syntax, and semantics. Dyslexic and other learning disabled students may be affected by
the same weaknesses… If a child cannot decode letters they will inevitably have
difficulty reading whether they are learning disabled, learning English as a second
language, or is in early grade school and presently learning reading skills. (Nosal 2012)

78

When Davis refers to little P.D. he is discussing the general process of any potential dyslexic as they
move from underlying unconscious talent to the consequence of dyslexia since being exposed to printed words
(Davis 1994).

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In consideration of the similarity between the confusion felt by dyslexics and ESL students
while processing letters and their sound correspondences it seems there could be some element
that can be associated with the sound or word class that does not cause this disorientation.
Replacing the written symbol with a colour, if only temporarily, seems like it might limit
confusion. Coloured felt can fit this need because no matter which way it is turned the element
always stays the same unlike letters that can change constantly. For example, the letter “p” can
change from “b” to “d,” etc. The different shapes of the colourforms should also not cause
dyslexics to become confused because they have had multiple experiences with shapes and can
visualize one easily. Using colour would also serve to eliminate the need for ESL students to
recognize and decode foreign symbols so that unknown signs will not distract them.
In light of Lamb’s mental activations proposal, it seems reasonable to consider that the
shift experienced by dyslexics is not exactly due to the movement of a mental eye, but from the
struggle for dominance between the left and the right hemispheres. It may well be that the reason
dyslexic people feel this keenly is because, as Davis (1994) asserts, they think in images. Thus,
their RH could be “dominant.” Certainly, considering Davis’ proposal that dyslexics develop the
ability to move their mind’s eye while still infants (Davis 1994, 104), it would seem that
dyslexics rely on their strong right hemispheres more often than their left ones at least for the
special talent of disorienting.
Davis argues that the language processing deficits that are commonly connected with
dyslexic students are not visible until a child enters school and is faced with the challenge of
learning arbitrary symbols like letters. This fact also suggests that the right hemisphere of a
dyslexic child is more “dominant” than their left side at this time. The fact that a dyslexic child
can look at a three letter word such as “cat” and see the 40 possible configurations of it instantly

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(Davis 1994, 84) suggests that the right side of the brain which revels on complexity (Edwards
1989, 90) is quite active in the mind of a dyslexic or that the LH is simply less dominant. Early
exposure to Edwards’ characterizations of the LH and the RH as the L- and R-mode respectively,
has had a profound influence on how to address the tendency towards semiotic confusion. Colour
was selected, in part, because of its obvious connection to attention and mood through the
somatosensory level of signs as a qualisign. As the early learning of infants is non-verbal and
involves the experiencing of qualisigns such as colour and texture, it seems reasonable to
consider colour as being associated with the R-mode.
Learners of languages have to recognize letters as well as how they interact to represent
sounds. For words to convey the meaning they need to, students must also have the correct
sequence of letters, which means the student needs to gain a sense of the rules that allow for the
word’s creation. If a learner has an understanding of how words are created and the rules that
dictate this process, but no understanding of the order they need to be in, they can use, perhaps,
the meaning of the content words to form utterances. They can make simple sentences such as
“cookie me desire” which are useful when one needs to communicate very little. As human
beings are pre-programmed through their evolved ability of symbolic reference (Deacon 1997) to
convert symbols into meaning, the natural response for L1 learners seems to be to find an
equivalent L1 sign for the L2 sign they are being presented with and place it in a meaningful
framework.
In an academic environment, unless there is some degree of awareness of L2 structure, it
seems a student will tend to convert the L2 content words into their L1 grammar pattern in order
to achieve meaning. Krashen (1987) implies that if learners have a sense that they do not have an
understanding of some language form, they may avoid using it or look to their L1 for a solution

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(Krashen 1987).79 This would explain why L2 learners could spontaneously produce L2 words
from their newly learned vocabularies in an L1 pattern. Once this process occurs, it seems likely
that it would be difficult to disassociate the meaning from the L1 grammar pattern into the L2.
The English (L2) words may remain intact through its connection to a L1 sign equivalent. This
means that if a student were to see this word they could recognize it and potentially pronounce it
if the sound image of it had been part of its network, but without a knowledge of its placement in
the L2 sentence, they would have difficulty writing it and potentially speaking it in an L2
grammar pattern. (Please refer to the content in section 5.2 of the Colour-form methodology
section for more information regarding this.)
The structurally based grammar of Colour-form has been inspired by Role and Reference
Grammar’s reconfiguration of Chomsky’s generative grammar, and Van Valin, who separates
subjects into actors and undergoers. These are the first elements taught in the approach while the
obligatory components of sentence structure, subject and predicate, are introduced. Students that
have a Canadian Language Benchmark proficiency level of 3-4 are likely to know what a
sentence looks like in English (Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks 2006). Most of the
students that come into the Colour-form class know the term “sentence” and what one looks like,
but do not have an effective understanding of its parts. While Colour-form is mostly a bottom-up
approach, working from simpler elements to more complicated constructions, it actually begins
with a brief introduction of the overarching parts of a sentence: subject and predicate. 80 This is
to establish a foundation for students as they learn.

79

Krashen says that “According to a hypothesis first proposed by Newmark (1966), performers who are
asked to produce before they are “ready” will fall back on first language rules, that is, they will use syntactic rules of
their first language while speaking the second language” (Krashen 1987, 27).
80

For a more detailed account of the procedures please refer to Section 5.3 of the Colour-form section.

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Top-down and bottom-up learners may find the approach effective. Using an RRG
approach at this point establishes a visual framework with actors and undergoers forming a
meaningful relationship with the predicate or non-verbal predicate.81 Van Valin’s (2010) model
of nuclear, core and clause is transformed into a series of interlocking boxes that learners are
able to look into. The symbol of a box is utilized to help students gain a sense of the embedded
nature of English letters, words, phrases, clauses, sentences and paragraphs. Beyond these RRG
elements, other RRG concepts such as operators are not used specifically.
The methodology of Colour-form is essentially based on multisensory learning where
students experience new concepts through different thought modalities such as kinesthetic,
tactile, oral and visual. The multisensory approach is largely based on the research of Orton and
Gillingham from the 1930s, which was adapted for classroom use by Slingerland in 1935
(Slingerland 1981; Orton and Gillingham 2012). The idea behind it is that the more pathways
information can travel through to the brain, the greater the retention of that information there will
be. Colour-form uses each of these thought modalities simultaneously. For example, students say
their sentence aloud to themselves as they move the pieces around to form it, thus hypothetically,
speaking through their movement stimulates a kinesthetic path to their brain, whereas watching
the pattern unfold as they place the pieces opens a visual pathway. Hearing themselves say the
words that the colours represent opens an aural pathway and finally, the act of touching the
pieces and manipulating them into their places opens a tactile pathway. Combinations of thought

81

Actors are the subjects in sentence that do an action whereas undergoers are subjects that receive the
action. For example in the sentence, “He hit him.” he is the actor and “him” is the receiver of the hit.

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modalities (sign modes) create a stronger retention of information in each of the sign modes
because of the overlap between modes (Shams and Seitz 2008).82
Shams and Seitz attest that “. . . multimodal processing reduces cognitive load because
information from different modalities can be more easily chunked into short-term memory and
used to build long-term representations” (Shams and Seitz 2008, 5). As Sham and Seitz’s (2008),
research into memory demonstrates that multisensory learning can increase an individual’s
ability to recognize objects; the Colour-form approach uses a variety of sensory input. Each
sensory modality likely becomes layered until a complete mental image of that learning event
occurs. Saussure would have considered this a sound image but Leach would view it as a sense
image. This would be the sign that is achieved through the combination of sensory information.
For example, an infant’s experience of a ball involves moving it around, feeling it on their
tongue, listening to the sound it makes as it is squeezed and even smelling the scent of rubber.
These are all sense-images that are processed through multisensory experiences that help the
infant convert the resulting sense-images into a mental image which is itself a sign and a
configuration of other sign-forms just as Peirce’s Triadic vision of the sign and his unlimited
semiosis hypothesis implies.
In the Colour-form approach, the coloured manipulatives attempt to utilize Peirce’s idea
of unlimited semiosis in that each felt piece, by nature of its colour, refers to itself, what it
represents and the label that is assigned to it as well as its relationship to other parts around it.
The very fact that these parts have a relationship to each other implies that there is some kind of
hierarchy present to dictate that there is a relationship between those elements. Following

82

Acton’s (2012) work presents contradictory evidence that suggests that modalities may compete with
each other. For more information in regards to this please access his Haptic-Integrated Clinical Pronunciation
research website at http://hipoeces.blogspot.ca/.

