AN EXAMINATION OF THE UNDERLYING MORAL FRAMEWORKS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
by
ANNA THERESA BERESFORD

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN THE
INTERDISCIPLINARY HUMANITIES
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Master of Arts

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

...............................................................................
Dr. Myron A. Penner, Ph.D.; Thesis Supervisor

................................................................................
Dr. Grant Havers, Ph.D.; Second Reader

................................................................................
Dr. Robert Doede, Ph.D.; External Examiner
TRINITY WESTERN UNIVERSITY
Date July, 2017
© Anna Beresford

ABSTRACT
The vast amount of environmental philosophy texts offers many solutions and methods with
which to approach ecological crises. Quite often though, these solutions are contradictory.
Environmental awareness is often cited as the justification for many competing strategies,
policies, and everyday actions. With so many conflicting and confusing reports, it is difficult to
know how we should relate to nature or which approach to adopt; which method is both plausible
and ethical. In this paper I discuss and analyse the views of radical ecology and holistic
environmental ethics in order to identify their underlying moral frameworks to ascertain their
practical consequences with regards to humanity. In the first chapter I present and analyse the
radical ecology position inclusive of deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism. I then
isolate and analyse the underlying ethical framework of the radical ecology position and evaluate
what the costs and benefits of this position regarding humanity. In the second chapter I present
and analyse the holistic environmental ethic and then proceed with the same method as chapter
one. In the third chapter I introduce a philosophical argument for the necessity of making the
concern for persons the initial step in ecological attitudes. I then revisit the structures of radical
ecology and holistic environmental ethics with this view in mind. I ultimately argue that
although both radical ecology and the holistic environmental ethics view of nature offer valuable
insight that they are too quick to dismiss the uniqueness of the human condition. Thus these
methods must be modified, with a view to a humanistic approach, in order to be logically
coherent and provide plausible frameworks from which to encounter the natural world.

2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are many people who helped me in the completion of the MAIH program and this thesis
specifically. Primarily I would like to thank my supervisor, Myron Penner, for his guidance in
this thesis and throughout the entirety of my MA. He demanded nothing less than my best while
offering continuous support in the process. His precision and clarity of thought gave direction to
this thesis. He spent many hours meeting with me for philosophical conversations and guiding
my thought and research. Additionally, he has a love of truth that is inspiring and to be witness to
this, I am especially grateful. Grant Havers as a professor and a reader on this thesis provided
many scholarly recommendations and thought provoking comments. His knowledge of
Enlightenment philosophy helped to establish this paper as a conversation between
environmental philosophers and their intellectual predecessors. Robert Doede asked thoughtful
questions and gave me many recommendations for how to continue with the ideas of this thesis
and how to integrate them in other areas of research. Mr. Schintgen first instilled a love of
philosophy in me and provided me with philosophical principles and tools that I have used over
the course of my academic career. I would also like to thank Jayne Cummins, knower of all
things, who provided unending logistical aid and alleviated much stress over the completion of
this dissertation. My siblings and friends who engaged with and endured many philosophical
conversations as I wrestled with these ideas during the writing of this thesis, without whom I
could not have completed this paper. Finally, my parents, David and Theresa, who have tirelessly
encouraged and supported me through this MA program offering moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and financial support far surpassing nature’s mandates. This project is as much theirs as mine.
For any flaws that lie herein I am, of course, responsible.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
I. The General Introduction
II. Statement of the Problem
III. Significance of the Problem
A. Significance for Environmental Philosophy
B. Significance for Daily Practice
IV. Plan of Research
A. Methodology
B. Definitions
C. Chapter Summary
V. Conclusions
Chapter 1: Radical Ecology
I. The Necessity of a Paradigm Shift: Response to the Ecological Crisis
A. Deep Ecology
1. Arne Naess
2. George Sessions
3. Bill Devall
B. Social Ecology
1. Murray Bookchin
C. Ecofeminism
1. Karren J. Warren
2. Carolyn Merchant
II. Analysis
A. What are the Operative Moral Frameworks of the Radical Ecology Movement?
1. What must be assumed true in order for their claims to be true?
B. What are the Implications and Possible Problems of the Radical Ecology Moral
Framework?
1. The Benefit of the Radical Ecology Ethic to the Human Species
2. The Cost of the Radical Ecology Ethic to the Human Species
III. Conclusion
Chapter 2: Biocentrism or Environmental Ethics
I. The Problem with Anthropocentrism and the Need for a Biocentric Solution
A. Biocentric Holism
1. Aldo Leopold
2. J. Baird Callicott
3. Holmes Rolston III
4. Paul Taylor
B. Utilitarians Briefly Considered – Peter Singer
II. Analysis
4

A. What are the Operative Moral Frameworks of the Biocentric Environmental
Ethics Movement
1. What Must be Assumed True in Order for Their Claims to be True?
B. What are the Implications and Possible Problems for the Biocentric
Environmental Ethics Framework?
1. The Benefit of the Biocentric Environmental Ethic to the Human Species
2. The Cost of the Biocentric Environmental Ethics and Internal Logical Issues
III. Conclusion
Chapter 3: Shifting the Moral Structure for Environmental Ethics: Re-Thinking the Human
Factor
I. Should We Reconsider the Human Element?
A. Aldo Leopold Revisited with Notes from Berthold-Bond
B. Small is Beautiful: The Need for the Human Scale
1. E.F. Schumacher
2. Oliver Rackham & Robert MacFarlane
3. P. B. Medawar & the Human Aspect of Induction
4. Wendell Berry
II. Re-adjusting the moral structures
A. Re-adjustment to Radical Ecology
B. Re-adjustment to Holistic Environmental Ethics
Conclusion

5

I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE GENERAL WORRY
Environmental concern has become the topic of general debate in the public forum in the last
forty to fifty years. Often cited as the inspiration to the widespread recognition of environmental
awareness is Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962). In Silent Spring Carson brought to the public
attention scientific evidence linking the death of millions of birds to the widespread use of the
pesticide DDT and advocates for the necessity of rethinking our attitudes towards the use of
nature.1 Additionally, authors such as Henry David Thoreau, William Morris, and Aldo Leopold
offered ground breaking ideas on the necessity of caring for and rediscovering the natural world
through paradigm shifting approaches. Likewise, the scientific field of ecology blossomed,
further contributing to the call for the discipline of environmental philosophy. In response to the
awakening of environmental consciences emerged many and varied solutions and as many
diagnoses of the problem. The study of environmental philosophy and the ecological crisis have
become conversations of global proportions in an effort to identify causes and possible solutions.
There are conflicting and contradictory narratives for both the cause and the solution of
the environmental crisis. George Sessions blames Western culture for the root of the
environmental problem, as he explains: “Western cultural ideas of the domination and control of
nature has shaped the development and thrust of modern science and technology.”2 Furthermore,
using the thought of Lynn White Jr., Sessions argues “Because ‘modern science and technology
1

Carson’s account of the connection of DDT to the death of birds, although it inspired many into environmental
action, is controversial as she chose particularly lurid examples and her action resulted in the death of many children
in developing nations due to the ban of DDT. For an article that details the direct effect of DDT on birds see: Joseph
J. Nocera, Jules M. Blais, David V. Beresford, Leah K. Finity, Christopher Grooms, Lynda E. Kimpe, Kurt Kyser,
Neal Michelutti, Matthew W. Reudink, John P. Smol, “Historical pesticide applications coincided with an altered
diet of aerially foraging insectivorous chimney swifts,” The Royal Society,
http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2012/04/15/rspb.2012.0445.
2
George Sessions, “The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review,” Environmental Review: ER Vol. 11, No. 2 (1987),
105-125, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3984023. 106.

6

are permeated with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature’ we will have a worsening crisis
‘until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to serve man.’”3
For Sessions, as for most deep ecologists, Christianity and Western culture are the source of the
environmental problem. Alternatively, Kate Rigby argues that, “most obviously, it is important
to note that the West does not have a monopoly on ecological errancy.”4 Meanwhile there are
equally conflicting ideas as to the proper solution to environmental problems. Arne Naess argues
that we can agree that “The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a
substantially smaller human population. [And] The flourishing of non-human life requires a
smaller human population.”5 Environmental concern is cited as justification for global policies
and governments, inspiring global conferences and discussions. While at the same time
environmental interests are used as the justification of small-scale local policy and practice, as
Roger Scruton says, “The more distant the legislature from the people the greater will be the
distortion.”6 It is a marketing ploy used to sell products as well as to limit the consumption of
goods. Many jobs have been created in the interest of environmental consciousness and as many
prevented in the name of conservation. Impassioned and even hostile debate affirming and
denying environmental crises have arisen dividing and uniting countries, cities, and local
communities.
There are three main branches or fields of study, offering different methods or
approaches of environmentalism. The main branches are: 1) radical ecology, which includes
deep ecology, ecofeminism, and social ecology; 2) biocentric environmental ethics, generally
3

Ibid.
Kate Rigby, “Ecocriticism,” Literary and Cultural Criticism at the Twenty-First Century, Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 151-178, 157.
5
Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects,” Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, Michael E. Zimmerman, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 193-211, 197.
6
Roger Scruton, How to Think Seriously About the Planet, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 98.
4

7

speaking, which is concerned mostly with holistic concepts of nature although does contain some
individualists accounts as well; 3) and anthropocentric reformism.7 The radical ecology approach
maintains that we need a paradigm shifting, revolutionary approach regarding our human
relationship towards and the understanding of nature. The general biocentric environmental
ethics approach – both holistic and individualistic – argues that we need to combat the
anthropocentric traditional understanding of ethics and instead employ a bio or eco centric
approach. Anthropocentric reform primarily argues that the roots of the environmental problems
are not the result of anthropocentrism, but are the result of greed, ignorance, or general malintent. As such what is needed is the reform of government policy, an increase in education, and
the encouragement of responsible stewardship. This view, generally speaking, considers the
natural world as valuable only insofar as it has use to the human population.
In the face of so many contradictory theories or approaches to how to proceed regarding
the environmental crisis, we are often left feeling overwhelmed by deciphering which approach
is presenting the truthful tale, and thus at a loss as to how to act. But we are also left with the
knowledge that something must be done. We must take some action. But to whom should we
turn? Which theorists or schools of thought present us with an honest and practical approach to
deal with the environmental issues?
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Environmental philosophers rarely state the moral framework from which they are theorizing.8
Similarly though, our ethics do not exist within a vacuum; there are underlying assumptions that

7

Michael E Zimmerman, “General Introduction,” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical
Ecology, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998, 3-5.
8
Peter Singer explicitly mentions that he is working from within a utilitarian moral framework and that his praxis
corresponds accordingly. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics. Second Edition, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
1999.

8

we have towards life that influence the way that we view morality.9 Conversely, our ethical
assumptions guide our actions. Thus each of the approaches to environmentalism above make
assumptions regarding the nature of ethics, each in turn relying on different moral structures.
These moral structures require further that they make assumption regarding the nature of human
beings and our relationship with the natural world. With the expansive amount of literature and
policy regarding environmental action, how are we to adopt an attitude or philosophical approach
to nature? It is often difficult to identify the normative implications with regards to our lives and
the lives of other human beings, as well as the implications for the rest of the biotic community.
In my thesis I will analyse the moral frameworks underlying the fields of radical ecology
and holistic environmental ethics respectively. I will uncover and analyse the implications that
they hold regarding the human species. I will determine further if and where these frameworks
should be adapted with regard to human application. I introduce a philosophical argument for the
necessity of making the concern for persons the initial step in ecological attitudes. I then revisit
the structures of radical ecology and holistic environmental ethics with this view in mind. I
ultimately argue that although both radical ecology and the holistic environmental ethics view of
nature offer valuable insight that they are too quick to dismiss the uniqueness of the human
condition. Thus these methods must be modified, with a view to a humanistic approach, in order
to be logically coherent and provide plausible frameworks from which to encounter the natural
world.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Significance for the Environmental Philosophy

9

A point also referred to my Michael P. Nelson, in “Aldo Leopold, Environmental Ethics, and the Land Ethic.”
Wildlife Society Bulletin (1973-2006) Vol. 26, No. 4 (1998) 741-744.

9

There is a vast amount of literature circulating regarding environmentalism. Although the
various positions offer philosophical arguments, quite often the language of thinkers is
ambiguous, focused entirely on practice rather than theory, or even mystical. Identifying the
theoretical ethical structures necessitate that the different methods be understood with clarity
regarding their logical coherence. Furthermore, by identifying the ethical frameworks from
which the approaches are operating, provides three possibilities concerning the theories: 1) it
connects a relatively new environmental philosophy with an established ethical theory, which
opens it to the possibility of stronger support from the expansive ethical canon or critique
depending on where one’s views align; 2) if the environmental philosophy is completely radical
and not operating on any classical ethical worldview, identifying the structure provides clarity
through which to view the strengths, weaknesses, or possible internal contradictions within this
new approach; 3) if it is a combination of both, built on an existing moral structure but with
significant modifications, we can identify whether it is logically consistent as a theory or whether
it requires further modifications. The focus on the cost/benefit analysis with regards to humanity
will identify exactly what is at stake for the person or persons who adopt or promote the different
philosophical approaches. Additionally, the normative application with regards to humanity will
offer insight with how to practically apply aspects of the different methods under review.
B. Significance for Daily Practice
We are encouraged daily to adopt practices to aid in averting the ecological crisis. Identifying the
underlying moral framework and the implications that they have, specifically for humans, will
aid in our ability to discern whether or not an environmental philosophy is consistent with our
existing ethical practices. If so, allowing us to adopt a more eco-friendly and knowledgeable way

10

of life. If not, it will provide reasons to consider whether our current ethical assumptions or our
possible environmental approach should be modified.
IV. PLAN OF RESEARCH
A. Methodology
To quote Arnes Naess, “One should not expect too much from definitions of movements; think,
for example, of terms like “conservatism,” “liberalism,” or the “feminist movement.”10 The same
critique can be applied to “environmentalism” as well. As such, I will begin by looking at the
positions presented by the founders or most influential thinkers within the different philosophies.
For example for the deep ecology movement I will look at the writings of Arne Naess, George
Sessions, and Bill Devall. While for the holistic environmental ethics position I will consider the
writings of Aldo Leopold, J. Baird Callicott, and Holmes Rolston III. Once I have presented the
views of the respective movements, I will analyse the underlying moral structures on which the
philosophies are built. Through analysis of the moral frameworks I will discuss the assumed
ethical code which the respective contrasting approaches hold. By isolating the ethical
framework one can more clearly understand the implications that the positions present. Often the
result or the practical implications of a method are obscure, but when only the values are present
it is much easier to see what is at stake and entailed by adoption of the method.
Given that the purpose of this project is to ascertain whether or not positions should be
adopted with respect to their cost or benefit towards humanity, I then consider what is entailed
by the different approaches concerning humanity. Finally I introduce philosophical arguments
that show the necessity of first acknowledging the uniqueness of the human species and the

10

Arnes Naess, “The Deep Ecology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects,” Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998, 193-211, 196.

11

necessity of returning to a human scale in order to resolve the conflicts contained in the radical
ecology and biocentric environmental ethics structures.
Definitions
1. Anthropocene: Relating to or referring to the current geological age. “The Age of
Man.” First used by ecologist Eugene F. Stoermer.11
2. Anthropocentric: (1) Considering human beings as the most significant entity of
the universe. (2) Interpreting or regarding the world in terms of human values and
experiences.12
3. Biocentrism: The view or belief that the rights and needs of humans are not more
important than those of other living things.13
4. Biodiversity: The variety of all forms of life, from genes to species, through to the
broad scale of ecosystems.14
5. Cartesian Dualism: A theory or system of thought that regards a domain of reality
in terms of two independent principles, especially mind and matter. The mind and
the material body are completely different types of substances that interact with
each other.15
6. Deep Ecology: A movement originally developed by the Norwegian philosopher
Arne Naess. It emphasizes that human beings are only part of the ecology of this
planet, and believe that only by understanding our unity with the whole of nature
11

Holmes Rolston, III, “The Anthropocene! Beyond the Natural?” Stephen M. Gardiner and Allen Thompson, The
Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, New York, Oxford University press, 2017, 62.
12
Merriam Webster: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric.
13
English Oxford Living Dictionaries. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/biocentrism.
14
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published June 11, 2013 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/biodiversity/.
15
While Descartes may have intended his cogito to refer to a distinction between mind and body rather than two
completely different substances, environmental philosophy interprets the cause of the subjugation of the material
world as stemming from the substance dualist interpretation of Descartes’ thought. Since substance dualism is the
main interpretation among environmental philosophy it will also be the definition used throughout this paper.

12

can we come to achieve full realization of our humanity. Deep ecology believes
that all organisms are equal: Human beings have no greater value than any other
creature, for we are just ordinary citizens in the biotic community, with no more
rights than amoebae or bacteria.16
7. Ecology: (1) The science concerned with the interactions of living organisms with
each other and with their environment, also called bionomics. (2) The system
within the environment as it relates to organisms living in it.17
8. Ecofeminism: There is no single definition of ecofeminism. Ecofeminists agree
that the domination of women and the domination of nature are fundamentally
connected and that environmental efforts are therefore integral to work to
overcome the oppression of women. Ecofeminists do not seek equality with men
as such, but aim for the liberation of women as women. Central to this liberation
is the recognition of the value of the activities traditionally associated with
women; childbirth, nurturing, and the whole domestic arena.18
9. Radical Ecology: The movement which claims that their analyses disclose the
conceptual, attitudinal, social, political, and cultural origins of the ecological
crisis. It argues that only a revolutionary or a cultural paradigm shift can save the
planet from ecological devastation.19
10. Social Ecology: founded by Murray Bookchin, social ecology claims that the
environmental crisis is a result of the hierarchical organization of power and the

16

The Green Fuse/Topics: http://www.thegreenfuse.org/deepecology.htm.
Biology Online: http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Ecology.
18
The Green Fuse/Topics, http://www.thegreenfuse.org/ecofem.htm.
19
Michael Zimmerman, “General Introduction,” Environmental Ethics: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1-16, 4.
17

13

authoritarian mentality rooted in the structures of our society. The Western
ideology of dominating the natural world arise from the social relationships.20
B. Chapter Summary
In chapter 1 I will present the main positions of the radical ecology movement, from the
positions of deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism respectively. I will then analyse the
moral framework upon which the radical ecology movement is built. With the moral framework
in view I will make comparisons to existing ethical theories identifying which are the most
influential to the radical ecology movement. Of particular focus will be the implications for the
human species. The ultimate goal of the analysis of the moral frameworks is to determine the
cost/benefit with regards to humans and where or whether aspects of radical ecology movement
should be adopted as daily practice. Chapter 2 deals with the holistic environmental ethic view. I
will present the main arguments of this movement through the writing of Leopold, Callicott, and
Rolston III. Once the main ideas are presented I adopt the same approach as Chapter 1 and
analyse the moral framework specifically with an eye towards the cost and benefit towards
humanity. Ultimately, I will determine which aspects of the holistic approach should be adopted
and which (if any) require further modification. In Chapter 3 I reconsider the thought of Aldo
Leopold with a second interpretation of his view of humanity. I also introduce the thinkers who
advocate for concern for individual persons as the necessary first step in the resolving ecological
problems. The ideas are presented through E F Schumacher, Oliver Rackham, P. B. Medawar,
Wendell Berry, and Daniel Berthold-Bond. With the introduction of thought focused on a deeper
concern for humanity I suggest that the application and theories of radical ecology and holistic

20

The Green Fuse/Topics: http://www.thegreenfuse.org/socialecology.htm.

14

environmental ethics would benefit from a consideration of these human-scaled and humancentred philosophies.
V. CONCLUSIONS
I conclude by arguing that although the methods of radical ecology and holistic environmental
ethics offer insightful and important ideas, they must first have concern for the human species
and return to a human scale in order to resolve the logical contradictions they contain and in
order to be applied in a plausible and ethical manner.

