Inferentialist reliabilism and proper functionalism : a comparative analysis as defenses of externalism

The specific question this thesis aims to answer is this: does Jack Lyons' inferentialist reliabilism or Alvin Plantinga's proper functionalism provide a more plausible defence of externalism? This thesis compares inferentialist reliabilism and proper functionalism as external epistemic theories and evaluates them on how plausibly they answer the main objections that have been raised against externalism. This thesis begins by outlining these objections: The Generality Problem, the New Evil Demon Problem, and the Clairvoyance and Mr. Truetemp Objections. I list and defend the criteria that each theory must meet in order to provide successful solutions to these objections. Next I evaluate Lyons' and Plantinga's responses to the objections and which criteria they meet in solving the objections. Finally, I conclude after a comparison of the solutions Lyons and Plantinga give to the objections that inferentialist reliabilism provides a more plausible defence of externalism than proper functionalism does.