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Lamb’s work with sign networks, the colour of the felt piece refers to a hierarchal label. Lamb
uses tree diagrams to show the relationship between higher and lower level elements, but
colourforms are created to represent these simultaneously. The shape of a colourform represents
lower level labels such as the function of words, whereas the colour refers to a higher-level label
that denotes the relationship.
As in Peirce’s unlimited semiosis, labels are never fixed but can always refer to a word
on the same level because of its infinite ability to relate back to signs that share the same
qualities as signs within that level. For example, the shape of a square signifies a basic content
word. This square shape can relate to any basic content word through its shape and label, which
connects all other words that serve that function. Once the lower level pieces have been learned,
then higher-level constructions are introduced in such a way that the word classes become
layered on top of hierarchical structures. This is because it is the hierarchical patterns of the
linguistic system that allow for the relationships between lower level items to exist, as is
suggested by Lamb’s semiotic networks.
Each colourform piece is intended to refer to itself and the hierarchical relationship that it
has to other parts of the system. Phrasal pieces of orange and red can then be placed on clausal
level structures of blue. Dependant clauses are purple, because purple represents future tense at
the clause level and a “child” who is “dependant” will become independent from his/her
“parents” in the future. As longer sentences are created, more purple “phrase strip” can be used.83
By the time paragraphs are being created, the pieces can be layered on a large felt board and
students then use a combination of making sentences on the board and writing them in their
notebooks in the lesson.
83

The term “longies” refers to long coloured pieces of felt that represent clause level structures: purple
rectangles for dependant clauses and blue rectangles for independent clauses.

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While the theory of bimodality that Danesi (2003) describes has not directly influenced
the approach, the original justification for using the colourforms was to strengthen the right
hemisphere’s (R-mode) ability to process information that would traditionally be handled by the
left hemisphere (L-mode) by using a medium that would help stimulate the R-mode. Colour,
with its connection to the visual cortex in the center of the perceptual nervous system, was
selected to help stimulate the R-mode through its reference to hierarchical relationships.
In light of the research stated above, the methodology for Colour-form assumes grammar
can be learned as a set of colour patterns that represent word classes and constituent relations and
that this will provide a framework for further language learning. Without a general understanding
of word order, language is learned in isolation from the patterns that serve to both frame and
dictate where elements are to be put. This order serves to guide speakers and listeners alike to an
understanding of meaning in spoken and written language. As patterns are based on the order of
elements, Colour-form’s structure uses word classes and constituents. Apart from languages that
have no fixed word order, word orders such as SOV or SVO could be fairly easy for students to
recognize, not only in the language that they are learning but also in their own.
The following paragraph from Danesi (2003) effectively summarizes the underlying
structure of the Colour-form approach in any given class. Danesi says:
In order to make something accessible to the L-Mode, pedagogical experience dictates
that the learner should be allowed to explore the new structures and concepts through RMode techniques (dialogues, questioning strategies, simulation activities, etc.). Once the
initial R-Mode orientation stage has been allowed to "run its course," the teacher must
"shift modes" and put the student in a frame of mind that allows him/her to reflect on the
new structural patterns in themselves. This implies the use of L-Mode techniques such as
grammatical explanations, mechanical exercises, etc. Only after it can be ascertained that
the students have become familiar with the structural and conceptual features of the new
material should they be allowed to use these creatively and meaningfully in
communication tasks. (Danesi 2003, 51-52)

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5.1 Colour-form Academic Teaching Context - Personal Note
I work at a private Korean institution that employs English and Korean practitioners to teach
Korean students English as well as other academic subjects such as math, to students whose ages
range from nine to early twenties. Classes usually begin at 4:00 pm and run until 6:00 pm with a
ten minute break in between hours. In 2008, after working there for six months, I began to
develop a learning system to resolve some of the common errors my students kept making in
their homework, such as forgetting articles and prepositions in their sentences, placing the object
directly after the subject and violating tense agreement rules. I hypothesized that as they were all
making similar errors, there must be some correlation between the errors and the allowable
constructions in their first language. I started asking Korean staff members for example
sentences in Korean and found that the errors my students made in English correlated with the
grammatical structure of Korean. The students did not realize this because they did not know
their Korean grammar. The Korean staff told me that Korean grammar is not taught in Korean
elementary schools but English grammar is.
My students were afraid to write because they didn’t want to make mistakes. Whenever
they would try to write, they would lose their idea because they had to think about how to spell
each word. Likewise, they would know a concept in Korean, but not know the English word for
it. They were embarrassed to show their work, even when they were assured that it was good to
make mistakes because that’s a great way to learn. Coming from an academic environment
where the central goal was to achieve the highest score on tests, this made it difficult for the
students to perceive mistakes as a positive product of their learning process. Students wanted to
know how to write sentences well before they put pen to paper. There was also an additional
important point for consideration: traditional grammar classes could be boring. One could teach

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students how to write simple sentences, but then they would only write simple sentences and
gradually become uninterested and discouraged because of their lack of improvement. I wanted
to give my students opportunities to use the wealth of knowledge they had from their L1 to help
them learn the L2. I wanted to make learning grammar easier for them.
I created a game, Colour-form, designed to teach the grammatical patterns of English by
using coloured pieces of felt. As my first students were around nine to ten years old, the levels of
Colour-form were kept simple to address specific grammar issues. However, as I was given older
students, more levels were added to prevent students from making sentence fragments and other
clause-level errors. Central to this original design, I was helping my students to become aware of
the fact that all languages are sub-systems of relationships between form and meaning. This
awareness came about slowly as they worked from Korean colour grammar patterns to English
ones. They realized that as they had already learned one system in Korean, they could learn
another. My students improved and from that point on, my employer usually sent the students
who were having difficulties to my class. During my linguistic training at Trinity Western
University, the system has been evolving and I have now been trialing it for three years. Usually
there are two to three Colour-form writing classes running per semester.
Colour-form classes are small, commonly ranging from 2-5 students and involve a
combination of direct style teaching on the white board, where students take notes and
participate in discussions, asking and answering questions. They participate in dialogues about
the patterns they see and discover, write, draw and use the coloured felt pieces called
colourforms. Depending on the need of the students, multisensory techniques may also be
utilized such as writing in the air or tracing words with one’s finger and illustrating the meaning
of a word with images or clay. When teaching a new grammatical concept such as clauses,

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students are first asked to write a sentence in Korean showing the Korean colour pattern. Then
they build their sentence out of the colourforms. They are asked questions about their pattern
such as “can it be made any smaller?” or “what parts can be moved?” Then students are invited
to build what they think the English pattern will look like and are guided to a correct
representation. The similarities and differences are discussed. After new information has been
introduced or discovered, students are given an activity to practice using the new grammar.
To summarize the lesson, the new pattern rules are integrated into the Colour-form game.
The rules are designed to help students attend to certain aspects of the language such as areas
they will likely have difficulty with based on how different the grammatical rules are between
their L1 and those of the L2. For example, being able to place down a green colourform
(article/preposition) in the allowable colour sequence will gain the player fifteen points, whereas
placing the red colourform (noun/proper noun/pronoun) in the allowed sequence will only give
the player five points. To maximize the amount of points they receive, students pay attention to
the pieces that will give them the most points and these pieces correspond with the particular
grammatical pieces that students have difficulty with. The purpose of the rules is to make the
student aware of the differences in a fun yet focused state.
The students enjoy the challenge of a new level in the game. As they master certain
patterns, new colours are added to game. In a similar manner to a video game, the change in
level reminds them of how much they have learned since the first level. The dice colour signifies
which colour can be placed down as well as the number of points the roller will receive if he/she
is able to put the colourform of the dice colour down in accordance with the pattern laws. At
each stage the dice colours represent slightly different functions of the language. For example, in
Stage 1, the white colour on the dice means that the roller misses his/her turn, but during Stage 3,

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the white colour represents clause markers such as the word “when.” The Colour-form game
session that occurs near the end of the class is always in English. Ideally, one day students will
be able to play it in Korean, but at present, parental expectations to teach English must be met.
5.2 Making Bridges Between Korean and English Apparent
The initial work of Stage 1 is for students to associate the colour red with the subject slot in a
sentence and the colour orange with the predicate slot.84 These are drawn on the white board
with coloured markers. As Korean and English sentences have these two elements, the students
learn this quickly. After this, the parts of speech, referred to as units, are linked to this
framework through their identical colours. Beside the red noun and adjective which are
associated with the subject, and the orange verb and adverb, which are associated with the
predicate, the green preposition and article become quite apparent through their contrasting cool
colour. Green represents all functional words in a language: those that serve to clarify the
relationship between words. In English and Korean, the green preposition situates an action or
subject in time and space. In English, the green article shows the relation of the subject/object to
one that has previously been referred to. It also shows a numerical relation with the subject
symbolizing a singular subject. During the “bridging-process” these become important areas for
discussion. 85

84

Although the procedures outlined here follow a bottom-up approach this is mostly reflective of the low
level of English proficiency of the students sent to the Colour-form classes. Hypothetically, after the initial colour
associations between the L1 and L2 parts of speech are made, a top down approach could be followed depending on
the student’s prior knowledge of higher-level grammatical forms. Also if students have an understanding of some
higher sentence level forms but not the stage 1 unit-level forms then one can begin with Stage 1 and then skip others
as needed.
85

The term bridging-process is being used here to refer to the act of using a commonality established at the
level of signs in order to connect a known sign with an unknown sign for the purposes of learning the unknown sign
and understanding the relationships it has to other signs. Likely, someone else has coined this term, but presently,
time constraints will not allow for such investigations.