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Chapter 1: Radical Ecology
I. The Necessity of a Paradigm Shift: Response to the Ecological Crisis
There are many different versions of theories which can claim the title “radical ecology.”
The underlying feature of radical ecology is the assertion that we need a paradigm shift in order
to engage with and resolve the current ecological crisis. The understanding of humanity’s place
in the world, our importance, our hierarchical standing, the concerns which we have, our
understanding of ourselves must change in order to deal with the state that we caused in the
world. As stated by Edgar D. Mitchell upon the return mission of Apollo 14, in reference to how
to resolve the eco-crisis what we need “is a transformation of consciousness.”21 While there are
many different creeds or responses contained within the “radical ecology movement,” the
movement is made coherent through the agreement of the following reasons.22 First, as Michael
Zimmerman states, “they claim that their analyses disclose the conceptual, attitudinal, social,
political, and cultural origins of the ecological crisis. Second, they argue that only a revolution or
cultural paradigm shift can save the planet from ecological devastation.”23 Unifying to the radical
ecology movement and the diversity of writers within, from deep ecologist to ecofeminists to
social ecologists, is the assertion that we must shift the cultural paradigm and that they have

21

Edgar D. Mitchell, originally cited in Roberts, 2011. Drengson, A., Devall, B., & Schroll, M. A. (2011).
Drengson, A., Devall, B., & Schroll, M. A. (2011). The deep ecology movement: Origins, development, and future
prospects (toward a transpersonal ecosophy). International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 30(1-2), 101–117..
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 30 (1)., 103 Retrieved from
http://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/ijtstranspersonalstudies/vol30/iss1/11.
22
While there are many important and different aspects of the radical ecology movement, this chapter will deal
largely with deep ecology, touching on ecofeminism and social ecology in relation to deep ecology. This is not
because these methods are any less important, but simply because the scope of this paper will not allow for an in
depth analysis of all three and deep ecology claims to include ecofeminism and adopts the most paradigm shifting
approach.
23
Michael E. Zimmerman, “General Introduction,” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical
Ecology, Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1998, 1-6, 4.

16

identified the origins and cause of the crisis that we face within the current, mainstream,
paradigm.
Deep Ecology
The Deep Ecology Movement
1. Arne Naess
Norwegian mountaineer and philosopher, Arne Naess, invented the term “deep ecology”
to distinguish it from “shallow ecology,” in his article “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range
Ecology Movement: A Summary,” in 1973.24 Contrary to “shallow ecology,” which Naess views
as simply an extension of North American and European “use-value” anthropocentric ethics,
Deep Ecology calls for a upheaval or reordering of our understanding of our place in the cosmos
and our value systems. Like any other “movement,” it is difficult to give an exact and
comprehensive definition of Deep Ecology; Naess argues that each member has slightly varying
conceptions as to how it should be defined. However, there are eight underlying principles which
make up the Deep Ecology movement. While people differ on the importance or placement of
particular principles or the various aspects of them, the principles themselves, Naess argues, all
deep ecologists uphold. Thus the principles themselves provide the most clarity in terms of
defining the movement. Each self-identifying deep ecologist agrees on some combination of the
following:
1) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human
life on Earth have value in themselves regardless of the
usefulness of the non-human world for the human purposes.

24

Michael P. Nelson, “Deep Ecology,” Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, 206-211, 206.

17

2) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the
realization of these values and are also values in and of
themselves.
3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity
except to satisfy vital needs.
4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible
with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing
of non-human life requires a smaller human population.
5) Present human interference with the non-human world is
excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6) Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect
basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The
resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the
present.
7) The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating
life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than
adhering to the increasingly higher standard of living. There
will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness
and greatness.

18

8) Those who ascribe to the foregoing points have an
obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the
necessary changes.25
While Naess provides the principles and explanation for Deep Ecology, Harold Glasser
argues that there are many thinkers who misinterpret or misunderstand what Naess entails in his
thought. Through discussion of Naess’ deep ecology in “Demystifying the Critiques of Deep
Ecology,” Glasser provides clarification and defenses to the common misconceptions of Naess’
thought and provides his own nuanced understanding of Naess to add further clarity.
Significantly, he argues that while deep ecology require more care for other species, that this
does not justify less care for humans. Additionally, population reduction or control does not
entail draconian measures.26 While it is necessary that the human population be reduced this
reduction does not justify maltreatment of living persons.
2. George Sessions
In George Sessions’ review of the deep ecology movement, he describes the contribution
to deep ecology by Lynn White, Jr., which highlights what Sessions’ understanding of the root
cause for the ecological crisis. White argues that Christianity provides the “justification” of an
anthropocentric and subjugating view of nature.27 Until we rid the world of Christianity, we
cannot hope to address the ecological crisis. Although White denounces Christianity, he does
admire the thought and practice of St. Francis and thought that the solution to the environmental
crisis was to adopt the ecological egalitarianism of St Francis. White’s article was reprinted

25

Arne Naess, The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects. Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. Michael E. Zimmerman. New Jersey: Simon & Schuster, 1993, 196-97.
26
Harold Glasser, “Demystifying the Critiques of Deep Ecology.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights
to Radical Ecology. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998, 212-226.
27
Sessions is making reference to Lynn White Jr.’s “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” 1967.

19

many times as well as being published in several anthologies. Christian thinkers for the most part
denounced White’s thinking. Sessions continues that since the 1960, radical ecologists have
taken inspiration from writers such as “Thoreau and Muir, from the Zen Buddhism of Huxley,
Watts, and Snyder, and from the antiutopian social critiques of Huxley and Orwell.”28
Additionally, Michael Zimmerman interpreted and developed the thought and method of
Heidegger through an ecological lens. While Stuart Hampshire, a scholar of Spinoza, used
Spinozo’s pantheism to critique the anthropocentric exploitation of nature.29 Naess, also drawing
on the work of Spinoza, developed his deep ecology from the concept of universal selfrealization. Sessions further explains that, from the writings of Arne Naess, George Session and
Bill Devell distinguished between the deep ecology and shallow ecology methods and used this
distinction and a basis for “classifying and describing the various ecophilosophical positions.”30
The ecological worldview, Sessions explains, questions the modern metaphysics and challenges
us to rethink the method Western ethics entirely.31
Sessions offers considerable detail in regards to the necessity of a global approach to the
ecological crisis, citing the need for a united effort to reduce the human population as the top
priority in order to care for the earth. While, he states it is necessary not to compromise the
dignity of humanity, it is the duty of the United Nations to give the “highest priority to

28

George Sessions, “The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review.” Environmental Review: ER Vol.
11 No. 2 (1987) 105-125. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3984023, 109.
29
Although Stuart Hampshire interprets Spinoza as a pantheist, as noted by Grant Havers, Spinoza makes a
distinction between the universe and human nature, indicating that he did not advocate for pantheism. Baruch
Spinoza, Ethics: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010, 33.
30
George Sessions, “The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review.” Environmental Review: ER Vol.
11 No. 2 (1987) 105-125. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3984023, 113.
31
George Sessions, “The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review.” Environmental Review: ER Vol.
11 No. 2 (1987) 105-125. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3984023.

20

stabilizing the human population in the shortest time possible.”32 On a practical level, Sessions
argues that progress has been made in recent years to stabilizing the human population saying,
“birth control programs, including making contraceptives freely available to all who want them,
have quite recently proven to be highly effective in dramatically reducing birthrates in certain
Third World countries.”33 He then further states, “Third World countries should be encouraged
to adopt as high a priority as possible on the establishment of ecosystem protection zones, and
the protection of large areas of free nature.”34 Thus, as developing countries have more
undeveloped areas they should be encouraged to maintain these areas as undeveloped and since
they also have the fastest rising populations they, most of all, should be encouraged to stabilize
their populations.

3. Bill Devall
Bill Devall emphasises the importance of a paradigm shift to defuse an anthropocentric
hierarchy. As he states, in “The Deep Long Range Ecology Movement 1960-2000 A Review,”
“When they accept slogans such as “Earth First!” or “thinking like a mountain,” they are
rejecting human hubris and placing Homo sapiens, as a species, in a more modest position in the
cosmos.”35 He states that while there is tension within politics as there is bound to be in the
overturning of any paradigm, “The practice of deep ecology includes both personal lifestyles and
community lifestyles.”36 Thus politics plays a crucial part in DEM [Deep Long Range Ecology
Movement], as in public policy we can start to think of policies for the wellbeing of all, the good
32

George Sessions, “Ecocentrism, Wilderness, and the Global Ecosystem Protection,” Environmental Philosophy:
From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 245-262, 259.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Bill Deval, “The Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement 1960-2000-A Review” Ethics & the Environment, Vol.6
No.1 (2001), 22.
36
Ibid, 24.

21

of the ecosystem as a whole. Additionally, like Sessions, Devall argues that this policy applies to
developing and developed countries alike.
While some critics argues that developing countries must primarily focus on problems of
military conflict, poverty, gender equality, etc., Devall argues that it is DEM’s emphasis on long
term sustainability that makes it essential for developing countries. He states, “On the contrary,
supporters of the DEM conclude it is most appropriate for the Third World because of its
emphasis on long-range sustainability of natural systems within which humans as well as all
other species must dwell.”37 The natural integration of the human species with the rest of the
ecosystems provides a means of championing social equality, whereas social justice movements
often cause further subjugation of the nonhuman world as a result of their emphasis on human
equality. As he states, “It is the human species that must learn to live together as a civilized and
mutually supportive community. To focus on the development of civility among the human
species is not to inflate unduly the importance of humanity within the ecosystem of life on Earth;
rather it is to recognize how dangerous the human race is to the viability of the Earth's
ecosystem.”38 The emphasis should be on the unity of the ecosystem as a whole, or a globalist
approach (inclusive of the nonhuman) to solving such problems.
Devall’s view of the most significant aspects of deep ecology is made apparent through
his discussion and interpretation of John Muir’s works. Devall argues that Muir’s greatest
contribution to ecology is his recognition of the essential unity of all things. Devall states, “In his
writings he uses the word God, Nature, And Beauty almost interchangeably.”39 This unity is

37

Ibid, 27.
Ibid, 33.
39
Bill Devall, “John Muir as Deep Ecologist,” Environmental Review: KER, vol. 6, no. 1, (Spring, 1982), pp. 63-86,
66. Oxford University Press on behalf of Forest History Society and American Society for Environmental History.
Accessed: April 3, 2017. www.jstor.org/stable/3984050.
38

22

especially significant for epistemological reasons. Muir offers a way of knowing beyond
reductionist classifications. As Devall states, “For Muir [. . .] Nature is only partly described by
models. The map is not the territory […] He went beyond ecology as reductionist science, as
theories of interrelationships to begin blinding with the landscape.”40 In immersing oneself in the
landscape and seeing it as a whole, while the language becomes somewhat mystical, it allows for
and experience and knowledge beyond categories. Devall argues that Muir’s travels in the wild
allowed for a transformation of consciousness bringing him into self-realization. In this manner
ecology moves beyond a use or manipulation and offers a way of being in the world. The
following quotation from Devall regarding Muir offers a clear understanding of what Devall
considers essential to Deep Ecology, “Muir recognized that an objective perspective would be
different from the dualism so prevalent in Western philosophy since the seventeenth century. In
Muir’s participatory science, his “wandering from flower to flower” was extending unity,
flowing from the Tao.”41 In this passage Devall expresses his admiration for Muir and though
this shows what he considers to be essential to Deep Ecology, namely, a rejection of the dualist
Enlightenment philosophy, and self-realization through recognition of the unity of all things,
which he expresses through Taoist philosophy.42
Social Ecology
1. Murray Bookchin

40

Ibid, 66.
Ibid, 78.
42
For a great introduction to Taoism see Keith Seddon’s, Lao Tzu & Tao Te Ching, Lulu: 2006. Additionally, while
it is beneficial to examine Devall’s thought through his discussion of Muir, I disagree with his interpretation of Muir
as Deep Ecologist and his interpretation of Taoism. Muir’s use of literary devices throughout his texts, particularly
in My First Summer in the Sierra highlights a distinctly human way of knowing, further illustrating the uniqueness
of humanity. Likewise, while Devall interprets Taoism as the foundation for Deep Ecology, I think a more accurate
interpretation is to understand Taoism in Aristotelian terms of “act” and “potency.”
41

23

In his article “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology Movement”
Bookchin examines the tenants of the deep ecology and social ecology movements. Deep
ecology, he argues has its foundation in an “original sin” theory that sees anthropocentrism as the
plague upon the earth; “humanity” in its flourishing is the main cause of the environmental crisis.
He argues that it promotes an eco-brutalism that justifies the starvation of the developing world
in order to lighten the burden on ecological resources. Bookchin argues that deep ecology,
championed by Naess, is a spiritual ideology, rather than intellectual movement, deriving its
identity from Malthusian anti-humanism and “biocentric orgies.” Deep ecologists fail to
recognize the value and uniqueness of human society, as seen through their claims that there is
no difference between humanity and the members of the larger community of living species.
This denial of the difference of humanity also fails to recognize that the environmental problem
is ultimately a societal one. Instead, deep ecologists present us with, what Bookchin refers to as
“eco-la-la,” in which humanity is dissolved into a “cosmic self” unified with bears, the earth, and
the universe. This eco-la-la removes any remnant of concrete humanity and becomes something
completely abstract, resulting in the loss of any notion of self. This loss of identity is something
that is controlled by large corporations in a homogenizing movement under the guise of the
“Connected Whole.” A problem for deep ecology, that Bookchin raises, is that in this transition
from self-identity to the cosmic-self what are we to do with species such as smallpox or the
AIDS virus – can they be eradicated? Or should they, in the interests of biocentrism be
preserved? If not, who is to decide in the biocentric cosmos what species should be eradicated?
Ultimately, Bookchin argues, the deep ecology promoted by Naess, Devall, and Sessions,
through all of its over-spiritualised earth-loving language is little more than a justification of

24

social Darwinism, a method of keeping developing countries poor, and a “morally” acceptable
justification of exploiting the poor and vulnerable.
Conversely, Bookchin explains that social ecology is a “Green” movement, particularly
leftist in its allegiance and focuses on humanism. Social ecology does not deny the uniqueness of
the human species nor does it justify an “anthropocentricism” that in turn justifies the
exploitation of more vulnerable humans and other species. The “marvel” nature has produced the
“marvel” homo sapiens – homo sapiens are unique thinking species and yet entirely natural and
as such do not resort to a dualism in their identity.
Social Ecology focuses on the following:
1. Global government and social movements as the solution to the environmental problems
we face.
2. Unwilling to accept the anti-humanist claims of the deep ecology movement.
3. An adherence to evolutionary theory and thus the dualistic humanity vs. the nonhuman
world tension must be dispelled.
In order to solve the environmental crisis Bookchins states that we must look to ecology and
reject the anti-ecologist movement of deep ecology.43
A. Ecofeminism
1. Karren J. Warren
Simply stated by Karren Warren and Jim Cheney in “Ecological Feminism and Ecosystem
Ecology,” ecofeminism is feminist because it has the twofold commitment to critique male bias
in ethics and to develop methods of analysis that are not male biased. Additionally, “ecofeminist

43

Bookchin, Murray. “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology
Movement,” Green Perspectives: Newsletter of the Green Program Project, 4 no. 5.
Reprinted in Witoszek and Brennan 1999, 281-301.

25

ethics extends feminist ethical critiques of sexism and other social “ism of domination” to
include critiques of “naturalism,” i.e., the unjustified domination of nonhuman animals and
nature by humans.”44 Thus ecofeminism critiques anthropocentrism as well as androcentrism. In
“The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism,” Karen Warren states that, “all
ecofeminists agree about, then, is the way in which the logic of domination has functioned
historically within patriarchy to sustain and justify the twin dominations of women and nature.”45
Warren presents an argument that she claims has been sanctioned by the dominant Western
culture, stemming from a patriarchal society, which goes as follows:
(1) Women are identified with nature and the realm of the physical; men are
identified with the “human” and the realm of the mental.
(2) Whatever is identified with nature and the realm of the physical is inferior to
(“below”) whatever is identified with the “human” and the realm of the
mental; or conversely, the latter is superior to (“above”) the former.
(3) Thus, women are inferior to (“below”) men; or conversely, men are superior
to (“above”) women.
(4) For any X and Y, if X is superior to Y, then X is justified in subordinating Y.
(5) Thus, men are justified in subordinating women.46
The above, which Warren refers to as the “logic of domination” is what all ecofeminists agree
must be abolished in itself, in order to prevent feminism from becoming little more than a
“support group.”

44

Karen J. Warren and Jim Cheney, “Ecological Feminism and Ecosystem Ecology,” Hypatia 6, no. 1, Ecological
Feminism (1991): 179-197, 180. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810040. Accessed: April 3, 2017.
45
Karen J. Warren, “The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism,” Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, Toronto: Prentice-Hall (1998): 325-344, 329.
46
Ibid, 328.

26

While one may argue that ecofeminism does not necessarily include the natural
nonhuman realm, Warren disagrees and states that it is because the logic of domination itself is at
question, any form of oppression must be ended. She states the argument as follows:
(1) Feminism is a movement to end sexism.
(2) But Sexism is conceptually linked with naturism (through an oppressive
conceptual framework characterized by a logic of domination).
(3) Thus, Feminism is (also) a movement to end naturism.47
It is the logic itself that is the fundamental issue. Thus one cannot claim to be “feminist” and not
against naturism as well, as it is the conceptual framework of oppression that is the fundamental
problem. Thus in order to be logically consistent, one must be both feminist and ecofeminist.
Furthermore, the “logic of domination” refers to historically specific forms of social domination.
While ecofeminism rejects phrases like “necessary and sufficient conditions” for
ecofeminism as those concepts themselves, Warren argues, are born out of an androcentric
conceptual framework, there are some “boundaries to ecofeminism in regards to environmental
ethics. However, these boundaries are spoken in terms of minimum conditions, providing the
basis but not the necessary internal structure. It is a base that comes from a dynamic multiplicity
of voices. Feminism and Ecofeminism alike share the following minimum conditions:
a) Anti-naturist
b) Contextual – a shift from conceptual ethical frameworks applied to individuals to a
concept of ethics growing out of defining relationships.
c) It is pluralistic – it presupposes and maintains difference among humans and nonhumans
alike.
47

Ibid, 331.

27

d) “Theory” is always “theory in process.”
e) Inclusivist: it arises from listening to the voices of the outsider, the other, and the
oppressed.
f) Makes no attempt to offer an “objective” view point.
g) Essential place for value, care, love, trust, friendship etc. – values that presuppose our
relationships to others are essential to understanding the self.
h) A re-imagining of what it means to be human and denial of individualism. Relationships
are not extrinsic to humanity but an essential part of what it means to be human and to
know the self.48
Warren’s notion of ecofeminism critiques the logic of domination that is “justified” through the
hierarchical valuing of the rational/mind attributes of humanity (historically considered male
attributes) over the physical/embodied/or feelings attributes (historically considered as feminine
or nonhuman). Ecofeminism does not seek to rework the system of conceptual ethics, but instead
to dispel the framework as a whole, as it is the framework itself that is morally impermissible.
She provides a fluid, and contextual minimum requirement boundary for how to achieve
ecofeminsism through listening to a multiplicity of voices and views.
2. Carolyn Merchant
Carolyn Merchant’s insight into the historical attitudes regarding the human/nonhuman
relationships is essential to understanding ecofeminism and radical ecology generally speaking.
Her work The Death of Nature is a comprehensive history of the attitudes of humanity towards
nature. It focuses specifically on the male/female analogies that undergird the different
perspectives on nature and the role that humanity plays. Carolyn Merchant’s motivation in this
48

Ibid, 336-339.

28

work is to understand and investigate the worldview and the science that led to the dominion of
nature by man, which in turn led to the current ecological problem that we are facing and its
connection to science, technology, and the economy.
Merchant begins the first chapter with the line, “the world we have lost was organic.”49
From ancient systems of thought, right up to the sixteenth century, nature was viewed as a living
organism, the parts of which were dependent upon each other for proper functioning and
flourishing of the everyday life. Within the organic theory of nature, nature was metaphorically
understood to be female in two senses: a nurturing mother, caring for and looking after the needs
of humanity; conversely, as a wild, untamed, disordered and chaotic woman, who could cause
storms, droughts, famine, etc. on a whim. The first metaphor – nature as nurturing mother – was
lost within the context of the scientific revolution and nature became viewed as a chaotic
disordered female to be controlled by the male dominated science of the Enlightenment.
The organic unity of thought in the Renaissance was rooted in Greek thought: Platonism,
Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. The common denominator was that all parts of the cosmos were
connected and interdependent as a living whole; changes of one part reflected in the changes of
the others. Within this hierarchical yet interdependent model the well-being of each component
was important as the well-being of the whole consisted in the flourishing of the parts. In order to
live nature, that living unity, both male and female, must be kept well and alive.
In “Nature as Disorder, Merchant says the following, “Nature-culture dualism is a key
factor in Western civilization’s advance at the expense of nature.”50 The interpretation of nature
as organic unity transitioned to an interpretation of nature as machine. Nature, in the new

49

Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution. New
York: Harper Collins Publishing, 1990, 1.
50
Ibid, 143.

29

mechanistic framework became something to tidy, to control, to fix. The male dominated
sciences reduced nature to her most basic parts in an effort to exploit her. This reduction to a
non-living mechanism is what Merchant refers to as the death of nature. Earlier in the text
Merchant showed the progress of capitalism and how women’s role in production was removed.
Similarly, the advances of science, particularly medicine, removed the role of women from
reproduction. Midwifery became a male practice with scientific advancement because women
were not allowed to study and so the midwife practices of women quickly became obsolete.
Since the role of women in the conception of a child was, wrongly, considered to be entirely
passive, with the scientific revolution, women became entirely passive in roles regarding
production and reproduction. Merchant uses the analogy of forceps to capture the division
between male and female participation: just as the forceps of the doctors had removed the
midwife from childbirth and became a tool to penetrate and exploit that field of work, so too had
science become a method of unveiling nature’s secrets in order to study, control, and
manipulate.51
II. Analysis
C. What are the Operative Moral Frameworks of the Radical Ecology
Movement?
2. What Must be Assumed to be True in Order for Their Claims to be True?
The primary assumption for the Radical Ecology movement is that the historical notions
of how the human species relates to the nonhuman (or in the case of ecofeminism, how male
persons relate to females and the rest of the nonhuman male species) has been immoral and

51

Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution. New
York: Harper Collins Publishing, 1990.

30

subjugating, and therefore that we need a completely new way of interacting with the nonhuman
world. Entailed by this assumption is that all hierarchies are harm-inflicting human constructs;
there are no natural hierarchies and that hierarchies are a method of “justified” subjugation of
other persons or species. Thus any constructed hierarches must be dispelled. As Holy-Luczaj
states, “all entities in the environment have an equal right to thrive. Interests of human beings are
not considered by deep ecologists to be always inevitably superior to other beings as they are not
justified by “higher” status of human life.”52 Further, the androcentric/anthropocentric “values”
or “rights” moral framework must be dispelled and focus be placed more on the wellbeing of the
whole. Although, the main critique ecofeminists have against deep ecology, as formulated by
Zimmerman, is not that it is anthropocentric, but that it is inherently androcentric. Jim Cheney
reformulates the ecofeminist critique, showing that they are not so concerned with the deep
ecologist’s critique of anthropocentrism, but only that they do not do so in a strictly androcentric
manner. However, Fox argues (which Cheney later acknowledges) the deep ecology movement
does not rest on the language of intrinsic value or concepts of rights and thus is not subject to the
androcentric critiques. Instead, deep ecologists are concerned with a wider state of being and as
such with an expansive sense of self rather than rights or values. In this manner, it is similar to
ecofeminism, which, Fox explains, is primarily concerned with the ethics of love, care, and
friendship. One thing that the ecofeminists and deep ecologists agree on is that men have been
far more implicated in the ecological crises than women. The deep ecologist’s main purpose is to
unmask the anthropocentric ideology so that it can no longer be used as social domination for

52

Magdalena Holy-Luczaj, “Heidegger’s Support for Deep Ecology Reexamined Once Again: Ontological
Egalitarianism, Or Farewell to the Great Chain of Being,” Ethics and the Environment 20 no. 1, (2015): 45-66.
Indiana University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/ethicsenviro.20.1.45. Accessed: March 4, 2017.

31

any group or class.53 Thus the dispelling of any hierarchy is the foundational assumption within
radical ecology.
As explicitly stated above by Naess, Sessions, and Devall, the practice of deep ecology
involves devoting work to “stabilizing” the human population. As highlighted, especially by
Sessions, the most important and significant method of carrying out the duties of the deep
ecology movement is to reduce the human population. As principle eight in Naess’ list states,
“Those who ascribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to
implement the necessary changes,” and thus, as the other principles can only be attained or
implemented through the reduction of the human population, that is priority one in terms of
practice. Thus each Deep Ecology must directly or indirectly work to reduce the human
population. Conversely, anything that contributes to the growth of the human population must be
avoided as this directly opposed all of the eight platform principles of Deep Ecology specifically,
and radical ecology generally. However, it must be noted, as argued by Harold Glasser that
decreasing populations do not entail draconian measures.

D. What are the Positive Implications and Possible Problems of the Radical
Ecology Moral Framework?
3. The Benefit of the Radical Ecology Ethic to the Human Species
The main benefit of the radical ecology movement is that it offers a method for
dissolving the human-constructed division between humanity and the rest of the nonhuman or
natural world. In order to identify the benefits of dispelling the human/nature conflict it is
necessary to discuss the possible problems and implications of Cartesian dualism. Because the
53

Fox, Warwick. “The Deep Ecology – Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels.” Environmental
Ethics Vol. 11 No. 1 (1989): 5-25.

32

cogito is the starting place for his philosophy Descartes has trouble maintaining an intrinsic
relationship between mind and body. Descartes begins with the clear and distinct idea that “I am
thinking.” He then concludes that the “thinking” belongs necessarily to the substance. Since the
body is not the “thinking” part then one could conclude that the body is not essential to the
human. As Fredrick Copleston states, “For if Descartes begins by saying that I am a substance
the whole nature of which is to think, and if the body does not think and is not included in my
clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking thing, it would seem to follow that the body does
not belong to my essence or nature.”54 Following from the substantial differentiation of
mind/soul and body one can conclude that the human is made up of two separate parts: body and
soul. One can further conclude with this separation of substances that the body becomes a vessel
for the soul. But since the essential feature is the “thinking part” and the body does not have this
quality then the material substance becomes inferior to the thinking or rational soul. This
separation can lead to a “justified” subjugation of the physical body to the soul. Descartes
highlighted the distinction of mind and body but did not emphasis the complete substantial
difference between mind and body in an effort to maintain the unity of the human person. The
distinction between mind and body is not a problem, however, a certain interpretation of
Descartes’ thought leads to a substantial separation of the mind and body further causing a
subjugation of the material body. While he may not be at fault this interpretation of the mind and
body as completely distinct, with the body as lesser, this interpretation has become the popular
interpretation of Cartesian philosophy and the one with which environmental philosophy takes
issue. Descartes provides the catalyst for a dualist tension between reason and the empirical
world, which further entails a dualistic tension between humanity and the rest of the nonhuman
54

Frederick Copleston, SJ., A History of Philosophy: Volume IV Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Leibniz, New
York: Image Books, 1963.

33

world. Because of the substantial difference of mind and body humans are “set apart” from or
outside of the rest of the nonhuman world in a divisive manner.55 As Christopher J. Preston
states, “Dualisms between culture and nature, reason and emotion, male and female, universal
and particular, human and animal, have become mutually, enfolded and reinforcing of each
other. But there is one dualism in particular . . . central to the creation of all others… the dualism
between reason and nature.”56
Both ecofeminism and deep ecology at the centre seek to dispel this dualistic tension.
Although, as seen above, ecofeminism proposes the division is an androcentric one, with women
included in the segregated side with the rest of the nonhuman, non-male, non-rational population.
While social ecologists would argue against the plausibility of deep ecology, they too seek to
dispel the dualistic division between humanity and nature.57 William Cronon in response to the
“wilderness” movement articulates the central problem with this dualism as follows, “this, then,
is the central paradox: wilderness embodies a dualistic vision in which the human is entirely
outside the natural. If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild,
then our very presence in nature represents its fall.”58 While Cronon is specifically referring to
the American conversation of the preservation of the wilderness inspired by Henry David
Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, John Muir, and the like, as they are working within the Modern
philosophical context, the same criticism can be applied to the relationship of humanity to nature
55

Though it must be noted that some argue that this dualistic view of reason as distinct from the natural or mind as
distinct from the body is beneficial to some theological or religious or even some common sense perceptions of how
we think. However, this is not what is at issue in the environmental debate and thus the possible benefits to various
worldviews will not be discussed. For a brief yet comprehensive discussion on the value of mind/body dualism see,
Elliot Sober, Core Issues in Philosophy, Pearson, 2012.
56
Christopher J Preston, Grounding Knowledge: Environmental Philosophy, Epistemology, and Place, London: The
University of Georgia Press, 2003, 112-113.
57
The social ecologists would argue that they attribute more significance to the human species, not undercutting the
value of rationality, whilst maintaining that reason is something completely “natural.”
58
William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” Uncommon Ground:
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995, 69-90, 79.

34

generally speaking.59 The radical ecology movement, with its emphasis on the inherent value of
nonhuman life, regardless of use, as well as the insistence upon the wellbeing of the whole or the
cosmic identity, underscores the importance of a dispelling this division of humanity with nature
and further allows for this dismissal to be done.
A significant benefit of the Radical Ecology movement – one which also makes it very
difficult to pin down for the very reason that it is beneficial is that it promotes the sacralising or
re-enchanting of nature (a reason for which Murray Bookchin criticizes deep ecology). The
mechanistic view of the natural world that comes from the Enlightenment – through the coupling
of Cartesian and Baconian thought – that the nonhuman can be understood through a reductionist
dissection is certainly a significant player in the justification of the exploitation of the nonrational world. In his controversial and influential article “The Historical Roots of our Ecological
Crisis,” Lynn White Jr. attributes this mechanistic reductionism to the dualistic division from the
Judeo-Christian worldview.60 While one could argue Judeo-Christianity is not the source of the
conflict, but rather a specific interpretation of Judeo-Christianity, his observation and assertion
that the Enlightenment and specifically Cartesian philosophy is born out of that tradition, is
astute and does provide a plausible cause for much of the ecological crisis.61 As discussed above,
this Cartesian dualism and the philosophical conversations in response to it do champion
59

Although putting John Muir firmly in this tradition is contentious, as some would argue, as Bill Devall does, that
Muir was the “first deep ecologist,” see: Bill Devall, “John Muir as Deep Ecologist,” Environmental Review: KER
6, no. 1, (1982): 63-86, 66. Oxford University Press on behalf of Forest History Society and American Society for
Environmental History. http:www.jstor.org/stable/3984050. Accessed: April 3, 2017. I would agree that Muir does
not sit firmly in the transcendental tradition but neither does he “fit” the deep ecologist mold either.
60
Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, Science, New Series, vol. 155, no. 3767 (March
10, 1967), pp. 1203-1207. Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science, URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1720120. Accessed: 10-11-2016.
61
It might be more accurate for Lynn White Jr to say a particular, historically situated, strand of Christianity lead to
the viewing of natural world in this divisive manner. For a brief yet compelling defense of the benefit of Christianity
(highlighting the importance of the Incarnation) see Wendell Berry, “Christianity and the Survival of Creation,”
Cross Currents,” Summer 93, Vol. 43 Issue 2, p149, 15p. http://www.crosscurrents.org/berry.htm. Accessed on
April 20, 2017.

35

Descartes’ “reason verses the empirical” or “humanity verses the nonhuman world” dualistic
tension. As Michael Polanyi states, “the conception of animals as machines goes back to
Descartes.”62 Carolyn Merchant provides a vivid analogy of the transition to a mechanistic
worldview through her description of the transition of responsibility of childbirth from midwives
to (male) doctors’ use of metal forceps extracting the goods from and subsuming the contributing
role of women. At this point, Merchant argues, women’s contributing roles in society were stolen
and they became “producers” of good. Likewise, the Earth, seen as feminine, “mother,” became
a “producer” viewed with an eye to how much she could produce – how much could be extracted
– in a calculated and mechanistic manner. Within this mechanistic “use-value” view of the
nonhuman world, any matter outside of the human itself (and some would argue that humanity
itself) becomes no more than a commodity.63 It is difficult to ascribe inherent value beyond use.
The radical ecology movement, through stressing the inherent value of all things or of the whole,
overthrows this limiting mechanistic view which distils the nonhuman world to its basic parts.
The “re-sacralizing” of the nonhuman world or the recognition of the unity of the all entails the
upheaval of all pervasive Cartesian-Baconian mechanistic view of the natural world. I must note
that this is not to reject a clinical understanding of the nonhuman but that there are beings that
cannot simply be understood in that manner.
The direct benefit, beyond the well-being of the whole worldly ecosystem, is that it
accounts for an aspect of human knowing and experience that is commonly overlooked. In his
62

Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man, Oxford: Martino Publishing, 2014, 52. It must also be noted that this type of
interpretation of Descartes is problematic but that is not necessarily the view that Descartes himself espoused. As
Peter Harrison argues Descartes uses the machine metaphor as an analogy but did not intend it to be taken literally.
See, Peter Harrison, “Descartes on Animals,” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 42, no. 162 (1992): 219-227.
Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews.
Accessed June 6, 2017. www.jstor.org/stable/2220217.
63
Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010,
argues that within the current “managerial” system of business, that the human person cannot be seen as anything
other than a producing object as the system itself entails that interpretation of humanity.

36

discussion of the thought of Muir, Devall states, “Muir’s intuition of unity influenced his
epistemology […] it is difficult in our language even to describe that [connection of surroundings
central to all life] sense.”64 This element of human knowing is perhaps more clearly articulated
by what Michael Polanyi refers to as “tacit knowing.” In his discussion of tacit knowing, Polanyi
states, “Speaking more generally, the belief that, since particulars are more tangible, their
knowledge offers a true conception of things is fundamentally mistaken.”65 By claiming that we
need to overcome or move beyond the mechanistic and dualistic way of knowing, radical
ecology allows for the encounter with being that is quite often overlooked in our dissecting
analysis. Polanyi uses the example of a piece of music to explain this concept of tacit knowing.
While the knowledge of the individual is essential, if one tries to play a piece on the piano while
focusing on each particular note, the unity of the piece is destroyed. He states, “ The word
uttered again in its proper contest, the pianist’s fingers used again with his mind on his music,
the features of a physiognomy and the details of a pattern glanced at once more from a distance:
they all come to life and recover their meaning and their comprehensive relationship.”66 The
radical ecology shift from androcentric/anthropocentric-use, dissecting mechanistic way of
knowing opens up the sphere of knowledge for an experiential knowing of the unity of things; it
allows for the legitimizing of other methods of knowing that are not limited to number or usevalue. It must be noted however, that this particular benefit is not to fall victim to the antievolutionary thinking of Teilhard de Chardin which, as Dennett describes is to deny, “the
fundamental idea: that evolution is a mindless, purposeless, algorithmic process.”67 So while the

64

Bill Devall, “Muir as Deep Ecologist,” 66.
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009, 19.
66
Ibid, 19.
67
Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, New York: Simon & Schuster
Inc., 1996, 320.
65

37

“unity” or whole thinking allows for a different method or acknowledgement of knowing, this
does not impose a mystical purposiveness on the earth’s ecosystems.
4. The Cost of the Radical Ecology Ethic to the Human Species
The emphasis on the cosmic self or the unity, while it may allow for a method of
knowing that goes beyond reductionism, appears naïve in its assertion that we can shift entirely
from anthropocentrism. In his article on the compatibility of scientific and religious ways of
knowing, Del Ratzsch in “Humanness in their Hearts: Where Science and Religion Fuse,” says,
“In the human-cognitive case, we apparently have no abstraction-permitting contrast – all our
experiences are human-mediated. And this humanness cannot be purged from science.”68
Likewise, Thomas Nagel, in “What is it like to be a bat?” says, the following, “It is difficult to
understand what could be meant by the objective character of an experience, apart from the
particular point of view form which its subject apprehends it. After all, what would be left of
what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat?”69 Although Nagel is
responding to reductionist theories of mind in this article, his point can be applied to the
challenge of the radical ecologists. These quotations from Nagel and Ratzsch, both emphasize
our inability to step outside of our own consciousness. An inability to do so on the individual and
species levels alike; we can only experience and know in relation to who we are as particular
members of the human species. Radical Ecology, particularly Deep Ecology, requires that we
“think for the good of the whole,” not putting our human needs above those of the other
members of the biotic community. However, since we are not able to step outside of our

68

Del Ratzsch, “Humanness in the Heart: Where Science and Religion Fuse,” The Believing Primate: Scientific,
Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion, Edited by Jeffrey Schloss and Michael J.
Murray, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 215-245, 228.
69
Thomas Nagel, “What it is like to be a bat?” The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4 (October 1974): 435-50, 43839.

38

subjectivity, thinking in a global manner is asking something of our species that we are incapable
of doing. Even if we imagine that we are acting in the best interests of the whole it is still in
relation to our specifically human way of knowing. The assertion to do otherwise, the request to
think for the good of the entire ecosystem, excludes the possibility of thinking to a human scale,
or more simply knowing as humans.
Similarly, the emphasis on a “global” solution, in addition to undercutting the value of
individuals, may simply not be practical. While radical ecology advocates for a reduction of the
human population on a global scale, regardless of one’s position on the morality/feasibility of
reducing the human population, the scale itself may be implausible. Once something is moved
beyond the scale of our human knowing the level of knowledge and the significance of what can
be lost – even without knowledge of it – can be vastly increased. As Roger Scruton states, “The
more distant the legislature from the people the greater will be the distortion.”70 This statement is
based simply on the recognition that we know those things which are in close proximity to us
more than those that are far. Roger Scruton in his analysis of global attempts of ecological
solutions gives the example of the gamekeeper verses animal rights activist. While the
gamekeeper works within a knowledge base from being immersed in the land, “he must control
foxes and badgers if he is to protect ground-nesting birds; plant cover if he is to retain pheasants
and partridge; ensure berries in winter and corn and kale in summer; take action against
scavengers, dog-walkers and so one.”71 The other, (not always of course) operates on a feeling or
emotional, but without the key factor of risk and embodied knowing. So while the radical

70

Roger Scruton, How to Think Seriously About the Planet” The Case for an Environmental Conservatism, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012, 98.
71
Ibid, 113.

39

ecologist calls for the global “stabilization” of the human population, this type of solution
overlooks a way of knowing that is essential to practical solutions.72
Likewise, this impractical “thinking for the whole” method undercuts the value of the
individual. Kierkegaard, in explaining what he views as the danger of Hegelian philosophy
states:
No single individual (I mean no outstanding individual – in the sense of
leadership and conceived according to the dialectical category of fate) will be
able to arrest the abstract process of levelling, for it is negatively something
higher, and the age of chivalry is gone. No society or association can arrest
that abstract power, simply because an association is itself in the service of the
levelling process.73
This passage beautifully articulates Kierkegaard’s concern that what is lost in the Hegelian
dialectic. In the Hegelian self-realising historical dialectic, Kierkegaard argues that if each
member is acting in the self-realisation of the whole in the unfolding of history then the
individual qua individual is not valuable in its own right, but only in relation or for the bringing
about of the whole. In proceeding for good of the whole the uniqueness of individuals is
“leveled” in the name of the cosmic whole. Kierkegaard’s concern with Hegelian thought can be
applied to the deep ecology exhortations as well. Deep ecology emphasises the necessity of

72

Additionally, I would agree with Bookchin in the criticism that the deep ecologist’s first response to reduce
growing populations ends up being a eugenicist “justification” of the reduction of the developing world. Given that
developing countries have the majority of growing populations and that the top priority in the practice of deep
ecology is to stabilize or reduce the human population, it is essentially a “justification” of controlling the procreation
of persons in the developing nations.
73
Kierkegaard, The Present Age: On the Death of Rebellion, Translated by Alexander Dru, New York: Harper
Perennial, 2010, 28.