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The first bridge students discover during Stage 1 is that although English has an SVO
word order and Korean has an SOV word order, as presented to the students through colourforms, this means that they already have two things in common. The students learn that in both
Korean and English, the subject comes before the object and before the verb. In terms of colour
patterns, this means that all they need to make a Korean pattern look more like an English pattern
is to reverse the orange and the red square. 86 In Korean, the subject gives the topic or theme of
the sentence, yet the Korean staff contends that the subject can often be omitted particularly in
regards to simple sentences such as “this is an apple” 87, which becomes “is apple.” Chang
(1994) confirms this when he says that “Korean is a topic, as well as subject, prominent language
and the topic or known elements are suppressed in a discourse” (Chang 1994, 3).
Likewise, they quickly recognize that their Korean pattern does not have the green
English article. They can see that English must have the green article before the noun whereas in
Korean the green rectangle may not be needed at all. There was some discrepancy between staff
responses when asked whether Korean had articles or not. Most of the staff said Korean had no
articles, but one of the students thought there were, and one of the staff members asserted that
Korean had articles but that this was restricted to formal academic writing. Since this time, all
the staff has confirmed that while Korean has counters and a word for “the,” they do not have
articles.

86

Most of the information about Korean language contained in the Colour-form section has been taken
from Chang’s (1994) book on Korean grammar. However, for example sentences given from the Korean staff in
2007 please see Appendix B. These sentences have been made from colourforms to illustrate the process and how
the bridges are discovered.
87

Please note that all of the example sentences in this section are either from Chang or the Korean staff
members of the institution. All of the staff examples are in an English orthography and are in italics for ease of
reading.

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After some discussion, students came to the consensus that they did not need the green
rectangle that represents the English article, for their Korean sentences to be considered
grammatically correct. The student and the staff member also agreed that articles were optional.
By trying to remove the green square from their Korean sentences they discovered that they
needed the green square because they had words in their sentence that were related to the noun
but they were not actually nouns. These were words that marked the noun as a noun in
distinction from the verb. The Korean staff refers to these as postpositions. As these words
represented a relationship, students chose to colour them green. The meanings associated with
this morpheme were very similar to the English preposition that is represented by the green
square. Staff members said that postpositions form part of the noun and in this way function a bit
like adjectives, giving the reader more information about the noun such as its location. Korean
adjectives act more like verbs that would be considered non-verbal predicative adjectives in a
RRG model of language description.
The second bridge in Stage 1 occurs when students make Korean sentences that have
proper nouns. When presented with the equivalent sentence in English made from the
colourforms, students quickly see that in both Korean and English proper nouns are not preceded
by quantifiers or determiners and cannot be followed by plurals.
At the word building level during Stage 1, students can quickly see how English and
Korean have similar morphological processes such as nouns can be made into adjectives with the
addition of suffixes. For example, the suffix -hata can be added to a noun in Korean to make an
adjective just as the English suffix –ful can be attached to a noun to form an adjective. Students
use coloured pens and note paper for this level of Stage 1.

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The colours also make differences easier to see. While both English and Korean can have
titles such as Miss before personal names, Korean has several different words that can be placed
before or directly after the name to indicate the status of the person. Here is an area that students
can appreciate the complexity of their own language. It is also provides an effective segue for
discussions of cultural practices such as greeting people of different ages.
According to Chang (1994), there are definite pronouns in Korean for things, times,
places and people. These are “i,” “ku” and “ce” (Chang 1994, 30). These are roughly equivalent
to the English demonstrative pronouns of “this,” “that” and “there” (Chang 1994, 30).
They function in a sentence the same way English demonstrative pronouns do, referring to both
the thing it refers to and itself through the relationship between it and the thing it refers to. For
example, one could point to an object and say, “that object.” In this case, the object is the thing
that is referred to and the word “that” refers to it through its conventional relationship. The
Korean staff said that while they have these words, “i,” “ku” and “ce” are shortened forms of
them and the full words are iguk ‘this,’ geguk ‘that’ and ka gisae ‘there.’ The staff asserts that
these are only used in very informal conversation, the type of language my students know. When
they are used, they come before the noun just as they appear in English.
As they are in English, verbs in Korean can also be inflected for tense. However, in
contrast to English, Korean verbs can be inflected for status as well (Chang 1994, 40). Both
English and Korean have main and auxiliary verbs. Both languages also have intransitive,
transitive and ditransitive verb forms (Chang 1994).
Stage 2 bridges are usually discovered quite quickly, now that students have figured out
their constituents and colour patterns. In terms of noun phrases, Korean and English patterns are
quite similar. According to Chang, definite pronouns of i, ku and ce come before nouns such as

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“book.” Adjectives such as colours follow the i, ku or ce as in the following sentence i ppalkan
chayk i “this red book” (Chang 1994, 61). Noun phrases in Korean have a head noun with the
addition of optional adnouns. These come before the head and any classifiers that precede it.
Proper nouns can be a full noun phrase by itself just as in English. Students can trace their finger
from the colourform that represents proper nouns in a Korean sentence straight down to the
English, noting that they occupy the same position and have the same meaning.
According to Chang (1994), phrases in Korean consist of a verb and optional adjectives
or auxiliaries as they do in English. However, the Korean staff asserted there are no verb phrases
in Korean. Korean has auxiliary verbs and auxiliary connectives. Adjective phrases in Korean
can have verbs, adjectives, auxiliary-connectives and auxiliary-adjectives. The head of an
auxiliary phrase is always at the end of the auxiliary phrase. Adverb phrases have an adverb and
modifiers such as acwu manhi “very much” (Chang 1994, 65).
Stage 3 clauses begin with students making long and short verb phrases and noun
phrases. When they begin to move these phrases around, behind, and in front of other
constituents, they are guided to discover dependant and independent clauses. Chang (1994) says
there are three criteria that can be used to determine whether a clause is subordinate or
coordinate: “reversibility,” “insertability” and “enumerability” (Chang 1994, 136). The students
physically test whether elements in phrases are reversible by moving them in front or behind the
other phrases in the clause. Likewise, they pick out phrases and try to insert them elsewhere in
the clause.
Stage 4 bridges are learned through moving around certain patterns of colours to see
which colourforms have to move together and which ones do not. In the lesson, the subject is

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represented by a long red rectangle and the predicate is represented by a long orange rectangle,
the same model that was drawn on the board during the first week of classes.
As in English structure, the central meaning of a sentence in Korean is carried by the
predicate. Korean is a verb final language. Students quickly discover that the verbal or nonverbal predicate such as an adjective comes at the end of their Korean colourform pattern.
Simple sentences consist of a subject and a predicate just as they do in English. The predicate in
Korean is often verbal and it will include its modifiers, compliments and objects. According to
Chang (1994) there are three classes of simple sentences in Korean: adjectival, verbal and
copular (Chang 1994, 70). His examples of each of these are provided below in Figure 9.
(3)

Subject

Predicate

[Adjective S]

a.
Kulim-i
Picture-SM
Mia-ka
SM

yepputa
pretty
cengcikhata
honest

Subject

Predicate

Mia-ka
SM
Yong-i
SM

Pancang ita
Class leader is
Pancang-i anita
SM not-be

Subject

Predicate

“The picture is pretty.”
‘Mia is honest’
[Copular S]

b.
“Mia is the class-leader.”
‘Yong isn’t the class-leader’
[Verbal S]

c.
Hay-nun
Tongccok-eyse stunta
“The sun rises in the east.”
Sun-TOP
East
at rise
Mia-ka
Yenge-lul cal hanta
SM
English-OM well speak ‘Mia speaks English well.’
The subject is normally a noun phrase (NP) or a noun clause (NC) marked
with the subject marker i/ka or the topic marker (n) un. The NP marked with nun (in
3.c) is the subject as well as the topic.
Figure 9. Chang, Suk-Jin. 1994. Korean. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 1994: 70.

In Korean, adjectival sentences that use transitive adjectives require the subject to be
marked twice with a subject marker (Chang 1994, 74). Note the example in Figure 10 from

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Chang.88

(12) Transitive Adjectives
a.
Khokkili-ka
kho-ka
Elephant-SM nose-SM
Elephants
noses are

kil-ta
long-SE
long/Elephants noses

‘Elephants have long noses’
b. Yong-i ki-ka khu-ta
SM height-SM long-SE
‘Yong is tall’
c. Mia-ka melt-ka aphu-ta
SM head-SM ache-SE
‘Mia has a headache.’
The outer (or the first) subject may be called ‘large subject’ or Subject-1, the inner
one the ‘small subject’ or Subject-2. The first subject is normally marked with the
topic marker nun. There is another type of transitive adjectives that require double
subjects—emotive adjectives: mipta ‘be hateful’, cohta ‘be likable’, or the like.

Figure 10. Chang, Suk-Jin. 1994. Korean. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
1994: 74.

When emotive adjectives are used, this double marking of the subject also occurs. When my
students first come they often say sentences such as “me homework is hateful to me.” I used to
interpret this as “my homework, I hate” or rather “I hate my homework” instead of “I hate
homework.” The students had to negotiate how to represent the double subject marking in their
L1 colour patterns.89
88

Chang’s (1994) examples have been retyped in Figures 9 and 10 to resemble the original ones as much as
possible. It is likely that there are some minor stylistic differences such as the font that is used.
89

One of the consequences of having no formal Korean language instruction is that I must rely on my
students’ own perceptions of their grammatical patterns. However, frequently if there is some question as to whether
a student has represented some part of the pattern correctly, there will be other students that have slightly different
patterns. This is not a negative outcome because it always seems to facilitate a class discussion and students gain a
clearer and deeper appreciation for their L1 grammar as well as English. Also knowing less about Korean helps me
utilize some of the silence both Gattegno and Messum and Young feel is necessary.