40

understanding our identity in a cosmic sense rather than understanding ourselves as individuals.74
Dismissing the identity of individuals diminishes the value of the individual as it attributes worth
only in relation to the whole rather than for that being itself. Additionally, if the value of the
individual members is diminished then it is difficult to see how this does not diminish the value
of the whole.
Guilherme argues that the above objection does not stand; the value of the individual is
not diminished through receiving their identity only in light of the cosmic whole. He argues that
each being ought to pursue its own interest and by doing so that each contributes to the interest
of the collective. Maintaining that there is a connected unity of all things each being acting out
of self-interest also contributes to the good of the whole. For example, the human being who is
guided by reason will pursue the same goals as other human beings. Likewise, it is in the best
interests of humans to encourage biodiversity within the whole ecosystem as the well-being of
the whole contributes to the well-being of the human species.75 However, it is difficult to see
how that manner of thinking is not appealing to anthropocentrism, which is exactly what radical
ecology is trying to avoid. Because Guilherme’s response rests on an anthropocentric appeal it
does not stand as a proper response to the objection that the “cosmic self” devalues the
individual.
The most troubling aspect of deep ecology in regards to humanity is that it requires that
we deny our uniquely human attributes or properties. Coupled to this denial is a contradiction
with the evolutionary theory. Firstly, it requires that we see our identity in a more cosmic sense,
as discussed above. But what this means, as Bookchin points out, is that we deny the fact that
74

Fox, Warwick. “The Deep Ecology – Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels.” Environmental Ethics 11, no. 1
(1989): 5-25.
75
Guilherme, Alex. “Metaphysics as a Basis for Deep Ecology: An Enquiry into Spinoza’s
System.” The Trumpeter, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2011): 60-78.

41

there is something significantly different about the human species. Notably, Alasdair MacIntyre
argues that the ecophilosophical system belittles the dignity and potential of humans because it
does not contain a concept of a human telos. MacIntyre, denounces a “rights” based morality
entirely.76 Or rather, as Daniel Dennett discusses in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, natural selection
produced the marvel humanity. Bill Devall in a review of the long term goals of the deep ecology
movement states, “To focus on the development of civility among the human species is not to
inflate unduly the importance of humanity within the ecosystem of life on Earth; rather it is to
recognize how dangerous the human race is to the viability of the Earth's ecosystem.”77 This
passage and others of the like in many of the deep ecology writings reveal a logical
inconsistency. The emphasis on the danger of the human species entails a uniqueness and even
hierarchical understanding of the species. So while explicitly denying the uniqueness of the
human species, the emphasis of the danger that we can cause entails a uniqueness to our species.
Thus the underlying principles of radical ecology, particularly deep ecology can be summed up
in following two statements: 1) the human species deserves no unique consideration because it is
not any more significant than any other species; 2) the human species is unique in its ability to
cause destruction to the rest of the nonhuman world and thus we must actively pursue methods of
decreasing this uniquely dangerous species.
Additionally, what is overlooked it that if the human species is not particularly special or
unique or deserving extra consideration in this dismissal of hierarchical care as “speciesist,” then
why should the species drastically reduce its numbers? One what grounds? As Daniel Dennett
states, “If ‘doing what comes naturally’ meant doing what virtually all nonhuman species do, it

76

Noted in Sessions article as well.
Bill Deval, “The Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement 1960-2000-A Review” Ethics & the Environment 6 No.1
(2001): 33.
77

42

would be hazardous to the health and well-being of us all.”78 The thinking of the wellbeing of the
whole appears to conflict with certain evidence from an evolutionary standpoint. While it may
benefit the “whole” to think in respect to how to preserve or conserve the wellbeing as a whole,
the adaptive benefit of favouring one’s offspring or species may suggest otherwise. If humanity
is no different or is given no consideration over other species, then how can we, as a species, be
expected to act outside of adaptive benefits of natural selection? While, again, one could argue
that it is in the best interest of the species as a whole to preserve the well-being of the planet (as I
think it is) in order to maintain our species and for the potential good of the other species, this is
an inherently anthropocentric appeal.79 One who is not a radical ecologist can argue with logical
consistency that it is in the best interest of the human species that we reduce the population but
the radical ecologist does not have this luxury. The underlying premise requires that we not act
from human self-interest. David Waller, in “A Vegetarian Critique of Deep and Social Ecology”
argues that rather than giving a solid argument for why we should kill as few animals as possible,
deep ecology exploits our own feelings towards the animals, saying, “Its [deep ecology’s]
proponents exploit our [emphasis added] sentiments toward animals in order to advance
ecocentrism, but they refuse to address the qualities in animals that give rise to these feelings in
us.80 While I do not agree with the thesis of his article, Waller’s point regarding the method to
“preserving” animals is insightful. By appealing to our feelings in order to make the “case” for
animals, this is an anthropocentric appeal – it is not a case for the animals for their own intrinsic
worth. Likewise, it is rarely, as Waller continually points out, a case for the reduction of pain for
78

Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, New York: Simon & Schuster
Inc., 1996, 78.
79
This point that the arguments for the well-being of the whole planet should be preserved for the higher quality of
life is anthropocentric is one made by Peter Singer as well in “The Environment.” In Practical Ethics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
80
David Waller, “A Vegetarian Critique of Deep and Social Ecology,” Ethics and the Environment no. 2, vol. 2,
1997, 187-197, 190. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40338940. Accessed April 4, 2017.

43

the animals, but simply to how we feel towards other species with whom we are meant to
identify.81 This appeal to our emotions is the epitome of anthropocentrism, the very thing that
deep ecology is desperately trying to shift.
The denial of this uniqueness also threatens the benefit of radical ecology of breaking the
constructed dualistic division between humanity and nature. In failing to recognize the properties
of the species, a double-layered construction appears – by denying or misrepresenting aspects of
the uniqueness of the human species, a false perception is presented. In this false representation I
think it creates a further distance of the human’s place relation to the rest of the non-human
world. The double-constructed nature of the radical ecologist approach is clarified in the
following quotation from Naess: “I am not saying that we should have preserved the primordial
forest as a whole, but looking back we can imagine a development such that, let us say, one third
was preserved as wilderness, one third as free nature with mixed communities, which leaves one
third for cities, paved roads, etc.”82 This division necessarily excludes or compartmentalizes
members of the biotic community, distinctly setting culture “outside” of the natural world.
Which makes it difficult to see how this segregation is any different than what Cronon critiques
the transcendentalists of doing. Thus, while it is a double-layered segregation, it seems to be little
more than a human-constructed oversimplification of the human species.
III. Conclusion

While they claim to offer “radical” approaches to shifting the paradigm the radical ecologists’
“solutions,” as a whole, rely on the denial of the uniqueness of the human species, rather than a
81

While I agree with Waller’s critique regarding the appeal to our emotions, I do not think that appealing to the pain
of the animal would necessary contribute to the “radical” part of radical ecology, as it is difficult to see how a
reduction of pain for reduction’s sake is anything less than a version of Mill’s Utilitarianism.
82
Arne Naess, “Ecosophy, Population, and Free Nature,” pp.118 quoted in “Ecocentrism, Wilderness, and Global
Ecosystem Protection,” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, Toronto: Prentice Hall,
245-262, 256.

44

“radicalized” account of our place in the cosmos. However, this method of thinking does offer
insightful and invaluable critiques of the historical and philosophical reasons for the current
ecological crisis. Additionally it offers beneficial elements to our relationship with the nonhuman
world, and interesting conceptual and philosophical experiments. However, the solution also
rests on a logical inconsistency and denial of the human attributes of the human species. Thus, in
order for the solutions (the primary one being the “stabilizing” of the human population) to the
ecological crisis to be plausible and logically consistent, the underlying foundation must be
readjusted with respect to the understanding of humanity.

45

Chapter 2: Biocentrism or Holistic Environmental Ethics
I. The Problem with Anthropocentrism and the Need for a Biocentric Solution
Biocentric environmental ethics works within existing ethical frameworks but seeks to extend the
ethical community beyond that of the human species alone. As Callicott states, “it may be
understood to be an application of well-established conventional philosophical categories to
emergent practical environmental problems. On the other hand, it may be understood to be an
exploration of alternative moral and even metaphysical principles, forced upon philosophy by
the magnitude and recalcitrance of these problems.”83 Biocentric environmental ethics identifies
anthropocentrism as the root cause of the environmental crisis but seeks to work towards a
solution within existing ethical frameworks. This field endeavors to apply various existing
ethical approaches to the rest of the nonhuman world. The biocentric environmental ethics,
following the lead of Leopold, adhere to the Darwinian evolutionary theory as the foundation for
ethics. While there are many different types of community-extending ethical approaches, this
chapter will mainly deal with holistic biocentric ethics. However, I will briefly address
individualistic approaches as well, to give clarity to the holistic approaches by means of contrast.
A. Biocentric Holism
1. Aldo Leopold
Aldo Leopold’s Sand Country Almanac is a seminal work in the field of environmental
ethics. Whether in varying degrees of agreement or with harsh disagreement Leopold’s “Land
Ethic” is an oft sited text. The “Land Ethic” is the section in which he most clearly states his
conservation view and method, but there are passages throughout the entire text that portray the

83

J. Baird Callicott, “Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics,” American Philosophical
Quarterly vol. 21, no. 4, University of Illinois Press, October 1984, pp. 299-309, 299. JSTOR:
www.jstor.org/stable/20014060. Accessed: 28 December 2016.

46

central ideas. Thus although, the his essay at the end of SCA, “Land Ethic,” is the most
influential section, offering a practical approach to his environmental ethic, the work as a whole
offers important insight into the ecological movement. As SAC is so influential within the
community of environmental ethicists, it is worth touching on the main points within this work.
The “Land Ethic” encourages a reinterpretation of the relationship of humanity with the
rest of the natural world. There are many aspects of the “Land Ethic” that are important but two
in particular stand out. First, Leopold naturalizes ethics. As he states, “The extension of ethics, so
far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolution.”84 He re-grounds
morality in the natural world. He argues from an evolutionary biological standpoint, while citing
examples from history showing the evolution of human ethical attitudes or worldviews. He
begins by referring to the hanging of slave girls by Odysseus upon Odysseus’ return from Troy.
He argues that action, which would now be considered unjust, was considered justified, even
moral behaviour, for a great warrior at the time. The reasons for which Leopold argues are
because the slave girls were considered to be “outside” of the obligatory moral community.
Since that time, we have extended the moral community to include all persons,85 as such we view
Odysseus’ action as unjust and immoral. This change in attitude, Leopold argues shows that
ethics evolve.86 Additionally, as the evolutionary theory suggests that humans have evolved the
evolution of ethics is simply a natural process taking place within a natural species. Second,
Leopold insists that our relationship with the natural world must shift from the view of nature as

84

Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic” A Sand Country Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River,
(New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1970), 237.
85
To ideally include all persons, for of course there are many heartbreaking and immoral acts e.g. genocide, serial
killings, etc. However, these actions are usually considered by the majority as crimes, further proving Leopold’s
point.
86
Although one could argue that the crime committed to Odysseus in his household was an act of treason, and thus
it would be more accurate to claim that the punishment for the crime evolves but the action itself is still considered
immoral e.g. disloyalty is still looked up with contempt.

47

“mechanistic other” to members of a biotic community. Individuals within the biotic community
cannot be viewed solely with regards to their use to humans but must be encountered with
respect as fellow members of the larger community.
Although, Leopold insists upon the necessity of changing our view of nature as
something of use to a community to which we belong, he still maintains some anthropic
preferences. The following quotation cuts right to the heart of Leopold’s theory; “But we, who
have lost our pigeons, mourn the loss. Had the funeral been ours, the pigeons would hardly have
mourned us. In this fact […] lies objective evidence of our superiority over the beasts.”87 Implicit
in this quotation is the difference between the human species and the other members of the biotic
community. Although Leopold is typically interpreted as promoting the equal membership of all
species in the community the fact that he notes that pigeons would not mourn is particularly
telling. By noting the mourning element Leopold does not diminish the uniqueness of the human
condition within the biotic community. Although we have to recognize the other members as
members in order to know, love, and conserve, we must also not diminish the fact that it is only
our species that does so. In doing so there is a justified preference of the human species over
others in the biotic community.
Even though he is frequently cited in environmental philosophical texts, Aldo Leopold is
commonly understood as presenting a sentimental appeal for the need for a new approach to
nature rather than contributing philosophically rigorous arguments.88 However, Michael P.
Nelson argues that Leopold’s philosophical contribution is paradigm shifting, the full

87

Leopold, Aldo. A Sand Country Almanac” With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York:
Ballantine Books Inc., 1970, 117. For my own part, I would be inclined to use the word “difference” rather than
“superiority.”
88
Notice the above example of “mourning the loss” of the pigeon in Leopold’s appeal to the immorality of
needlessly eradicating another species.

48

implications of which are only now, starting to be understood. Nelson explains that Leopold
argued that until conservation explored more philosophically significant and deep-probing
questions regarding human existence and our relationship with nature, that it would not make
appropriate headway. By arguing that ethics do not exist in a vacuum, Nelson claims that our
worldviews influence and “justifies” our actions. As long as society maintains the Modern
mechanistic worldview, humanity can justify using natural resources and will not mourn the loss
of a species. Leopold, with the aid of ecology, insists on the need for a new attitude towards
nature, which understands humanity as a part of the biotic community as a whole. Thus nonhuman species are worthy of our respect for their own sake. The insistence of Leopold on the
necessity of changing the attitude of the relationship between humanity and nature allows for the
birth of the discipline of environmental ethics prior to which had not been possible. Not only
does Leopold contribute to the field of environmental ethics as a discipline but calls for a
reinterpretation of how we view humanity as a whole. Nelson argues that it is not that Leopold
did not make philosophical contributions through his Land Ethic but that the philosophical
contributions were so paradigm shifting that we are just now starting to understand the full
implication of his contributions.89
Additionally, a common criticism of Leopold is that his “Land Ethic” is a fascist creed
that “justifies” mistreatment of individuals. However, Nelson also defends Aldo Leopold’s
“Land Ethic” and environmental holism in general, against the claim that they have fascist
implications. He shows that environmental holism does not entail fascism. The arguments
against an holistic approach to environmental ethics is as follows. The practical implications of
an ethical theory that is primarily concerned with the well-being of the whole necessarily
89

Nelson, Michael P. “Aldo Leopold, Environmental Ethics, and the Land Ethic.” Wildlife Society
Bulletin (1973-2006) Vol. 26, No. 4 (1998) 741-744. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3783545.

49

excludes concern for the individual. Thus, the individual, including individual human beings, can
be “justifiably” sacrificed for the greater good of the whole. Since Leopold argues that we must
have concern for the well-being of the biotic community as a whole, his critics argue, he must
necessarily overlook the well-being of the individuals within the biotic community. Furthermore,
Nelson argues, the fascist argument, originated by Tom Regan, is not dissipated any, by the
defenders of Leopold’s position (Callicott, Abbey, and Hardin) who encourage the good of the
whole through the sacrifice of individuals, with statements such as, “I’m a humanist; I’d rather
kill a man than a snake” (Abbey). However, Nelson argues that Leopold provides the evidence to
show that he does not intend his “Land Ethic” to justify environmental fascism, nor does it entail
it. He argues that Leopold’s focus on the holistic approach is actually a form of concern for the
individual, as Nelson states, “we should protect and defend the whole because doing so would
better insure individual survival.”90 Since the argument for a holistic approach is built upon the
desire to better care for the individuals within it, Nelson argues that holistic approaches do not
necessarily entail fascism. If there is any “ism” that can be applied to a holistic approach to
environmentalism, it is communitarianism, as it emphasises the responsibility the individual has
to the whole community rather than the subjugation or sacrifice of the individual for the good of
the whole.
Perhaps the best method of summarizing Leopold’s thought is to end with his own
maxim: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”91
2.

J. Baird Callicott

90

Michael P. Nelson, “Holists and Fascists and Paper Tigers…Oh My!” Ethics and the Environment Vol. 1 No. 2
(1996), 103-117. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27766017, 108.
91
Leopold, Aldo. A Sand Country Almanac” With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York:
Ballantine Books Inc., 1970, 117.

50

J. Baird Callicott must be considered both for his own thought and for his explication of
the thought of Aldo Leopold, for he has made important contributions to both, and they inform
each other.
In “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold’s Land Ethic?”
Callicott provides a paraphrasing of Leopold’s maxim: “A thing is right when it tends to disturb
the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends
otherwise.”92 While, he acknowledges the criticism of Tom Birch and Holmes Rolston, III that
this maxim is incomplete and requires some nuancing, Callicott argues that it is in the nature of
pithy maxims that they be incomplete and require further explanation. Thus it is a good place to
begin in understanding his thought. There are many assumptions entailed by this statement: 1)
humanity is a part of the natural world, having evolved through natural selection, and thus the
things that we do, inclusive of culture, are natural; 2) as actions that we perform and the culture
that we build are natural they are therefore moral pursuits; 3) species extinction, is also a natural
aspect of natural selection; 4) The main issue and thus the main immoral action of the human
species within the biotic community, is not that we are causing other species to go extinct (see
premise 3), but the scale and speed at which we are causing these extinctions. These assumptions
will be explained in further detail below.
In “The Conceptual Foundations of ‘The Land Ethic,’” Callicott argues that, contrary to
the popular opinion of environmental philosophers, Leopold’s “Land Ethic” is not a work to be
taken lightly nor with a tone of derision. The reason that it is too often chided by philosophers is

92

J. Baird Callicott, “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold’s Land Ethic?”
Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, Edited Michael Zimmerman, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998, 145-164, 160.

51

because the philosophy within is too, “abbreviated, unfamiliar, and radical.”93 Callicott examines
and defends the rigorous underlying philosophical arguments in the “Land Ethic” in “The
Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic.” He argues that the “Land Ethic” rests on three
scientific principles: Copernican astronomy as the backdrop for ecological and evolutionary
theory. Evolutionary theory provides a link of “kinship” between humans and other species,
while, ecology lends a sense of community and social integration between all members of the
biotic community. Copernican astronomy, “scales the Earth down to something like a cozy
island paradise in a desert ocean.”94 From these three tenets of scientific thought, Leopold
presents a holistic rather than individualistic notion of morality. Callicott argues that “The Land
Ethic” is a deontological rather than a prudential ethic; we are duty bound to consider the wellbeing of the entire biotic community, says Leopold. Notably, Callicott emphasizes the somewhat
paradoxical nature of Leopold’s ethic; nature is not amoral.95 Because of the evolutionary theory
underlying Leopold’s ethic which requires us to see ourselves, humanity, as a member of the
community of the living inclusive of soil, birds, mammals, etc. this means that we are a part of
nature and thus, significantly, humans as moral beings are a result of the evolutionary process.
An issue which Darwin grappled with as Callicott explains:
Human survival and reproductive success, Darwin argued,
grappling with this conundrum [the apparent increase of ethical
behaviour rather than the increase of selfish behaviour], is only
possible in a social setting. . . . In short, if there is no ethics, there

93

Callicott, J. Baird. “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal
Rights to Radical Ecology. Edited by Michael E. Zimmerman, New Jersey: Simon & Schuster, 1993, 102.
94
Ibid, 108.
95
Ibid, 119.

52

is no community; if there is no community, there is no survival
(and, more importantly, no reproduction).96
Or as Callicott states regarding “The Land Ethic,” “The biosocial analysis of human moral
behavior, in which the land ethic is grounded, is designed precisely to show that in fact
intelligent moral behaviour is natural behaviour. Hence, we are moral beings not in spite of, but
in accordance with, nature.”97 The emphasis of nature as moral and consistent with Darwinian
evolution is perhaps the most significant part of the Callicott’s analysis of ‘The Land Ethic.’
However, the “naturalizing” of morality is not without problems and there are important tasks at
hand as a result.
The most important task for environmental ethics, Callicott argues, is a philosophically
justifiable non-anthropocentric value theory. Without a non-anthropocentric justification of
environmental ethics the whole movement collapses in on itself and must resort to normative
ethics. Callicott discusses theism, holism, and sentimentalism as three possible justifications for
a non-anthropocentric value theory. Most closely tied to the anthropocentric view of ethics is the
hedonistic utilitarian argument. Callicott argues that it is inadequate as the basis for a nonanthropocentric theory of environmental ethics as it necessarily excludes all non-sentient beings.
Furthermore, it excludes the biosphere itself, as it is also insentient. Thus ethical hedonism must
be rejected. Similarly, the theistic argument must be dismissed as, although it appears to sidestep the anthropocentric criticism by appealing to God, it is “essentially mythic, ambiguous, and
inconsistent with modern science.”98 Likewise, the holistic argument that appeals to a Platonic

96

Ibid.
J Baird Callicott, “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic,” In Environmental Philosophy: From Animal
Rights to Radical Ecology edited by Michael E. Zimmerman, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 101-123, 1993, 119.
98
J. Baird Callicott, “Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics.” American Philosophy
Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 4. (1984): 299-309. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014060, 302.
97

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existence of “objective good” fails as justification for a non-anthropocentric theory. The problem
that Callicott identifies with the holistic argument is that is provides no justification for why the
good in itself should be valued; every attempt to do so ends up appealing to an anthropocentric
concern. The non-anthropocentric value system must be able to account for the following:
An adequate value theory for non-anthropocentric environmental
ethics must provide for the intrinsic value of both individual
organisms and a hierarchy of superorganismic entities –
populations, species, biocoenoses, biomes, and the biosphere. It
should provide differential intrinsic value for wild and domestic
organisms and species. It must be conceptually concordant with
modern evolutionary and ecological biology. And it must provide
for the intrinsic value of our present ecosystem, its component
parts and complement of species, not equal value for any
ecosystem.99
Conversely, Callicott argues that the moral sentient arguments are, by definition, “otheroriented,” and thus can form the basis for a non-anthropocentric value theory, accounting for all
of the above. The Humean ethic is intrinsically “other-oriented” and as such it is nonanthropocentric, however, it is still human. As Callicott states, “the Darwin-Leopold
environmental ethics, grounded in the axiology of Hume, is genuinely and straightforwardly nonanthropocentric, since it provides for the intrinsic value of non-human natural entities.”100
Callicott argues that we are genetically disposed to regard the earth and those within as part of

99

Ibid, 304.
Ibid, 305.

100

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our tribe, genetically disposed to value and find community with the other species of the earth.
However, it is a specifically human system, as we are “doing” the valuing.
Strikingly, Callicott argues, “Since normal ethical theory is conventionally
anthropocentric, no critical theoretical thinking needs to be done. Environmental ethics is thus
reduced more or less to cost-benefit analyses and public policy considerations.”101 Callicott
makes the important point that, “a new, revolutionary moral paradigm is no more created ex
nihilo than a new, revolutionary scientific paradigm. Without some historical continuity, a new
theory, natural or moral, could not be recognized as such.”102 This point both highlights his
reasons for founding his ethics on Hume and simultaneously takes a shot at radical ecology.
3. Holmes Rolston, III
Holmes Rolston, III, in “Challenges in Environmental Ethics,” articulates that the central
challenge of environmental ethics is the “attempt to redefine the boundaries of ethical
obligations.” Similarly, in his lecture “The Ethical Imperatives of Wilderness,” Rolston states,
“The question is, are we apart from or a part of wilderness?”103 He argues that life, inclusive of
humans, sets up boundaries. So, what does this mean? How do we understand and reconcile
human actions with the rest of the nonhuman realm? How are we to view culture; is it a part of
the wild or an imposition upon it? How do we act morally towards those “outside” of our human
culture? Rolston argues that the “is” and the “ought” are not so far apart after all. Or as he says it
in “The Ethical Obligations of Wilderness,” seeing the natural beauty of American wilderness
makes it easy to move from “is” to “ought.”104 However even with our environmental awareness

101

J. Baird Callicott, “Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics,” 299.
Ibid, 300.
103
Holmes Rolston III, “The Ethical Imperatives of Wilderness,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ptq8BS91fko.
Time: 8:48. Accessed: May 12, 2017.
104
Ibid, time: 15:32.
102

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we still employ a semi-anthropic ethic which extends moral value to sheep and wales which
implores us to act “humanely” towards them. Rolston identifies the underlying problem: how do
we treat wild animals ethically with ethics that are learned/developed in culture, not in the wild?
As Rolston says, “there is no value without an evaluator. . . . Its esse is percipi.”105 However,
Rolston argues that value only exists in community. Because of this, the problem with
anthropocentric value is that it rests on the assumption that humans are the only members of the
community. Even though earth and its non-human community cannot reflect or understand
values, they can still “claim their care.” While value is justified through our understanding of
what is a “humane” manner of acting, Rolston, argues that it is possible, nay necessary, to move
beyond a strict anthropocentrism. Important to note: while ethics exist in community, Rolston
does not favour “The Anthropocene.”
Contrary to proponents of the Anthropocene, Holmes Rolston, III, in his article “The
Anthropocene! Beyond the Natural?” argues that we need to deviate from the trajectory of a
human cultivated planet and solve the human/ecological problem where it actually lies. As he
states, “If our concern is for the poor in this new humanist excellence, then emphasize
environmental justice, more equitable distribution of wealth between rich and poor on developed
lands, rather than diminishing wild nature to benefit the poor. Solve the problem in the right
place.”106 Furthermore, while advocates of the Anthropocene argue that “wild” nature does no
longer exist and that the parks we create are equally as constructed as Disney Land. However, as
Rolston queries, “Wilderness advocates may wonder if anyone who makes such a claim has ever

105

Rolston III, Holmes, “Challenges in Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to
Radical Ecology. General Editor Michael E. Zimmerman. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998. 124-144, 141.
106
Holmes Rolston, III, “The Anthropocene! Beyond the Natural?,” The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 70.

56

done a backcountry trek in Yellowstone or the Bob Marshall Wilderness.”107 Rolston agrees that
humans are the dominant species and will continue to become increasingly dominating (for the
time being). However, although we have a duty to each other within our human species, this
dominating duty-bound species is not excluded from having ethical obligations to other species
as well.
Our obligation to others species is clearly articulated in his article “Ecology,” which
discusses the field contained in the title. Rolston begins with a discussion of the meaning and
evolution of the meaning of the term “ecology,” by showing the historical roots of the word itself
and the way that ecology has evolved since it was first coined in 1866. Rolston then discusses the
central tensions at the heart of ecology. The simple meaning of ecology is a science that studies
organism-environment relations; a field which influences conversations in technology, science,
philosophy, and ethics. Ecological ethics refers to “doing ethics” in light of what ecologist have
found in their studies – encouraging humans to imitate the way ecologies function or considering
ecosystems to be a foundational good to be valued and preserved. The environmental crisis refers
to the assumed inherent value of ecosystems and the potential threat to them from pollution or
otherwise. Thus ecology and ethics have teamed to encourage humans to live more sustainable
lifestyles in harmony with nature. Main concepts in ecology rely on ecosystems. A term which
Rolston defines as, “a succession of communities rejuvenated by disturbances, energy flow,
niches and habitats, food chains and webs, carrying capacity, populations and survival rates,
diversity, and stability.”108 Of central concern is the question of how much of human
environmental policy can be drawn from ecology, from which are derived classical is/ought
107

Ibid.
Holmes Rolston, III, “Ecology.” In Holbrook, J. Britt and Carl Mitchams, eds. Ethics, Science, Technology, and
Engineering: A Global Resource, 2nd ed, Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference, USA. Cengage Learning,
2015, vol.2, 27-31, 29.
108

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concerns of moving from fact to value. Ecologists and their philosophical and ethical disciples
challenge the is/ought division by arguing that there are values in nature that humans ought to
consider and care for. As Rolston says, “ecology invites human beings to open their eyes and to
appreciate realities that are valuable in ways humans ought to respect.”109 Ecology, as a
discipline, assumes Hume’s problem of fact/value conflict is not a legitimate concern because if
the ecosystem has value then we ought to preserve it. Thus the field of ecology itself assumes an
ethical creed that steps beyond Humean ethics. Furthermore, while, our ethics have a distinctly
human interpretation to them, ecosystems have a value that extends beyond our ability to
manipulate or maintain them.
Additionally, while it may sound like an anthropocentric appeal, Rolston argues that we
need to cultivate and allow for the urban, the rural, and the wild to flourish and that in denying
any aspect we are stunting elements of our humanity. As he states:
“the more we become dominantly Anthropocene, the more we
shrink to become one-dimensional, we hope for healthy people on
a healthy planet. Alas, as likely a future as any on our present
trajectory is a warmer, less biodiverse planet – weedier, more
degraded, less sustainable, with a widening gap between rich and
poor, with lives that are more artifacted, more artificial. We cannot
be human without culture; that is our distinctive genius. Yet
equally we do not want a denatured life on a denatured planet.”110

109

Ibid, 30.
Holmes Rolston, III, “The Anthropocene! Beyond the Natural?,” The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 70-71.
110

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Additionally, Rolston points out that it is not that nature will cease to exist, but that we must
quell our anti-ecological methods for our own sake. Nature will continue to exist long after the
Anthropocene can thrive. As he states, “Nature has not ended and never will [. . .] wilderness
will return to take what course it may. This ought not to serve as an excuse to continue our
dominance; rather it should sober us into finding a more lasting fitness for humans on Earth.”111
Rolston adheres to a Darwinian model for the foundation of his appeal to the inherent value and
adaptivity of ecosystems. Or as Christopher J. Preston in Grounding Knowledge: Environment,
Philosophy, Epistemology, and Place, explains that, “Rolston moves towards intrinsic and
systemic values by arguing that in all cases people find nature value-able only because nature is
something that is able-to-carry-value.”112
4. Paul Taylor
Taylor contrasts his life-centred ethics to the anthropocentric theory of ethics. He argues
that we have a prima facie moral obligation to other life-forms such as plants and other animals
themselves as members of the biotic community. In order to do so we have to reorder our
understanding of the moral universe. Underlying Taylor’s attitude of respect for nature is a
biocentric outlook of nature. The biocentric approach to nature is made up of the following four
components: 1) humans are thought of as members of the earth’s community of life, holding that
membership is on the same terms and applies to all the nonhuman members; 2) the earth’s
natural ecosystems as a totality is seen as a complex interconnected web; 3) each individual
organism is considered a teleological centre of life; 4) the claim that humans are superior to other

111

Ibid, 71.
Christoper J. Preston, Grounding Knowledge: Environment, Philosophy, Epistemology, and Place, London: The
University of Georgia Press, 2003, 115.
112

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species if a groundless one and must be rejected in light of claims 1, 2, & 3.113 These four
principles provide the base point from which we can start working towards resolving the
environmental problems. They justify that we cannot proceed with a preference to our own
species. Although, as Taylor admits, it will not be easy to place limits on human population and
technology, it is within our power to do so and we are likewise duty-bound to try. Additionally,
simply because it may be difficult to embody a respect for nature attitude this does not lesson the
moral obligation to do so.
B. Utilitarians Briefly Considered – Peter Singer and Tom Regan
While the Utilitarians explicity state the framework that they are working from, they do
provide insightful criticism for the holistic environmental ethics. In this chapter Singer examines
and critiques two approaches to environmentalism. The first is the Western tradition grounded in
Judeo and Aristotelian thought and integrated through the writings of Aquinas. This tradition,
Singer argues, is anthropocentric and hierarchical and, although there are a few deviations, the
dominant position is that humans have dominion over the natural world; a “right” given by God.
Although this tradition can be harsh, it can still reveal a concern for the natural world. This can
be done as long as the well-being of the natural-world contributes to human well-being i.e. the
greenhouse effect could end up causing flooding in Nile delta possibly resulting in the loss of
human life. Singer then asks whether we are morally obligated to extend ethics beyond sentient
beings. Doing so comes with a host of difficulties. The first of which is that, without a conscious
interest, we have no way of determining the weight that should be given to the flourishing of
different life forms, as our value judgements usually come down to our own feelings. He
similarly criticizes the deep ecology approach, as we have no way of knowing what it is like for
113

Taylor, Paul W. “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” Environmental Ethics Vol. 3 No. 3 (1981): 197-218, 74-75.

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a biosphere to flourish. As such it has failed so far in providing convincing arguments in that
direction. Singer’s own view of what an environmental ethics should looks like in broad terms,
“fosters consideration for the interests of all sentient creatures, including subsequent generations
stretching in the far future.”114 On a practical level this ethic 1) discourages large families; 2)
measures success not through the accumulation of material goods but through the development
of abilities and achievements; 3) eliminates extravagant environmentally harmful activities i.e.
unnecessary long drives for pleasure etc. Essential to this ethic is that we reassess our notions of
extravagance and emphasize frugality and the simple life, not denying pleasure but finding
pleasure in “warm” relationships and activities consistent with the environmental flourishing.
II. Analysis
A. What are the Operative Moral Frameworks of the Biocentric Environmental
Ethics Movement
1. What must be Assumed to be True in Order for their Claims to be true?
The fundamental assumption for biocentric environmental ethics is that Darwinian
evolutionary theory provides an accurate and exhaustive picture of reality and thus that we are a
product of natural selection. This assumption further entails that reason and morality are products
of evolutionary adaptability. As such, the classical hierarchy of reason, will, passions, is a
misrepresentation of the way that human ethics evolve or should be understood because our
physical traits and adaptability defines or produces our moral inclinations and thus our ethical
creeds.115 As Callicott states, “Hence, anthropogenic changes imposed on nature are no less

114

Singer, Peter. “The Environment.” Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 nd ed. 1993, 264288, 286.
115
This hierarchical classical approach to understanding the parts of the “soul” is originally introduced by Plato in
Plato. The Republic. In The Dialogues of Plato in Four Volumes: Volume II. Translated by B. Jowett. London:
Oxford University Press, 1964.

61

natural than any other. However, since Homo sapiens is a moral species, capable of ethical
deliberation and conscientious choice, and evolutionary kinship and biotic community
membership add a land ethic to our familiar social ethics, anthropogenic changes may be landethically evaluated.”116
Since our ethics are grounded in nature, another assumed truth is that nature is not
amoral. Since these ethical guidelines are grounded in evolutionary adaptability as the
foundation of ethics, this model provides the foundation for the ethical creed. As such, in the
words of Aldo Leopold regarding ethical evolution, “[m]any historical events, hitherto explained
solely in terms of human enterprise, were actually biotic, interactions between people and land.
The characteristics of the land determined the facts quite as potently as the characteristics of the
men who lived on it.”117 As J. Baird Callicott states in discussion of Leopold’s view of nature
and morality; “The biosocial analysis of human moral behavior, in which the land ethic is
grounded, is designed precisely to show that in fact intelligent moral behaviour is natural
behaviour. Hence, we are moral beings not in spite of, but in accordance with, nature.”118 Thus
“right” and moral actions and our knowledge of them are part of the natural process of the
natural world.
The emphasis on extending the moral community, like the radical ecology movement, is
also critical of the over-simplistic mechanistic view of nature. As such, it also resists the dualist
view of reality as the evolutionary story becomes the foundation and so places humanity firmly
within the rest of the biotic community. The issues of this are described in detail in chapter one,

116

J. Baird Callicott, “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Socialbiology,” 158.
Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic” A Sand Country Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River,
(New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1970), 241.
118
J Baird Callicott, “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic,” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal
Rights to Radical Ecology, Michael E. Zimmerman, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993, 101-123), 119.
117

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so I will not go into detail regarding the problems of dualistic view of reality. While radical
ecology works to dispel the dualistic tension through sacralising or mysticizing the nonhuman
world, biocentric environmental ethics seeks to dispel this dualism through scientific
evolutionary means. By grounding ethics, particularly environmental ethics in the evolutionary
narrative, this dispels any lingering division between the human and natural world. Thus one can
argue, as Rolston does, that urban, rural, and wild life are all needed for the wellbeing of three
dimensional humanity.
Callicott is right to point out that simply because our genes are selfish, this does not mean
that we are selfish; to claim such is to commit the fallacy of composition.119 However, his
method does provide a way of legitimizing a “favouring” of those closer to you which solves the
problems of deep ecology, in some respects. “And, from the same cosmic point of view, we do in
fact depend on our existence – with every breath we take, with every morsel of food we eat – on
our fellow voyagers in the odyssey of evolution.”120 As discussed in chapter one (see pages 2324) there are issues with the scale of the radical ecology movement in its solutions that undercut
or try to step outside of our subjectivity as humans. The emphasis of holistic environmental
ethics on the adaptive benefits of morality allows for the preference or protection of one’s
offspring and the importance of place in a manner which radical ecology does not.121 Resting on
the notion of natural selection, the holistic environmental ethics framework first is legitimate in
their claims that human actions are good, and second that even such results as the extinction of
other species is not necessarily a bad thing. If humans and their ethical codes are a product of
119

Although, perhaps it is more accurate to say that our genes are persistent rather than selfish.
J. Baird Callicott, “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold’s Land Ethic?,” 154.
121
Of course, as argued by Callicott in “The Conceptual Foundation of the Land Ethic,” we are encouraged through
Copernican astronomy to see the world as a “cozy home,” and thus care for the well-being of the whole, however
this concern for the whole does not necessitate that we are not legitimately allowed to show preference for those in
close proximity.
120

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evolution and the natural world is not evil then the actions of humans must also be considered
good in the same respect, when acting in accordance with the adaptive/evolutionary process. In
this respect, holistic environmental ethics “solves” the underlying contradiction of the radical
ecology movement. But further than this it is the acknowledgment that when we act within a
natural human scale that our actions are moral, even if they do result in the loss of some other
species’ lives in the building of homes, cities, farms, etc., thus showing that humans are part of
the natural world. Additionally, the biocentric environmental ethic view does not entail a false
dualistic us/them relationship between humans and the natural. As such it is consistent
evolutionary picture of the world and as such consistent with science. As Callicott states, “Once
again, it’s a question of scale. . . . The problem with anthropogenic perturbations – such as
industrial forestry and agriculture, exurban development, drift net fishing, and such – is that they
are far more frequent, widespread, and regularly occurring than are nonanthropogenic
perturbations.”122 It is only the massive rate at which we are causing death and extinction of
species and ecosystems that is at issue and thus immoral.
B. What are the Implications and Possible Problems for the Biocentric
Environmental Ethics Frameworks
1. The Benefit of the Biocentric Environmental Ethic to the Human Species
What I consider to be the greatest benefit of the biocentric conversation, particularly Callicott’s
contribution is the mentioning of the “scale” of the anthropogenic travesties. He makes a very
important distinction between the actions of humans and the large scale, perhaps even beyond
the human scale. Rolston makes a similar point with his emphasis on the necessity of the
preservation of all types of landscape for the wellbeing of three dimensional persons. The
122

Ibid, 159.