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The most useful bridge at the sentence level is that both Korean and English sentences
are made up of an independent clause or a combination of a dependant and independent clause.
By this time, students are aware of the colour patterns contained in English and Korean noun,
verb, adjective, adverb and prepositional phrases. They understand their similarities and
differences and how they combine to create clauses; thus sentence creation is, for the most part,
merely an extension of the same processes they have been refining since Stage 1.
Chapter 6: Conclusions
For decades, theorists in a wide variety of disciplines from branches of cognitive
semiotics to clinical psychology to education have sensed that the mind has two or more mental
modes: one that relates to the internal environment of the soma and another that concerns the
external social world. For Saussure, this was Langue and Parole; for Lacan, the big S and the
little S; for Piaget, social and ego-centric thought, whereas for Eco, it was the NC and the CT. In
each case, one of the two implied an internal sense, whereas the other contained an external
sense. Edwards in consideration of Sperry’s (1973) work proposes that these internal and
external senses are actually two different types of consciousness that result in L-mode and Rmode functioning. Relating L- and R-mode functions with their corresponding hemisphere
makes it possible to conceive of a PSCC as representing the right hemisphere and an SCC as
symbolizing the left. It makes sense that the hemisphere with R-mode functioning would be the
place of the self due to the qualities of intuitiveness, creativeness and emotiveness it is said to
have. 90

90

The PSCC/SCC model might possibly be useful as a tool to synthesize the wide body of research that has
been done in regards to language learning such as neurology, psychology, semiotics, anthropology and linguistics
for language teacher understanding.

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Semiotics allows individuals to see how meaning is constructed through the formation of
relationships between signs. As Lamb’s work suggests these relationships involve hierarchies
with sub-nodes reaching downward to production or upwards to recognition. The implication of
Lamb, Lakoff and Chevalier’s work is that hierarchies will develop as a natural outcome of the
embodiment of meaning through daily experiences, resulting in the formation of categories.
Symbolic reference allows people to create categories that help them interpret these
experiences.91 When signs combine they can impact how individuals perceive the world through
conventional patterns, natural patterns or both. These are translated into codes that form part of a
social semiotic. Signs gain meaning through their relationship to other signs. Without knowledge
of this code, language learners may not be able to express and, at times, comprehend concepts in
their L2 that have been formed through their life experiences because the concepts were first
learned in their L1. Ultimately, in terms of transfer, the problem is not L1 structural interference,
but an inequality between L1 and L2 signs. 92 A solution then is to consider language at the level
of referents. When signs are not equivalent, every effort should be made to find some aspect of
the language’s signs that can aid the learner in establishing a bridge from the L1 to the L2.
Alternatively, teachers could use a mode of presentation that could bypass the SC, such as using
a qualisign such as in Montessori’s approach, where colour and texture provide a sensory context
that capitalizes on the young child’s aptitude for embodied cognition.
Since natural patterns are those that are based on individuals’ PSCCs and conventional
patterns are connected to the SCC, practitioners should assist students in becoming aware of such

91

The term create here is being used to refer to individuals’ own perception of this process. This is also to
acknowledge that categories do not simply exist but are actively constructed by those who will use them.
92

The term structural is being used in the broadest sense here to refer to any sort of organized conceptual
apparatus and not simply grammar in the linguistic sense.

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patterns in their L1 and L2. The brain translates sensory information into sense-images. Senseimages form networks in the brain, as well as hierarchies that gradually touch other senses,
motivating the activation of sign slots, according to a universal blueprint, and as part of the
process of neural/corporeal human embodiment. In this way, individuals have a personal
information system that is a part of the internal world of the soma. Connections between signs
need to be activated and periodically strengthened, if L2 users wish to retain the information they
have learned. The interactions between neurons and synapses resemble semiotic processes.
Practitioners should employ approaches and materials that allow students to use their L-mode
utilizing their SCC and R-mode engaging their PSCC in a manner that is both captivating and
productive. As colour is a qualisgn associated with early R-mode learning, the inclusion of this
element may be particularly effective for engaging students’ PSCC.
The effective use of colour in the different programs created by Gattegno, Montessori and
Acton that are designed to assist students in learning relationships between forms and meaning,
suggest that colour may function to prevent semiotic confusion. Wilkin’s work with coloured
overlays supports this because it presents colour as a preventative to the visual distortions
experienced by readers when the quality of the text is insufficient. This seems very similar to
Davis’ disorientation theory where disoriented students are instructed to hold an image of their
orientation point in their mind and use it to establish their bodies’ position in space. Wilkin’s
coloured overlays provide a steady orientation point for students that limits the effects of visual
distortion. The implication of this similarity is that many, if not all, people may experience some
form of this disorientation; perhaps only during times of great personal stress, although
Festinger’s research suggests dissonance can occur when ever there is a decision to be made. In
any case the magnitude of feeling that not grasping the meaning of a sign can cause in any three

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of these theories is strong support for the existence of the state of semiotic confusion. Davis and
Festinger’s theories in particular could explain the emotional reaction people can have to
semiotic confusion.
Festinger made his theory so broad in its scope that it could effectively encompass any
manner of information that involved “nonfitting relations” (Festinger 1957, 3). Thus, semiotic
confusion could be viewed as a facet of his greater theory. However, it is important to be aware
of SC’s distinctions. Cognitive dissonance is largely linked to behaviour, but SC is not limited to
this as SC may occur subconsciously without any change in outward behaviour. A person may be
terribly confused but not wish anyone else to know, thereby effectively hiding their semiotic
confusion. Using the sign as a specific element involved in the cognitive process narrows the
focus of the research in the hopes that it will reveal more about how the sign can be interpreted
in relation to other signs. Festinger’s theory seems too broad and may miss the idiosyncratic
details that combine to create a sense of either dissonance or consonance in the individual. For
example, Festinger lists events and beliefs among the information that can be involved in
dissonance. However, an event or belief can be composed of multiple signs, perhaps even
hundreds, both conscious and subconscious, that contribute to the level of dissonance
experienced by an individual. Therefore the distinct title of semiotic confusion seems warranted.
To use an analogy, in the manner that a telescope and a microscope reveal different information,
so too may a theory of semiotic confusion offer a different perspective of “nonfitting relations”
than cognitive dissonance theory.
Like Uexküll, who does not link his umwelten to specific brain areas, Festinger mentions
that dissonance refers to “nonfitting relations” between cognitive elements, and gives little
explanation as to what these elements are. This is a distinction between Festinger’s cognitive

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dissonance theory and semiotic confusion as in contrast to cognitive dissonance theory, integral
to semiotic confusion is the idea that individuals have a PSCC and a SCC and the functioning of
these consciousnesses is likely embodied in the left and right hemisphere. Without a focus on the
sign and a semiotic perspective such a hypothesis would be untenable; thus the focus reveals
something distinct from Festinger’s theory and merits a different label despite the fact that it
contains several principles used in cognitive dissonance theory.
It is hoped that an investigation on a smaller scale than Festinger’s cognitive dissonance
theory will better reflect the linguistic needs of students and teachers. As previously mentioned,
both PSCC and SCC are required for individuals to become fully functioning members of society
and a lack of either will cause definite problems. If one is stronger than the other, this can also
have serious consequences, but only if the degree of difference is significant. In the case of
second language learning, the introduction of L1 signs through the SCC cannot ignore the
necessity of a connection between the L1 signs in the PSCC and the L2. Even if the L2 sign
being taught is learned, without establishing a connection to the L1 signs in the PSCC, the
language may not be felt. In Damasio’s words, they will not know “… the feeling of what
happens” (Damasio 1999, 26). This is precisely what learning methods such as TPR and
Suggestopedia seemed to be trying to achieve. In a way, practitioners of these methods attempted
to utilize a first-language learning situation where one learned through the experience of doing.
Arguably, seen from a PSCC/SCC perspective, practitioners of TPR and Suggestopedia
used action signs that would have linked up to students’ L1 action signs thus establishing a
connection between the L1 signs in their PSCC and SCC and the L2 sign, the label for the action
being introduced. Also if one assumes that Stokoe’s prediction that sign language was developed
before oral language could be correct, human beings may already have a predisposition for