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holistic approach to environmental ethics emphasizes that the creation of culture and human
changes to the landscape are not to be stopped or immoral: Rolston by arguing that all urban,
rural, and wild landscapes are necessary for the three dimensional person and Callicott by saying
that it is simply the scale at which we are changing the landscape which is the issue. The current
rate of species extinction is bad.123 Rolston’s emphasis on the solving the problem where it lies,
of actually helping the poor makes a similar and important point. The main “good” to be
preserved is the natural scale sizes. Radical ecology, particularly deep ecology, tended to vilify
human actions which resulted in contradictions, whereas the emphasis of the goodness of natural
human scales, a scale that preserves natural scope of the species avoids the radical ecology
altogether.
2. The Cost of the Biocentric Environmental Ethics and Internal Logical Issues
The effort to ground environmental ethics in the Hume/Darwinian/Leopold model
appears to work off of the evolutionary inductive method, however, there are some inherent
problems contained within it. Firstly, the nature of induction is that it can only be proved false,
thus as the bases for a theory of an ethical framework, it entails inconsistency. This eventually
leads to a dogmatic claim for morality. Or if it is not, it is difficult to see how this type of ethics
does not rest on dogmatism. The foundation must adhere to the principle that only logical
certainty is that which can be falsified as falsifiability is the only certainty in the scientific
method. However this model asserts that ethics is always evolving. This problem is discussed
further below.
In discussion of the “type” of ethic needed for a plausible environmental ethic, Callicott,
discusses both Platonic conceptions of the “good” and Christian ethics. While, he admits that
123

J. Baird Callicott, “Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology,” 158.

65

they would solve the problem of a foundation for a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic, he
ultimately dismisses both frameworks. The first, which he refers to as holistic “rationalism,”
Callicott rejects because, although there is a standard of good it necessarily undermines the value
of the individual;124 the latter because it is “outdated and anti-scientific.”125 However, the
problem with dismissing any exterior appeal for the grounding of ethics is that the foundation for
ethics becomes solely fact based, which ends up baring a striking resemblance to the ethics of
Hume, indeed, Callicott explicitly appeals to Hume as the foundation for his ethics. Consider the
following quotation from Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, “Men are
now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to
no arguments but those which are derived from experience. It is full time they should attempt a
like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or
ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation.”126 This claim is essentially the same
that Callicott makes in his rejection of classical appeals to or notions of “the good” and in his
explanation of Leopold’s “Land Ethic.” Both the HEE and Hume use fact as the foundation of
their ethical frameworks. While it is beneficial as it provides a parsimonious base framework that
is consistent with an evolutionary view of reality, this model is not without its problems.
The problems with Hume’s ethics and the holistic environmental ethics are made
apparent by Kant’s criticism. In the “Introduction” to his Critique of Pure Reason Kant discusses
the problem between synthetic and analytic propositions on which the Critique dwells for the
remaining pages. In this introduction, Kant says the following about David Hume:
124

J. Baird Callicott, “Non-anthropocentric value systems, 303. The formulation in Platonic terms of the imitation of
the imitation in the Republic. .
125
Although many philosophers would argue otherwise, that there is no conflict between religious belief and science
and that there are rational explanations for religious belief.
126
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,
http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/klein/Assets/Hume_Morals.pdf, 6.

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“David Hume came nearest to envisioning this [problem between
synthetic and analytic], but still was very far from conceiving it
with sufficient definitiveness and universality. . . . If we accept his
conclusions, then all that we call metaphysics is a mere delusion
whereby we fancy ourselves to have rational insight into what, in
actual fact, is borrowed solely from experience, and under the
influence of custom has taken the illusory semblance of
necessity.127
This criticism of Hume by Kant, with nuances, can be applied to the Callicott/Leopold model as
well. First, as stated above, the ethics in this model are said to be evolving (see example of
Odysseus and the slave girls) and as such the claim is not for an objective morality as such. So
one may try and argue that the objection does not stand as the moral code is not claiming any sort
of “necessity.” However, there are problems with this type of reply and ultimately the criticism
stands. The Callicott/Leopold model falls into the same error as the Logical Positivists with their
“verification principle:” the same problem as David Hume. How can we infer the “ought” from
the “is?” Their model entails logical incoherence in the statement of moral truths. For although
Callicott appeals to the inherent goodness of the concern for “otherness” as the foundation for his
ethics, there is no reason supplied for why being concerned for others is necessarily a good thing.
While I agree, that concern for others’ wellbeing is a good thing, Callicott’s simple assertion that
this notion is the foundation of his ethics does not make it necessarily good.

127

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2007, 55.

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The issue for the Callicott/Leopold model is that, while it may not perpetuate the
fact/value distinction he argues that the facts are the foundation for the value; the “is” produces
the “ought.” Consider the following argument from Callicott:
Why therefore are anthropogenic clear cuts, beach developments,
hydroelectric impoundments, and the like environmentally
unethical? As such, they are not. Once again, it’s a question of
scale. . . . The problem with anthropogenic perturbations – such as
industrial forestry and agriculture, exurban development, drift net
fishing, and such – is that they are far more frequent, widespread,
and regularly occurring than are nonanthropogenic
perturbations.128
In the above passage, Callicott definitively states that the problem with human changes to the
landscape is that they are being done at an unprecedented large scale and that scale is immoral.
While I happen to agree with him in the judgement in the immorality of the scale, his reasoning
is problematic. This statement appeals to some sort of objective or external standard of truth.
One can observably say that this type of action is unprecedented, but then to condemn it as
immoral makes a judgment beyond what is observable. Presumably there are those who would
disagree with that statement as well – those making profits off of this type of mass subjugation of
the natural world for example – thus to call out their actions as immoral, one has to appeal to
something other than the facts. However, Callicott already dismissed any notion of “goodness”
beyond the working of natural selection as a legitimate appeal. One cannot begin with induction
as the foundation or framework for ethics and end up with statements like “this action is
128

J. Baird Callicott, “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Social Biology Undermine Leopold’s Land Ethic?” From
Animal Rights, 159.

68

immoral.” Again, while I agree with Callicott in many of his conclusions, it appears that the
rational he uses in getting to them is little more than a dogmatic assertion that some actions are
good and others are not.
The above discussion of the Kantian critique of Hume in reference to criticism of
Callicott is relevant for two reasons. First, Kant anachronistically provides legitimate and
concerning objections to Callicott’s position. Second Rolston and Taylor’s position, where it
differs from the Leopold/Callicott model, is built upon a Kantian framework, so the introduction
of Kantian ethics helps to highlight the objections to Rolston/Taylor below.
The Rolston model, while it follows some aspects of the Darwinian model adheres to a
more Kantian duty ethic than an empirical adaptability model. Rolston, begins his article
“Challenges in Environmental Ethics” by arguing that the “is” and “ought” are not so far away in
the moral realm by appealing to a duty that we have as humans to act morally towards the rest of
the biotic community. Rolston’s method or ethical framework is a duty based ethic. One cannot
help but think of Kant when “duty” and “ethics” are coupled. Rolston appeals to the intrinsic
value of all species as the duty to act morally towards the rest of the biotic community.129 One
could argue that Kant makes the exact opposite appeal, especially as he begins his duty ethic in
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals with the following statement: “There is no possibility
of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good
without qualification, except a good will.”130 However, the method of justification for their
respective duty ethics is strikingly similar. Consider the following statement from Kant, “all

129

Holmes Rolston, III, “Challenges in Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to
Radical Ecology, Edited Michael Zimmerman, Second Edition, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1998, 124-144, 143.
130
Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysical of Morals with On a Supposed Right to Lie because of
Philanthropic Concerns, Third Edition, Translated by James W. Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 7.

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imperatives are expressed by an ought and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of
reason to a will that is not necessarily determined by this law because of its subjective
constitution (the relation of necessitation).”131 The appeal to the “ought” is frequently made by
both Kant and Rolston throughout their respective ethics. However, the similarity in method is
made apparent through the following quotation from Kant:
And just in this lies the paradox that merely the dignity of
humanity as rational nature without any further end or advantage to
be thereby gained – and hence respect for a mere idea – should yet
serve as an inflexible precept for the will; and that just this very
independence of maxims from all such incentives should constitute
the sublimity of maxims and the worthiness of every rational
subject to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends, for
otherwise he would have to be regarded as subject only to the
natural law of his own needs.132
This lengthy quotation contains many key concepts for the justification of Kant’s ethic and
undeniable similarities to Rolston’s Kantian environmental ethic, as well as some important
differences. Explicitly, this passage states that Kant’s ethic is anti-consequentialist; regardless of
the outcome, members of the rational community are owed respect, for simply being the type of
being that they are.133 If the rational member is not owed respect then it may be treated as simply
a means or something to be used like the natural non-human world. There are two very important
things to note: 1) the intrinsic value and consequent duty that the members within have to act
131

Ibid, 24.
Ibid, 43.
133
Note that “dignity” in the Grounding is often translated as “intrinsic value” as well: in text note in The Grounding
for the Metaphysics of Morals, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf, 33.
132

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morally to those members within that specific community; 2) Kant considers it morally
permissible to “use” those who do not hold “rational membership.” Rolston appeals to the notion
of intrinsic value as the justification for his environmental ethics. In his method of argument, the
duty that we have to act morally is the same as Kant’s appeal. Consider: “we always shape our
values in significant measure in accord with our notion of the kind of universe that we live in,
and this drives our sense of duty.”134
What is excellent about Rolston, is that he, in some senses, obliterates the is/ought
distinction, which is certainly a beneficial element to his moral theory. However, it is difficult to
see what he is grounding his theory in, as he takes natural selection as the starting ground.
Rolston, wishing to avoid the problem that the Leopold/Callicott model entails, through his
appeal to the intrinsic value, appeals to a Kantian version of intrinsic value. Otherwise, he is left
in the position of simply asserting that the natural world is good just because it is.
Others would argue that a Kantian ethic provides a plausible and coherent foundation for
environmental ethics. For example, John Martin Gillroy argues that Immanuel Kant provides an
environmental ethic that contributes to the two separate debates within the current environmental
ethic conversation. He argues that Kant’s theory of autonomy should be at the heart of
environmental policy making as it defines the human duties to both nature and humanity through
its focus on inherent worth. Likewise, the Kantian environmental ethic is comprehensive as it
supports the conservation of resources for human perfection as well as promoting intrinsically
valuable components of ecosystems.135

134

Holmes Rolston, III, “Challenges in Environmental Ethics,” 143.
Gillroy, John Martin. “Kantian Ethics and Environmental Policy Argument: Autonomy, Ecosystem Integrity, and
Our Duties to Nature.” Ethics and the Environment Vol. 3 No. 2. (1998) 131-155.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40338948.
135

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While it is helpful to ground Rolston’s ethic in a classical framework, with all of the
support that history offers, the problems or challenges that accompany Kantian ethics accompany
Rolston’s method as well. As Alasdair MacIntyre states, “So ‘Keep your promises throughout
your entire life except on’, ‘Persecute all those who old false religious beliefs’ and ‘Always eat
mussels on Mondays in March’ will all pass Kant’s test, for all can be consistently
universalized.”136 And, while eating mussels on Mondays actually sounds like a great addition to
universal morality claims, it illustrates the inherent problems with a morality based on the
categorical imperative; simply because we all may wish to make something a universal law, does
necessitate that that law or wish is actually good. However, there is a far deeper problem with
Kantian ethics as the foundation for a biocentric environmental ethic.
Kant’s notion of the inherent value or worth of rational beings is our capacity for a priori
reasoning. A priori knowledge provides the unifying concepts with which we understand the
empirical world. Kant’s argument for the ability of reason to understand the empirical world is
built upon the recognition that there is a fundamental difference between humans and the other
species; reason is a faculty singular to humans that gives us the ability to understand the rest of
the empirical world. As he states in the Critique:
But the law of nature is just this, that nothing takes place without a
cause sufficiently determined a priori. The proposition that no
causality is possible save in accordance with laws of nature, when
taken in unlimited universality, is therefore self-contradictory; and
this cannot, therefore, be regarded as the sole kind of causality. . . .
This is transcendental freedom, without which, even in the
136

Alasdair MacIntryre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Third Edition, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2010, 46.

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[ordinary] course of nature, the series of appearances on the side of
the causes can never be complete.137
The very foundation for our ability to understand the natural world, on which his ethics is built,
is that we, as rational creatures, are distinct from the rest of the natural world. Furthermore,
although Kant does argue that morality must be lived, it cannot be known in any empirical
manner. However, that claim goes against the foundational assumption of the environmental
ethics worldview: humans have evolved through natural processes and are not distinct from the
natural world. Biocentric environmental ethics seeks to dispel the distinction of humanity as the
foundation for their ethics but this distinction is precisely what Kantian ethics is built upon.138
Thus an attempt to resolve the problems that come from a Humean ethic by shifting to a Kantian
framework, still entail all of the potential issues with Kantian morality, but also bring more
problems to the table. Extending the community in the Kantian ethics to include all of the biotic
community either forces abilities on species that they do not have or entail us to necessarily
exclude some species or existing elements of the biotic community from moral responsibility.
Kantian ethics provides the reason for why we must act morally however, it rests on the
distinctness of humanity. If we are to dismiss anthropocentrism and appeal to a biocentric
foundation for ethics, the Kantian framework needs to establish a reason other than the capacity
for reason to act morally. At the very least, it must give a reason not to treat nature as simply a
means, as the justification for treating persons as members of the “kingdom of ends” rest on the
notion of pure reason. While this may be possible, within a Kantian environmental ethic, such a
137

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2007, 410.
138
It must be noted however that in his distinctions Kant is not implying that reality is dualistic; his distinctions are
in relation to one reality. As he says in the Critique, “Taken together, the analogies thus declare that all appearances
lie, and must lie, in one nature, because without this a priori unity no unity of experience, and therefore no
determination of objects in it, would be possible.” Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by
Norman Kemp Smith, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, 237.

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framework requires more nuance and thought to bring about an “ends” justification of the natural
world.
III. Conclusion
The biocentric environmental ethics movements rest on the foundation of the Darwinian
evolutionary theory. These ethical frameworks, working within existing ethical models, largely
adhere to David Hume’s or Immanuel Kant’s moral theories. While there is certainly some
elements of these theories that are beneficial to thinking about environmental issues shifting
from anthropocentric moral theories to biocentric theories entail issues with these shifts, as many
of the foundational reasons are inherently anthropocentric, and as such entail logical
inconsistencies or at the very least problems that require further thought. Additionally, while I
agree with many of the criticisms of current human actions and many of the conclusions put
forward in these theories, the foundational logical structure requires shifting in order to stand up
to rational scrutiny, particularly the Hume/Leopold/Callicott foundation as explained above.
However, the emphasis of the goodness of the natural scale is a crucial point in the development
of a plausible environmental ethic that must not be downplayed.

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Chapter 3: Shifting the Moral Structure for the Environmental Ethics: Re-Thinking the
Human Factor
“Men did not love Rome because she was great. She was great because they had loved her.”
-

G.K. Chesterton.

I. Should We Reconsider the Human Element?
This chapter considers and adopts the ideas of four different thinkers and applies them to
central concerns from left over from chapters 1 and 2. The thinkers in this section are not all
environmental philosophers, however their ideas present possibilities for resolving the conflicts
of the radical ecology and environmental ethics frameworks. While these writers discuss
different topics from global economy to the scientific method to the history of the English
countryside, the central theme that undergirds each of their texts is the focus on some aspect of
the uniqueness and importance of the human species. It is not a dwelling on the human species as
a method of dismissing the importance, intrinsic value, or beauty of other members of the biotic
community, but an embrace of our species and the qualities we have in the recognition of our
subjectivity that we cannot step outside. Thus in order to present a plausible and coherent
environmental ethic, we must recognize humanity’s qualities and abilities: recall, the problems
left over from Chapters One and Two were a result of too hasty a dismissal of the human species
or of some of our attributes.
A. Aldo Leopold Reconsidered with Notes from Berthold-Bond
While Leopold is commonly lauded as articulating the necessity of a new interpretation of ethics
to incorporate the “land ethic,” perhaps his most significant contribution is his emphasis on the
necessity of humans to live in and love the land that should be maintained. This point is
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commonly overlooked or dismissed as a naïve appeal to sentimentality;139 however, this
sentimentality is of central importance and lends coherence to his theory in The Sand County
Almanac as a whole. Of central importance is his distinction that we mourn the loss of a species.
While the emphasis is often put on Leopold’s insistence of the extension of moral obligation to
include the whole biotic community, his point that the human species is unique is commonly
overlooked: an oversight that can cause the breakdown of his whole approach to a land ethic.
There are many places through A Sand Country Almanac in which Leopold appeals to the human
capacity of love. In reference to Leopold’s Sand Country Almanac, John Gatta says, “Leopold
expressed the heartfelt sentiments of a distinctly defined personality who loved a certain plot of
land in Wisconsin and could not live without knowing wild things.”140 He continues by saying,
“developing a right relation to land meant enlarging one’s capacity to love. Stirring this impulse
to love was, of course, crucial to Leopold’s rhetorical purpose in the Almanac.”141 Gatta’s
emphasis on the importance of love as central to Leopold’s land ethic is accurate. For there are
many times throughout that Leopold makes this appeal, as in the following quotation:
For one species to mourn the death of another is a new thing under
the sun. The Cro-Magnon who slew the last mammoth thought
only of steaks. . . . But we, who have lost our pigeons, mourn the
loss. Had the funeral been ours, the pigeons would hardly have

139

The criticism of Leopold as being overly sentimental is the one which Callicott addressed in his article “The
Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic,” as discussed in Chapter 2, in which he argue that there are strong
philosophical arguments underpinning ‘The Land Ethic” and that it does not rest simply on sentimental affection.
140
John Gatta, Making Nature Sacred: Literature, Religion, and Environment in America from the Puritans to the
Present, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 58.
141
Ibid, 58.

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mourned us. In this fact [. . .] lies objective evidence of our
superiority over the beasts.142
There are three essential things to note from this passage. First, Leopold emphasises our
mourning of the loss because we love the pigeons. Second, entailed by this, working from the
Darwinian model is the fact that we are in community, or to use Leopold’s term, “kinship” with
the pigeons. Third, and what is most commonly overlooked, is that although, we are in
community with the other species, Leopold does explicitly say that there is a natural hierarchy of
species and places humanity, because of our unique ability to feel sadness over the loss of
another species, at the top.
Another telling story from SCA is from his chapter “Thinking Like a Mountain,” in which
he recalls the shooting of the wolves for the “sake” of the deer. Upon encountering the dying
wolf, Leopold says, “We reached the old wolf in time to watch a fierce green fire dying in her
eyes. I realised then, and have known ever since, that there was something new to me in those
eyes – something known only to her and the mountain.”143 Leopold continues to explain how that
encounter with the wolf, dying by his own hand, changed how he viewed the ecology of the
mountain. But what is essential is that it was an encounter of individuals – he needed to see the
wolf and recognise the life slipping from her in a personal encounter in order to understand the
significance of the useless death. In the abstract, he was happy to go about shooting wolves for
the “sake” of the deer population. The personal interaction with the life of the wolf allowed
Leopold to see and recognize the value of that life. While it is a love that is manifested through
living in a place, thus creating a knowledge of the places that are to be preserved, it is a love that

142

Aldo Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac and Sketches Here and There, New York: Oxford University Press,
1968, 110.
143
Ibid, 130.

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can only be developed through this knowledge and in knowing and living the love deepens – it is
a natural growth of knowledge and affection.
Of central importance to this appeal of love it that it is a personal love of places and
species that is at the heart of the land ethics. It is a mutual giving and receiving of knowledge and
love but can only be done within the bounds of our experience and personal interactions.
Because of the personal love at the centre of this land ethic, the scale of the endeavor must
remain to a human scale. As soon as the process or the framework exceeds our capacity to know
on the human scale the proportions get lost and the nucleus of the land ethics gets shifted to the
sidelines or lost in the renovation. However, when this happens, the logic of the land ethic, as the
centre is off balance, becomes incoherent and the farther it exceeds the scale the more incoherent
it becomes. At this juncture the appeal to human scale sounds like a quaint appeal but with little
philosophical foundation, however, there are several key concepts from the thinkers examined
below that provide philosophical clout to this claim.
In “The Ethics of ‘Place’: Reflections on bioregionalism,” Berthold-Bond discusses
bioregional theory with regards to aspects of Leopold’s SCA in order to establish a plausible
foundation for environmental ethics. He argues that environmental ethics has become a
“subversive philosophy of space.” Biocentric theories of environmental ethics, as opposed to
anthropocentric ones, “dis-place” humans from their positions as the possessors of value and that
we are just a part of a community of nature – a community which is inherently valuable as a
whole.144 Since biocentric theories of environmental ethics are essentially about philosophies of
place, bioregionalism is concerned with, “locating place more precisely and concretely.”145 As a

144

Daniel Berthold-Bond, “The Ethics of ‘Place’: Reflections on Bioregionalism,” Environmental Ethics, 22 (2000):
5-24, 10.
145
Ibid, 10.

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theory, bioregionalism calls us to question the political systems that mask their pillaging of the
environment and to “re-place” the politics of ecology. It is a call to “live in a place,” rather than
to “live placelessly.” “Living-in-place,” although a call to nature, easily gets romanticized and
can turn to a worship of the laws of nature or view nature as the guide. Essential to “living-inplace,” Berthold-Bond argues is the human element, the creative, meaning imposing, subjects
who interact with nature to create a “place.”146 The subject is essential to the definition of place,
and consequently bioregionalism, as it is the subject working within the natural context which
creates the place initially. Berthold-Bond quotes Dodge, saying, “the very gut of bioregional
thought is the integrity of natural systems and culture, with the function of culture being the
mediation of the self and the ecosystem.”147 However quite often, Berthold-Bond argues theories
can swing too far from the consideration of nature’s laws and look solely to the cultural aspect of
place to define “living-in-place.” A method that is equally as problematic as it’s opposite.148
Finally, Berthold-Bond argues that the elusive nature of the definition of “place” or
“region” within bioregionalism is because it is itself a relational structure; “it comes into being as
a response of inhabitants to the landscape in which they dwell.”149 Because of the relational
nature of regions, there can be no purely objective definition as places are never static. Place is
never “finished,” as the response of inhabitants to the landscape can never be predicted. Place is
therefore inherently vague, a, “quality without name,” as Berthold-Bond quotes Christopher
Alexander.
Although Berthold-Bond does criticize the romanticizing of nature in the theories of
some bioregional literature, he argues, the spiritual nature that Leopold emphasizes in “Sketches”
146

Ibid, 15.
(Dodge, 109, in Berthold-Bond 16).
148
Ibid, 16.
149
Ibid, 17.
147

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is not necessarily a part of this romanticizing. Conversely, Berthold-Bond maintains that
bioregionalists are interested in the spiritual redemption of the individuals through their
connection/immersion in a place. Bioregionalism calls for a fundamental paradigm shift in the
way in which we interact and view nature whose success is achieved through even one
individual’s life becoming more fulfilled. In this manner, Berthold-Bond claims, Leopold is
correct in emphasizing the spiritual component to one’s immersion in the land. By experiencing
places, as a space of mystery, a place which cannot easily be understood, where there is
“something to learn”; “he seeks to learn a different way . . . . where in order to know the marsh
we objectify it and hence become blind to it, but by digging himself into it, by giving himself
over to it. As such, he becomes transformed.”150 Therefore, the interaction of the person with
place is not only essential to our understanding and definition of region or place, but also, our
identity as persons becomes transformed through our interaction with places. It is a constant give
and take by which places and persons exist in a condition of ever becoming through their
relationship.151
B. Small is Beautiful: The Need for the Human Scale
1. E.F Schumacher
E. F. Schumacher provides a thorough and convincing argument for the value and
necessity of maintaining a human scale in order to establish a genuine and plausible economy.
He begins his work Small is Beautiful with reference to a 1930 address by economist Lord
Keynes which proposed that, “the day might not be far off when everybody would be rich”
however, he cautioned that time is not yet, instead, “For at least another hundred years we must

150

Ibid, 24.
This section also used in a comparative review of articles in “place theory” for PHIL 607 submitted to Myron A.
Penner, December 15, 2016.
151

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pretend to ourselves and to every one that fair is foul and foul is fair; precaution must be our
gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into
daylight.”152 Keynes argues that in order for the world to be rid of poverty we must overturn
morality and create wealth with no regard for the means by which we do so. Schumacher in
Small is Beautiful argues against Keynes claiming it is not possible for a nation build on wealth
to ever have enough. What is enough? Schumacher asks; “There are poor societies which have
too little; but where is the rich society that says: ‘Halt! We have enough’? There is none.”153
Small is Beautiful shifts the focus of economics from concern over the amalgamation of wealth
to a concern over the well-being of humanity as a whole and considers the philosophical
approaches to ecology, politics, and economies that are necessary in order to do so.
Schumacher’s chapter “Development” analyses the phenomenon of developing countries.
The two largest sources of concern in developing nations, he argues, are mass unemployment
and mass migration to cities. Many look at the problem and recognize the need, but then suggest
that the solution lies in more aid.154 However, Schumacher argues that the root of the problem
lies in the “dual” economy that exists in these countries; two completely distinct ways of life
existing side by side. The humblest income of the “modern sector” consisting of roughly fifteen
percent of the population far exceeds the possible income of the most diligent of the other eightyfive percent. The concept of evolution, Schumacher argues has influenced all areas of thought,
except for development economics. In development economics we still think in terms of
creation. Doing so, fixes the recipient of aid as a material object that can be “planned and

152

Schumacher, E. F. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Harper and Row, 1973, 22.
Ibid, 23.
154
In the case of the deep ecologists, such as Naesse, Sessions, and Devall, the method of solving this problem is to
decrease the population.
153

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scheduled and purchased with money.”155 Undoubtedly, he argues, the problem lies with poverty.
However, Schumacher argues that the level of poverty “degrades and stultifies the human
person” and thus the problem cannot be fixed solely with goods. The real solution “starts with
people and their education.”156 He argues that until we have concern for the person as the whole
person and not simply for their material needs that the possibility of their economic growth will
remain latent.157
Schumacher argues that in our excitement over our scientific and technological
capability, we have built a system of production that, “ravishes nature and a type of society that
mutilates man.”158 Commonly the solution is regarded as one of money; if we had more money,
then we could solve the problems that we face. This system that we have built places the
accumulation of wealth as the highest goal, the pursuit of which can “justify” any action. In
regards, to the second development decade Schumacher states “[it] will be no better than those of
the first unless there is a conscious and determined shift of emphasis from goods to people.
Indeed, without such a shift the results of aid will become increasingly destructive.”159 Although
he is speaking specifically towards the growth of economies in developing countries in this
passage, this principle is applied to his theory through Small is Beautiful. Until the primary
concern of our society shifts from the production and accumulation of wealth to the well-being
of those dwelling within, we will continue to wreak havoc on and exploit the land and its more

155

Ibid, 138.
Ibid, 140.
157
This passage sounds strikingly similar to the reasoning of Holmes Rolston, III for why the urban, rural, and wild
landscapes must be preserved – for the well-being of the whole, three dimensional person – the person as a whole
should be looked after, not just one element of his or her being.
158
Schumacher, E. F. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Harper and Row, 1973, 246.
This claim of Schumacher’s is very similar to the problem that the Radical Ecologists and the Holistic
Environmental Ethicists, are trying to fix as well – they are identifying the same problem, but with drastically
different approaches to the solution.
159
Ibid, 160.
156

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vulnerable members. Thus our society instead of being focused on the actual needs of humanity
is built upon greed and the material wants of a few at the cost of the dignity, value, and humanity
of the many.
2. Oliver Rackham & Robert MacFarlane
Through his exploration of the history of the English countryside, Oliver Rackham raises
some significant issues and key concepts to developing a plausible and practical environmental
ethic. In The History of the Countryside, he states, “Tree-planting is not synonymous with
conservation; it is an admission that conservation has failed.”160 At the beginning of the chapter,
“Conservation,” from which this sentence is taken, Rackham explains that there are four types of
losses that the landscape undergoes: 1) the loss of beauty, “especially that exquisite beauty of the
small and complex and unexpected, of frog-orchids or sundews or dragonflies;”161 2) loss of
freedom; 3) loss of historic vegetation; 4) and the loss about which he is the most concerned, the
loss of meaning.162 Citing historical texts and the continuation of the countryside in France and
other countries, Rackham argues that the cause of the loss of meaning and landscapes is not
necessity or human need. Instead, Rackham argues that it is monetary gain and the “blight of
tidiness” which result in the loss of landscapes. As the “meaning infusing” species, we have
shifted the value of profits over meaning with regards to the countryside in the United Kingdom.
Thus his point, in regards to the planting of trees being the failure of conservation, is the
manifestation of money being valued over meaning and nature itself until we are driven to the
point of this recognition and driven to the point of needing to re-plant: it emphasises the point
that the land has already lost meaning.
160

Oliver Rackham, The History of the Countryside: The Class History of Britain’s Landscape, Flora, and Fauna,
London: The Orion Publishing Group Ltd., 1988, 29.
161
Ibid, 25-26.
162
Ibid, 26.

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In reference to the four losses that Rackham distinguished in his History of the
Countryside, Robert MacFarlane says the following, “Oliver Rackham describes four ways in
which ‘landscape is lost’ . . . . I admire the way that aesthetics, human experience, ecology and
semantics are given parity in his list. Of these losses the last is hardest to measure. But it is clear
that there is now less need to know in detail the terrains beyond our towns and cities, unless our
relationships with them are in some way professionally or recreationally specialized.”163 By
dwelling on the language of places, MacFarlane builds on Rackham’s expression of the loss of
meaning of landscapes. The use of language, the naming of places, cultivates a knowledge and
love of place that allows for the possibility of conservation. Macfarlane is not naïve in thinking
that words will magically inspire or re-enchant a population to become naturalists, but, as he
states, “Rather that they might offer a vocabulary which is ‘convivial’ as the philosopher Ivan
Illich intended the word – meaning enriching of life, stimulating to the imagination and
‘encouraging creative relations between people, and people and nature’.”164 The emphasis on
language, is the necessary first step in cultivating a harmonious relationship between humans and
the nonhuman world and rests heavily on our ability to find meaning and gives names to the
nonhuman places in which we dwell.
In his anthologizing of place-terms, MacFarlane highlights the connection between the
instilling of meaning and the affection we derive from the knowledge of places. The following
quotation makes the point that it is not a homogenous “environment” that we are working to save
but different and particular places and because of these different particulars it must be particular
and individual loves – rather than a commitment to the preservation of “nature” while abusing
the particular places, as he states, “For there is no single mountain language, but a range of
163
164

Robert MacFarlane, Landmarks, United Kingdom: Random House, 2015.
Ibid, 9.

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mountain languages; no one coastal language, but a fractal of coastal languages; no lone tree
language, but a forest of tree languages.”165 This difference is also addressed in Rackham’s point
on the deterioration of the English countryside. It is the meaning and the language as connected
to the people living there who can instill and derive meaning from landscapes. Or as Macfarlane
beautifully articulates, “To celebrate the lexis of landscape is not nostalgic, but urgent. . . . to
defend what we love we need a particularizing language, for we love what we particularly
know.’”166
3. P.B. Medawar & the Human Aspect of Induction
As the evolutionary theory and the naturalization of ethics is the foundation of the
morality and the basis for an environmental ethics in chapter 2, it is worth looking at P. B.
Medawar’s The Uniqueness of the Individual, particularly his chapter “A Note on ‘The Scientific
Method.’” Medawar argues that what is of great interest to scientists is that hypotheses get
“devised” at all. He states, “Its creation is evidently a leap upstream of the flow of deductive
inference. One does not, as writers of detective fiction stories seem to imagine, deduce
hypotheses; quite the reverse, hypotheses are what we deduce things from.”167 He continues with
the following, “The creation of an hypothesis is akin to, and just as obscure in origins as, any
other creative act of the mind. If science were an art we should call it inspiration, but as only
astronomy has a Muse that will not do.”168 Medawar argues that the hypothesis comes from a
creative act of the mind – perhaps more formally called abduction – the crucial point is that
scientific discovery rests, in a sense, on the human imagination or creativity. This is not to

165

Ibid, 11.
Ibid, 11.
167
P. B. Medawar, The Uniqueness of the Individual, New York: Basic Books Inc., first printing 1957, a published
domain book, 73.
168
Ibid 73-74.
166

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suggest that we arbitrarily create the laws of nature but simply that there is a specifically human
way of knowing that our scientific knowledge rests upon. Even though we have the capacity to
abstract we cannot transcend our species and become what Firth argues as “ideal observers.”169
This idea will be discussed at some length before returning to Medawar’s ideas and contributions
of scientific thought with reference to this paper.
Peter van Inwagen argues, contrary to the ideas presented in Medawar that scientific
know-ability rests on a human scale, that there is objective know ability in science distinct from
any human subjectivity. Arguing specifically against the pragmatists, van Inwagen states that
simply because a word is vague, this does not change the truth value of the concrete facts. He
responds citing the height of Mount Everest as an example. Most would not contest that Mount
Everest is 8,847.7 metres high. Neither can this fact be refuted by appealing to the relationship of
tall to small things; there is concreteness to this number that has no bearing on any relationship.
Furthermore it is in no way contingent on any type of human knowledge or human influence. As
van Inwagen states; “If no human had ever evolved, and if no other intelligent beings inhabited
the earth, the vast, slow collision of the Indian subcontinent with the continent of Asia, which is
what caused […] the rise of the Himalayan Mountains [it] would have occurred in exactly the
fashion that it did.”170 As there is no human influence and consequently no mind to refer
relationship, this fact of the height of Mount Everest is an objective truth not subject to the
relativity of human understanding and limitation. Thus by simply measuring the height of the
mountain we can learn the objective, impersonal, fact about its height.171

169

Firth, Roderick. “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, VIl.
12, No. 3 (March 1952), 317-345, 319
170
Van Inwagen, Peter. “Objectivity.” http://jeffsnapper.org/assets/vaninwagenobj.pdf, 528-529, 238.
171
Example used in Philosophy of Competing Paradigms paper, submitted December 31, 2015.

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Empirical knowledge is not simply subject to our whim nor does this mean that it is
completely relative but that we have human lenses through which we view the material world,
which we cannot remove. Van Inwagen is correct in pointing out that since the evolution of
humankind has had no influence (or as far as we can tell) on the collision of the subcontinents
that we have no influence on the actual fact of the mountain. However, from this, he concludes
that we can then know the objective, non-human-influenced, height of the mountain. This
conclusion is too hasty and simply overlooks the human aspect to further conclude that it is not
present. Metres are an efficient way to measure the height of the mountain; they are large enough
that there is the possibility of encompassing the vast height of the mountain but small enough or
to enough to a human scale that we can understand what a metre looks like and thus further grasp
that over 8000 metres is quite large. Certainly Mount Everest is 8,847.7 metres high but what if it
is measured in millimetres? Each millimetre unit is placed on each surface of the mountain
measuring around each uneven surface or jutting edge of each stone. Measured this way the
mountain would be much taller than 8000 metres once all of the millimetres were added together.
Measuring Mount Everest with millimetres seems ridiculous, but it is only ridiculous because it
so impractical to us. For an ant this may be a completely practical way of measuring the height
of the mountain because this unit of measure is to the scale of the ant. Thus the relationship of
the person to the objective size of the mountain is relevant. When measured in a specific way,
using metres, the mountain is a specific height but what are the reasons that we use this specific
method of measuring and this unit of height? The reasons for this method of measuring are
because they are to our human scale. Our way of measuring has no bearing on the actual states of
affairs of the mountain (although this is allowing that we overlook the fact that the human has to
determine where the mountain is distinct from the rest of the land thus determining which point it
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ought to be measured from) in this van Inwagen is correct but in terms of “objectively” knowing
the height of the mountain we must accept that we know the height only in relation to how it
pertains to us.172 We can objectively know the height of the mountain in metres but it is the
relation of the metre to our human scale or size that measures the mountain in metres in the first
place; we subjectively know that it is objectively true that Mount Everest is 8,847.7 metres.
Similarly, Medawar argues that all of scientific inquiry rests on two pillars, which
together form the “metatheory” without which reason cannot rest: logical syntax and semantics.
As he states, “logical syntax, deals with the concepts of formal truth and falsity and the
ordinances that govern the activity of deducing. . . . semantics, more recent origin and lay circles
now more fashionable, deal with the theory of the meanings of words and the ideas of material
truth and falsity.”173 This cooperation of the content and form of truth and falsity in the scientific
endeavor does not underwrite the existence of facts or logical form outside of our understanding,
but simply that since we are doing the understanding the content cannot be excluded from the
form and the content comes with our human-infused preferences or ideas.
4. Wendell Berry
Finally, Wendell Berry offers the concept of “affection” that is essential to the
development of a plausible environmental ethic. In his lecture “It All Turns on Affection,”
Wendell Berry makes the distinction between “stickers” and “boomers.” “Boomers” are those
who want to exploit the land, with an eye only to monetary gain and after having done so, to live
their lives work-free and wealthy, whereas, “Stickers on the contrary are motivated by affection,

172

Of course there may be benefits to knowing the height of the mountain in millimetres or various other
unorthodox means of measurement but these too would gain their value through our human lense even if it is just
because we would like to know how it is an ant would measure Mount Everest.
173
P.B. Medawar, “A Note on the Scientific Method,” The Uniqueness of the Individual, New York: Basic Book
Publishers Inc., 74.

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by such love for a place and its life that they want to preserve it and remain in it.”174 Driven by
“boomers” the current economy ignores the land economy, in the interests of dollars and cents.
The love of land and the well-being of the land is preserved only through the love of the
“sticker.” As he states in reference to his family ties to their historical land, “if we had not lived
there to be reminded and to remember, nobody would have remembered. If we, like most of our
generation, had moved away, the place with its memories would have been lost to us and we to
it. . . . I am fairly literally flesh of its flesh.”175 Berry emphasises the bond between himself and
the land, acknowledging that he is made by the land – he is dependent upon it and it has become
a part of him. However, this ability rests on the fact that he loves the land, a love cultivated
through personal and experiential knowledge of it. A personal love that lives through the
memory and the interaction between himself and the land, as he states:
But the risk, I think, is only that affection is personal. If it is not
personal, it is nothing; we don’t, at least, have to worry about
governmental or corporate affection. And one of the endeavors of
human cultures, from the beginning, has been to qualify and direct
the influence of emotion. The word ‘affection’ and the terms of
value that cluster around it – love, care, sympathy, mercy,
forbearance, respect, reverence – have histories and meanings that
raise the issue of worth. We should, as our culture has warned us
over and over again, give our affection to things that are true, just,

174

Wendell Berry, “It All Turns on Affection,” It All Turns on Affection: The Jefferson Lecture and Other Essays,
11.
175
Ibid, 12.