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creating signs from perceivable movements through their ability for symbolic reference. The fact
that infants begin learning through movement also suggests that this behaviour has been
biologically inherited from early hominids. Acton’s EHIEP seems to use touch and motion in a
similar way but uses it, in part, as a distraction away from the L2 conflicts.
As Libby (1974), Mollon (1991) and Gegenfurtner (1998) hypothesize that the human
eye may have been shaped by evolution to notice warm colours first and cool colours second,
making content words such as nouns and verbs in warm colours seems logical. Also because
languages break-up the spectrum into warm and cool divisions of colour, it might be considered
semi-natural for function words such as articles and prepositions to be represented by cool
colours such as they are in Colour-form. As human beings have the same capacity to perceive the
colours of the spectrum, colour signs may serve to connect L1 and L2 signs in the SCC and the
PSCC. Practitioners may be nervous that using colour may only appeal to visual learners. This
concern may be warranted; however, as Gardner’s (1999) work on multiple intelligences
suggests, the use of less frequently used intelligences can help to build up those intelligences. As
visual skills are required for writing and reading, it is important students be given opportunities
to strengthen this skill. Considering the advantages in speed and creativity that those who think
in pictures can have, it seems likely that any temporary discomfort in utilizing an infrequently
used intelligence would be worth it for such gains. Also reading, writing and spelling demand a
certain level of visual skills.
Danesi concedes that currently technology does not allow teachers to have access to an
empirical way to measure how much a particular learning approach can activate certain brain
areas in the classroom. Not even Montessori has this kind of budget. He implies that even if
practitioners lived in a futuristic era where MRI scans were readily available and we could

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monitor our students’ brains, there is so much to learn about how the brain responds to stimuli
that we would not be able to interpret the resulting data. Perhaps with the advances in
neuroeducation, one day there might be some rendition of a high-tech classroom, but for the
present, it is enough for language teachers to concentrate on making decisions that are informed
by both neurological advances and the close observation of their students. With this in mind,
Danesi strongly suggests that teachers should employ “intermodal learning,” a combination of Rmode techniques, priming students for activities that require L-mode thinking (Danesi 2003,
119), to set students up for a successful learning experience.
The Colour-form approach attempts to promote “bimodal” learning by using a
combination of colours that are based on linguistic patterns, L-mode math and reasoning and Rmode drawing and creative writing. While at present, the Colour-form approach has only been
used with Korean students learning English, it is hoped that like Gattegno’s (1972) Silent Way
approach, Colour-form will be adaptable to other languages in the future.
Practitioners cannot ignore the fact that children create for themselves a language system.
They develop it from their somatic beginnings and it shapes them. The presence of an
interlanguage whereupon not all errors can be attributed to either the L1 or the L2 may reveal
that there is some proto-language and other things. Given this perspective, the PSCC/SCC
construct seems as though it could become a useful perspective from which to consider such ESL
topics as the critical period hypothesis, UG, interlanguage, transfer, grammar, pragmatics,
sociolinguistics and material design, among many others.
The external world is an immense tapestry of signs, continually reweaving itself to both
reveal and conceal the conventions that make it; thus human beings have been equipped to be
able to categorize all manner of external and internal objects into groups and terms. Until

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someone proves otherwise, Deacon seems correct in assuming that the ability to refer to things
symbolically within a cultural context composed of the integration of frames is uniquely
human. 93 Is this the basis of the neural circuitry that allows for the development of something so
complicated as language and culture? If one concedes that there is a universal blueprint in the
form of embodied neural structures due to common human embodiment which is then shaped
through human experience then Chomsky’s (1977) UG has merit, certainly, at the level of
neurotransmitters and synapses of neurological patterns; however, whether that applies to
overarching constraints on structure remains a question.
Typological studies of languages and Optimality theory would suggest that there are
strong commonalities between languages and possibly some marked forms that are uncommon
across languages (Kager 2004, 2-3). This is hardly surprising, considering each human being
begins as a somatic entity which gradually builds itself and sets in motion the processes that have
fine-tuned it through centuries of evolution in order to create its brain and shape its thinking. At
the heart of the matter, is that a universal capacity may dictate the presence of a set of sign slots,
thus no matter how different a language may seem, teachers will be able to help their students
discover commonalities that may help prevent dissonance. Likewise, students can share the
events in their lives that have served to make connections between those slots, for it is not sign
slots that determine the distinctions between languages, but the connective lines that are formed
through the experiences of daily life achieving the appearance of consonance within the
collective. Can we now travel beyond Agar’s “aforementioned” circle (see Chapter 1) that was

93

Deacon is careful to differentiate between the type of gesture communication animals engage in and the
type of third-order symbolic modeling processes that human beings communicate through in such products of
culture as rituals, frames, and syntax (Deacon 1997).

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forged by Saussure and gravitate towards some place that is perhaps new yet simultaneously as
ancient as embodied cognition? We can, indeed.

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Appendix A: Colour-form Description
This version for the Colour-form approach is intended for a 3-5 month course with Korean
learners of 9-14 years of age.
The initial stages of the Colour-form Approach (the first five classes):
In Gattegno’s Silent Way approach, the basic philosophy is that there should be a
“subordination of teaching to learning” (Gattegno 1972, 1) As a teacher, I have been influenced
by Gattegno’s belief that a teacher should only need “. . . to watch, challenge, encourage, and
study the products of the individual and collective efforts of the learners” (Gattegno 1972, 78).
Consequently, during the approach there are many times I simply watch and ask the students to
describe their process guiding each one to make discoveries about language.
The basic philosophy is “learning as cultural sharing.” Everyone is both a learner and a
teacher (Vella 1995) and learners will guide each other through a series of activities in order to
discover patterns in language.
During the first classes:
Colours are introduced and their associated grammar/Korean/English and the pictures coded in
the colour.


There are distinct colour terms for orange and red in Korean so distinguishing red from
orange is not viewed as a potential difficulty. Colours can also just be pointed at.



Word creation activities - word building used with writing and spelling in the air (learners
rely on size and colour in these lessons).



Explanation of root words - these words are like seeds because each seed has the
potential of growing different word classes. Some seeds produce the same leaf colour

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such as the verb seed (leaf colours of verb prefixes/suffixes can be used to create
scaffolding for Stage 3 work).


Discovering rules - which words can change and what do they change into (always
searching for patterns). For example, “create” verb root becomes “creation” –noun or
“creationism”-noun or verb root “create” becomes adjective “creative”.



Learning is somewhat repetitive in that they trial many different words in order to
discover, test and recognize patterns.



Various games designed to reiterate patterns the students have found are utilized to help
them solidify concepts.



The Korean numerals for 5, 6, 10, 15 and the + and – symbols can be utilized to keep
track of points during the game (students keep track of points earned by each member of
the class).

For the Colour-form game, these general considerations apply:


In game sequence, coloured pictures are replaced by coloured shapes



First game sequence at pre-game level uses only green, red, and orange

Stage 1: Units
Materials used:


Red square - nouns



Small red rectangle - pronoun + proper noun



Small brown rectangle - demonstrative pronoun



Orange square - verbs



Green rectangle - articles



Green square - prepositions/post-positions (depending on language)

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

Red rectangle - adjectives



Orange rectangle - adverbs



Small orange rectangle - helper verb



Colour grammar patterns 1-A + 2 (students see this pattern)



Coloured pens and markers

Learning about types of words and the jobs that they do. Colours represent word classes (basic
grammatical categories).
Level 1


Students associate green pieces with function words and orange and red with content
words - orange for verbs and red for nouns (warm colours stand out while cool colours
recede)

Level 2


Modifiers such as adjectives and adverbs are introduced



Helper verbs are introduced



Colour-form game at level 1 is played again—this time with students clapping out the
rhythm each time if they choose – add level 2 with red rectangles and orange rectangles
(meant to internalize patterns through visual and body memory.)

Stage 2: Phrases
Korean has noun phrases and verb phrases.
Materials used:


Yellow rectangle - conjunctions



Colour grammar pattern 1-B and 1-C

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

All Stage 1 materials are used

Students discover there are rules as to which colours can come beside each other and learn that
units are grouped into certain colour patterns. Students should begin to recognize the patterning
from the Colour-form game.
Level 1


Students learn colour combinations for NPs, PPs, VPs, AdjPs, and AdvPs



Students learn which colours are allowed in each phrase type



NPs= red or green + red – Example: [she] or [the duck]



VPs=orange or orange + NP(green + red) –Example: walk or walked down to the river



AdjP=red + red –Example: [beautiful girl]



AdvP=orange + V(orange) or orange + NP(green+ red) –Example: [quickly walking] or
[[walking quickly] [to [the store]]

Level 2


The yellow rectangle (coordinating conjunction) is introduced to help students make
longer sentences in their game.



Students learn that a coordinating conjunction joins like-phrases together.



The game can be played with level 2 or 3 of the game which includes stealers
(opportunities to add modifiers and add the points from the shape next to it) and
coordinating conjunctions, students try to make the longest sentences they can to receive
many points.

Stage 3: Clauses
Materials used:


White rectangles - clause markers (“wh” words) and corresponding colour patterns.

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

Yellow rectangles-subordinating conjunctions/coordinating conjunctions.



Pictures + time cards.



Tense and aspect colour-forms –pink circle (present), blue circle (past), green circle
(progressive), purple circle (future). (If suffixes were written with coloured pens in the
world building pre-stage 1 for verb prefixes and suffixes there is already scaffolding and
the colour should help make this connection).



Blank desk space to represent negation (depending on word/phrase/clause level of
negation).



Colour-form reference charts for all patterns and pieces.



All Stage 1 materials are used.



All Stage 2 materials are used.

Stage 3: Grouping of Phrases into Clauses
Clauses Level 1


Students learn that there are dependent and independent clauses.



Students discover which colours are missing from an independent clause through
investigating and recording the patterns they see.



What colours need to come together to make a sentence? Students answer questions such
as, “is there a word that does not act like the others? Do we need to use a different colour
for it?”



Students identify these words and label them.

Clauses Level 2: Tense and Aspect

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

Tense and aspect are introduced. These colour-forms are strikingly different from the
Stage 1 set because tense and aspect modify the verb. These color-forms are small circles
that can be placed on top of the orange verb square and helper verb rectangle



Pictures and actions are used to help students understand that verbs in English are coded
for time.



Students place coloured circles on the verb to code them for time. Different colours
represent past, present and future.



Students are asked how time is marked in a sentence in Korean. The teacher knows the
answer and ensures learners are able to discover for themselves how Korean marks time.



Students practice making sentences with a tensed verb. As they become longer, students
should discover that the colour of tense has to match if you have more than one verb.



Students examine what exceptions there are to this and generate grammatical rules to
describe what they see.

Clauses Level 3: Negation


Negation is also introduced by showing the affirmative sentence first and then the
negative and asking the students to identify the difference.



The students can also be reminded of the word building pre-fixes “un” and “dis” that they
used during the word building stage where they negated certain kinds of words.



Now students will learn that not only words can be negated, but whole phrases and
clauses as well.



The students will see that a space has been left in front of the verb (it should be
immediately apparent to them that this is different). Having a blank space between the
colourforms signifies negation as there is nothing there.

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

Students practice making their own negative sentences in the present tense and then with
each of the newly learned tenses.



Colour-form reference charts are provided to the students for tense and aspect and every
other colour and pattern law they have learned up until this point for it.



Students identify these words and label them.

Clauses Level 4: Clause Markers


Clause markers are introduced as white rectangles.



Students learn how to write statements and questions using white clause markers.



Subordinating conjunctions are introduced as other joiners of clauses, but different from
the coordinating conjunction. These are still represented by the same yellow rectangle.



Students learn that there are clauses that can stand alone and clauses that need other
clauses through manipulating their colour pieces and answering a number of guided
questions such as which phrases can you move around without changing the meaning?
Does one phrase seem clearer than the other? Are we left with any questions etc. . . ?



Students learn that there are different kinds of dependant clauses – ones that tell them
about time, locations or people.

Stage 3 Portfolio Project: Students create the beginning of a story in both English and Korean by
creating a character or using one from life.
Stage 4: Sentences and Sentence Units
Materials are:


Tiny yellow triangles-commas.



The Colour-form family:
o Grandfather- a tall brown rectangle with white triangle at the top and cane shape

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o Father - a tall brown rectangle with a white triangle at the top
o “Big Brother” - a brown rectangle with an up-side down white triangle
o “Little Sister” - a brown rectangle with a right side up triangle looking like a skirt
o Mother- a tall white rectangle with a white upside down triangle


Images of different sizes of bricks.



Picture of a house.



Notebook paper for students to write down their stories.



Students receive tiny yellow rectangles to represent commas. Semi-colon and colon are
not taught at this stage.



All Stage 1, 2 and 3 materials are used

Students are introduced to family relations between sentences
Sentences Level 1:


Students receive Colour-form family members: Grandfather, Father, “Big Brother” and
“Little Sister”.



Father gives his children their identity and direction (He is made of the same colour
brown as the demonstrative pronoun from Stage 1). The demonstrative pronoun brown is
made from its two colours: red, because it is a pronoun; and green, because in a similar
way to a green preposition it gives the direction of the actor/undergoer.



In Korea, children receive their last name from their fathers and their fathers influence the
direction they will take in life.



Students are told that in Colour-form, a special family is used to teach them how to write
paragraphs. Each member of this family has a special skill: they can make a type of block
out of thin air.

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o Father makes a heavy foundational block that no one else can lift except him.
o “Big Brother” can make several smaller blocks at one time but they are not strong
enough to form the base of the family’s paragraph house.
o “Little Sister” can make the most blocks at once, but these are quite small and
easy to carry. However, if she tries to load too many into the same sentence, her
sentence will fall apart (sentences are meant to explain one complete thought; too
many thoughts in the sentences destabilizes it).


Father represents the topic sentence because in a topic sentence one must identify the
topic and give the direction for the reader so the reader knows where the author is going.



The paragraph, using building a house as a metaphor, is introduced.
o Father carries the foundational blocks of identity and direction, if he tries to carry
the blocks of support and reason as well it is too much for him to carry and the
foundation will not be strong.
o “Big Brother” must carry the supporting blocks of reasons (statistics, definitions,
facts and possibly descriptions) and if he tries to help Father carry the heavy
foundational blocks, then he will not be able to carry his own blocks of reasons.
Likewise, if he tries to carry “Little Sisters” as well, he will have too many blocks
to fit in the row of his sentence.



Students are warned that if they let “Big Brother” carry too much, “Little Sister” will be
angry because she wants to help out too. “Little Sister” carries examples, further
descriptions and details that support Big Brother’s block of reasons.
o This metaphor is to help students visualize and understand what will happen to
their paragraph house if they try to put too many ideas in the first one to two

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sentences. If they want a well-shaped paragraph (house) then they must make sure
that foundational blocks come first, followed by the support blocks and finally
their secondary support blocks of examples or their paragraph will be unbalanced.
Sentences Level 2:


Students discover that the content words, nouns and verbs, are common to some of the
sentences.



Teacher assists students in making sentences into groups of related sentences to make a
simple story.



Students write a statement and then isolate the content words.



Teacher demonstrates how to generate questions about the content words - using the Wh
question words: when, what, where, why, who and how.



Each student is asked to come up with an answer for one of these questions in the form of
a statement.



These are written down and made with the colourforms.



Stories are generated and students are encouraged to write longer and longer stories.



The Colour-form game is played for level 4 with tenses added to points. For example,
orange is worth 6 points but with a tense, it becomes 16 points.

Stage 4 Portfolio Project: Students write about the actions their character does in their story.
Stage 5: Longer Paragraphs and Multi Paragraphs
Materials used:


Pink heart



Yellow circle



Brown triangle

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

White diamond



All materials from Stages 1-4 are used

Sentences Level 1: Stage 5 discourse structure- moving from stories into types of essays


Students learn there are different types of writing; stories are not the only kinds.



They talk about the types of writing they have in Korea and how these types are similar
and different from the types of writing in English.



Students discuss how the degree of realness is assigned to a statement and story. How can
students hear or read a story in Korean and know that it is true or not? Is it the content
that tells them or some mark?



Students discuss discourse markers, if any, in Korean and the consequences of using
them in the right and wrong location in the sentence. If I were to read a Korean book,
how would I know I am reading a serious essay verses a narrative about someone’s life?

Sentences Level 2: English essay types are introduced


Pink heart for narrative - Narrative involves feelings of some kind either from the
characters or from the reader, thus pink heart symbolizes feelings here. If students
become confused with the use of the present tense “pink circle,” you can always explain
to them that presence means the idea that a person has an energy, a presence, a heartbeat
and narratives are about living beings and their feelings.



Yellow circle for informative - Informative is a circle because it simply states a topic and
proves it through its body by restating it at the end - there are no jagged bits – it’s just the
presentation of information. The yellow coordinating conjunction simply joined the
information and did not negate it like the empty space.

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

Brown triangle for persuasive - A triangle is used for persuasive because it is meant to
convince the reader of one thing so that the one thing is always jutting out at the reader.
All foundational arguments lead the reader to believe the one thing. Quite literately, you
are making a point. Students can be reminded that just as in the demonstrative pronoun,
the brown colourform, it is vitally important that a persuasive essay identify the argument
for the reader and make it clear why they are trying to convince the reader.



White diamond for evaluative - A diamond represents evaluative because it contains the
persuasive essay of the triangle, but unlike the triangle, it also works backwards taking
the beliefs of those who would argue against it and acknowledging them while down
playing them in order to make their point at the top seem even stronger. A diamond is
also known to be a very valuable stone so it helps students remember that there is “value”
in evaluative arguments.

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Appendix B: Bridges Between Korean and English Colour Patterns
Please note Korean will always be presented first and the second example will be from English
Stage 1 Word Building Bridge Using an Example of Making Verbs
Korean
Nore
noun
song
“sing”

-hada
verb suffix
do

English
paint
noun
paint
“painting”

nore-hada=

norehada =

paint-ing =

painting =

-ing
Progressive aspect
doing

Stage 1 Word Building Bridge using an example of plurals
Korean
sagwa
noun
apple
“apples”

-deul
plural suffix
more than one

English
apple
noun
apple
“apples”

sagwa- deul =

sagwadeul =

apples-s =

apples =

-s
Plural suffix
more than one

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A few items to note:
During Stages 1 and 2, students are likely to see the most similarities between the languages
because at base levels, languages have more in common. However, at the later stages students
are learning with the framework of broader structures such as independent and dependent
clauses. It is assumed that students can still be aided by colour patterns during these later stages
because the same principles apply and they will be able to recognize the earlier patterns. There is
a general consensus among students in regards to what words should be coded orange to
represent the predicate, and which words need to be red to represent the noun and its modifiers.
Deciding which elements in the sentence should be green is particularly difficult because
one is trying to represent something that everyone has a sense of, but they find it difficult to
articulate in words. Chiefly, my students struggle with the decision to code noun suffixes red or
green. Some of them want to make it red because they are used to seeing it attached to the noun,
but suffixes vary so they know it is not a permanent part of the word because different suffixes
can be chosen and thus, some of them want to make it green because they have an intuitive
understanding that the suffix on the end of nouns does something other than give the subject or
action.
When students are questioned in class, they have a sense that the noun suffix is situating
the noun in either time or space. That is a relational function and would therefore be green. The
need to take the time to discuss all of these issues is not a flaw of the approach’s design, but a
necessary and integral part of Colour-form’s framework. I want them to be able to use what they
know, but first, as they have had no formal grammar teaching, they need to develop an
awareness of their L1 grammar system by discovering they already know so much more than
they thought. Students enjoy the opportunity to be the expert. When similarities are not