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and beautiful. When we give affection to things that are
destructive, we are wrong.176
The personal love rests on our ability to show and experience love as persons (which
admittedly sounds like a tautology), which further rests on the capacity to interact with those
whom we love on a personal level – entailing a love within the human scale. To illustrate the
importance of the human scale to personal love, Berry uses the example of the industrialization
of the tobacco industry and its relationship with his grandfather.
Berry explains that the industrialist James B. Duke, was a man who in his early years
would have known those similar to Berry’s grandfather. In later years as the tobacco industry
grew in size, the farmers, such as Berry’s grandfather, become removed and as such reduced to a
mere statistic, or in Berry’s terms, as “negligible detail;” once seen in this regard, they could be
dismissed or hurt with little or no concern. The size and distance caused by the industry removed
any feeling of “community” or care from those persons and as such the land that was their
heritage, home, and method of provision, could be used for monetary growth without a care to
the loss of those dwelling therein. As Berry states, “Power deals ‘efficiently’ with quantities that
affection cannot recognize.”177 However, as Berry argues, this size and the resulting power of
industrialism, for industrialisms’ sake, rests on the notion that the land and the people can be
“divorced without harm.”178 And furthermore in this divorce, that the human prospect can be
brightened through subjugation and exploitation of the land for wealth’s sake. However, this is
not the case, as Berry states, “But land abuse cannot brighten the human prospect. There is in
fact no distinction between the fate of the land and the fate of the people. When one is abused,

176

Ibid, 15.
Ibid, 16.
178
Ibid, 18.
177

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the other suffers.”179 Resting on the notion that we are intrinsically connected to the land by
trying to separate that connection and exploit the one ultimately ends up as a misuse and/or abuse
of the other. However, this does not necessitate that all persons become farmers or should not
have jobs in industries, offices, etc., simply that the exploitation of the land cannot be done
without an exploitation of humanity as well.
In our current age we are unwilling to accept the physical limitations of our species and
endeavor to step outside the bounds of our physicality. As Berry states, “Now the two great aims
of industrialism – replacement of people by technology and concentration of wealth into the
hands of a small plutocracy – seem close to fulfillment.”180 These aims are the opposite of the
foundations of nature and culture which are, according to Berry, “The fertility cycle turns by the
law of nature. The cultural cycle turns on affection.”181 “In my region and within my memory,
for example, human life has become less creaturely and more engineered, less familiar and more
remote from local places, resources, pleasures, and associations. Our knowledge, in short, has
become increasingly statistical.”182 Statistical knowledge is known by means of “facts” or “data.”
This type of knowledge assumes an ownership or dominion over the knowledge, which is
inherently problematic if we “know” our land solely in this manner. As he states, “Statistical
knowledge is remote, and it isolates us in our remoteness.”183 As illustrated by the tale about his
grandfather, this type of removed-knowing also allows us to inflict harm easily and without care,
as it is already at a distance so removed that we cannot properly care. Berry further claims,
“Propriety of scale in all human undertakings is paramount, and we ignore it. We are now betting

179

Ibid.
Ibid, 22.
181
Ibid, 23.
182
Ibid, 23.
183
Ibid, 25.
180

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our lives on quantities that far exceed all our powers of comprehension. . . . we are thus isolated
within our uniquely human boundaries, which we certainly cannot transcend or escape by means
of technological devices.”184 Berry uses the striking example of the effect on our hearts of the
knowledge of many deaths in war, as opposed to the gravity of one death fully imagined. Citing
it as a “horrible fact” that we can read in the paper of many deaths and destruction without
breaking down – a thought that ought to terrify us – this ability to receive this knowledge with
apparent apathy is because these facts have been removed beyond our scope of knowledge. He
says, “The effort to connect cities with their surrounding rural landscapes rests exactly upon the
recognition of human limits and the necessity of human scale.”185 The appropriate human scale
breeds affection for the things within that sphere and it is this affection that is necessary in order
to instill and develop a plausible environmental ethic. As Berry states, “Affection can teach us,
and soon enough, if we grant appropriate standing to affection.”186 However, in order to have,
cultivate, and receive affection, we must acknowledge our physical limits and reorient ourselves
within a natural human scale.
II. Re-adjusting the Moral Structures
A. Re-adjustment to Radical Ecology
As discussed in chapter one, one of the greatest contributions of the radical ecology movement is
that it allows for the acknowledgement of the needs and existence of beings beyond their
mechanistic parts. This aspect allows for the “sacralising” or re-enchanting of the natural world –
resulting is a mystical-type language or experience; something which Aldo Leopold (and
Christopher Alexander) refers to as “a quality without name.” Through the extension of the

184

Ibid, 25-26.
Ibid, 31.
186
Ibid, 32.
185

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ethical community to include all of the biotic community, they claim that the mechanising, usevaluing, of the nonhuman will be expunged. However, this action is primarily done through the
“stabilizing” of the human population, a solution reached through the logically incoherent
statement regarding the human species.187 Based on this claim Deep Ecologists conclude that the
number of consumers must be reduced. The increasingly larger human population, as consumers,
tends to use the nonhuman world for our own selfish needs and wants with little regard for the
well-being of the nonhuman world. As the solution to the problem of the rampant consumerism
by humans, their initial solution is to decrease the number of possible “consumers.” The radical
ecologists are correct in identifying the birth of the problem and misuse of the natural world as
stemming from the growth of the scientific revolution; the Baconian and Cartesian method of the
reduction and analysis – in its extreme form and with only this view – does appear to “justify” a
misuse. However, it is not that this is an anthropocentric “justification.” This method of viewing
the world solely in these terms also strips dignity from the human species and reduces us to little
more than “consumers” or” users.”
It is not that the anthropocentric ethic causes the misuse of the nonhuman world, but that
the interpretation or view of our species as users perpetuates that identity in our actions. In Small
is Beautiful Schumacher acknowledges that the greatest problem with our economy is poverty.
The developing countries, he argues, and indeed it would be generally acknowledged, struggle
with the mass migration to cities, starvation, etc. While the central problem is poverty, it is not
simply a lack of goods but a poverty of the whole person – inclusive of spiritual goods,
education, physical health, etc. Thus the solution is not simply throwing material goods at the

187

Again, for “stabilizing” read “decreasing:” since the populations that are increasing are in developing countries,
“stabilizing” is a soft term for preventing and controlling the births and lives of the world’s most poor and
vulnerable.

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poor in the developing countries. The criticism that Schumacher raises regarding “aid” is similar
to the solution advocated by radical ecology. On a fundamental level, the radical ecology
movement suggests that we remove the poor in order to “solve” the problem of poverty. They
couch the removal in the softer language of “stabilizing” as it is a positive word conjuring
imagery of building and strength and is certainly easier to swallow than a blunt appeal to
eradicate any possible new consumers. While it is the consumer culture that is the problem the
solution is not simply to remove possible consumers. This creates a twofold shift – it reaffirms
our understanding of humans solely as consumers while not actually addressing the problem.
Recall that this was part of the logical contradiction we were left with at the end of Chapter One.
The radical ecology emphasis on a global solution to the environmental problems we face
removes the issue from our hands and by its very scale prevents a plausible solution. As the
problem is a global one, the radical ecology movement emphasized a solution on a global scale.
Although perhaps laudable in its intent, this emphasis one a global solution perpetuates the
distance and removes the issues from the sphere of human affection – a problem addressed by
Berry above. By removing the solution from the human scale, not only does this remove the
issue from our level and capacity of affection, it is also dismissal of our manner of knowing and
our physicality. In doing so, it also removes contributions from certain members of society and
thus becomes elitist.188 By turning our attention from the human characteristics in favour of a
global way of thinking our form of action becomes ineffective. However, if we return to a
legitimate way of human action with an embrace of the uniqueness of our species to reflect, to
love, to know, then in doing so we return to the scale that will allow for plausible and positive
changes. Furthermore, this type of action does not require that we not try and implement this
188

This is something Roger Scruton address How to Think Seriously About Our Planet, as well.

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type of action and thinking on a global level, it is only the order which is reversed. We begin
with a focus on the individual persons and societies and encourage this concern for individuals
on a more global level.
Applying the concepts from each of the thinkers above to our understanding of the human
species, this can resolve the contradiction that the radical ecology espouses. We must first see the
members of our own species as the creative, meaning imbuing, beings of affection that we are:
that we cannot be reduced to our mechanistic parts and known only through our material
consumption. Recall the logical contradiction we were left with at the end of Chapter One: the
human species is not unique and must be given no special consideration over the rest of the
biotic community and the human species is unique and can cause destruction on a level far
surpassing any other member of the biotic community so this species alone must be actively
stabilized with an eye to reduction. Reason does not allow for us to genuinely accept both of
these propositions. Additionally, since the conversation about how we are causing environmental
problems is a conversation that we are having the second proposition appears self-evidently true.
However, the first part of the second proposition is only self-evident; it is not self-evident that
the human species must be reduced, nor do I think it necessary. Once we accept that perhaps our
species is unique, then only can we begin to ask “how?” in the hopes that we can use this
uniqueness to aid our environmental pursuits. As the thinkers above, but particularly Leopold
and Berry, argue we are unique in our ability to feel affection for all members of the biotic
community. This ability rests on our human capacity to act within our human scale. Recall the
example from Leopold and the shooting of the wolf.
In short in order to recognize the other members of the biotic community as community
members, we must first see those members of our own species as members of our community not
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as individuals that can be sacrificed for the good of the whole.189 However this capability as
argued by Berry, rests on our ability to act or think affectionately towards others. This further
requires that we do not exceed our limitations in knowing and interactions for in doing so we do
reduce humanity to consumers or degrade some aspect of our species. This degradation is
excellently illustrated in Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner.
The problem lies with our inability to find community with anyone, not just those outside
our human community, as a result of the denial of some aspect of our species we do not find
community with anyone, human or otherwise. It rests on an autonomous use-valuing of our
human species, instead of a communitarian ethics. Instead of being anthropocentric the practice
of this type of ethics might more accurately be described as solipsistic or self-centred.
Coleridge’s anthropology offers insight into the problem and the central defining feature of
humanity as our ability to love. As Christopher Dinkel states in reference to the Coleridge’s
anthropology:
“The mariner’s curse is brought about by his killing the albatross,
and his salvation is initiated by his learning to love the sea-snakes
that had so revolted him. . . . In the poem, the mariner forfeits his
humanness in his senseless killing of the albatross. In effect, the
mariner has become imbruted. The act of killing the albatross
indicates the Mariner’s fragmented humanness. This loveless act
moves the Mariner into a world devoid of love and even the

189

Perhaps it is possible to act ethically towards other species in the biotic community without recognizing the
closeness of our own species, however, the way that this is presented by the radical ecologists is unconvincing and
for my own part, I remain skeptical towards this possibility.

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capacity to love. Whatever he had been before, he has further
degraded whatever humanity he had.”190
This interpretation of Coleridge’s portrayal of the fall of the Mariner is analogous to the problem
of the post-Enlightenment ethics showing the inability to recognize those with whom we are (or
ought to be) in community with and encounter them with a genuine expression of care.
The radical ecology movement suggests that we see other species and members of the
biotic community as community. In doing so, however, they request that we see those closest to
our community with less value; citing anthropocentrism as the root of the ecological crisis
humans are “justifiably” condemned. However it is not that case that anthropocentrism is the
cause of the problem. Indeed if the ethics “justifying” ecological abuse were actually
anthropocentric, the poor, indeed all persons, would be of central concern as well. If this were the
case, then the economy could not run on the exploitation of the poor or developing countries. If
that were the case, then there would not be such an exploitation of the nonhuman world because,
as Rolston argues we do need urban, rural, and wilderness landscapes for human well-being. It is
the “justification” of exploitation that is the problem. The exploitation is not limited to nature or
women or the nonhuman, but it includes an exploitation of all of the poor and of human nature in
general. Our capacity for consumption and greed are great – these characteristics are exploited
even by ourselves and the other elements of our beings over looked – thus “justifying” our
actions as consumers and exploiters.
The deep ecology movement offers invaluable insight into the encounter with others in
the nonhuman community, emphasizing that beings are not reducible to their use value to

190

Christopher Dinkel, “Coleridge the Rime, and the Image of God: Humanness as Communion with Creator,” The
Friends of Coleridge, New Series 34, Winter 2009,
http://www.friendsofcoleridge.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6&Itemid=29, 42-44.

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humans but to be respected in their own right. While their criticism of human actions is astute,
the radical ecology movement over-corrects and ends up reducing the value of the human species
and rejecting the necessity of recognizing the closeness of our human community. It disregards
the unique ability of our species to feel affection and moral responsibility to others. However,
this ability is something that cannot be extended to the members of the biotic community unless
we learn it first from members of our own species as it is a skill or habit developed and
cultivated in relationship with persons, places, and other species.
B. Re-adjustment to Holistic Environmental Ethics
A similar shift in focus with regards to humanity is necessary for the holistic
environmental ethics to be plausible as well. J. Baird Callicott insightfully describes the
immorality of our human actions as the result of the scale of the widespread misuse, abuse, and
subjugation of the other members of the biotic community. However, he then in turn, offers the
Humean ethical creed as the solution. His criticism is astute and completely accurate however
the solution perhaps does not get far enough to the heart of the issue. Callicott’s argument that
the problem with human interference on the rest of the nonhuman world is the large scale with
which it is done, that it is done on a scale that surpasses our natural human needs, however as the
solution he dismisses the human scale in his correction and goes to the concepts of adaptability
and natural selection for the source of the solution. In essence, he identifies the scale as the
problem but then does not consider the possibility of a realistic scale as the solution. While the
evidence for evolution is incredibly compelling, it is not necessary that we take mindless
adaptability with the fact/value distinction as the foundation for ethics. Incorporating the thought
of Medawar, since, abduction is prior to inductive falsifiability in the scientific method – an
ability which implies and entails a specifically human way of knowing and ability to see unity
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and portray creativity – then would it not also be likely that any ethical creed could rest upon this
foundation as well? This requires the acceptance that environmental ethics rests on a specifically
and uniquely human capability. But the crux of the problem, especially with Callicott, is that he
presents the division of facts and values and tries to argue from the “is” to the “ought.” However,
the initial step in the way that we discover scientific knowledge begins with our ability to
already think and to know in a manner that is ontologically prior to induction in the scientific
method. In acknowledging this point, it is not simply to restate Kant’s critique of Hume or to
adopt a Kantian model.
Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals rests on concepts and distinctions made
in his Critique of Pure Reason; central to these are his noumenon/phenomenon distinction and
his synthetic/analytic distinction. With the noumenon/phenomenon distinction in particular, Kant
argues that we cannot know the material world and that we, the rational animal, are distinct
because of our ability to reason. Furthermore, because the noumenon (thinking beings) and the
phenomenon (the rest of the empirical world) are substantially different, we can never know (in a
scientific way) other noumenon, but can only “think” them.191 Because of this distinction, Kant
facilitates a further separation of the mind and body, creating a greater divide between humans
and other species. Because of the division of Kantian epistemology, I do not wish to suggest that
by beginning with the human capacity of abduction and are specifically human way of knowing
that we should follow a Kantian model.192 Instead of focusing on the a priori, we can simply
acknowledge the unique ability that we have as a species to think creatively and give and abstract
191

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007,
268-269.
192
There are other reasons that a Kantian epistemology is unconvincing as well, specifically with regard to his
assertion that we cannot make knowledge claims about statements of fact, but only how we perceive things.
Drawing on our abilities to inquire and reflect, Bernard Lonergan offers a convincing refutation of Kant’s
epistemology in his work: Insight: A Study into Human Understanding, New York: Harper and Row Publishing Inc.,
1978, 341-342.

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meaning. Applying the concepts of the our species as outlines by Rackham and Medawar above,
this does not require a separation of our species from the rest of the biotic community in a
Cartesian or Kantian manner, but it does allow for a different beginning place for a plausible
environmental ethic. Instead of beginning with pure reason, or with the Darwinian model alone,
claiming our homogeneity with other species, we begin with our embodied but unique abilities.
By beginning with our embodied unique abilities we are still in accordance with the evolutionary
theory. In doing so, we do not have to underwrite or apologise for our capacities, nor does it
require that we consider ourselves to be completely set apart from the rest of the nonhuman
world. However, it does allow for a genuine place of beginning, as Berthold-Bond would argue:
an acknowledgement of our subjectivity as the foundation for place-making capacities.
Although the adjustment to holistic environmental ethics rests on the recognition of the
importance of humanity, this does not mean that we do not have a responsibility to act ethically
towards the rest of the biotic community. However, it should be acknowledged that our ability to
recognize that we are in community to the other members of the biosphere is through our unique
ability to think creatively – a capability which also does set us apart from the rest of the biotic
community (or at least as far as we know at this point). Ontologically speaking the ability to see
unity and think abductively is prior to the know ability of scientific theories. Because of this
ontological priority, the uniqueness of humanity should be applied to an ethical creed, if it is
using evolutionary theory as the foundation for ethics. If one is appealing to the scientific method
as the justification for ethics then one ought to recognize the first step in the method.
Conclusion
It is popular and easy to blame anthropocentrism as the reason for the environmental crises that
we face today. And while it is clear that addressing a specific human greed and particular set of
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the human species – it is not clear that it is anthropocentrism properly speaking that is the
problem. Assuming that morality is a benefit to the human life and we are considering needs
beyond just the material and we are including the poor as members of the humanity then a true
anthropocentrism would entail ethical actions towards the rest of the biotic community. Our
current consumer driven, industrial production of unnecessary goods, can only be maintained on
the backs of exploited labour, which appears to be anti-human or egocentric as opposed to
anthropocentric. Thus contrary to the predominant claims that our ethics are anthropocentric,
they appear to be inherently anti-human.
Genuine anthropocentrism is not the creed that justifies the exploitation of the nonhuman
world, but anti-humanism under the guise of meeting human needs is the root of the problem.
Even in claiming that the problem is anthropocentrism perpetuates the myth that humanity is not
more than the sum of its parts – that very issue that environmental philosophy is trying to resolve
with respect to the rest of the nonhuman world. Thus to claim that a natural species, resulting as
the evidence would suggest from evolutionary processes, already assumes the reduction of
humanity to its chemical or mechanistic parts – an application of Cartesian and Baconian
thinking in the effort to solving the problems that result from Cartesian-Baconian distillations.
As a beginning point for a logically coherent and plausible environmental ethic, we must
develop a human-scaled method of acting and knowing. This beginning place further requires
that we act ethically towards members of our own species, in a manner that the Radical
Ecologists and Holistic Environmental Ethicists do not call for us to do. They claim that we must
learn to cultivate and ethics of care for the biotic community and at the same time dismiss those
who are closest in our community. These claims contain logical inconsistencies and do not offer
a plausible solution. While the scope of this paper will not allow for the step-by-step break down
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of what creating a culture of care with a true anthropocentric concern would look like, a genuine
anthropocentrism must not be dismissed because of the abuses of a “so-called” anthropocentric
creed.

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Conclusion
While anthropocentric ethical frameworks provide an easy scapegoat for the current
ecological problems we face, in reality the problem is not quite so simple. The Radical Ecology
movement and the Holistic Environmental Ethics movements each blame anthropocentrism as
the source of the widespread abuse of the nonhuman world, whereas it is a certain interpretation
of humans as simply consumers or users that is the problem. This view is an oversimplification
and even abuse of who we are as humans. Both of these movements provide accurate and
insightful critiques of philosophical frameworks and historical events that have led to the
problems that we currently face. However, each requires that a shift regarding our understanding
of humanity be made in order to lend logical coherence and plausibility of application.
The Radical Ecology approach primarily requires that we acknowledge that the human
species should be given special consideration in order to maintain that we are uniquely capable
of causing harm. Once this is acknowledged we can then ask why or in what ways we are unique.
With these questions we can begin to consider practical and human approaches to solving
ecological problems, recalling the abilities and embodied methods of our species. Likewise, the
Holistic Environmental Ethics approach also is too hasty in dismissing elements of the human
species. This method is more consistent with the evolutionary theory and scientific method
which adds to the plausibility and verifiability of this ethical creed. However, the foundation of
ethics should not be empirical verifiability but instead should rest on a philosophical claim;
doing so requires that we acknowledge the human-infused elements of knowledge that
accompany our philosophical inquiries. The emphasis of the goodness of human action and the
immorality of the vast scale of the destruction are invaluable contributions to establishing a
coherent and plausible environmental ethic.
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It is important to acknowledge the uniqueness of the human species in order to develop a
plausible and logically coherent environmental ethic. The first step in a practical application or
development of this ethic is to adopt a genuine human scale, embracing our physicality and the
method of knowing and the human affection that comes from this human scale, which includes
adopting many of the earlier philosophical insights that have been dismissed by many modern
environmental philosophical systems, often without any argument or rationale. This paper
provides arguments that show the necessity of the human scale be included as a premise in
establishing a practical and logical environmental solution. What ethical creed this human-scaled
value system should follow remains to be established. How to implicate this approach on a
practical level working within the existing elements of our society and culture also needs to be
established. The step-by-step philosophical foundation and the practical applications require
further thought. To reiterate, first we must recognise our place within the biotic community, then
embrace our physical humanity, to work towards a moral, logical, and affectionate manner of
engaging with the nonhuman world.

104

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