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immediately clear, inevitably discussions and critical thinking follow. This tends to lead to a
deeper appreciation for both languages and a drive to understand them.
The examples presented in this section are only samples of the bridges my students have
discovered and note that there are a number of others. However, a sampling should be sufficient
to attain a general understanding of the types of bridging my students have discovered.
Stage 1: Subject and predicate bridge
Korean
ku
-neun
ppalli
1st
Subjective
adverb
person
postposition
pronoun
he/she
SMarker
quickly
“he/she quickly ate”

Korean-subject

+

ku-neun
English-subject
he

muck-utda
eat-past
eat-past

English
he
1st person
Pronounmale
he

predicate

ppalli muck-utda
+

predicate
ate quickly

ate
predicate

quickly
adverb

eat-past
“he quickly ate”

quickly

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Stage 1: SOV and SVO Bridge
Korean
neun

Na

First
person
pronoun
I

kimchi

Subjective noun
post
position
Designates Spicy
subject
cabbage
“I like kimchi”

-rul

English
joahanda I

Objective
verb
postposition
Objective
like
postposition

like

First
person
pronoun
I

na-neun

kimchi-rul

joahanda

I

like

spicy cabbage

verb

spicy
cabbage
noun

like

spicy
cabbage
“I like spicy cabbage”

Stage 2: Noun Phrases Bridge
Korean
Areumdaun san
adjective
noun
beautiful
mountain
“beautiful mountain”

areumdaun

the

beautiful

English
the
beautiful
mountain
article
adjective
noun
One/specific beautiful
mountain
“The beautiful mountain”

san

mountain

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Stage 3: Dependant Clauses Bridge
Korean
oenu
maeul
-ae
unspecific noun
Postposition
some
village location
“in a village”

oenu

in

maeul

a

English
in
preposition
in

a
article
singular
“in a village”

-ae

village

village
noun
village

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Stage 4: Sentences
Please note that postpositions that attach to subjects and objects are indicated with dashes rather
separate boxes.
bun
adjectival

Korean
don
Noun

earned

money

bun

-euro
post position

iPhone5-reul
sa-go
ship-seup-nida
noun-objective verb
auxiliary verb
postposition
polite
with
iPhone 5
buy
want to
“I would like to buy the iPhone 5 with the money I earned”

done- uro iPhone5-reul sa-go ship-seup-nida

I would like to buy the iPhone 5

English
I
would

like

1p- Auxiliary
verb
sing verbhypothetical

to

buy

the

prep

verb art

with the money I earned

iPhone 5

with the

money I

noun

prep art

noun

earned

1p- Verbsing past

“I would like to buy the iPhone 5 with the money I earned”

The following example shows the relationship between the main parts. Students would
not necessarily draw connecting lines between the Korean and English because they would move
the felt colourforms around. It is challenging to show in an example like this; however, one can
imagine that the lines depicted below represent the direction of the student’s finger pointing from

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one constituent in the Korean sentence to the corresponding one in the English version of the
sentence. When first learning how to construct clauses the students begin by building up and
breaking down small sets of recognizable patterns. Thus, bottom-up and top-down processes are
utilized.

bun done-uro iPhone5-reul sa-go ship-seup-ni-da

I would like to buy the iPhone 5 with the money I earned

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Appendix C: Preliminary Coloured Figures of the PSCC/SCC Construct Model
Accounting for all of the facets of the diagrams in relation to the research
The following paragraphs present each of the main elements in the PSCC/SCC model
such as sign slots. An underlined title precedes each paragraph to ensure readers know which
component of the model is being discussed. Figures 11-16 illustrate these various concepts
within the PSCC/SCC construct model.
Sign Slots
Sign slots are being used to represent the broad properties that make up Chomsky’s neural
blueprint. Chomsky says that:
Let us define "universal grammar" (UG) as the system of principles, conditions,
and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages not merely by accident
but by necessity—of course, I mean biological, not logical, necessity. Thus UG can be
taken as expressing "the essence of human language." (Chomsky 1977, 29)
If one is to concede that Peirce is correct in his belief that people think in signs, then this
suggests that there is some intellectual capacity in the bodymind that designates the raw input
people receive from their senses as signs. This seems to be what the research of Chevalier
(2002a) suggests. Given Chevalier’s argument to liken sign processes with neural processes, one
can perhaps conclude that a sign designation function must be part of the biological endowment
of the human species as Deacon asserts. As the ability of symbolic reference is viewed as a
human trait across cultures it can be thought of as both universal and biological and in this sense
is comparable to Chomsky’s UG, and perhaps sign slots function like his deep structure.
From an Optimality perspective it seems that sign slots would be near analogous to
constraints. Optimality holds that human languages have the same constraints, but it is only the
ranking of these constraints which is based on the experience of the individual cultural groups
that accounts for both the similarities and the differences found in human languages. These UG

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constraints seem equivalent to sign slots. The ranking of constraints could be likened to the
connective lines that form between signs and sign slots as these connections come about through
the experience of objects and events.
The development of sign slots as mental models that allow one to infer meaning from
certain stimuli begins as the soma develops in utero. Thinking processes come to be through
experiences with sensory input. Lamb says that:
Every normal human being is a model builder, building a model of the world and
the self and of the self’s position in that world. This model-building process, largely
unconscious, begins in infancy, perhaps even before birth, and continues into adulthood,
to some extent even to old age, subject to the limitations of senility. Our thinking works
along with our senses and the hearsay reports that we get through our linguistic systems
to give us pictures of the world. (Lamb 1999, 105)
Signs
Signs are the basic mode of thought and involve relationships between sensory input. As
Deely says signs are “… something which, on being perceived, brings into awareness another
besides itself” (Deely 1994, 58), they have three interrelated aspects. Peirce says the following in
regards to the nature of sign relations:
The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea of a sign, or
representation. A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces, or modifies.
Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which it
stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it
gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation can be nothing but a
representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of
representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an
absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a
representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of
irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only
changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. Finally,
the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed
along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series
(Peirce nd [1994], CP 1.339).
All thought being performed by means of signs; logic may be regarded as the
science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: 1, Speculative Grammar, or the

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general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, whether they are icons, indices, or
symbols… (Peirce 1903, CP 1.191)
… as a necessary deduction from the fact that there are signs, […] there must be
an elementary triad. For were every element of the phaneron a monad or a dyad, without
the relative of teridentity (which is, of course, a triad), it is evident that no triad could
ever be built up. Now the relation of every sign to its object and interpretant is plainly a
triad. (Peirce 1905, CP 1.292)
Quota for stimulus into sign slots before nodes start connecting with signs in other slots
In the diagram, sign slots are presented as the properties of Chomsky’s neural blueprint.
It is proposed that they can be thought of as properties of the mind that take in information from
the senses. In a manner of speaking, sign slots could function like Lamb’s nodes because each
sign slot is conceptualized as having a quota for sensory stimulus and once that quota is filled,
the slot opens to begin making sign networks. Lamb attests that:
. . . I also proposed the hypothesis that each node has a threshold function
such that a greater amount of incoming activation leads to a greater amount of
threshold satisfaction, causing the node to send varying degrees of activation out to
other nodes: strong activation if the threshold is strongly satisfied, weak if only
slightly satisfied, none if the incoming activation doesn't reach the threshold at all.
(Lamb 1999, 178-179)
Although researchers, such as Weirzbicka through her work on semantic primes,
have tried to postulate what basic meaning these nodes would embody, further research is
needed to present a hypothesis at this time. However, in light of Lamb’s research it seems
likely that any additional signs and networks that form out of the original sign slot should
only serve to strengthen the underlying meaning of the slot, whereas a peripheral network
attached to it may not. In this regard, the meaning designation of the slot could be likened
to Lamb’s “central coordinating node” (Lamb 1999, 156, 254). Lamb intimates that:
So a prototypical exemplar of an object category will provide a higher
degree of satisfaction of the central coordinating node for the category than will a
peripheral exemplar. It follows that a part of the learning process has to consist of

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adjustments in the threshold so that the node will be neither too easily satisfied nor
too stringent in its demands. (Lamb 1999, 179)
Sign Levels
Sign levels have been based directly on Piaget’s developmental stages. While the work
on child development by Case (1985; 1987; 1992), Vygotsky (1962; 1978) and Erikson (1963;
1968) was also considered, Piaget’s sensorimotor stages seem to provide the clearest relationship
to sign levels. Please note the accuracy of when these stages occur is not viewed as essential to
these arguments, thus it is understood that these sign levels are only approximations of what the
actual process may be like. Also, one must keep in mind that the PSCC/SCC is only a model to
gain a perspective as to why signs are interpreted in certain ways at various stages of
development. The idea is that regardless of culture, people are born with the same set of sign
slots in their PSCC due to their common embodiment and umwelten. However, as a person’s
development is impacted by external influences such as culture, the connections between signs in
networks and sign slots will be distinct. As individuals take in more sensory input, they are likely
to develop certain skills and understandings about the world around them through their
experiences with stimuli as conceptualized through the interaction of their PSCC and SCC in
their bodymind.
Essentially, during the different stages of development, sign slots are pre-programmed to
take in certain types of stimuli and to interpret them in certain ways. It is important to note that
despite the discovery of that certain signs develop in tandem with a particular stage; this is not to
say they are no longer needed after the stage has passed. On the contrary, Piaget’s stages are
being used only to designate the beginning of each of the PSCC/SCC sign levels because they
will continue to develop throughout a person’s life.

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There are clear definitions of Piaget’s stages in Santrock et al. (2004).
The Sensorimotor Stage
Santrock et al. states: “The Sensorimotor stage lasts from birth to about two years of age.
In this stage, infants construct an understanding of the world by coordinating sensory
experiences such as seeing and hearing) with motor actions (reaching, touching)” (Santrock et al.
2004, 44).
During this stage infants gain the understanding that objects and events continue to occur
even though they cannot see them. Piaget calls this “object permanence” (Santrock et al. 2004,
44).
The Somatosensory Level of Signs
The somatosensory level of signs involves the soma taking in information in from the
senses. The mental representation of this input becomes somatosensory signs. These signs begin
to form from the infant’s interaction with him/herself and his/her environment. Two other sign
levels, body kinesthetic and spatial orientation, are achieved during this stage as well. This level
forms the core of an individual’s personal semiotic cultural consciousness.
The Preoperational Stage
The Preoperational stage begins around age two and continues to about age seven. The
child’s thoughts at this point are essentially intuitive and ego-centric rather than logical. During
this stage, children gain the ability to mentally represent an object that is not present. This can be
seen through the highly imaginative family drawings of a three year old (Santrock et al. 2004,
44). During this stage, it is difficult for the child to understand that other people have different
perspectives then they do. They may also attribute actions to inanimate objects, saying
something like “the mean flower bit me” when they prick their finger on a rose. At around age

247
four, children also develop intuitive thought; they feel they have knowledge, but they don’t know
how to express their understanding (Santrock et al. 2004, 45). As the child progresses through
this stage it is difficult for the child to understand that some quality of an object will stay the
same even though it may look different. This stage is characterized by the need to understand
how things work in the world. Consequently parents of young children are serenaded with the
seemingly endless din of whys starting around the age of three (Santrock et al. 2004).
The Actual Memory Creation and Schema Creation Levels of Signs
The levels of signs associated with this stage are actual memory creation and schema
creation. During this stage of development, sign networks would be becoming more complex
through the connections of sign mode networks, producing conglomerate mental
conceptualizations of objects and events. Memory creation refers to the process of noticing
certain signs and unconsciously focusing on them in order to retain those signs for some future
purpose. Despite the research that has been done on the phenomenon of memory such as the
work by LeDoux (1996; 2002) and Damasio (1999; 2010), there is still very little known about
how memories are made. As such, memory research is beyond the confines of this thesis. For the
present, it is only important to know that it is an important sign level to a developing child in part
because it will aid children in developing cultural expectations in the form of schemas. Children
at this stage would come to expect particular objects to be present during certain events. The
schema they create is entirely based on their own experiences as they assume everyone’s
experiences will be the same as theirs. This is perhaps one of the reasons why children and
sometimes adults can become emotionally troubled if an event does not match their expectations
for it. This is the last level of signs to be developed in the personal semiotic cultural
consciousness because the next level of signs, schema creation with object recognition, requires

248
that children be able to extract objects from their contexts in order to understand another
person’s perspective. Until this level of signs is reached it could be difficult for children to
accept other’s ways of doing things as equally valid.
The Concrete Operational Stage
The concrete operational stage begins about age 7 to about 11 years of age. Concrete
operational thought is about using mental representations to mentally reverse actions. An
important skill developed during this stage is the ability to classify objects based on their
relationship to other objects. For example, children of this age can understand that their parents
have multiple familial roles such as father, brother and uncle simultaneously. This stage is
characterized by the use of logical thought as opposed to intuitive reasoning in order to solve
concrete problems. Where abstract concepts are involved, children will have difficulty figuring
them out.
Schema Creation and Object Recognition Level of Signs
When children are able to process signs at the schema creation with object recognition
level, their attention would shift from using their own schemas to contemplating others’. When
this occurs they may become interested in how other people are different from them. They will
also perceive that they are unique from others, separate from the systems they now seek to
operate within. When this occurs it is proposed that the sign slots in the PSCC become
particularly active and that this triggers an identical set of sign slots to activate in the left
hemisphere which is the beginning of a personal semiotic cultural consciousness.
Formal Operational Stage
The formal operational stage occurs from about 11 to 15 years of age. Adolescents begin
to think in more abstract and idealistic and logical ways during this stage. They develop

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hypothetical-deductive-reasoning which is essentially the ability to systematically carry out tests
to come to a conclusion about some stimulus. An adolescent form of egocentrism develops as
well, giving the teenager a heightened awareness of themselves and the belief that everyone else
should notice them too (Santrock et al. 2004, 48).
Sign Networks
Experience allows for the development of neural connections between signs making it
possible to form networks. Lamb calls these networks “nections” because they involve many
connections between nodes. He intimates that meaning comes out of the nodes’ relation to other
nodes. This reflects Peirce’s triadic vision of the sign as well as his unlimited semiosis. Lamb
says that:
A connection is a connection, and a nection is a nection, no matter where it is.
What makes one nection subserve the concept cCAT while another makes the hand pick
up a pencil and yet another recognizes the opening bars of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony
is not what they contain but what they are connected to. And the great diversity of
accomplishments of our cortices can be attributed to the two kinds of connectional
proliferation, the first shared with other mammals: the variety of inputs they can receive
from the senses and the varied output elements (not just muscular but also glandular) to
which different nections are connected. And the second, which sets us apart from our
mammalian cousins, not a qualitative but a quantitative difference: expanded hierarchical
structure, with its multiple layers of integration and divergence, allowing us to combine
elements in infinitely diverse ways; along with the bounteous abundance of available
nections and of the latent bidirectional connections to and from both local and distant
destinations. (Lamb 1999, 370)
By virtue of feed-backward activation from a category node to the nodes for its
relevant properties, activation of a category subnetwork will provide heightened
activation to that subset of nodes currently receiving activation from the senses to which
it is connected. Perception is thus a bidirectional process…. Feed-backward activation
will also trigger inferences, correct or otherwise, by activating nodes for properties which
have acquired strong connections to the central category node because of prior experience
even if not currently receiving sensory input….” (Lamb 1999, 378-379)
Sign Modes

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Sign modes are the ways in which signs can travel through sensory pathways. For
example, visual information can be processed through one’s sight, and sight would be considered
a visual mode. Information can be converted from one mode to the another.
The basic argument is that the messages which we receive in different modes
(through our various senses of touch, sight, hearing, smell, taste etc.) are readily
transformed into other modes. Thus we can visualise what we hear in words; we can
convert written texts into speech; a musician can transform the visual patterns of a
musical score into movements of the arms, mouth and fingers. Evidently, at some deeply
abstract level, all our different senses are coded in the same way. There must be some
kind of 'logical' mechanism which allows us to transform sight messages into sound
messages or touch messages or smell messages, and vice versa. (Leach 1986, 11)
The analogical principle can account for much of the ability of people to interpret
and form new combinations; they simply make appropriate substitutions in previously
learned combinations used as exemplars. This analogizing ability would appear to be
innate and universal. Moreover, the term 'universal' here may apply not just for language,
as the process of forming and interpreting new combinations seems to be a very general
mental ability, used in a wide variety of modes of behavior and perception. (Lamb 1999,
263-264)
Feed-backward activation from a category node to the nodes for its relevant
properties provides heightened activation to that subset of nodes currently receiving
activation from the senses, resulting in increased awareness of the properties relevant to
that category; and it also triggers inferences, as activation of properties normally
associated with the category but not currently receiving sensory input (e.g. a portion of a
cat's body which is obscured from sight by an intervening object). Some such inferences
may be unwarranted in the particular instance; this is the source of errors in thinking
associated with ‘thinking in categories’. (Lamb 1999, 337)

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The PSCC/SCC Construct Model
Please note that the following diagrams are merely representations of what sign formation could
look and function like according to this model, and within the confines of current neurological
research. The inclusion of the following images is to help the reader visualize the mental process
as it may be taking place.

Figure 11. The PSCC with activated sign slots

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Figure 12. The PSCC and SCC’s connection to L-mode and R-mode

253

Figure 13. Sign slots with signs beginning to form networks

254

Figure 14. Sign slots with strong sign networks forming road ways

255

Figure 15. L2 introduced through the SCC

256

Figure 16. The full PSCC/SCC Construct Model

257
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Anttila, Raimo. 2003. “Analogy: The Warp and Woof of Cognition.” In The Handbook of
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